



**Confronting Barbary:
Reappraising the Responses of Britons to
Engagement with Moroccans, and their Influence
on Anglo-Moroccan Relations, 1625–1684**

Rickie Lette, BSc, BA (Hons)

**Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

University of Tasmania

September 2018

Declaration of Originality

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

7 September 2018

Authority of Access

This thesis is not to be made available for loan or copying for two years following the date this statement was signed. Following that time, the thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

7 September 2018

Acknowledgements

The past six and half years of undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate studies have been an incredible journey for me. It has been challenging at times for a variety of reasons, but it has also been extremely satisfying, made easier and more enjoyable by the support of many people to whom I owe debts of gratitude.

As a mature age student, the friendships I quickly developed with other students have been invaluable in helping me reintegrate into university life. In particular, I wish to thank David Huf, Imogen Wegman, Evan Pitt, and Audrey Peyper, who not only befriended me and provided me with advice and support in my early days as a postgraduate, but also stimulated my thinking on topics ranging from the inane to the profound.

There have also been many lecturers and tutors at UTAS who not only have assisted my learning, but have also inspired me. Chief among these are my supervisors, Gavin Daly and Michael Bennett. They allowed me to make this project my own, but patiently and carefully guided me in the development of my topic, and in researching and writing this thesis, helping me avoid the pitfalls of my own ignorance and ambitions. However, whatever deficiencies there are in this document, are to my own account. Elizabeth Freeman has also been an important mentor over a number of years, who as well as supporting my academic development, also instilled in me the confidence to publish at an early stage.

Having the opportunity to return to tertiary study and pursue a long-held dream is an incredible privilege, for which I owe my wife, Caroline Wells, the greatest thanks of all. She has provided unwavering support and encouragement, despite all the other demands which have been placed on her. She has been both a rock in troubled times and a source of inspiration, and this thesis is dedicated to her as some compensation for everything that she has done to assist me in its production.

Given that so much of my work relied on accessing original archival sources, I am very grateful for the assistance which was provided to me by the staff at the The National Archives, British Library, and Bodleian Library during my visits, and I retain very fond memories of the time I spent at each. Having not wished to burden my friends and colleagues with responsibility for the onerous task, I would also like to express my gratitude to Sheelagh Wegman for her professionalism and enthusiasm in proof-reading the final drafts of this thesis.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the financial support I have received from the award at the commencement of my candidature of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship, which made my decision to continue my studies that much easier.

Preface

Every doctoral thesis has a back story of how it came into existence, the events which led the candidate to a particular topic that was both academically significant, and of sufficient personal interest for them to devote the next few years of their life to intensively researching, and writing about, it. My own story began in early 2015. I was keen to continue to pursue my interest in Christian-Muslim relations and one of my prospective supervisors, Professor Michael Bennett, suggested I have a look at issues relating to Christian captivity in the Mediterranean in the early modern period. What I found was that while captivity had begun to attract increasing academic and popular attention over recent years, little attention had been given to how Britons had dealt with ethnological and religious differences in their actual physical interactions with the regimes and the peoples of North Africa during this period. The idea appealed to me because not long before I had had my own encounters with this region, the memories of which were still quite vivid.

In early November 2008, my wife and I were in Ceuta about to begin a motorcycle tour of Morocco. It was a cold, wet, and generally miserable day. Our departure had been long delayed by a problem with the paperwork for our group, and by the time we left the border it was late afternoon with hours of riding ahead of us. The poor condition of the roads along the 'scenic route' selected by our guides, the rain, the gathering darkness, and the speed at which we were forced to travel unnerved me, and I felt a great sense of relief to finally arrive at our *riad* in Chefchaouen, but only after having negotiated the city's chaotic traffic. My first day in Morocco was defined not by excitement, but rather by fear, and I began the second day with a sense of real trepidation. Nevertheless, as the days passed, I found myself relaxing, becoming less critical, and more receptive to what I found to be new and different. But although there were occasions of genuinely friendly engagement with the local people, I remained somewhat guarded in my encounters; influenced by preconceptions and lacking both an ability to freely converse and sufficient cultural understanding, I found myself feeling uncertain, suspicious of their motives and intentions.

However, the trip was a sufficiently positive experience overall that my wife and I again travelled to Morocco in 2011. On this occasion there was no travel group or guides, and we decided to spend most of our time residing in one place, Fez El Bali, the medina of Old Fez. The medina at first felt threatening; a maze of dark and foreboding alleyways, and populated with people who continued to cling to more traditional ways of Moroccan life. Yet, apart from the staff of the *riad* at which we stayed, we were on our own, and this forced us to engage directly with Moroccans much more than we had before. We became known in the local shops and restaurants, started acquiring a little knowledge of the language and local customs, and began to venture further into the medina. But, ironically, it was the very same people that we had sought so much to avoid during our first visit, the *faux* guides and other touts, with whom we developed the closest relationships, and who became our most important cultural mediators. It was a different, and in some ways more enriching, experience from our first encounter for various reasons, not least because between our two trips we had overcome our initial culture shock and had started on the path of positive acculturation.

This study reappraises the attitudes and responses of Britons to Moroccans and Anglo-Moroccan relations in the early modern period and challenges some current interpretations of the influence that the encounter of Britons with North Africa at this time had on the development of British imperial development and self-identity. But for me it was more than an academic study; it was through examining the experiences of my forebears that I began to really understand my own encounter with Morocco over 330 years later.

Contents

List of Figures	iii
Notes	iv
Place and Personal Names, and Terms	iv
Conventions for Transcription of Quotations.....	iv
Dating Conventions	iv
Abbreviations	vi
Abstract	vii
Introduction	2
1. Encountering Barbary.....	37
1.1. Disorientation and Accommodation: England in the Mediterranean	38
1.2. Turmoil and Resistance in Morocco	56
1.3. Mutual Needs: The Beginnings of Anglo-Moroccan Relations	66
Conclusion	80
2. Imagining Barbary	83
2.1. The Roots of Anti-Islamic Prejudice and the Barbary Discourse	88
2.2. Inter-cultural Learning and the Development of New Perspectives	97
2.3. The (Disruptive) Influence of Theatre	113
Conclusion	121
3. Pragmatism (1625–1660)	125
3.1. The King’s Agent: Negotiating National Interest and Personal Belief...	127
3.2. Competing Agendas, Different Understandings	145
3.3. Convenient Alliances: The Siege of Salé and the Promise of Peace	150
3.4. Practical Opportunism: Working within a Fractured Polity.....	159
3.5. Needs Must: Finding Common Ground for a New Rapprochement.....	167
Conclusion	170
4. Aspiration (1661–1666).....	175
4.1. A Divisive Issue: The Birth of English Tangier	178
4.2. Entrepôt or Bridgehead to Empire?	186
4.3. Promising Developments.....	201
4.4. Learning to Respect the Enemy	208
4.5. Imperatives for Peace.....	220

Conclusion	228
5. Hope (1667–1677).....	232
5.1. Reconciling Honour and Expediency	234
5.2. Time for some Housekeeping: Developing Tangier	242
5.3. A Reluctant Envoy: Extremes of Acculturation	248
5.4. Profound Learnings: Morocco as a Conceptual Model	262
5.5. Looking beyond the Walls.....	268
Conclusion	285
6. Despair, Crises, and Resignation (1678–1684)	290
6.1. Tangier under Siege	292
6.2. Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Local Responses.....	309
6.3. Diplomacy, Personal Encounters, and Ambivalent Friendships	319
6.4. A Price too High: The Final Days of English Tangier	339
Conclusion	350
Conclusion.....	354
Bibliography	366

List of Figures

1. *The West Part of Barbary Containing Fez, Marocco, Algiers and Tunis* [and part of Tripoli], by Herman Moll, 1732. Taken from Moll's *Atlas Minor*, third edition of 1736? From a copy of the map held by the author.
2. *Mediterranean Sea ... its Principall Parts or Seas*, by William Berry, 1685. Library of Congress, <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g5672m.ct000228>. Based on *La Mer Mediterrane'e divisee en ses Principales Parties, ou Mers* by Nicolas Sanson.
3. *Map of the Kingdoms of Morocco, Fez, etc.*, from John Braithwaite, *The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco, Upon the Death of the Late Emperor Muley Ishmael* (London, 1729: reprinted 1969).
4. 'Abd el-Ouahed ben Messaoud ben Mohammed Anoun, Moorish Ambassador to Queen Elizabeth I', by an unknown artist, 1600. Pictures from History/Bridgeman Images, © Bridgeman Images.
5. Frontispiece of *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, by G. Glover, 1637.
6. 'Mohammed Ohadu, the Moroccan Ambassador to Charles II', by Sir Godfrey Kneller and Jan Wyck, 1684. English Heritage Photo Library, © Historic England.
7. Contemporary plan of English Tangier showing its defences and the disposition of English and Moroccan forces on 27 October 1680, from E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912), opposite p. 194. Original source not identified.

Notes

Place and Personal Names, and Terms

Place and personal names are problematic for this study in that names attributed to places and people, and their spelling, vary, sometimes considerably, between contemporary sources. Furthermore, there is variation between modern Arabic or Arabised forms of place names and European adaptations by which they are widely known. I have attempted to identify and use place names which are likely to be the most familiar to the English speaking reader. The names of Britons have been standardised, where possible, with reference to those used in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Transliterated Arabic and Berber place names, personal names, titles, and other words have been standardised to simplified forms that appears to be of generally common usage in the literature, with any significant variations identified in the footnotes.

Conventions for Transcription of Quotations

In quotations taken directly from primary sources, capitalisation has been modernised, but the original spelling and punctuation have been maintained. The following letter forms have been modernised where necessary: u (v), vv (w), i (j) and the long s. Italics have not been preserved. Abbreviated words are rendered in full. Obsolete terms have been clarified in a footnote where this appeared to be helpful. Consistent with the general treatment of quotations, the original spelling of place and personal names has been retained, but more familiar forms and spellings are provided in square brackets following their first occurrence in a chapter.

Dating Conventions

The 'Old Style' (OS) Julian calendar was still in official use in seventeenth-century England and Ireland, but not Scotland. Under this system dates were ten days behind the 'New Style' (NS) Gregorian calendar used throughout much of the rest of Europe at this time, and due to tradition the new year began on Lady Day, 25 March.

However, contemporary English sources may use one or the other, or a combination of both styles; when not otherwise clear it has been assumed that the given date is in the Old Style. Nevertheless, it was common to give the year in both styles, e.g. 30 January 1661/2, and occasionally the day, e.g. 17/27 October 1680.

All year-dates provided in the discursive sections of this thesis are presented in the New Style, although those appearing in quotations have been retained in their original form, followed by '[OS]', as necessary. Otherwise dating is based on the Julian calendar to maintain consistency with the original sources and much of the scholarly literature, with any exceptions noted. Arabic dates, where quoted, are followed by their Julian equivalent in square brackets.

Abbreviations

Add.	Additional [manuscripts]
BL	British Library, London
Bodl.	Bodleian Library, Oxford
BHO	British History Online
CO	Colonial Office
<i>CSPD</i>	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series</i>
<i>Dartmouth MSS</i>	<i>The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth</i>
EEBO	Early English Books Online
Harl.	Harley [manuscripts]
<i>Heathcote MSS</i>	<i>The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq., Conington Castle</i>
Lans.	Lansdowne [manuscripts]
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
<i>OHBE</i>	<i>The Oxford History of the British Empire</i>
Rawl.	Rawlinson [manuscripts]
<i>SIHMA</i>	<i>Les Sources Inédites de L'Histoire de Maroc. Première Série — Dynastie Saadienne: Archives et Bibliothèques D'Angleterre</i> ¹
SP	State Papers
TNA	The National Archives, Kew, Richmond

¹ In total, there are twenty-four volumes of *Les Sources Inédites de L'Histoire du Maroc*, all published in Paris between 1905 and 1960 in sets based on the country from whose archives the documents they contain were sourced.

Abstract

Britons began regularly voyaging to Morocco, or West Barbary as it was commonly known, from the early 1550s, and within a few decades England had not only developed an extensive trade with the country, but also close political relations; as a result, the histories of Morocco and England became closely tied until the late seventeenth century. While diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries have been relatively well, but not extensively, studied, understanding of the situation of Morocco within British history has been overshadowed by the predominance of scholarship which has focussed on relations from the more limited perspectives of the threat posed to English shipping and coastal communities around the British Isles from 'Barbary' corsairs, Christian captivity, and the hostile encounters which marked the English occupation of Tangier. However, it is contended that when this relationship is re-examined from a more holistic perspective by combining elements usually treated in isolation, together with close attention to the impact of experiential engagement — an aspect which has received little detailed attention outside of captivity narratives — new perspectives on Anglo-Moroccan relations are revealed. Only then is it possible to properly evaluate the meaning of Morocco to early modern Britons and British history.

This thesis examines the impact that direct contact with Morocco and Moroccans had on the attitudes and actions of early modern Britons concerning them. It seeks to identify the psychological responses which experiential engagement elicited, and the circumstantial and personal factors which contributed to the different reactions of individuals. Furthermore, rather than simply regarding English policies concerning Morocco as contingent factors, this study attempts to understand the extent to which personal responses elicited by, and the knowledge Britons acquired through, direct experience actually helped shape diplomatic and commercial relations. By doing so, it shows that the encounter of Britons with Morocco between 1625 and 1684 was both a humbling and enlightening experience for them. There was no general turn to increasing prejudice and antipathy against the people associated with a desire to

dominate them and expand England's nascent empire, as has been argued by other scholars. Instead, the thesis demonstrates that early modern Britons not only possessed a well-developed capacity to consciously accommodate cultural difference in furthering their interests, but some were also susceptible to subconscious processes of positive acculturation in their encounters with other peoples. Moreover, the behaviour of Britons in Morocco was more likely to be based on pragmatism and cultural self-consciousness, than driven by incipient imperial and colonial aspiration.



Fig. 1 A map of Barbary showing Fez, Marocco, Algiers and Tunis [and part of Tripoli], by Herman Moll, 1732.

Introduction

But we have never sent any to understand their country, to search into their strength and dependancies, to examine their interest, their inclinations, and those other things which we might improve to the advantage of Tangier. (Anonymous, Tangier, c.1675/76)¹

The statement quoted above is from a tract by an English author that was appended to a related work, and published in London in 1680. The authors of both texts were writing in support of the retention and development of the small English colony of Tangier, located adjacent to the Strait of Gibraltar on the coast of Morocco. The English had been in possession of Tangier since 1662, and drawn by opportunities for trade and privateering had been increasingly frequent visitors to the Mediterranean from 1511, and to the Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa from around 1551,² with growing levels of both commercial and diplomatic contact occurring from those dates. Given this extended period of interaction, is it really conceivable that the English had learnt so little about the country that such a claim could be justified? And, if so, what does this reveal to us about their encounters? This thesis seeks to answer these questions, and more broadly reappraise the experience of Britons in early modern Morocco, part of an area known to them as Barbary, by examining how they engaged with this land and its people, and how they were affected, if at all, by the experience.

To the Arabs, the area which roughly encompasses the modern-day states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (see fig. 1), and whose peoples shared similar ethno-

¹ *The Present Interest of Tangier* (London, 1679), p. 4. Date and place of publication are as attributed in the British Library catalogue. Karim Bejjit surmises that the original text was probably written in late 1675 or early 1676. See Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance*, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), p. 147. Bejjit provides a transcription of the text on pp. 147–152.

² Richard Hakluyt provides references to some of the earliest English voyages to the Mediterranean and Barbary, and associated dealings in the region in *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 3 vols. (London, 1599–1600). See also Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols, vol. 1 (London, 1972), pp. 612–615. See pp. 96, 319–[320] of the second volume for details of the first English voyages to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Braudel dates the first English trading voyage to Morocco to the 1540s, but T. S. Willan asserts that there is no clear evidence of earlier voyages. See T. S. Willan, *Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade* (Manchester, 1959), pp. 93–94.

linguistic identity, cultural traditions and religious institutions,³ was traditionally known as the Maghrib, the 'Land of Sunset'.⁴ But the toponym 'Barbary' adopted by early modern Britons to denote the area appears to have originated from the Arabic adjective, *barbarī*, meaning primitive and foreign, derived in turn from the Latin name for the indigenous people of the area, the Berbers.⁵ The conflation of the term's pejorative meaning and its use as a geographic identifier by Britons is evident in the following extract from John Ogilby's book on Africa published in 1670:

The Arabians, according to the testimony of Ibnu Alrauiq, have given to this countrey, by Marmol call'd Berbery, the name of Ber, that is, desert or wilderness: from whence the inhabitants themselves were afterwards Bereberes. But others will have it so nam'd by the Romans, who having subdued some parts of Africa, this part lying opposite to them, they call'd Barbary, because they found the inhabitants altogether bestial and barbarous: nor is it improbable, considering it is usual to call such as lead a wilde and ungovern'd life, and not civiliz'd by education, Barbarians.⁶

According to Lotfi Ben Rejeb, between the 1490s and the late nineteenth century, the association of North Africa with barbarism became the 'principal frame or prism through which Europeans looked at North Africa', and the basis of a general discourse that emphasised the region as a site of piracy, slavery, and hostility to Christendom, and the antithesis of European civilisation.⁷ That may be so, but as will be shown, it

³ Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 4; Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 3.

⁴ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 1. An alternative spelling is 'Maghreb'.

⁵ The term 'Berber' itself is derived from the Latin word *barbari*, which the Romans applied to peoples who could not speak either Latin or Greek. See the discussion on the derivation of these terms in *ibid.*, p. 2. Godfrey Fisher comments on the imprecise nature of the area encompassed by the term in the early modern period. It could vary from the area roughly equivalent to North Africa, excluding Egypt, or only to the area which included the three Moroccan kingdoms of Fes, Morocco, and Sus. Similarly, the Barbary coast could refer to the Mediterranean coast from Ceuta to Tripoli, or the Atlantic coast of Morocco. See Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 17–18. On issues relating to geographical terminology for the area and its significance, see also Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, 1977), pp. 7–9; Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514–1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization', *Dialectical Anthropology*, 6 (1982), p. 345.

⁶ John Ogilby, *Africa: Being an Accurate Description of the Regions of Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia, and Billedulgerid ...* (London, 1670), p. 146. The book is, in fact, based on a translation of a work, *Description of Africa*, by the Dutch geographer Olfert Dapper, first published in 1668, but with some original additions by Ogilby.

⁷ Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'The General Belief of the World': Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean History', *European Review of History*, 19 (2012), pp. 15–16. On this argument, see also Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary's "Character"', pp. 345–355. Like Ben Rejeb, scholars commonly use Barbary and North Africa as synonymous toponyms. While this is not strictly incorrect, as there is no single accepted definition,

was not the only one: other conceptions coexisted with it, informed by different experiences and understandings of the region. This was particularly the case with Morocco, or West Barbary, a place with a rich history, and geographic and cultural diversity, with which Britons of diverse positions, backgrounds, and dispositions had a wider variety of interactions over a more extended period than in any other area within North Africa during the period.

It is for this reason it is not only difficult to understand the apparent lack of contemporary English interest in learning about Morocco implied in the unknown author's statement, but also the relative lack of enquiry by historians for much of the twentieth century concerning the role which Barbary and the wider Mediterranean basin played in British commercial and imperial expansion in the early modern period. Other historians have also commented on this neglect,⁸ and the omission is thrown into stark relief by the absence of any specific chapter on either North Africa or the Mediterranean region, and a general paucity of information concerning them, in the most recent authoritative survey of the development of the British Empire, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*.⁹

Nevertheless, the Mediterranean, and North Africa in particular, did continue to engage Britons long after the abandonment of Tangier, with tales of 'Barbary Pirates', of their countrymen taken captive and enslaved by them, and those who 'turn'd Turke' or 'turn'd Moor' by converting to Islam and becoming renegades.¹⁰ And the

both Egypt and Sudan are now commonly considered to be part of North Africa. The area generally associated with Barbary could more precisely be referred to as Northwest Africa, but in the interests of consistency with the general literature, it is referred to as North Africa in this study.

⁸ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), p. 17; Kenneth Parker, 'Reading 'Barbary' in Early Modern England, 1550–1685', *The Seventeenth Century*, 19 (2004), pp. 88–89; Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard University, 2012), pp. 1–3.

⁹ Wm. Roger Louis, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1998–9). Refer to volumes I and V in particular. The scant attention given to Tangier specifically is also highlighted by Colley in *Captives*, p. 33, and Tristan Stein in 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), p. 985. There was also a notable lack of references to either English and later British experience in the Mediterranean in the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich when the present author visited there in 2016.

¹⁰ Colley identified fifteen prose Mediterranean captivity narratives with significant autobiographical component by Britons and Americans which were published in Britain between 1700 and 1886, many with several editions. See *Captives*, pp. 380–382. For historical works on the subject, see, for example, Joseph Morgan, *A Compleat History of the Piractical States of Barbary ... By a Gentleman Who Resided*

appeal of these subjects remains evident. Over the past few decades there has been a surge of attention given by scholars and other writers to both piracy¹¹ and European captivity in the Mediterranean, a subject discussed later in this introduction. This phenomenon is partly explainable by interest in “white slavery” in the Mediterranean and its relationship with “black slavery” in the Atlantic during the period, and has also, undoubtedly, been encouraged by continuing interest in piracy in popular culture.¹² Gordon Sayre has also observed that interest in accounts of European captivity has been inspired by ‘geopolitical events’ since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001.¹³ However, the result has been a perpetuation of perceptions of Islamic polities as traditional sites of moral transgression and antipathy to Western Civilisation.

The neglect of the Mediterranean in the historiography of the early modern development of the British Empire is remarkable given the importance attributed to it by contemporary commentators as a locus of English trade and imperial aspiration. Charles II certainly had high expectations following his acquisition of Tangier in 1661, as he made clear in his instructions to the first English governor of the settlement,

there Many Years in a Public Character (London, 1750); R. L. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers Prior to the French Conquest* (London, 1884); and Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Barbary Corsairs*, 4 ed. (London, 1890).

¹¹ Much of this activity in the Mediterranean was, in fact, undertaken by privateers, both Muslim and Christian whose activities were sanctioned by various states and other polities.

¹² Examples include Peter Earle, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary* (London, 1970); Christopher Lloyd, *English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast* (London, 1981); Paul Baepler, ed., *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives* (Chicago, 1999); Joe Snader, *Caught Between Worlds: British Captivity Narratives in Fact and Fiction* (Lexington, KY, 2000); Daniel J. Vitkus and Nabil Matar, eds., *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England* (New York, 2001); Colley, *Captives*; Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800* (New York, 2003); Daniel Panzac, *The Barbary Corsairs: The End of the Legend, 1800–1820*, trans. Victoria Hobson and John E. Hawkes (Leiden, 2005); Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates. To the Shores of Tripoli: The Rise of the US Navy and Marines* (Oxford, 2006); Des Ekin, *The Stolen Village: Baltimore and the Barbary Pirates* (Dublin, 2008); Adrian Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean* (London, 2010); Alan G. Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs* (London, 2012); Justin J. Meggitt, *Early Quakers and Islam: Slavery, Apocalyptic and Christian–Muslim Encounters in the Seventeenth Century* (Uppsala, 2013). For a critique of academic and popular writing on North African piracy and European captivity, see Nabil Matar, *British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–1760* (Leiden, 2014), pp. 1–3.

¹³ Gordon M. Sayre, ‘Renegades from Barbary: The Transnational Turn in Captivity Studies’, *American Literary History*, 22 (2010), p. 350.

the Earl of Peterborough, in which he states his goals were to not only to expand trade with North Africa, but also to extend his dominions into the Mediterranean.¹⁴ A decade and a half later the region's perceived worth was still such that it led one advocate to go so far as to claim that '[t]he trade of England into the Mediterranean, is equal, if not exceeding all other nations put together. Can anything then challenge a greater share in our esteem, than the means which insure this mighty benefit to us?'.¹⁵

However, around the beginning of the twentieth century the significance of this sea to British history began to be recognised by historians, though their interest in the subject appears to have been driven more by concerns associated with the present than the past. Notable among these scholars were Walter Frewen Lord, who wished to impart the lessons he thought could be learnt for the greater good of the empire from the loss of Tangier and Minorca, and other British 'possessions' elsewhere, and from the consequences of a lack of imperial policy in the Mediterranean; Sir Julian Corbett, who argued that British experience in the Mediterranean from the seventeenth century had been pivotal in Britain's development as an imperial power; and, Enid Routh, who, like Lord, bemoaned the lost opportunity that Tangier represented, both in 1684 and in her own time.¹⁶ As Tristan M. Stein has observed, the resurgence of interest in the Mediterranean at this time arose from a recognition of the strategic value of Britain's presence in the Mediterranean during a period of increased geopolitical tension among the European powers. However, while the

¹⁴ 'Instructions for the Earle of Peterburgh', 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 29r; BL, Harl. MS 1595, f. 11r; BL, Sloane MS 1956, f. 68v.

¹⁵ Henry Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger on these Heads, 1. The Service Tanger has Already Rendred the Crown. 2. What Service it May Render it, if Improv'd. 3. The Mischief it May Do Us, if Possess'd by any Other Powerful Prince. 4. Some General Observations Touching Trade. In a Letter to a Person of Quality* (London, 1680), p. 32. Authorship of this pamphlet is attributed to Sir Henry Sheres in the British Library Catalogue. Sheres (also spelled Sheeres and Shere) was the surveyor-general of the Tangier mole from 1676.

¹⁶ Walter Frewen Lord, *The Lost Possessions of England: Essays in Imperial History* (London, 1896); Walter Frewen Lord, *England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830* (London, 1901); Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2 vols. (London, 1904). Routh's earliest published work on Tangier was 'The English Occupation of Tangier (1661–1683)', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 19 (1905), with her ideas more fully developed in her later book, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912).

works of Lord, Corbett, and Routh were shaped by contemporary conditions rather than historical realities, as Stein notes, the authors did demonstrate an appreciation of the Mediterranean's significance to the early modern development of Britain which has only recently begun to be expanded upon by historians.¹⁷

Despite their anachronistic perspectives, these studies have been influential in subsequent scholarship relating to British activity in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and, indeed, remain valuable resources. However, as others have also observed, more problematically they are also part of a historiographical tradition, which also includes works such as R. L. Playfair's *The Scourge of Christendom* (1884) and Stanley Lane-Poole's *The Barbary Corsairs* (1890), which developed during the nineteenth century and is infused with a pervasive imperial mentality.¹⁸ While not exclusively a British phenomenon, it is characteristic of a late Victorian and Edwardian mindset which was informed by a belief in British cultural superiority and an associated sense of entitlement. It led to a historicised understanding of North Africa which was reductive, essentialising and prejudicial, which either ignored or marginalised the distinctive nature of local historical developments and the diverse nature of interactions and understandings which existed between North Africans and Europeans. Despite the decline of the British Empire over the course of the twentieth century, the interpretations provided by this earlier generation of historians — loaded as they are with Anglo-centric bias, colonial and imperial rhetoric, and at times sentimentality for a bygone age — have become deeply embedded in historical understanding and have all too often been insufficiently challenged and scrutinised,

¹⁷ Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 10–11. Stein does not include Lord within the scope of his remarks but his work was composed in a similar vein. The contemporary concerns which motivated both Corbett and Routh are made quite explicit by the authors. See Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), 2, p. 568; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 270–271. The motivations of Lord are less clearly stated, but can be deduced. See Lord, *Lost Possessions*, pp. v–vii, and *England and France*, pp. 3–5. On the intellectual and political context of Corbett's work, see the discussion on the subject in David Delison Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642* (Aldershot, UK, 1994), pp. 107–113.

¹⁸ See, in particular, Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 87–115; Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 40–42.

by present day scholars;¹⁹ their legacy is such that one historian, a century after Playfair, can still dismiss Salé as ‘that hornets’ nest’ and emphatically affirm the general untrustworthiness of the town’s Muslim corsairs;²⁰ another can draw an analogy between Muslim corsairs and modern terrorists, a parallel which may not be totally unjustified, but is as unhelpful in its simplicity and subjectivity as Playfair’s own assertion that the corsairs were the ‘scourge of Christendom’.²¹ It is a perspective perpetuated by over-reliance on the veracity of a self-reinforcing ‘rusty chain’ of citations along which the meaning of original sources is suffused with the language and mentality of another era.²²

However, around the middle of the last century, there emerged one notable exception who challenged the traditional historical perspective on Anglo-North African relations. Sir Godfrey Fisher, while not necessarily claiming a special role for North Africa in British history, did seek to highlight the diversity of political and economic relations which existed between England and North Africa from the Elizabethan period to the early nineteenth century, and in doing so challenge the traditional image of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli as being miscreant states.²³ Fisher’s revisionist and sympathetic perspective on Barbary’s Muslim corsairs was subject to a mixed reception from his peers, and even later historians remain unconvinced about some of his conclusions.²⁴ However, while Fisher may have overcompensated

¹⁹ For similar views on the subject, see those expressed by Parker, ‘Reading Barbary’, pp. 88, 93–94, 108; Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 42. On the influence of the colonial period on the interpretation of Maghribi history, see Laroui, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 3–6.

²⁰ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 168, 183.

²¹ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 46, 50–51. On Colley’s assertion, see also Parker, ‘Reading Barbary’, pp. 107–108.

²² Martin Elbl uses the phrase ‘[a] rusty chain of citation to citation’ in the context the historiography of the urban history of Tangier, but extension of the metaphor to British history in the Mediterranean and North Africa is apt. See Martin Malcolm Elbl, *Portuguese Tangier (1471–1662): Colonial Urban Fabric as Cross-Cultural Skeleton* (Peterborough, Canada, 2013), pp. 58, 61, 74. Quotation is from p. 58.

²³ Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, pp. 3–7.

²⁴ See, for example, Robert G. Albion, ‘Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830. Godfrey Fisher’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 31 (1959), pp. 131–132; M. S. Anderson, ‘Sir Godfrey Fisher’s Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1411–1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957)’, *The English Historical Review*, 74 (1959), pp. 724–726; V. J. Parry, ‘Sir Godfrey Fisher: Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 22 (1959), p. 404; F. B. Dowd, ‘Barbary Legend. Sir Godfrey Fisher. Oxford

in pursuing his argument, his work was a marked, and for some contemporaries a welcome, departure from existing scholarship; one which, undoubtedly, encouraged others to reconceptualise the history of North Africa, and European relations with, and attitudes toward, the region and its people.

Nevertheless, aside from its general interpretative deficiencies, the fact remains that until recently the body of work concerning the role played by the Mediterranean in British history has been relatively limited. The marginalisation of the early modern Mediterranean in the nation's history has been attributed to a long-held belief that the region's importance as a centre of political power and trade declined during the seventeenth century, with attention shifting to the imperial and commercial expansion of the states of Northwest Europe.²⁵ The importance of the Mediterranean has also been overlooked because of a traditional emphasis on a master narrative for the rise of the British Empire focussed on the Atlantic and concerned with the rise and loss of the American colonies.²⁶ A belief in the decline of the importance of the Mediterranean during the early modern period has been strongly influenced by the seminal work of Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, first published in 1949.²⁷ However, a new generation of

University Press', *African Affairs*, 57 (1958), pp. 79–80; David Delison Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, p. 12., n. 3.

²⁵ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 33–34; Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 8–10. Similarly, in terms of historical disengagement with the Ibero-African frontier in the Western Mediterranean, Andrew C. Hess argues that following Spain's disentanglement with Islam and North Africa on the Iberian Peninsula and the discovery of the New World at the end of the fifteen century, the attention of scholars turned to the Americas and Asia, the new system of economic relations they helped create, and the religious and dynastic conflicts that engulfed Europe. Braudel attributes the lack of attention given to developments in the sea in early modern Spanish history to the absence of major conflicts, so that 'other locations steal the limelight'. See Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 2010), pp. 7–9; Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1973), p. 1186.

²⁶ Colley, *Captives*, p. 33; Sari R. Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot, UK, 1991), p. 8.

²⁷ The original text was in French, and not available in English translation until 1972. Aside from providing a sweeping geographical and historical survey of the Mediterranean, Braudel's other undertaking in this work was 'to discover the collective destiny of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century'. See Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, II, p. 1240. In doing so, he draws attention to what he believes to have been an irreversible socio-economic decline in the region. While historians have at times emphasised suggestions in the body of the work of an earlier chronology for the commencement of this process, Braudel clearly asserts that it did not occur before 1620, and suggests the possibility of date as late as sometime between 1650 and 1680. See *ibid.*

historians is reappraising Braudel's assumptions regarding the waning of the influence of the Mediterranean, as well as its cultural unity, and the sea is now reclaiming a place in early modern British, European, and global history.²⁸

After a century of being sidelined in the narrative of British commercial and political expansion, over the past two decades the Mediterranean Sea has once again begun to attract the attention of scholars, who not only now acknowledge the continuity of its importance as a meeting place for competing states and cultures, and a centre for trade and commerce, but also the significant contribution it made to British culture, national identity, and imperial development during the early modern period.²⁹ Understanding the experience of Britons in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century is important, not only in terms of illuminating Britain's naval, political and economic history, but also to understanding the nation's social and cultural development. The historiography reveals that the Mediterranean, and in particular North Africa, provides fertile ground for new directions in research in this respect. Furthermore, as one scholar has observed, the Mediterranean is an 'excellent laboratory' in which to explore the issues of identity, cultures, and the interaction of individuals and groups under conditions of both peace and conflict.³⁰

²⁸ See, for example, Hess' reappraisal of Braudel's thesis of unity in the Mediterranean in *The Forgotten Frontier*; Molly Greene's revisionist perspective on Braudel's unity argument in *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2000) in which she emphasises the unique dynamic of the eastern Mediterranean, her reappraisal of the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century, in which she challenges the validity of Braudel's 'Northern Invasion' paradigm, in 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', *Past and Present*, 174 (2002), pp. 42–71, and her discussion of the marginalisation of the importance of the Mediterranean, and its commercial decline in 'The Early Modern Mediterranean', in Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014), pp. 91–106; as well as Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009), and Stein, 'The Mediterranean' in which they reposition the sea into England's commercial and political expansion in the early modern period. More expansive historical works concerning the Mediterranean which also confront Braudel's legacy include Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2002); W. V. Harris, ed., *Rethinking the Mediterranean* (Oxford, 2005); David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (Oxford, 2011).

²⁹ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 33–35; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. ix; Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 8, 13. However, the influence of engagement with the Islamic cultures of the Mediterranean region on developments in Elizabethan England has been recognised by some historians and literary scholars for some time. Most recently, this relationship has been examined by Jerry Brotton in *This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic World*, first published in 2016.

³⁰ Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, 2006), p. 2. Dursteler notes that while much of the important earlier work

Interestingly, among the first to reappraise the role of the Mediterranean in the shaping of British history were not cultural historians but rather literary scholars examining how depictions of Muslims in early modern English plays and literature reflected contemporary understanding of ethnic and racial difference. Much of this work is post-colonial in nature, informed by Edward Said's concept of a Western Orientalist discourse, and attempts to establish a connection between the construction of the cultural and ethnic Other and processes of conquest and empire building. According to such academics, negative conceptions of the people commonly referred to as 'Turks' and 'Moors' and other non-Europeans, established through popular discourse mediated through the stage and text, were influential in legitimising English, and later British, colonial and imperial expansion.³¹

Yet Said did not conceive of an institutionalised Orientalist discourse as existing before the late eighteenth century.³² The historian, David Armitage, in fact argues that the influence of notions of empire in English literature in the early modern period was minimal, and generally critical when it was apparent. He remarks that:

[R]ecent scholarship has found the literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth century to be deeply, because necessarily, inflected by the 'imperial' experiences of racial difference, irreducible 'otherness', assertions of hierarchy, and national self-determination. However, to apply modern models of the relationship between culture and

on the encounter of Europeans with other cultures has been situated in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, attention is now being given to the Mediterranean.

³¹ Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999), pp. 8–12. A. G. Hopkins comments on the general 'mass conversion of newcomers from literary studies' to colonial studies that occurred as a result of the influence of post-modernism. See A. G. Hopkins, 'Development of the Utopian Ideal, 1960–1999', in Robin W. Winks, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 648.

³² Said explains that 'Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it ruling it: in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'. See Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 2003), p. 3. On the limitations of the applicability of the concept of Orientalism to early modern English discourse, see, for example, Kenneth Parker, *Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology* (London, 1999), pp. 2–6, 28–29; Daniel J. Vitkus, *Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630* (New York, 2008), pp. 10–11; Robert Irwin, 'Introduction', *For Lust of Knowing. The Orientalists and their Enemies* (London, 2006). Kim M. Phillips provides an insightful critique of Orientalism and a chronology of its development in *Before Orientalism: Asian Peoples and Cultures in European Travel Writing, 1245–1510* (Philadelphia, 2014), chap. 1.

imperialism to early-modern literature and Empire demands indifference to context and inevitably courts anachronism.³³

That is not to say that literary studies do not correctly identify depictions which informed the development of common perceptions of the Muslim Other held by early modern Britons, but they have tended to exaggerate their impact. Nicholas Canny believes that such work 'has compounded the belief that English people were more blinkered than any other Europeans in the appraisal of alien cultures'.³⁴ Similarly, Stein observes that confusing statements of 'aspiration with the effective expression of imperial dominance' can subvert understanding of the actual role the Mediterranean played in England's political and commercial expansion.³⁵ Despite possessing such limitations Saidian notions of power and hegemony, and of colonial and imperial discourses, continue to inform the methodologies of studies of the contact of Britons with the region in the early modern period. However, as others have also observed, and I will similarly argue, such a focus can both limit and skew the way in which Britons are seen to have engaged with, and responded to events in, Morocco.

Literary scholars have also been influential in drawing attention to another aspect of the early modern Mediterranean which has, arguably, wider historical importance, and that is the phenomenon of Christian European captivity and enslavement by Muslim privateers — more generally referred to as 'corsairs' in the context of the Mediterranean — operating from the coast of North Africa between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Accounts left by the victims — so-called Barbary captivity narratives — provide a rich, but at times interpretively problematic, source of historic detail derived from the author's or the narrator's intimate, often traumatic, engagement with Barbary. Various attempts have been made to enumerate the number of Christian Europeans who were captured. One estimate is that at least one

³³ David Armitage, 'Literature and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 102. See also Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 3–5.

³⁴ Nicholas Canny, 'England's New World and the Old', in *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 148–149.

³⁵ Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 12–13. The confounding of ideas of empire with the reality of empire by literary scholars is addressed well by Vitkus in *Turning Turk*, esp. pp. 5–7.

million were taken from vessels and coastal areas of the Mediterranean, the British Isles, and as far north as Iceland between 1530 and 1780.³⁶ However, it has been argued that these figures are excessive,³⁷ and even the scholar who compiled them is circumspect about the reliability of the sources on which they are based.³⁸ But whatever the precise numbers, they were undoubtedly significant. Aside from inviting us to understand the meaning of individual experiences of capture and enslavement, the nature and scale of this phenomenon raises questions about the economic impact it had on European states and local communities, as well as about its wider social and cultural consequences.³⁹ For many Europeans Barbary was more than an imaginative construct, it was a lived reality, often involuntary, and experienced in a multiplicity of ways, a fact which problematises generalised interpretations of the impact of cultural encounter on European perception and self-identity.

The work of two scholars has been particularly influential on the subject of the impact of Barbary on early modern Britons and Britain, and will provide key points of reference and comparison for this study: Nabil Matar, who has been prolific in his studies of relations between early modern Britain, Western Europe, and the Islamic states of the Mediterranean, with his book *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (2005) of particular relevance to this thesis;⁴⁰ and, Linda Colley, through her reappraisal of the

³⁶ Robert C. Davis, 'Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast', *Past & Present* (2001), p. 118. Davis does not provide a breakdown of the figures by nationality, but Colley notes that between 1600 and the early 1640s North African corsairs captured in excess of 800 English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish vessels in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, taking perhaps as many as 12,000 English subjects, and a further 6,000 Britons may have been seized between 1660 and the 1730s. See *Captives*, pp. 43–44. Colley does not identify the source of her figures. David Delison Hebb in *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 136–140, 273, estimates that between 1616 to 1642 North African corsairs captured around 400 English vessels and more the 8,000 people from them. In *British Captives*, Matar provides listings of the names of captured Britons who he has identified, but despite indicating he intends to answer the question of the number of Britons seized in North Africa, he does not achieve this aim. While the listings he provides are a useful resource, for the reasons given in his extensive section on caveats they do not 'furnish the names of all captives', as claimed by the publisher.

³⁷ Matar, *British Captives*, pp. 9–11.

³⁸ Davis, 'Counting European Slaves', pp. 96–97, 118.

³⁹ Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 141–146, 157–170; Davis, 'Counting European Slaves', pp. 118–124; Sayre, 'Renegades from Barbary', pp. 349–356. Sayre provides a useful discussion on the critical use of the captivity narrative genre.

⁴⁰ *Britain and Barbary* was the third instalment in a trilogy which also includes *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge, 1998), and *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*.

rise of the British Empire in *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (2002). Their work has contributed to a growing corpus of scholarship which has challenged traditional historiography, and provided new perspectives on European engagement with the Mediterranean and North Africa.⁴¹ While both scholars emphasise the important influence that North Africa had on British self-identity and imperial development, their approaches and conclusions differ significantly.

Both authors use a similar range of primary source material but their respective emphases differ markedly. Like many of his literary *confrères* Matar adopts a framework centred on contemporary theatre. He relies heavily on elite views, those of the more notable personalities in English society of the period, including playwrights, many of whom had no direct experience of Barbary, to attempt to reconstruct popular contemporary images of Moors and North Africa, and to identify how they changed over time. However, Colley's principal sources are the experiences and accounts of some of the thousands of Britons captured by non-Europeans in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in the world, which she uses to examine and reassess traditional historical narratives of British imperial history.

Matar argues that the ascendancy of English military and naval power from the mid-seventeenth century completely changed the nature of British relations with, and perceptions of, the people of North Africa, leading to a 'paradigm shift' in the 'English imagination and British political and social self-identity'.⁴² According to Matar, before 1649 'Britons were fearful of the Moors' and 'the encounter with the Moors was precarious and dangerous', but during the second half of the seventeenth century, as

⁴¹ Aside from Godfrey Fisher, Andrew Hess, Molly Greene, and Tristan Stein whose contributions have already been acknowledged, other notable contributors to Anglophone scholarship in this area include Jack D'Amico, *The Moor in English Renaissance Drama* (Tampa, FL, 1991); Parker, *Early Modern Tales*; Jonathan Burton, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005); Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*; Vitkus, *Turning Turk*; Games, *The Web of Empire*. To this list should be added Charles-André Julien's influential *The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. From the Arab Conquest to 1830*, trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart (London, 1970), translated from French; the Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui's *History of the Maghrib*, also translated from French; and the more recent work of another Moroccan scholar, Karim Bejjit, who in *English Colonial Texts*, emphasises the political agency of the Moroccans in resisting the presence of the English in Tangier during the Restoration period.

⁴² Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 11.

a result of their maritime victories, 'Britons developed a sense of imperial glory and destiny', seeing their achievements as evidence of cultural superiority and Protestant righteousness.⁴³ Having lost Tangier, but subsequently achieving domination of the Mediterranean shores of North Africa, by 1689, the British 'lost not only their curiosity about the inhabitants, but also whatever capacity they had to integrate themselves into that world of non-Christians'. Matar claims that this change was so incisive that Britons no longer even appeared to be anxious about having been seized by Muslim corsairs.⁴⁴

More recently, Matar and Gerald MacLean have examined what Britons knew about Muslims, their lands, societies and religion, through exploring the ways in which encounters with Islamdom⁴⁵ were described by their fellow countrymen, and how their lives were influenced by this knowledge. Despite the authors' objective of 'focussing on Britain's early encounters with North Africa in some detail' through recourse to consular records,⁴⁶ their findings concerning the perceptions of Britons of Muslims essentially differ little from those of Matar's earlier work. They conclude that maritime conflict and the seizure of captives 'led British writers, sailors, preachers, and state officials to create a generalized portrait of Islam as an aggressively violent religion peopled by sabre-wielding turbaned janissaries', although the authors do acknowledge the possibility that this may be an oversimplification.⁴⁷

Colley on the other hand argues that the Ottoman Empire was not in serious decline, and the Barbary powers continued to be formidable in their own right throughout

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 133. See also p. 158.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

⁴⁵ 'Islamdom' is a term coined by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, intended to be analogous to the term 'Christendom', but encompassing 'the society in which the Muslims and their faith are recognized as prevalent and socially dominant' in preference to 'the Islamic World' — which he argues is a phrase which is not only clumsy, but uses the term "Islamic" in too broad a sense — and recognises that 'there is only "one world" even in history. If there is to be an "Islamic world," this can be only in the future'. See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols., vol. 1. *The Classical Age of Islam* (Chicago, 1977), pp. 57–58.

⁴⁶ Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, *Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 1–2, 7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 230–232.

the seventeenth century.⁴⁸ The story painted by Colley of 'Britain' in the Mediterranean during the period is one of both aggression and vulnerability, and of necessary 'compromises and collusions'.⁴⁹ She also stresses the heterogeneous nature of British imperial experience: she is critical of the way in which British attitudes have often been 'reconstructed – and over-homogenised' on the basis of the perspectives provided 'by a few conspicuous actors in positions of power or notoriety'.⁵⁰ Colley believes that due to the complex nature of British interaction with the region it is necessary to question the extent to which Islam and Islamic societies were perceived and treated as being different and inferior, and, conversely, the degree to which Britons perceived themselves as superior and possessed of a common aim and interest. To this end, in order to identify changes in British attitudes to Islam, she believes it is necessary to look beyond standard, stylised denunciations; it is necessary to look more broadly and deeper to trace the differing reactions which were proliferating after 1600.⁵¹ She asserts that 'British responses to Islam, and to Islamic powers ... were never static or uniform'. They were dependent on changes in British intellectual thought, and the power and reputation of the Islamic states, and 'they also changed in accordance with the estimates made by Britons of their own state and of its potential'.⁵²

There are clear differences in scope and focus between Colley's and Matar's works, but they are not sufficiently significant to invalidate a comparison of the authors' views concerning the nature and meaning of the encounter of Britons with North Africa in the early modern period. In fact, given the very different interpretations they offer there is evident value in further investigating the impact that engagement with North Africa had on Britons at this time.

⁴⁸ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 65–67.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 133–134. Colley refers generally to Britain and the British even in relation to the period before the formal establishment of Great Britain in 1707.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16, 62, 375. Quotations are from p. 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103, 105.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

North Africa was the region with which Britons had their most widely known, and widest-ranging relations with Islamdom in the early modern period.⁵³ But, while much of the population of the region shared a common heritage, it is important to appreciate that Barbary was not homogeneous in other ways. During the early modern period it consisted of four distinct political entities: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, which developed as client states of the Ottoman Empire; and Morocco, which was politically fractured for much of the period but managed to resist Ottoman hegemony. The socio-political environment in Morocco was, therefore, very different from that in the other Barbary States. Furthermore, the dynamics of contact between England and Morocco were also quite distinct. The relationship was defined by issues relating to commerce, piracy and slavery, as with the other states, but commercial and political relations between the two countries had far greater depth, and for much of the period of this study Morocco was also the site of England's earliest colonial venture in the Mediterranean, Tangier, which gave rise to its own unique set of interactions and responses.⁵⁴ These differences between Morocco and the other Barbary States significantly complicate contextualisation and interpretation of the impact of encounter at the regional level, and for these reasons the principal focus of this thesis is on the interaction of Britons with Morocco.

This study is not primarily intended to be a critique of Matar's and Colley's theses; although it does closely engage with their work. Instead, it seeks to gain more insight into how Britons emotionally and intellectually processed their direct experiences in Morocco, the extent to which such experiences challenged their preconceptions and prejudices, and, in turn, how those experiences shaped their subsequent behaviour and influenced Anglo-Moroccan relations more broadly. As a result, this thesis reconceptualises in many ways the encounter of early modern Britons with Morocco. Such understanding is of intrinsic value because it not only contributes to consideration of questions concerning the historical development of British national

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 43; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. ix.

⁵⁴ Parker in 'Reading Barbary', pp. 87–88, remarks on the 'remarkably singular set of responses' associated with the English occupation of Tangier compared to those generally associated with relations with the Barbary States, but fails to appreciate the unique nature of Anglo-Moroccan relations over an extended period in this context.

identity, but also to a growing corpus of British national and imperial historiography involving cultural studies in which the influence of the overseas experiences and responses of Britons during the early modern period has begun to be recognised.⁵⁵

This thesis also contributes to a broader turn to studies concerning cultural encounters, particularly during the early modern period, in disciplines such as history, literature, and anthropology. Stuart B. Schwartz observes that while such work seeks to answer common questions of 'perceptions of self and others, epistemology, and the dynamic nature of cross-cultural contact', the tendency of scholars to work within disciplinary boundaries 'has sometimes led to a narrow conceptualization of problems that are in fact shared'.⁵⁶ It is for this reason in undertaking this present study attention has been given to theories, methodologies, methods and studies from other disciplines which could usefully contribute to it. However, before turning to these aspects, it is timely to highlight two issues which define the scope of this study: the nature of the subjects, and the period.

Use of the terms 'Britain' and 'British' in the context of the seventeenth century is always problematic as the political entity of 'Great Britain' was not formally established until the passing of the Acts of Union in 1707. Use of these terms is understandable in the interests of conciseness, but often in the literature they are used interchangeably with 'England' and 'English', resulting in inevitable uncertainty,

⁵⁵ See, for example, Hopkins, 'The Utopian Ideal', pp. 651–652; Robin W. Winks, 'The Future of Imperial History', in *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 656; Colley, *Captives*, pp. 18, 375. For a more recent discussion on developments and directions in British (and European) national history, see Stefan Berger, 'The Return of National History', in Pedro Ramos Pinto and Bertrand Taithe, eds., *The Impact of History?: Histories at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Hoboken, NJ, 2015), chap. 6, esp. pp. 189–190.

⁵⁶ Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Introduction', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 3–4. Surekha Davies and Neil L. Whitehead also reflect on the shared nature of these questions in 'From Maps to Mummy-Curses: Rethinking Encounters, Ethnography and Ethnology', *History & Anthropology*, 23 (2012), p. 174. Sanjay Subrahmanyam comments on the large volume of literature on early modern cultural encounters which focusses on how such encounters facilitated the development of new categories of perception and analysis, which are considered to have influenced the establishment or development of a range of academic disciplines in modern social sciences, and also influenced the study of world history. See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. xiii–xiv.

if not confusion, and, at times anachronism. To try to avoid such problems in this thesis, reference is generally either made to the nationality of the specific actors — English, Welsh, Scottish, or Irish — when it is known, or to ‘Britons’ as a multi-national group with a common origin in the British Isles. While neither national or confessional differences are readily apparent in this study, it is useful to keep in mind that such differences did exist because the attitudes and responses of people could be influenced in various ways by national identity, and political and religious allegiances. Nevertheless, with respect to diplomatic decisions and actions, emphasis will be given to those of the English state, being the dominant polity of transoceanic enterprise originating in the British Isles throughout the seventeenth century.⁵⁷

The seventeenth century is a fascinating period for a study of this nature, concerned as it is with the attitudes and responses of Britons, for three reasons. Firstly, the period is marked by not just social unrest and political conflict in the British Isles but also in Barbary, as well as war in Continental Europe and between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and competition between the European powers for control of oceanic trade routes and colonies. Secondly, it also encompassed important changes to English society and culture. Christopher Hill, for example, discerned that a fundamental transformation took place in England during the seventeenth century that was ‘far more than merely a constitutional or political revolution, or a revolution in economics, religion or taste.’⁵⁸ Hill states that a ‘great revolution of human thought’ arose from that period involving a general realisation:

that solutions to political problems might be reached by discussion and argument; that questions of utility and expediency were more important than theology or history, that neither antiquarian research nor searching the Scriptures was the best way to bring peace, order, and prosperity to the commonwealth.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, p. viii, and Nicholas Canny, ‘The Origins of Empire: An Introduction’ in *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 17–18. Canny discusses the origin and early usage of the terms “Britain” and “British” on pp. 1–2.

⁵⁸ Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714*, 2nd ed. (Wokingham, UK, 1983), p. 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

The engagement of Britons with Barbary in the seventeenth century was, therefore, backgrounded by a complex interplay of events and ideas that challenged existing relationships, principles and beliefs. Thirdly, it is during this century that England began to establish itself as a naval and proto-imperial power; when it was finally able to begin the realisation of aspirations which had been nurtured during its 'moment of ideological emergence' between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and which influenced both the development of English national identity and foreign relations.⁶⁰

Between 1625 and 1688 England created both a fully state owned and funded navy, and established a standing army. As a result, among other changes to English navigation, state ships began to replace merchant vessels in the defence of trade, and the resulting improvement in the protection they offered contributed to the growing importance of English shipping in Mediterranean trade during the Restoration Period. This increase in naval power not only provided England with a means to protect her trade, but also to promote her diplomatic and colonial interests.⁶¹ It is the unique effects that this period — defined as it was by a marked change to English military power and national aspiration, and by developments in English thought — alongside more individual factors, may have had on the attitudes of Britons concerning Morocco that are explored in this thesis.

The methodological approach which has been adopted for this purpose differs from that of other scholarship on the subject in two fundamental ways. First, it is not principally concerned with the perceptions or opinions concerning Barbary held by elites inhabiting the *metropole*, or even with the responses of those who suffered the fear and indignity of enslavement, which have been adequately addressed by Colley. Neither is it concerned with Europeans renegades, whose particular personal circumstances and mental pathologies offer potentially intriguing, yet perhaps

⁶⁰ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 9.

⁶¹ Michael J. Braddick, 'The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688', in *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 287–289, 291–292; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, pp. 1–3.

analytically more challenging, insights into the consequences of cultural immersion. Rather, it seeks to contribute to the story of early modern British history in the Mediterranean through closer examination of the individual experiences of those Britons who sojourned there as ostensibly normal free men.⁶² To do so it draws on a diverse range of published and unpublished accounts which provide insights of varying degrees into their experiences, including diaries, memoirs, travel accounts, ethnographic writing, letters, official reports, and treatises.

Admittedly, these experiences were shared with Moroccans. However, this study is singly focussed on understanding how individual Britons responded to their encounter with Morocco, why they responded as they did, and the consequences arising from their responses. For while it is crucial to properly contextualise the encounter by describing the individual and collective behaviour of Moroccans with whom they interacted, it is not at all necessary to discern the motivations and perceptions of the Moroccans themselves for the purposes of understanding the impacts on Britons.

Among the people who feature prominently in this study are the royal agent John Harrison, the chaplain Lancelot Addison, the secretary John Luke, the surveyor Hugh Cholmley, the governor Percy Kirke, and the ubiquitous chronicler of Restoration life Samuel Pepys, as well as many fragmentary, but no less important voices. Through use of such sources, this thesis seeks to elucidate the ways in which a variety of Britons responded to engagement with Morocco, physically, emotionally, and intellectually; and how differences in motivation for travel, nature of engagement and the personal character of individuals impacted on their experience. It is not that the perspectives offered by such people have been overlooked, but rather that they are often marginalised, used selectively and decontextualised, within a narrative which reinforces relations characterised by hostility, and ethnological and religious

⁶² Unfortunately, there are no accounts by women for the period under examination. The only account of note by a woman set in early modern Morocco is by Elizabeth Marsh who was held captive there, some seven decades later. See Elizabeth Marsh, *The Female Captive: a Narrative of Facts which Happened in Barbary in the year 1756* (London, 1769), and later edited accounts.

difference, the hallmark of much of the traditional scholarship on Christian-Muslim relations from the Middle Ages to the modern period.

This type of binary narrative is increasingly being challenged, with scholars arguing that a more nuanced view of the cultural encounter between Christianity and Islam is required.⁶³ Timothy Powell believes that while binary analysis proved useful in cultural studies as a means 'to deconstruct the epistemological structures of Eurocentrism and recover historical voices which were overlooked because of entrenched ethnocentrism', its value has diminished because:

[A] binary form of analysis that collapses a myriad of distinct cultural voices into the overly simplistic category of "Other" defined in relation to a European "Self" is theoretically problematic. The time has come to initiate a new critical epoch, a period of cultural reconstruction in which "identity" is reconfigured in the midst of a multiplicity of cultural influences that more closely resemble what Homi Bhabha has called the "lived perplexity" of people's lives.⁶⁴

While Powell is writing in the context of the analysis of multicultural identities in America, Daniel Vitkus believes his appeal 'for a more complex, non-dualistic paradigm ... can and should be applied ... to early modern cultural identities in England and the Mediterranean'.⁶⁵ Similarly, Eric R. Dursteler, in his study of Veneto-Ottoman cultural interaction and coexistence, argues for the need for scholars to move beyond 'the "clash of civilizations" model' of encounter between Islam and Christianity, 'and instead to analyse the lived reality microscopically and on a local, cultural level'.⁶⁶ Dursteler adds that by moving between the macroscopic and microscopic levels of the encounter, 'a more precise picture of the real rather than rhetorical character of everyday existence on the frontier materializes'; focussing on

⁶³ For example, see Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz, 'Popular Attitudes Towards Islam in Medieval Europe', in David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto, eds., *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1999), pp. 55–56; Colley, *Captives*, p. 103; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, p. 8; Daniel G. König, 'Muslim Perception(s) of "Latin Christianity": Methodological Reflections and a Reevaluation', *Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und Vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung*, 20 (2010), pp. 20–21. For a more general discussion on the complexities inherent in the study of cultural contact see Schwartz, 'Introduction', pp. 1–19.

⁶⁴ Timothy Powell, ed., *Beyond the Binary: Reconstructing Cultural Identity in a Multicultural Context* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1999), p. 1.

⁶⁵ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 2–3.

⁶⁶ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, p. 19. See also pp. 6–9.

individuals and small groups enables us to go beyond generalisations and categorisations 'that help organize, but may also obscure, the past'.⁶⁷

With these insights in mind, my second departure from existing scholarship, both in relation to the study of Britons in North Africa, and studies of historical cultural contact more generally, is that the analysis of the responses of my subjects to their encounter is considered with reference to the concept of 'acculturation'. Schwartz notes that while the initial encounter between people of different cultures is framed on both sides by existing understandings of self and Other, these understandings are modified by the interaction. As further contact occurs, the dynamics of encounter and the interpretation of the culture of the other party are subject to adjustment.⁶⁸ In other words, a process of acculturation is enacted.

There is no generally accepted definition of acculturation. Understanding of the concept varies between the disciplines in which it is studied; it is dependent on their particular interests, and the theoretical and methodological bases of their work.⁶⁹ One definition which is often cited was proposed by the anthropologists Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits in 1936: 'Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both'.⁷⁰ The definition is recognised as having deficiencies, but it captures the essence of the concept.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20. On this *via media* approach to the examination of cultural encounter, see also Rickie Lette, 'The Influence of Inter-Cultural Engagement on the Perceptions of Mendicant Friars in the Thirteenth Century Concerning Islam and Muslims', *Medieval Encounters*, 23 (2017), pp. 481–483.

⁶⁸ Schwartz, 'Introduction', p. 15.

⁶⁹ Jelena Petkovic, 'A Critical Review of the Relevant Interpretations of the Process of Acculturation', *Facta Universitatis: Series Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History*, 11 (2012), p. 91.

⁷⁰ Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation', *American Anthropologist*, 38 (1936), p. 149. On the use of this definition see, for example, Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, trans. Richie Robertson (Oxford, 1989), p. 49; Floyd W. Rudmin, 'Catalogue of Acculturation Constructs: Descriptions of 126 Taxonomies, 1918–2003', in *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 8(1) (2009), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1074>, p. 3; Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*, p. 24

The value of acculturation as a distinct phenomenon and object of historical study has begun to be recognised by historians. Urs Bitterli observes that acculturation pervades the experience of cultural encounter in many different forms and at different levels.⁷¹ To date, much of the work, and associated debate, on acculturation in history, as it has in other fields, has centred on attempts to differentiate and define the types of response to cultural contact. However, there are three features shared by the work that has been undertaken by historians in this area to date. First, their focus has been on the societal or group level. Second, they seek to categorise outcomes which were in reality much more varied and complex. Third, their emphasis is on the transmission of cultural attributes.⁷² Consequently, what such approaches do not do is help us understand the acculturative response arising from cultural contact at the individual level. That is not to say that other historians have always overlooked the personal dimensions of cultural encounter. For example, Linda Colley does not formally adopt acculturation as an element in her methodology for *Captives*, but despite this much of her analysis concerns the changes which occur as a result of cultural immersion, particularly in regard to the perceptions of her subjects about individual and group identity. However, I believe that to properly understand the personal dimensions of acculturation it is necessary to turn to the field of cross-cultural psychology.

Berry et al. describe cross-cultural psychology 'as the study of the relationships between cultural context and human behaviour. The latter includes both overt behaviour (observable actions and responses) and covert behaviour (thoughts, beliefs, meanings)'.⁷³ Cross-cultural psychology recognises the fact that while cultural and other acculturative changes at the group level may influence changes at the individual level, due to differences in the nature of participation and personal psychological characteristics, individual response to culture encounter is likely to

⁷¹ Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, p. 49.

⁷² See, for example *ibid.*, pp. 20–51; Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*, pp. 24–25.

⁷³ John W. Berry et al., *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*, 3rd ed. (New York, 2012), p. 1. The authors acknowledge that interpretations and definitions of the field do vary, but note that most, but not all, researchers accept the existence of common psychological functions and processes between different cultural groups, that is, there is a 'psychic unity' among humans, pp. 1–4.

vary. Therefore, the focus of cross-cultural psychology with respect to acculturation phenomena is the impact on the individual, not changes elicited at the group level.⁷⁴ It directs our attention to the changes which occur to the individual as a result of contact with another culture. The realisation that cross-cultural interaction can influence changes in individuals is not new. Daniel Carey expresses it well when he states that early modern English authors 'worried about the impact of travel precisely because they accepted the commensurability of human beings, and therefore the capacity of the English to become like those they observed and with whom they lived'.⁷⁵ These concerns went beyond those associated with simple imitation of 'alien models of power, wealth, and luxury';⁷⁶ one of the greatest fears in English society at the time was the perceived allure of Islam and the prospect of their fellow citizens converting, and 'turning Turk'.

A generally well accepted model for examining psychological acculturative change is the ABC model of 'culture shock' developed by Ward, Bochner and Furnham. Ward and her colleagues state that contemporary understanding of culture shock not only recognises that cultural interactions can often be 'difficult, awkward and stressful', but also that the responses of people to unfamiliar cultural environments can be treated as 'an active process of dealing with change'.⁷⁷ The model identifies three main areas of change involved in this process: 'Affect, Behaviour and Cognitions, that is, how people feel, behave, think and perceive'.⁷⁸ While historical studies of cultural contact may give attention to one or more of these dimensions of response, they do so without any explicit analytical framework within which to integrate them. The ABC model provides a means to do so. While other models of psychological acculturation have been developed, the ABC model is particularly useful because it possesses a broad, integrated theoretical framework, focussed on the main responses elicited by

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 313–314.

⁷⁵ Daniel Carey, 'Questioning Incommensurability in Early Modern Cultural Exchange', *Common Knowledge*, 6 (1997), p. 40.

⁷⁶ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Colleen Ward, Stephen Bochner, and Adrian Furnham, *The Psychology of Culture Shock*, 2nd ed. (Hove, UK, 2001), p. 270.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

physical immersion in a new culture.⁷⁹ The empirical and concrete nature of the model also makes it, arguably, a more practical analytical tool than Homi K. Bhabha's more abstract concepts of the 'third space of enunciation' and 'hybridity' with which to examine the interaction between individuals from different cultures.⁸⁰

The affective or emotional component of culture shock includes such responses as anger, frustration, confusion, anxiety, disorientation, suspicion, bewilderment, perplexity, and a desire to be elsewhere.⁸¹ Other negative manifestations may be feelings of nostalgia for the place of origin, and an exaggerated sense of difference between the home and new culture.⁸² However, it is also possible that people may experience euphoria, enchantment, fascination, and enthusiasm, at least initially.⁸³ Moreover, the distress of cultural contact can be mitigated by personal factors such as age and gender, by personal resources such as self-efficacy, emotional resilience, and education, as well as by access to social support'.⁸⁴

The behavioural component is associated with cultural learning, and premised on the notion 'that the rules, conventions and assumptions that regulate interpersonal interactions, including both verbal and non-verbal communication, vary across cultures'. People inserted into an unfamiliar cultural situation who do not possess the relevant social skills will have difficulty initiating and sustaining appropriate relations with members of the other group.⁸⁵ To function correctly, a person must acquire the necessary skills, which requires acquisition of knowledge of the society's historical, philosophical and socio-political foundations. Failure to do so is associated with many

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 4–5; Berry et al., *Cross-Cultural Psychology*, p. 314; H. Chad Lane, 'Intercultural Learning', in N. M. Seel, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning* (New York, 2012), p. 1619.

⁸⁰ However, Frederick Fahlander does provide an interesting demonstration of the utility of Bhabha's concepts in 'Third Space Encounters: Hybridity, Mimicry and Interstitial Practice', in Per Cornell and Fredrik Fahlander, eds., *Encounters-Materialities-Confrontations. Archaeologies of Social Space and Interaction* (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 15–41. These and other related concepts concerning processes of cultural production were introduced by Bhabha in *Locations of Culture*, first published in 1994.

⁸¹ Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, *Culture Shock*, pp. 80, 270–271. Such affective perspectives are also referred to in the literature as 'acculturative stress'.

⁸² Eric B. Shiraev and David A. Levy, *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Critical Thinking and Contemporary Applications*, 5th ed. (Boston, 2013), p. 303.

⁸³ Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, *Culture Shock*, pp. 80–82.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 270–271; Berry et al., *Cross-Cultural Psychology*, p. 315.

⁸⁵ Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, *Culture Shock*, p. 271.

of the negative aspects of inter-cultural contact.⁸⁶ However, sociocultural adaption is also dependent on psychological adjustment; that is, there is interplay between the affective and behavioural outcomes of interaction.⁸⁷

The cognitive component of the model involves the notion that culture consists of meanings shared between members of a group relating to material, interpersonal, institutional, existential and spiritual phenomena. However, when a person comes into contact with another culture such accepted truths may no longer apply, and the way in which such differences are processed may affect how each party sees the other, how they regard themselves, and the extent to which they are prepared to change their existing views.⁸⁸ The ABC model proposes that there are four broad responses manifested by people when their social reality is challenged through cultural contact, and each has a different effect on self-identity: they may respond by resisting change, and even become more ethnocentric, that is, more embedded in their existing culture; they may accept the new culture, and even assimilate to such a degree that they relinquish their original culture; they may synthesise elements of both cultures, and become bi-cultural; or, they may vacillate between the two cultures, identify with neither, and consequently become marginalised in both.⁸⁹

Unlike the affective and behavioural aspects of cultural contact, it is more difficult to determine what cognitive responses are advantageous, as it will depend on the specific circumstance that produce them. For example, maintenance of prejudiced attitudes may benefit a person through enhancing his standing within his cultural group, and, therefore, make such beliefs hard to change. Furthermore, the way in which cultural contact influences a person's intrapersonal, interpersonal and intergroup identities may manifest itself in his or her affective and behavioural responses.⁹⁰ For this reason, particular attention is given in this study to not only the interpersonal beliefs and perceptions that are educed through cultural contact, but

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* See Figure 12.11, The ABC model of 'culture shock', p. 274.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 271–272.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 272–273.

also the extent to which subjects change their grounds of self-definition as a result of such experience.

The insights into acculturation provided by cross-cultural psychology draw the historian's attention to the wider effects of cultural encounter; not just to its cognitive outcomes as reflected in acts of representation, but also to its affective and behavioural dimensions. They encourage the researcher to try to identify evidence of acculturation in narratives of encounter, and to consider their significance. Examination of the experience of encounter through the lens of psychological acculturation provides another perspective from which to read and analyse historical sources, to attempt to understand the meaning of encounter at an individual level, and identify the reasons for differences in the responses between people. In this way it may be possible to progress beyond generalised notions of cause and effect. However, while I believe that an understanding of the processes of psychological acculturation has much to contribute to studies of this nature, I am not suggesting that such models and associated research should be applied prescriptively to historical sources — cultural psychology is a specialised field, and, furthermore, there is need for caution in drawing conclusions from contemporary research on acculturation in order to avoid anachronism. Rather, I believe that they can be used instructively to complement other methods of interpretation available to the historian.⁹¹

A fundamental issue for historians is the extent to which the representation of cultural encounter can provide access to the reality of what actually transpired. Greg Denning, states that the experience in ethnography suggests that there is no ultimate truth in representation, 'because all reality like all culture is implicit, virtual'. According to Denning, representation is a product of the significance of the ways in

⁹¹ The disciplines of history and psychology have had a long troubled relationship of which the historian needs to be cognisant. Lynn Hunt provides an excellent survey of key developments in the relationship in 'Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Historical Thought', in Lloyd S. Kramer and Sarah C. Maza, eds., *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, Blackwell Companions to History (Malden, MA, 2006), pp. 337–356.

which it is expressed, and the reality of encounter must be negotiated.⁹² Stephen Greenblatt expresses similar sentiments: 'It is, I think, a theoretical mistake and a practical blunder to collapse the distinction between representation and reality', but acknowledges that they cannot be kept isolated from one another, for 'they are locked together in an uneasy marriage'⁹³

The challenges for the historian negotiating the manifold nuances of the "reality" of cultural encounter are compounded by the fact that they rarely possess sources which provide clear and comprehensive insights. Instead accounts are generally ambiguous and partial, affected by the limitations of perception and memory,⁹⁴ informed by prejudice, prudence, motivation, conventions of genre, and audience expectation, and subject to editorial licence. Of course, to borrow a phrase from Linda Colley, the historian can test the 'overall factual anchorage' of an account by 'triangulating' its details with other relevant sources.⁹⁵ He or she can also attempt to understand the meaning(s) of a text through the practice of close reading. Close reading, or reading 'with the grain', can be useful because it facilitates comprehension of what an author is consciously attempting to communicate through a text.

However, if the focus of study is not simply the recorded "facts" of encounter which a writer wished to convey, but rather an understanding of the unconscious factors which shaped the text, what methods can historians use to access these psychic artefacts? To attempt to discern hidden, repressed, or conflated meaning in historical narratives requires recourse to textual deconstruction, to reading 'against the grain',

⁹² Greg Denning, 'The Theatricality of Observing and Being Observed: Eighteenth-Century Europe "Discovers" the 18th Century "Pacific"', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 457. See also n. 13.

⁹³ Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Oxford, 2003), p. 7.

⁹⁴ For useful background on the nature of perception see Ulric Neisser, *Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology* (San Francisco, 1976), particularly, pp. xii, 1–3, 9, 53–57, 80, 87. Perception and memory are closely related. The book is a little dated, but the concepts are well explained for the lay reader.

⁹⁵ Colley, *Captives*, p. 13.

that is, reading texts against their normal rhetorical interpretation.⁹⁶ Reading against the grain of a narrative involves identifying 'how texts come to embarrass their own ruling systems of logic',⁹⁷ by closely examining and questioning the points made by an author, his ideas and perspectives, and identifying: 'firstly, contradictions, secondly, linguistic quirks and aporia, thirdly, shifts or breaks (in tone, viewpoint, tense, person, attitude, etc.), and finally, absences or omissions'.⁹⁸ It involves trying to interpret what the author is saying from different perspectives.

In practice, the approach to the reading and analysis of texts I have adopted for this thesis has been informed by the work of the anthropologist Dianne Bell. She explains that she first notes 'omissions, confusions, and plagiarisms' that raise questions about interpretation, editing, and selection of particular phrases. She then contextualises the sources she uses by asking such questions as: What did Europeans already know of the inhabitants? What were the observer's motivations for travel? What factors informed their observations? What is known about the observer's personality, training, and interests? Who was the intended audience? She also reads her sources against the grain to discern their possible implicit meanings.⁹⁹ While Bell's 'against-the-grain' readings are informed by notions of ethnocentrism and the historical construction of gender, mine are informed by notions of acculturation and the influence of inter-cultural engagement more generally on learning and behaviour. As noted above, while there is evidently a relationship between representation and reality, they must not be conflated. Representations provide access to perceptions of

⁹⁶ However, Ann Laura Stoler cautions that students are often too hasty to read against the grain. She explains that '[r]eading along the archival grain draws our sensibilities to the archive's granular rather than seamless texture, to the rough surface that mottles its hue and shapes its form. Working along the grain is not to follow a frictionless course but to enter a field of force and will to power, to attend to both the sound and sense therein and their rival and reciprocal energies. It calls on us to understand how unintelligibilities are sustained and why empires remain so uneasily invested in them'. See Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, 2009), pp. 50, 53.

⁹⁷ Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, 2 ed. (Minneapolis, MN, 1996), p. 116.

⁹⁸ Peter Barry, 'Tackling Textuality – with Theory', The English Association, <http://www2.le.ac.uk/offices/english-association/schools/teaching-poetry/tackling-textuality-with-theory>, accessed 7 April 2016. The article was first published in *The Use of English*, Vol. 52.1, 2000.

⁹⁹ Dianne Bell, 'An Accidental Australian Tourist: Or a Feminist Anthropologist at Sea and on Land', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 503–504.

the Other and are reflection of the self, but it is necessary for the historian to negotiate these meanings, to speculate on the extent to which they matched actual personal experience and belief.

Colley makes some useful observations about the nature of captivity narratives which are apposite to the consideration of other types of contemporary travel-related accounts which have been used in this study. She acknowledges that they were influenced to varying degrees by bias arising from fear, anger, ignorance, preconception and prejudice. However, other factors could also lead to distortion. Desperation could play a part in their production, with authors embellishing accounts in the hope of persuading Parliament to act to redeem captives.¹⁰⁰ Some protagonists sought, or were compelled, to tell their story for the purposes of catharsis, social redemption or profit, motivations which could also influence the veracity of accounts. Without pen, paper or time, they could have difficulty in accurately recalling people, places, and events. They could also lose control of their stories: they may have had little or no education, and were, therefore, dependent on others to assist in the writing of their accounts. In some cases, these other parties are not identified, and their motivations and contribution can only be speculated upon. Furthermore, in accordance with contemporary conventions and expectations, fictional and pirated material could be interposed with the factual.

But Colley, quite rightly, stresses the importance of not attempting to characterise accounts as being either truthful or mendacious, as there is always the tendency among people to attempt to order facts in coherent patterns, and omit some details that are peripheral, discordant, embarrassing or painful.¹⁰¹ What is true of early modern English writers, remains equally true for the modern day academic. James Clifford expresses the situation well, reinforcing points made earlier: 'Even the best

¹⁰⁰ Colley, *ibid.*, p. 57–58.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, chap. 6, esp. pp. 84–85, 91–93. Colley cites Lennard J. Davis, who provides a useful discussion on attitudes to verity in published texts in early modern England in *Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel* (Philadelphia, 1996), esp. chap VIII. Davis observes that 'no confession, history, or memoir could guarantee veracity', a situation that 'seems to reflect an ongoing fuzziness in the definition of fact and fiction', p. 148.

ethnographic texts ... are systems, or economies of truth. Power and history work through them, in ways that their authors cannot fully control. Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial — committed and incomplete'.¹⁰² As Colley observes, most historical sources cannot be accepted at face value, writers had their own motivations and influences, but 'they can — and should — be sampled and sieved', and they need to be analysed not simply textually, but also within their wider context of production.¹⁰³ However, it must also be borne in mind that this study is not principally concerned with the objectivity and historical accuracy of accounts; it matters less whether what authors wrote was either true or false, than what they actually said, because their perceptions, as reflected in their statements, shaped their personal reality, and their resultant memories of encounter. As Kenneth Parker concludes, ascertaining the truth of accounts is less important than understanding the reasons for their variety, and how they were received.¹⁰⁴

It is for these reasons that this thesis ranges between the macro-historical and the micro-historical in order to properly situate the sources, and the experiences of their subjects, within the broader socio-cultural, political and historical context in which they occurred. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the prevailing situations in the Mediterranean and Morocco, and England's relationship to them. The first section of the chapter reveals the complex and dynamic nature of political, religious, and commercial relationships which existed in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century and puts into perspective the power and influence of the English in the sea. The second section examines the contemporary political situation in Morocco. It highlights the long history of political unrest in the country which the European powers attempted to exploit, and how a combination of internal and external factors would frustrate their efforts. The final section identifies important developments in

¹⁰² James Clifford, 'Introduction: Partial Truths', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Los Angeles, 1986), p. 7.

¹⁰³ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 93, 97. Schwartz discusses the challenges associated with issues of objectivity and subjectivity in the interpretation of historical cultural encounters in 'Introduction', pp. 1–9. The collection of papers he provides in the volume include a number of interesting case studies which explore the intersection between reality and representation in such encounters.

¹⁰⁴ Parker, 'Reading Barbary', p. 108.

the political and commercial relationship between England and Morocco from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the following century.

Whether they were based on fact or fiction, Britons who came to Barbary undoubtedly did not do so without some existing notions of the region and its people. Chapter 2 considers how Barbary was conceived of by early modern Britons, to understand what knowledge, preconceptions, and prejudices they may have brought with them. It surveys not only attitudes to religious difference but also to somatic difference and ethnicity, both of which are equally important points of reference for considering issues of prejudice. Of course, perspectives would have varied widely between individuals. The intent, therefore, is not to attempt to reconstruct some sort of generalised, commonly held perception of Barbary which would be of questionable validity, but rather to identify the different ways — from simple stereotypes to more informed understandings — contemporary Britons conceived of it, and the range of sources and other factors that informed their ‘imaginative geographies’.¹⁰⁵ These perspectives provide a means to compare and contrast the responses of Britons that were elicited by their encounter with Barbary, and which are investigated in the subsequent chapters. The chapter also serves to reinforce another, broader theme of this thesis: the way in which perceptions of difference between peoples is not only empirical and contingent, but also very much individually constructed.

Chapters 3 to 6 provide the analytical core of the thesis. They engage with primary sources and the observations and interpretations of other scholars to (re)examine how Britons responded — affectively, behaviourally, and cognitively — to what they found and experienced in Morocco. The chapters are organised chronologically rather than thematically. This structure has been adopted for two reasons. First, observations and admissions made by the subjects often address more than one type

¹⁰⁵ ‘Imaginative geographies’, is a concept that was articulated by Edward Said, in which ‘space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here’. Said goes on to say: ‘For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away’. See Said, *Orientalism*, p. 55

of issue; to tease them apart and consider them separately risks fragmentation, decontextualisation, and repetition. Second, the experiences have a particular temporal context. In this respect, as another scholar has also observed, a chronological examination of accounts in itself provides thematic insight, in that it reveals distinct changes in the general nature of relations between England and Morocco over time,¹⁰⁶ an understanding of which is critical to interpretation of the reactions of individual Britons. Consequently, the chapters are organised into periods which appear to have a distinct coherence in terms of the prevailing disposition of Britons concerning their activities in Morocco.

Contrary to the claim of the author of the epigraph at the beginning of this introduction, the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that many Britons who travelled to Morocco between 1625 and 1684 did seek to understand it, and did acquire generally reliable, objective knowledge of its geography and its people. Contrary to the claims of some modern scholars, such men did so not for the purposes of colonial exploitation, but out of genuine interest and a desire to develop mutually beneficial relations. Neither did Britons possess a commonly shared image of Moroccans as being barbaric and implacably hostile to Christians, or necessarily perceived themselves to be superior to them. Through their contact with the local peoples some Britons were able to overcome traditional prejudices towards Maghribis. They were able to see beyond cultural and religious differences and instead identify equivalences and useful contrasts with their own society, and these insights not only influenced how they perceived the ethnic and religious Other, but also how they perceived themselves, their compatriots, and their own society. Through recognising a shared humanity, some Britons not only came to appreciate that Moroccans were worthy enemies, but also their equals, if not their superiors in some ways. Despite contemporary rhetoric to the contrary, the encounter of Britons with Morocco between 1625 and 1684 was both a humbling and enlightening experience for them.

¹⁰⁶ Khalid Chaouch, 'British Travellers to Morocco and their Accounts, from mid-16th to mid-20th Centuries: A Bibliography', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Chaouch/Chaouch.htm>, accessed 13 April 2016, p. 3 of 28.

This thesis supports Linda Colley's assessment that there was no monolithic, homogeneous perspective concerning Islam and the Islamic powers in the Mediterranean held by Britons during the seventeenth century, and that it is necessary to delve more widely and deeply in order to appreciate the significance of Barbary's impact not only on British self-identity, but ultimately also on British imperial development. In this way it also contributes to a growing body of literature on cultural contact in the early modern period which is demonstrating the diverse impacts that such contact had on Britons and other Europeans, and on the indigenous peoples they encountered.

1. Encountering Barbary

Did our ancestors mean any more by dominion of the sea than commanding there or not being commanded by any pirates or others there, and not propriety? (Samuel Pepys, voyage from Tangier, March, 1684)¹

Before examining how Britons responded to contact with Morocco, it is useful to appreciate the broader context in which they did so. More generally, as Jack D'Amico has noted: 'It is helpful to consider the real interests, mundane desires, and complex political motives that affected the way Moors and Morocco were represented in reports, letters, and summaries'.² In this chapter key events, developments and issues are identified which provide a background to the concerns, interests, and activities of Britons as they relate to Morocco in the seventeenth century which are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. This survey highlights the complex and dynamic nature of the Mediterranean region as a site of transnational trade, and converging and interacting economic, political, religious, and cultural systems during the early modern period, and England's place within it. But it also seeks to reinforce the distinctive nature of North Africa, and particularly Morocco, within the broader historical contexts of both the Mediterranean and Islamdom.³

The domestic social and political situation in England, and in the British Isles more generally, is not examined separately, but instead relevant commentary has been woven into the discussion of issues pertinent to the activities of Britons in the Mediterranean, and relations between England and Morocco, in the period up to the

¹ Samuel Pepys, *The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys*, ed. Edwin Chappel ([London], 1935), p. 239. Although Pepys' general notes from which the quotation is sourced are undated, based on preceding entries it is evident that the relevant sub-section of the papers was written during Pepys' return to England from Tangier, where he arrived on 3 April 1684.

² Jack D'Amico, *The Moor in English Renaissance Drama* (Tampa, FL, 1991), p. 7.

³ As noted by Andrew C. Hess in *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 2010), p. 260. Hess cites the following works for which the region's historical autonomy is a central theme: Charles-André Julien, *The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. From the Arab Conquest to 1830*, trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart (London, 1970), Abdallah Laroui, *L'histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthese* (Paris, 1970), and Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1971). The 1987 edition of Abun-Nasr's book is cited elsewhere in this thesis. Laroui's book was later translated into English. See Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, 1977).

end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century. However, due to their complexity, and their importance in understanding later events and the responses of the protagonists, the examination of domestic political developments in Morocco has been extended into the 1650s, overlapping with the scope of chapter 3. As will become evident throughout this study, significant developments in Europe, in the Mediterranean, and in the Barbary states during the early modern period were often interrelated or became intertwined as states and polities pursued their respective economic and political interests.

1.1. Disorientation and Accommodation: England in the Mediterranean

There is a long-standing narrative which continues to influence the historiography of the English in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century, which portrays England as a small nation which overcomes adversity to establish its dominance in that sea by the end of century. Through fortitude, superior skills and technology, driven by the desire for imperial greatness, and exercising no small measure of aggression, the English triumphed over Christian European and Muslim rivals alike.⁴ In the opinion of at least one recent scholar this achievement not only shaped England's imperial future, but also a world view which was defined by an overriding sense of cultural superiority and Protestant righteousness.⁵ But such an interpretation overlooks critical elements of the English experience, and the reality appears to be quite different, in that the position of the English in the Mediterranean remained precarious even towards the end of the century. Instead, the story of England in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century is more one of limits, pragmatism, and accommodation, which brings into question the veracity of generalisations concerning the impact that this period of Mediterranean activity had on Britons, and the development of British self-identity.

⁴ See, for example, Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1904), esp. pp. 1–4; Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), esp. pp. 298–300, 566–568; Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (London, 1970), pp. 162–168.

⁵ Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), pp. 8, 133, 158; Nabil Matar, *British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–1760* (Leiden, 2014), pp. 192–195.

Although England's entry into the Mediterranean is traditionally dated to 1511 based on voyages recorded by Richard Hakluyt in *The Principal Navigations*, Fernand Braudel observes that England's maritime and consular activities in the region date to at least the early fifteenth century. However, it was not until early in the following century that English merchants began to truly establish themselves in Mediterranean commerce, 'after a long and not always brilliant apprenticeship'.⁶ But this period of success was short-lived; from 1534 English trade in the Eastern Mediterranean began to wane, and from the early 1550s, for some two decades, the trade was 'utterly discontinued, and in maner quite forgotten'.⁷ The reasons for this decline are uncertain, but what is evident is that in the early 1570s there was a rapid re-entry of the English into this market, along with the Dutch and French.⁸ While English trade in the eastern Mediterranean may have been stimulated by the preparedness of southern European cities to employ foreign shipping, it had yet to be resumed in the Levant.⁹ But the excommunication of Elizabeth I in 1570 freed the English from restrictions which had been placed by papal edict on trade with Muslims, and the Ottomans were keen to obtain the raw materials which England could provide.¹⁰ The prospect of diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte was also attractive to the queen given rising tensions with Spain. Negotiations commenced in 1578, and in June 1580 the English obtained the trading privileges they sought.¹¹ England was now poised to take advantage of the vast commercial opportunities available in the Mediterranean.

⁶ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols, vol. I (London, 1972), pp. 612–613. See Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 3 vols., vol. II (London, 1599–1600), pp. 96ff.

⁷ Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, II, pp. 136–137.

⁸ See, for example, Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, pp. 615, 621–624, cf. Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 49–50, and David W. Waters, *The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times* (London, 1958), pp. 88, 100. On factors which may have influenced England's interest in the Mediterranean at this time, see Ralph Davis, 'England in the Mediterranean, 1570–1670', in F. J. Fisher, ed., *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England* (London, 1974), pp. 117–118. Aside from domestic economic changes, Davis also identifies the impact of political developments on the European continent during the 1570s.

⁹ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, pp. 623–624.

¹⁰ Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 50.

¹¹ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, p. 625.

The establishment of the capitulations with the Ottomans was followed soon after by the establishment of a number of chartered English trading companies from 1581, and the installation of an ambassador in Constantinople in 1583. Chief among the entities established by the English was the Levant Company which was chartered in 1592, and grew rapidly. By the mid-seventeenth century there were English trading posts and consulates located around the coast and islands of the Mediterranean.¹² Merchant communities were also established in North Africa, and consuls were appointed for managing relations with Morocco and the three Ottoman regencies.¹³ Along with hundreds of licensed English vessels involved in long distance commerce were a multitude of private operators involved in coastal shipping, as well as English privateers and pirates, who aggressively competed with both established traders and other new European entrants.¹⁴

Braudel argued that the commercial environment of the Mediterranean was fundamentally transformed by the rise of the northern European powers, particularly the English and Dutch, from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, with consequent changes to existing systems of commerce, trade, and finance.¹⁵ It was an argument that became very influential in shaping understanding of events in the Mediterranean in the early modern period.¹⁶ Molly Greene has examined Braudel's 'Northern Invasion' thesis and, in particular, its inherent implication that the economic competition that arose from the arrival of the northern powers 'heralded a decisive break with the old conflict between Islam and Christianity and the

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 626–629; Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 50–51.

¹³ The most comprehensive account of English consular activities in North Africa between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth century is still to be found in Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford, 1957). While focussed on consular operations in the Levant, Niels Steensgaard's study in 'Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 15 (1967), pp. 13–55, also provides insights which are generally applicable to consular activity in North Africa. For a contemporary English view of the role of consul in North Africa see 'Reasons for keepinge constante an agent or consull at Algier', 1622, TNA, SP 71/1/Pt. 1, f. 116r.

¹⁴ Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 51; David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 459–462.

¹⁵ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, pp. 621–642. Davis, in 'England in the Mediterranean', first published in 1961, advances a similar argument. See pp. 127–137.

¹⁶ Molly Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', *Past and Present*, 174 (2002), p. 42.

beginning of a new, national world'.¹⁷ While Greene acknowledges the secular character of the developments, she believes that the attention which has been given to this interpretation obscures other changes which occurred. Her reinterpretation of the situation has important implications for understanding England's position in the sea, and consequently the actions and responses of Britons in North Africa.

In support of her counter-thesis Greene identifies three distinguishing features of the situation in the region during the seventeenth century. First, the impact was not uniform: it is more evident in the western Mediterranean than the east, and in long-distance trade than the coastal trade.¹⁸ Second, the marketplace was 'messy', in that it is often difficult to clearly identify the national or religious affiliation of parties involved in trade, partly because no state was strong enough to impose order over it. The resultant fragmentation of sovereignty across the sea allowed the resurgence of both Christian and Muslim piracy.¹⁹ Given this situation, Greene claims that the identification of means to protect commercial interests became of upmost importance, and the arrangements which developed 'cut across both national and religious lines'.²⁰ Furthermore, the European states struggled to impose national trade policies on their citizens operating in the region, and, therefore, could not readily harness their endeavours in the service of the state. However, importantly, Greene also observes that the complexity of trade in the Mediterranean was not simply a product of 'weak states and fractious communities'.²¹ While the English, Dutch and French all sought to expand their trade with the Ottoman Empire, their ambition was not sufficient to totally negate the legacy of hostility between Christianity and Islam. According to Greene, the tension between these two factors created a 'profound moment of hesitation', an ambivalence, among all parties.²² Consequently, the foundation of Mediterranean trade was uncertain: 'Was the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44. See also Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard University, 2012), pp. 14–15, 26–27. As Stein notes, the naming of features around the Mediterranean in William Berry's map from 1685 (see fig. 2) highlights the way in which the sea was conceived of not just geographically, but also politically.

²⁰ Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 44. See also Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, pp. 462–463.

²¹ Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 44.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45, 58.

Mediterranean a collection of sovereign states bound by treaty obligations to one another? Or was it a cultural and political frontier, where two hostile religions faced each other in perpetual enmity?'. Greene believes that both views were asserted.²³ Nor were ambivalence and pragmatism concerning issues of politics and religion restricted to merchants and states; they also extended to pirates and corsairs.²⁴

Greene's third point is that the 'Northern Invasion' thesis is silent on the issue of religious confrontation, implying that it was no longer an important factor. However, she argues that the separate historiography on conflict between Muslim and Christian corsairs, known as the '*corso*', confronts this issue. She notes that traditional interpretations of the decline in corsairing are neatly accommodated within the framework provided by the thesis.²⁵ According to this scholarship, there was a significant increase in *corso* activity in the seventeenth century, after which it went into a terminal decline. Although other factors may have played a part, the most favoured explanation for this outcome is that the development of a more tolerant perspective made religious differences 'both irrelevant and anachronistic'.²⁶ Greene believes this account, with its 'Whiggish assumptions', is of little assistance in explaining developments. Instead, the gradual exclusion of Muslims from maritime activities suggests that religious difference began to be applied systematically by the French and English states towards the end of the century as a means to consolidate their control over trade.²⁷ Nevertheless, she believes that commercial activity in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century 'was characterized by widespread inconsistency and disagreement over the proper balance between the pursuit of commerce and the defence of religion'.²⁸ Similarly, David Abulafia refers to the Mediterranean suffering 'from a sort of disorientation', and Kenneth Parker observes

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁴ Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014), pp. 175–176, 180–182.

²⁵ Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 45. Rather than simply a confrontation between Muslim and Christian protagonists, the *corso* can perhaps be better conceived of as a form of 'quasi-commercial trade' practiced in the Mediterranean which incorporated a religious dimension. See Mercedes García-Arenal, 'The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros of Salé', in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain* (Leiden, 2014), p. 288.

²⁶ Molly Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 45.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

that Europeans travelling in the region became 'dis-oriented'.²⁹ As Greene astutely concludes, it is the distinctiveness of the period, and the ambiguous nature of the Mediterranean at the time, which historians tend to overlook in passing judgement on European success in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century.³⁰

But perhaps the failure to appreciate the unique, enigmatic character of the sea at this time is more than a simple oversight. Lotfi Ben Rejeb argues that from the early sixteenth century a discourse developed among Europeans that eventually reduced 'North African history to a story of piracy and slavery driven by fanaticism, and Mediterranean history to a Manichean drama — of Good and Evil, of victim and victimiser'.³¹ The discourse was propagated by the recycling of information, a process which overtime became self-referential, reinforcing its authenticity, and ultimately transformed into an ideological construct, providing the foundation for an eventual imperial program of conquest in North Africa.³² It is a discourse which continues to exert influence in both popular culture and scholarship.

The complex political, socio-cultural, and religious environment of the Mediterranean defies the construction of a simple narrative of binary opposites, as it does one based on progressive English dominance during the seventeenth century. However, several scholars have asserted that the experience, while challenging, was an informative one for both merchants and the state as the nation expanded its maritime interests, and that the adaptability demonstrated by the English in the Mediterranean would underpin later British imperial development. Tristan Stein argues that the complex political and legal regimes which operated in the sea shaped the nature of the English presence there, and limited the expansion of its sovereignty

²⁹ Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, p. 469; Kenneth Parker, *Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology* (London, 1999), p. 3.

³⁰ Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', pp. 63–71.

³¹ Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'The General Belief of the World': Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean History', *European Review of History*, 19 (2012), p. 23. Also see Ben Rejeb's earlier article on this subject, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514–1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization', *Dialectical Anthropology*, 6 (1982), 345–355. The Eurocentric nature of North African history, and resultant politically inspired reductionism is also discussed by Abdallah Laroui in the introduction to his book *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 3–12.

³² Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', pp. 23–25.

in the region, highlighting the relative weakness of the early modern English state.³³ He believes that the way in which direct English influence in the Mediterranean was restricted provides a model for understanding the way in which the English state subsequently expanded its authority beyond its actual claims to sovereignty and empire. In the Mediterranean, this involved sending naval fleets to respond to the activities of corsairs, the negotiation of treaties, regulation of navigation, protection of subjects from foreign powers, and establishing authority over English merchants and other subjects through consuls and diplomats. While England attempted to expand its authority in the Mediterranean through these claims of jurisdiction, they clashed with those of the Mediterranean states and of others operating there, and it is these conflicts which defined and limited English authority in the sea.³⁴

Given their precarious position, Britons initially had to take great care in negotiating the vicissitudes of Mediterranean commerce, or risk marginalisation or exclusion. Rather than military power and force, Braudel remarks that the English approach involved subtlety and guile, capitalising on religious divisions, and at times resorting to piracy when required.³⁵ Caught between the Catholic kingdoms in the north and *dār al-Islām* in the south and east, the Protestant faith of the English could be both a blessing and a curse. The pragmatism demonstrated by the English is a theme expanded upon by Alison Games, who argues that it was in the Mediterranean that England first acquired the skills and experience in long-distance trade that allowed it to develop its global maritime empire: organisation skills such as the securing of trading privileges and management of complex trading systems, and, equally important, familiarity with cultural exchange and accommodation.³⁶ She characterises the approach adopted by the English in the Mediterranean from 1580 until 1660 as principally one of 'accommodation and dissimulation', involving feigning support, lying, misleading, and fostering amicable relations in whatever way was

³³ Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. iii–iv, 21–23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5, 31–32. For a specific study of issues concerning treaties and 'Euro-American' consular jurisdiction in North Africa, see C. R. Pennell, 'Treaty Law: The Extent of Consular Jurisdiction in North Africa from the Middle of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 14 (2009), pp. 235–256.

³⁵ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, pp. 628–629.

³⁶ Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 47, 51.

most expedient. According to Games, Englishmen were prepared to 'subordinate their pride, their national affiliations, and their faith', essentially reforming their external identities, in order to overcome their 'political weakness and religious vulnerability'; but all that changed when they decided to occupy Tangier, only for them to resume their former mode of interaction after the colony's abandonment.³⁷

While not disputing the generality of Games' observations about cultural transfer and accommodation by the English, I believe that she may be, in fact, conflating two distinct modes of adaptive behaviour: conscious acts of deception, and essentially unconscious changes arising from psychological acculturation.³⁸ Certainly, contemporary observers comment on the importance of the need for travellers to be mindful of what they wore in the Ottoman lands. The Levant Company chaplain William Biddulph offered a warning to fellow Christians to wear no item of apparel of the colour green, 'for greene, they account Mahomet's colour'.³⁹ Furthermore, he instructs them when travelling outside cities that their apparel 'must be simple, for their safety'.⁴⁰ The traveller, Sir Henry Blount, went further, promoting the adoption of the 'Turkish manner' of dress.⁴¹ Blount not only understood that the wearing of European clothing could provoke anti-Christian resentment, but also believed that the use of local clothing was appreciated as a sign of respect: 'Now there is no innovation drawes in forreigne manners faster, then that of apparel. Besides that, it

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53, 74–79, 297–298. Quotations are from pp. 52 and 79. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, Linda Colley refers to the necessary 'compromises and collusions' which were imposed on the British in operating in the Mediterranean.

³⁸ Games does indicate an awareness that adaptive capability did vary between individuals, noting that this English cosmopolitanism 'was not a coherent system of behaviour or a uniform worldview', but was rather an organic development driven by necessity, aided by a willingness, or even a disposition, among some, to adapt to new circumstances. See Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 290.

³⁹ William Biddulph, *The Travels of Certain Englishmen into Africa, Asia, Troy, Bythinia, Thracia, and to the Blacke Sea ... Begunne in the Yeere of Jubile 1600, and by some of them Finished in this Yeere 1608 ...*, ed. Theophilus Lavender (London, 1609), p. 64. Biddulph cites the example of two men 'not acquainted with the customes of the countrey': one has his shoes, with their offending 'greene shoestrings', removed, and the other has his green 'breeches cut off, and he reviled and beaten'. According to the Prophet, the pious will be rewarded with, among other things, clothes of 'fine green silk and gold embroidery'. See Qur'an 77:1–22. Quotation is from *The Glorious Qur'ân*, trans. Marmaduke Pickthall, bilingual ed. (Istanbul, 2014), p. 579.

⁴⁰ Biddulph, *The Travels of Certain Englishmen*, p. 101.

⁴¹ Henry Blount, *A Voyage into the Levant: A Breife Relation of a Journey, Lately Performed by Master H. B. Gentleman, From England*, 2nd ed. (London, 1636), pp. 98–99.

seems honourable for the Turkish nation to retain their ancient habit of clothing'.⁴² It was more than an issue of physical subterfuge, of adoption of a superficial disguise; to be successful the merchant or traveller also needed to acquire deeper cultural understanding. Biddulph's advice was that those who travel to the Near East must emulate servants so that 'they may learne how to behave themselves in travell':⁴³ they must be prepared to eat whatever is available; they must not be sensitive to what they hear which may offend them; and, they must be prepared to quickly flee from danger. Furthermore, with their 'hands wide open ... they must be faithfull, not deceitfull: They must doe nothing closely or secretly', and be prepared 'to give liberally' when required to do so.⁴⁴ A merchant must understand 'how the place has changed his condition', and he must not stand 'upon his termes'.⁴⁵

Both dissimulation and acculturation could have produced ostensibly the same outcome — an ability to operate in a potentially hostile environment — but English travellers could not easily hide their religious and national identities, and to attempt to do so could be dangerous. As Biddulph and Blount show, English travellers in the Mediterranean in the early modern period were conscious of the need to understand and respect local cultural norms, to put aside notions of cultural and religious superiority, in order to gain acceptance, and minimise personal threat, but doing so paved the way for more fundamental personal change. Blount found that by fully accepting his changed condition and adapting to his new environment he 'grew so confident of the Turkish nature ... and nor were my wayes being framed onely to receive insolency, able to entertaine malice, especially a malice engaged by religion'.⁴⁶ The rationalist Blount found he began to appreciate the people and their culture outside the lens of cultural and religious difference: it was a process embraced by him, but feared by the religious Biddulph, who believed that through such experience men could be 'somewhat tainted with their sinnes, if no altogether

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100.

⁴³ Biddulph, *The Travels of Certaine Englishmen*, p. 100.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁴⁵ Blount, *A Voyage into the Levant*, p. 98.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

sowed with the leaven of their ungodliness'.⁴⁷ It was a fear shared by other Britons, a fear of their compatriots 'turning Turk'.

However, while cultural accommodation and deference were means by which Britons could further their interests in the Mediterranean, traditionally scholars have explained the commercial and political rise of England in the region during the seventeenth century principally in terms of the ascendancy of English naval power. A detailed examination of the extent to which the English relied on an overt policy of aggression, as opposed to one based on pragmatic commerce and diplomacy, and how the balance between these two approaches changed during the course of the seventeenth century, is outside the scope of this thesis.⁴⁸ But what appears to be clear is that the practice of what some have called the exercise of 'gunboat diplomacy' by the English during this period,⁴⁹ was, in fact, quite limited in both its occurrence and in its effectiveness in forcing the North African states to the negotiating table, and deterring their corsairing activities.

⁴⁷ Biddulph, *The Travels of Certain Englishmen*, p. 81.

⁴⁸ It is perhaps sufficient to note that views on the subject vary considerably. For example, Matar in *Britain and Barbary* argues for an increasing recourse to aggressive behaviour against Muslims in the Mediterranean by the English during the course of the seventeenth century. Similarly, David Delison Hebb in *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642* (Aldershot, UK, 1994) posits that there was a turn from a policy of diplomacy to one focussed on the use of force to deal with North African 'piracy' between the 1620s and early 1640s. On the other hand, Games, as noted above, sees the English occupation of Tangier as marking a period of less cautious and more assertive mode of interaction in the region. However, Fisher in *Barbary Legends*, p. 224, presents quite a different view, discerning that the first sign of an explicit recognition of the value of diplomacy in dealing with the North African regencies becomes evident in the late 1650s. These different interpretations reflect, at least to some degree, the diversity and complexity of the experiences and responses of Britons in the Mediterranean: not only how they perhaps changed over time, but were influenced by both the circumstances and location of encounter. In particular, as emphasised elsewhere, the dynamics of their interaction with Morocco were rather different to those pertaining to their dealings with the other Barbary States.

⁴⁹ Hill, *God's Englishman*, p. 168; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 9. While he does not use the term, Alan Jamieson similarly argues that the Ottoman regencies were all forced to make peace treaties with England, France, and the Netherlands. He posits that the reasons they did not simply remove the corsair threat was that they wished for them to continue their activities in order to either disrupt the trade of their smaller European rivals, or attack their enemies in time of war. These do not appear sufficient reasons on their own for such restraint given the impact that corsair activity continued to have on the shipping of these three states. See Alan G. Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs* (London, 2012), pp. 18–19. See also Matar's argument for what he believes was a successful explicit strategy by the English and French of disabling North African seafaring capability in *British Captives*, pp. 160–165.

The first notable event which has been associated with this approach occurred in 1620 with the entry of an English fleet into the Mediterranean under the command of Sir Robert Mansell. While the aims of the expedition have been the subject of debate, its principal purpose appears to have been to suppress the activities of Algerine corsairs.⁵⁰ The naval historian Julian Corbett proclaimed the episode as the 'dawn of England's career as a Mediterranean power'.⁵¹ While his assessment is not necessarily inaccurate, the fact remains that the exercise achieved little of significance or long-term value. Moreover, it may, in fact, have been counterproductive by exacerbating the hostility of the corsairs, or at least emboldening them.⁵² David Quinn and A. N. Ryan believe that because of the fact that Mansell was explicitly instructed to proceed by diplomacy rather than with hostility, the mission should not be dismissed as an example of 'gunboat diplomacy'.⁵³

It was not until thirty-five years later that an English fleet again attempted to enforce its will on the regencies, on the occasion of Admiral Robert Blake's much vaunted mission in 1655 to Tunis and Algiers.⁵⁴ Blake's action against the Tunisians at Porto

⁵⁰ Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 107–115.

⁵¹ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, I, pp. 111–112.

⁵² Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, pp. 188–192; Davis, 'England in the Mediterranean', p. 130; Christopher Lloyd, *English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast* (London, 1981), pp. 67–71; Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 105–107, 134–135; Adrian Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean* (London, 2010), pp. 106–125. Hebb and Tinniswood provide good accounts of the expedition.

⁵³ David B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan, *England's Sea Empire, 1550–1642* (London, 1983), pp. 225–226.

⁵⁴ Understanding of the true intent of Blake's Mediterranean expedition has, according to Julian Corbett and Christopher Lloyd, remained elusive, as the commander's final instructions have never been found. See Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, I, pp. 274–276; Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, pp. 105–106. However, if an archivist's notation that a copy of instructions for Blake dates from 1654, not 1656, then it may be that the original purpose was, at least partly, resolution of issues, and negotiation of a peace, with Algiers, and that Blake's focus on Tunis was in response to later developments. The instructions require Blake to demand restitution of all 'goods, shippes and merchandises' taken and the emancipation of all Commonwealth subjects, and to negotiate 'just and reasonable' articles to maintain good relations. In the event the Algerines refused, he was authorised to use all necessary force to compel them to comply. See 'Instructions to General Robert Blake', July 165[4], TNA, SP 71/1/Pt. 2, f. 165r–v. In the intervening period a squadron had been sent to Salé on the Atlantic coast of Morocco in 1637 under William Rainsborough to suppress the corsairs operating from that port and effect the release of English captives held there, by force if necessary. The mission was successful to some extent, not as a result of the exercise of force, but because of the commander's ability to reach accommodations with Moroccan leaders. See discussion of this event in chap. 3. Planning for a similar expedition against Algiers was initiated in 1641, but was not progressed due to the political crisis which was developing in England at the time. See Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 265–272.

Farina was notable for its destruction of corsair vessels in the face of fire from shore batteries, but it was certainly not a decisive victory, and did not result in immediate Tunisian capitulation. It has been argued that the success of Blake's mission has been exaggerated by both contemporaries and historians alike, whereas, in fact, it achieved little of long term value. Even Blake attributed the outcome to good fortune.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, as Corbett opines, what is perhaps more salient is how it was perceived by Blake's compatriots at the time, and they appear to have judged the expedition an outstanding achievement.⁵⁶

But even by the 1670s things appeared to have changed little for the English when their demands were defied. The English navy could by now bring significant pressure to bear on the corsair strongholds, but unequivocal success remained elusive. Despite blockading Algiers and destroying a small corsair fleet during their expedition between 1669 and 1671, admirals Thomas Allin and Edward Spragge achieved less than expected from their negotiations with the Algerines, although articles of peace were eventually renewed.⁵⁷ In late 1674, Admiral John Narborough was sent to Tripoli to seek restitution for the seizure of cargo aboard English vessels. The admiral had in fact been instructed to attempt to resolve the matter amicably, however, he instead decided on a more assertive approach. But he was unable to maintain an effective blockade, and despite hostilities lasting about a year, had still failed to land a decisive blow against the Tripolitanian corsairs. Narborough was eventually authorised to lower his demands, and a new treaty was concluded in March 1676. This episode demonstrates that it was not a simple matter of power, but also of economics; such interventions were not only costly to the state, but also of concern to English merchants because of the effect they had on trade.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, pp. 217–226; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, pp. 274, 308, 310. Tinniswood makes a similar assessment in *Pirates of Barbary*, pp. 223–227. A peace treaty was eventually agreed with Tunis almost three years later, on 8 February 1658. On Blake's expedition, see also David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690* (London, 2000), p. 173.

⁵⁶ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, p. 274.

⁵⁷ Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, pp. 243–245.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 266–268. Fisher's conclusions concerning the effectiveness of English force in controlling the regencies and their corsairs differ to those of Davis and Matar, but Fisher does present a detailed, and convincing argument, and Loades in *England's Maritime Empire*, p. 199, similarly remarks on the

Concerns about the cost of conflict with the regencies was still as much a consideration in the mid-1670s as they were in 1662 when Samuel Pepys remarked upon news that treaties had been concluded with Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers by Sir John Lawson, that the admiral would return 'highly honoured', for 'by making peace ... his fleet will also shortly come home, [and the cost of maintaining the navy] will every day grow less, and so the King's charge be abated — which God send'.⁵⁹ The inability of the English to force the regencies into submission, even towards the end of the century, and the costs which they incurred in attempting to do so, is well demonstrated in the war England waged with Algiers between 1677 and 1682. It was estimated that during this period the Algerine corsairs seized 157 merchant vessels and 3,000 captives, and the conflict cost the English Crown some £300,000. Consequently, one contemporary reflected that 'nothing could have been more acceptable to the king than the renewal of peace'.⁶⁰ Godfrey Fisher observes that the outcome was 'neither glorious nor successful', an assessment which appears to be supported by Pepys, who refers to 'the extravagancy of the peace with Algiers'.⁶¹

inconclusive nature of the short term results achieved by the English efforts. See Davis, 'England in the Mediterranean', p. 131, and Matar, *British Captives*, pp. 189–190.

⁵⁹ Samuel Pepys, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, eds. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 3 (London, 1970–1983), pp. 263, 271, entries for 22 and 30 November 1662 (my interpolation). Tinniswood in *Pirates of Barbary*, pp. 229–230, notes that Lawson's mission had been preceded by an 'apparently inconclusive' attack against Algiers by the earl of Sandwich the previous year, and general harrying of Algerian vessels by Lawson. Loades in *England's Maritime Empire*, p. 198, comments that the operation against Algiers was undertaken in collaboration with the Dutch, and that it 'achieved little'.

⁶⁰ 'Volume 90: April 1–June 15, 1704', in Joseph Redington, ed., *Calendar of Treasury Papers*, vol. III, 1702–1707 (London, 1874), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol3/pp248-271>, accessed 2 June 2016. See entry no. 11, c. 5 June, in online edition, and pp. 250–251 in printed edition. Linda Colley in *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), pp. 51–52, citing the same source, refers to a cost of £800,000, which is presumably an error. But Fisher does comment that French authors quote higher figures. See *Barbary Legends*, p. 264. Colley also notes that some estimates of the number of English vessels captured are as high as 500, but does not provide sources for these figures. The English squadrons were under the command of Narborough until 1679, and then Arthur Herbert, who was much criticised by Pepys.

⁶¹ Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, p. 264; Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, pp. 203–204. Pepys also remarks upon the king's 'incapacity to maintain the war longer', but pointedly notes that the navy was maintaining the same level of presence as it had during the war, almost two years earlier. Sari Hornstein on the other hand, argues that England forced the regencies to negotiate treaties by making it too costly for them to continue attacking English vessels, but gives little attention to the costs incurred by the English, and fails to reflect on what influence this aspect may have played in the outcome of the war. See Sari R. Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot, UK, 1991), pp. 8, 99–154. See also Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary*, pp. 238–239. Tinniswood also attributes the capitulation of the Algerians to the cost of the conflict incurred by them, but does acknowledge the significant cost also incurred by the English.

National pride had to be considered alongside national cost.⁶² But while England was eventually able to mitigate the depredations of the corsairs through a combination of intimidation and pragmatic accommodation, it was not the end of England's problems in the region. The sultan of Morocco, Mawlay Ismā'īl, not only forced England to abandon its once lauded colony of Tangier in 1684, but also institutionalised corsairing as a means of raising revenue for the state. In consequence, Moroccan corsairs continued to plague British shipping well into the eighteenth century.⁶³

The English undoubtedly exercised a provocative and aggressive approach to pursuing their interests in the Mediterranean at times, but, aside from the costs involved, their capability to do so was also severely limited before 1660.⁶⁴ As noted in the introduction to this thesis, efforts to improve the navy commenced from around 1625, but the period 1649 and 1660 under Cromwell marked a major turning point, with a significant increase in the size and effectiveness of the fleet. The development of the navy allowed state ships to begin to replace merchant vessels as the principal means of defence of maritime trade, and the resulting improvement in the protection they offered contributed to the growth of English shipping in the Mediterranean, particularly after 1670.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, while the ability of the navy to project its power increased, G. E. Aylmer cautions about thinking it indomitable, as evidenced by the equivocal outcomes of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars between 1652 and 1672, including a 'severe minor defeat' the English suffered in the Western

⁶² On problems associated with the cost of maintaining the navy, and its financing, during the period 1660–1688, see Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pp. 189–194.

⁶³ M. S. Anderson, 'Great Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth Century', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 29 (1956), pp. 102–106; Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, p. 273; Colley, *Captives*, p. 52; Stein, 'The Mediterranean', p. 149, incl. n. 10. The benefits which accrued to Mawlay Ismā'īl from corsair activity were such that John Braithwaite felt the need to comment upon them in his account of the country, *The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco, Upon the Death of the Late Emperor Muley Ishmael* (London, 1729), p. 357. Cf. Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 254.

⁶⁴ Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 52–53. Fisher provides numerous examples of English intransigence, and transgression of treaty provisions in *Barbary Legends*.

⁶⁵ Michael J. Braddick, 'The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 287–289. See also Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, pp. 1–5; Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pp. 248–251. Loades in *England's Maritime Empire* pp. 156, 248, dates the commencement of real renewal of the navy under Charles I to 1633.

Mediterranean during the first war.⁶⁶ Furthermore, Tim Blanning asserts that while Britain did eventually achieve naval supremacy over the other European powers and Ottomans, it occurred over the course of the eighteenth century, and was not ensured until after 1793.⁶⁷ When the naval chaplain Henry Teonge proclaimed in January 1675–76, '[s]o that wee are still conquerours',⁶⁸ rather than it being an exclamation of perceived English hegemony, as has been claimed by one scholar,⁶⁹ it was more likely to have been an expression of relief in response to a pleasing change in English fortunes in that sea.

The improvement of the navy was part of a fundamental shift in the role of the state in the expansion of English overseas trade. Prior to this, the English state had possessed a limited ability to provide diplomatic and military support for the activities of its merchants. As a result, trading companies involved in long-distance trade were granted monopolies and licensed to undertake these functions.⁷⁰ However, such monopolies became harder to justify as trade became more routine, and the military and diplomatic capacity of the government increased. Thus, over the course of the seventeenth century the English state's growing naval, fiscal power, and bureaucratic capability allowed it to increasingly rely less on licensed agents, and to assume a more direct role in relation to trade and overseas diplomacy.⁷¹ But Michael Braddick observes that the process of change was complex, with turning points dependent on the life cycle of particular trades and settlements, and associated local conditions. It was further complicated by domestic developments, and events in England's colonies, and the way in which these issues intersected. He remarks that the resultant

⁶⁶ G. E. Aylmer, 'Navy, State, Trade, and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 468–470.

⁶⁷ Tim Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648–1815* (London, 2008), p. 643.

⁶⁸ Henry Teonge, *The Diary of Henry Teonge: Chaplain on Board His Majesty's Ships Assistance, Bristol, and Royal Oak, anno 1675 to 1679* (London, 1825), p. 136. Teonge's comment was elicited by the forced grounding of a corsair vessel from Salé.

⁶⁹ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 10.

⁷⁰ Braddick, 'War, Trade, and Settlement', pp. 292–294.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 294, 301. The essential features of the legislation were confirmed in the Navigation Act of 1660, with the 1663 Staple Act completing the legislative framework for an English monopoly over the colonial carrying trade. A further Act was introduced in 1673. While there were problems of enforcement which limited the effectiveness of these measures, the same was true of attempts to regulate trade through chartered corporations.

‘tangled chronology’ makes it difficult to infer the existence of a ‘coherent Imperial vision’ directing English maritime expansionism.⁷²

The issue of the existence, or absence, of such a vision is very much at the heart of questions concerning the nature of English activity in the Mediterranean in the second half of the seventeenth century: was it driven by the purely commercial objectives of private enterprise, and perhaps geopolitical concerns, or did the English also have clear imperial and colonial intentions? An understanding of this issue is important for the purposes of this present study: if the English, or Britons more generally, were possessed of a shared vision for the Mediterranean it may have contributed to conditioning their attitudes and behaviours in their encounters with other cultures in the region. The late-Victorian historian Walter Frewen Lord certainly did not believe that England had ever possessed a coherent strategy for the Mediterranean in the early modern period,⁷³ while his contemporary Corbett, concludes that there was no such policy until at least the reign of William III (1689–1702); prior to that, English rulers had possessed no more than ‘an unreasoned intuition for dominion’.⁷⁴ Their views in this respect differ little from those of some of their successors, who stress both the lack of clear imperial and colonial strategies, and the existence of differing visions for English overseas expansion during the seventeenth century; in particular, whether England should aspire to a territorial empire or a commercial empire.⁷⁵ Furthermore, Stein argues that the focus on conquest and colonial settlement has conflated ‘expansion and empire’, and ‘obscured the institutional diversity that underlay the global extension of English trade and political authority’.⁷⁶ As Braddick remarks: ‘The transformation of the military and fiscal capacity of the state and the commercial revolution created new interests, new possibilities, and new ambitions, but in the end they took their place

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 301. On the changing role of the English state in overseas activity over the seventeenth century, see also Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 289–293; Stein, ‘The Mediterranean’, pp. 97–113.

⁷³ Walter Frewen Lord, *England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830* (London, 1901), pp. 4–5.

⁷⁴ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 567.

⁷⁵ Braddick, ‘War, Trade, and Settlement’, pp. 307–308; P. J. Marshall, ‘The First British Empire’, in Robin W. Winks, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols, vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 47–50; Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 293, 298–299; Stein, ‘The Mediterranean’, pp. 19–20, 49–50.

⁷⁶ Stein, ‘The Mediterranean’, p. 7.

alongside existing ones'.⁷⁷ While their newfound naval capability allowed the English to attempt to 'impose their commercial and military will in the region',⁷⁸ Braddick stresses that it was not an 'Imperial phenomenon', rather it was one driven by European competition and the civil war at home, but it did support both England's trading and colonial interests.⁷⁹ However, contemporary uncertainty concerning how England should exercise its naval power is perhaps revealed in Pepys' reflection from 1684 quoted at the beginning of this chapter: should it be used simply to protect the nation's interests against other European powers and pirates, or as a means to assert its sovereignty? It seems that some level of vacillation between these two options may have contributed to some of the inherent contradictions which are evident in the behaviour of the English in the Mediterranean during the second half of the seventeenth century.

⁷⁷ Braddick, 'War, Trade, and Settlement', p. 308.

⁷⁸ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 9.

⁷⁹ Braddick, 'War, Trade, and Settlement', pp. 291–292. Hornstein makes the same point in *Restoration Navy*, p. 2.




Fig. 3 The principal political domains of Morocco, from *The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco*, 1729.

1.2. Turmoil and Resistance in Morocco

While England was attempting to establish itself in the Mediterranean, and contributing to the disruption of the existing maritime order, dynastic change was underway in Morocco, which was also, at least partly, due to the encroachment of European states, namely the Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, the Spanish. Contemporaneously with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia similarly experienced the decline of reigning dynasties and increasing intervention by foreign powers from the end of the fifteenth century, with the main protagonists in their case being Spain and the Ottoman Empire. New autonomous states subsequently emerged, and the ports around which they developed became bases for Muslim corsairs, whose numbers were supplemented by Iberian Muslims driven from Spain following the fall of Granada, as well as by European renegades. While foreign encroachment had initially been facilitated by existing processes of political destabilisation, the subsequent interplay between foreign interference, internal political conflicts, changing alliances, and, especially in the case of Morocco, religious difference, made the region particularly challenging for the European powers for the purposes of trade, diplomacy, and, above all, colonial activities.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the ruling Wattasid dynasty in Morocco found itself under pressure from growing internal political conflict, and from the expansion of Portuguese commercial and colonial activities. In response, there emerged a popular desire for unity and stability within the country. This sentiment had both religious and political dimensions, and developed into a distinct religio-nationalistic movement, inspired to some extent by antipathy toward the European presence in Morocco. The Wattasids were unable to provide a rallying point for this discontent: as well as lacking religious authority, they were also politically compromised, having allied themselves to the Portuguese.⁸⁰ Sufi *shaykhs*, *sharifs* and

⁸⁰ R. Mantran, 'North Africa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 2 vols., vol. 2. *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 239–240; Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 206–208. See also Laroui, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 245–248; B. A. Mojuetan, 'Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the

marabouts became important socio-political forces in response to widespread disenchantment with traditional leadership, and growing determination by Moroccans to resist the perceived foreign threat to both their country and religion. Two sharifian families with the necessary religious affiliations and political authority subsequently emerged to provide leadership: the sharifs of Jabal al-Alam in the north-west, and the Sa'dīs in the south-west.⁸¹ However, the Sa'dīs were more fortunate in that both the Portuguese military presence and Wattasid authority were nominal in the kingdom of Sus, enabling them to better organise and sustain their religio-political movement.⁸²

After progressive success against the Wattasids, the Sa'dian ascendancy was also enhanced by their achievement by 1549 in dislodging the Portuguese from their settlements on the Atlantic coast, enabling the resumption of privateering from Salé⁸³ and Larache, and trade with France and England. Following a decisive battle in 1553, the Sa'dī leader, Muhammad al-Shaykh,⁸⁴ emerged victorious, and the Sa'dian dynasty was established. Through their control of the principal centres of power — Sus, Marrakesh (commonly referred to as Morocco or Marocco at the time), and Fez (or Fès) (see fig. 3) — the Sa'dīs effectively ruled the whole of Morocco.⁸⁵ However,

Seventeenth Century During the Interregnum', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), p. 47.

⁸¹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 206, 208; Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin, 1976), chap. 1. A *sharif* (sg. *sharif*/pl. *shurfa* in the common Maghribi dialect) is a member of the nobility, and specifically a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, while the title *shaykh* can refer to a tribal chief or senior religious scholar. Sufi masters who headed religious lodges, called *zawyas*, were accorded the title of *shaykh*. Marabouts in the Sufi tradition are persons, either alive or dead, who are considered to possess a close connection with God, which enables the marabout to act as an intermediary with the spiritual world. During the fifteenth century in Morocco maraboutism and descent from the Prophet became conflated and marabouts began to attain the status of saints. See *ibid.*, pp. 6–7, 23–26.

⁸² Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 208–209.

⁸³ Most commonly transliterated as 'Sallee' in seventeenth century English sources, although 'Sally' and 'Salley' were also used.

⁸⁴ Also known as Muhammad al-Mahdī. He changed his name in 1541. See Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 223.

⁸⁵ Mantran, 'North Africa', pp. 240–241; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 210–211. For an account of the events of this period also see Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 213–217. Julien similarly highlights the important role that the politico-religious sentiment which emerged at the time played in the rise of the Sa'dīs. See also Mercedes García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', p. 290. 'Morocco' and 'Marrakesh' continued to be used interchangeably as names for both the country and the city well into the twentieth century.

the Europeans were not the only foreign powers to have an interest in the country; the Ottomans had also become involved in the dynastic struggle. They not only appear to have viewed the Wattasids as a potential ally against the Spanish, but were also concerned that unification of Morocco by the Sa'dīs would challenge their own leadership in the region.⁸⁶

Despite their professed aim of expelling the Christian Europeans, the Sa'dīs were pragmatic. Trade with Genoese and Spanish merchants had played an important role in equipping them in their struggle against the Portuguese. Furthermore, trade with Europeans operating under the protection of the Portuguese was a significant source of profit.⁸⁷ Moreover, in 1555 al-Shaykh entered into an agreement with the Spanish for a joint expedition against Algiers. Although the plan was dropped following his assassination by the Ottomans in 1557, because of fear of Turkish expansionism al-Shaykh's successors maintained an informal alliance with the Spanish.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the Ottomans soon came to play an instrumental role in the country, which would not only directly influence Moroccan politics, but would also have far reaching, and long-term consequences for Europe as well.

In 1574 the Ottoman sultan agreed to provide military support to al-Shaykh's son 'Abd al-Malik to usurp his nephew Muhammad al-Mutawakkil (r. 1574–1576). In response, al-Mutawakkil approached the Portuguese for assistance.⁸⁹ In 1578, an army led by King Sebastian of Portugal landed in northern Morocco but was decisively defeated in the infamous (at least in the annals of European history) Battle of Alcazar. During the battle, Sebastian and al-Mutawakkil were killed, and al-Malik died shortly after. The result for Portugal was disastrous: without an heir to the throne, the country was annexed to Spain in 1580. While the Portuguese threat had been extinguished, with the death of al-Malik and the presence of Turkish troops in his army, the Ottomans now represented a greater danger to the Sa'dīs. However, al-

⁸⁶ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 155–156, 212.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 209–211.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214. See also Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 242–243; Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 226; García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', pp. 290–291.

⁸⁹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 214.

Malik was quickly succeeded as sultan by his brother Ahmad, who began to call himself *al-Mansūr* ('the victorious'). The transition was smooth, and al-Mansūr was able to avoid subsequent dependence on either the Ottomans or European powers.⁹⁰ However, al-Mansūr's success did encourage Spain, France, and England to make overtures to further diplomatic and commercial relations with Morocco.⁹¹

It was during Ahmad al-Mansūr's reign (1578–1603) that the Sa'dian dynasty reached its zenith, both politically and economically, and an administrative structure was established that could effectively facilitate centralised rule.⁹² Furthermore, he developed a large professional army modelled along Turkish lines. But despite his achievements, dissent continued. Al-Mansūr's rule was oppressive, his profligacy diminished the country's economic resources, and the inclusion of Christians and Jews in his court was a concern to the religious fraternities.⁹³ As well as imposing his authority within the country, al-Mansūr also adopted an audacious foreign policy. He maintained friendly relations with Spain as a counter to the Ottomans, who, along with their client subjects in North Africa, began to see al-Mansūr as a possible rival. But the relationship was a troubling one for the Sa'dīs due to Spain's own colonial activities in the Maghrib, and it is for this reason, at least in part, that al-Mansūr was attracted to the possibility of an alliance with England following concerted efforts by the English from 1580 to obtain his support to install Don Antonio on the Portuguese throne.⁹⁴

The death of al-Mansūr in 1603 led to renewed internecine conflict, and another highly unstable era in Morocco. The signs of a coming crisis were obvious to an English resident as early as 1600.⁹⁵ The sultanate disintegrated amidst conflict between the

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 214–215.

⁹¹ Mantan, 'North Africa', p. 244. For a good account of the developments leading up to and following the battle, see also Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 226–228.

⁹² Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 244; Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 228–230; Mercedes García-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur: The Beginnings of Modern Morocco* (London, 2009), *passim*.

⁹³ Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 245; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 215.

⁹⁴ Mantran, 'North Africa', pp. 246–247; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 218. On al-Mansūr's foreign policy see also Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 235–236; Stephen Cory, *Reviving the Islamic Caliphate in Early Modern Morocco* (Abingdon, UK, 2016), *passim*.

⁹⁵ 'Lettre de George Tomson a Robert Cecil', 21 August 1600, in Henry de Castries, ed., *SIHMA*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Paris, 1925), pp. 175–176. Note: for consistency, all dates associated with sources cited from

late sultan's three sons and religious fraternities championing the causes of groups which, once again, were seeking unity.⁹⁶ By 1613, the country was essentially divided into two parts. One was ruled from Marrakesh by al-Mansūr's son Zaydān (r. 1609–1627), the other from Fez by his grandson 'Abdullah (r. 1610–1627). The dynasty was further compromised by 'Abdullah's father, Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Mam'un, who by handing control of Larache to Spain in 1610 caused his son's authority to be rejected in the old city of Fez, Tétouan and Meknes.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, Zaydān was also having trouble asserting his own authority in the south. Charles-André Julien describes it as 'the darkest period of anarchy that Morocco has experienced'.⁹⁸ As happened a century earlier, the renewed encroachment of the European powers resulted in a widespread nationalist and religious movement. In response to popular outrage against the surrender of Larache, Ahmad Abu Mahalli, a Sufi leader who claimed to be the *mahdi* whose coming was prophesied in the Qur'an, had precipitated a major rebellion against the Sa'dīs in 1610. Abu Mahalli first seized Tafilalt, and then occupied Marrakesh in 1612.⁹⁹ Zaydān was eventually restored with assistance from the al-Hahi fraternity, but at the cost of his subservience to them.¹⁰⁰

These events were recounted by Englishmen in several published accounts, which reveal how well informed the English were about Moroccan affairs; so much so that one historian asserts that the accounts provided by English traders and travellers are among the best contemporary sources for the period.¹⁰¹ One account, *The Fierce and Cruel Battaile*, by an anonymous purported eyewitness concerns the struggle between al-Mansūr's sons for control of Marrakesh between December 1606 and the following April. The author provides not only a detailed description of the events, but also reflects on the intensity of the hostility: 'the like slaughter was never to

SIHMA are rendered in 'Old Style', except the year, even though the editors base the chronology on 'New Style' dating.

⁹⁶ Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 247; Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 236–237; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 219.

⁹⁷ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 219–220. During the civil war, the Spanish took possession of both Larache (al-'Ara'ish/El Araich) and Mehdyā (al-Ma'mura/Mamora).

⁹⁸ Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 237.

⁹⁹ Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 247; Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 238; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 220.

¹⁰⁰ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 220; Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 238.

¹⁰¹ Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 242.

foreseene nor heard of in Barbarie'.¹⁰² The pamphlet is particularly notable for the obvious insight that the author possessed about the political situation, and the general sentiment of the people, particularly their ambivalence concerning whom they should support.¹⁰³ The author's belief in the rebellious nature of the people was not necessarily the product of English bigotry either: it was also attested to by a contemporary Moroccan writer and a Portuguese nobleman.¹⁰⁴

Another pamphlet, *The New Prophetical King of Barbary*, published in 1613 by John Harrison, a notable personality in Anglo-Moroccan relations in the early part of the seventeenth century, also reveals that the English were not only well informed about developments, but were also cognisant of the religious dimensions of the conflict; although they may not have fully understood their implications.¹⁰⁵ It is an interesting text for a number of reasons, not least in highlighting the powerful role that religious leadership played in Moroccan society. Harrison's correspondent, a merchant 'who hath long time sojourned there', and who only identifies himself as 'R.S.', recounts events relating to the revolt led by Abu Mahalli (whom he names as 'Mulley Om

¹⁰² *The Fierce and Cruel Battaille Fought by the Three Kings in Barbarie, Nere to the Cittie of Maroques, the 25. of Aprill last. 1607* (London, 1607), p. 7.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also R. Cottington, *A True Historicall Discourse of Muley Hamets Rising to the Three Kingdomes of Moruecos, Fes, and Sus ...* (London, 1609). This text provides a more extensive account of political developments in Morocco relating to the rise of the Sa'dian dynasty from the early sixteenth century, as well as information about Islam, and Moroccan society and culture. The details of the account given of events at Marrakesh (chaps. XII–XIII) are remarkably similar to those provided in the previous text, and may have, possibly, been based on them. The text is signed 'Ro. C', but the EBBO record notes the text is attributed to an 'R. Cottington, who may be a fictitious person'. In around 1607, the London playwright and pamphleteer, George Wilkins used reports of events in Morocco as the basis of a cautionary tale about the consequences of civil discord and sin, highlighting how 'Descention hath now taken holde of Barbarie, a kingdome full of people, abundant in riches, flowing with Arts and trafficke with all Nations'. See George Wilkins, *Three Miseries of Barbary: Plague. Famine. Civill Warre. With a Relation of the Death of Mahamet the Late Emperour: and a Briefe Report of the Now Present Wars Betweene the Three Brothers* (London, [1607]), sig. D3. Wilkins' may have relied partly on information from Sir Anthony Sherley, who was in North Africa in 1605–06. See Anthony Parr, 'Wilkins, George (d. 1618)', in Lawrence Goldman, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 16 February 2015. Castries provides a transcription of the text in *SIHMA*, II, pp. 249–265, but dates it to 1604.

¹⁰⁴ Cory, *Reviving the Islamic Caliphate*, p. 205.

¹⁰⁵ The English were not alone in this respect. Despite being held prisoner by the Sa'dis between 1592 and 1606, the Portuguese observer António de Saldanha, author of the *Cronica de Almansor, Sultao de Marrocos (1578–1603)*, appears not to have understood the importance of sharifian descent to al-Mansūr's authority. See Cory, *Reviving the Islamic Caliphate*, p. 202.

Hamet ben Abdela') against 'Mulley Sidan'.¹⁰⁶ R.S. refers to the 'beginning and rising' of the Sufi mystic, which he notes 'are very strange'.¹⁰⁷ He records that Abu Mahalli proclaimed at a meeting with European merchants that he came to make peace, having been sent by God to challenge the current ruling dynasty, 'to stablish their Prophets religion ... and recover those parts of Christendome the king of Spaine holds from them'. Abu Mahalli asserted that the Moors would not only gain Spain, but also Italy and France, '[b]ut for England, Flanders or other parts they have not to doe, they will have friendship with us'.¹⁰⁸ The text is inherently contradictory: R.S.'s attitude towards Abu Mahalli as conveyed through his letter ranges from initial admiration, to ambivalence, and finally outright hostility.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the account does demonstrate how Abu Mahalli's piety could impress those who met him, and how he promoted a vision that could be used both to inspire his countrymen and potentially attract the support of Protestant Europeans through the promise of the conquest of the Catholic powers. In this way, it also reinforces the degree of pragmatism that Moroccan leaders were capable of when required, and how astute they had become in their understanding of the interests of Europeans, and in manipulating them.¹¹⁰

Zaydān died in 1627 without having been able to establish control over large areas of the country. The period following his father's death had been marked by general economic decline in Morocco, arising from both the internal conflict and external factors. Not only were trading activities frustrated by the political instability, but the goods of interest to European merchants became scarce. Loss of Moroccan influence in western Sudan had reduced the supply of gold, there was a decline in sugar

¹⁰⁶ R.S., *The New Prophetical King of Barbary or the Last Newes from Thence in a Letter Written of Late from a Merchant There, to a Gentl. Not Long Since Employed into that Countrie from His Maiestie*, ed. John Harrison (London, 1613). There were two other editions of the pamphlet printed in the same year. Both have similar titles, and contents, but one was produced by a different printer, and has different pagination from the one referenced here. The writer may have confused Abu Mahalli's name with that of the son of Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Mam'un, 'Abdullah, or simply made an error. However, given the events and his description of the 'new King' it is evident that he is referring to Abu Mahalli as the protagonist.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, sig. Cv.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, sig. B3r-v.

¹⁰⁹ On the contradictory nature of the text, and the possible exercise of editorial licence by Harrison, see chapter 3.

¹¹⁰ Julien in *History of North Africa*, pp. 240–241, makes a similar observation.

production, and the activities of the Dutch and French on the West African coast led to a diversion of trade routes.¹¹¹ These conditions not only affected trade, but also the general population. As the author of the *The Fierce and Cruel Battaile* remarked even a decade earlier: 'the country is spoyled, and the dearth increaseth ... for many persons die of meere hunger'.¹¹²

By the time of Zaydan's death the political situation in Morocco had become even more complex, having fractured along both tribal and sectarian lines, but with three principal groups opposed to the Sa'dīs having emerged. The most important of these were the Dilā'īs in the Middle Atlas, followed by Shaykh Abū Hassūn who occupied Sus and Tafilelt, and the Moriscos of the self-proclaimed republic of Bou Regreg.¹¹³ The leaders of all three groups possessed political aspirations masked by their professed religious causes, but only the Dilā'īs aspired to replace the Sa'dīs as the rulers of Morocco.¹¹⁴ The republic of Bou Regreg, which was centred on the adjacent towns of Rabat and Salé, had been established by descendants of the Iberian Peninsula's Muslim population, who had either fled or been expelled from Spain. These refugees had an antipathy towards Christians, and Salé became the major base of Muslim corsairs operating in the Atlantic, the infamous 'Sallee Rovers'.¹¹⁵ The people of Bou Regreg were drawn into an alliance with Muhammad al-'Ayāshī, a leader of a local Arab tribe who had commenced a jihad against the Spanish along the Atlantic coast and subsequently rebelled against the Sa'dīs. While he was

¹¹¹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 220–221.

¹¹² *The Fierce and Cruel Battaile*, p. 8.

¹¹³ Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 247; Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 238; Abu-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p.221. Abū Hassūn is also known as Abu al-Hasan al-Samlali.

¹¹⁴ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 221.

¹¹⁵ The area had been settled from early in the sixteenth century by Iberian Muslims who had fled persecution following the conquest of Granada. The new Morisco inhabitants consisted of two essentially discrete groups, the 'Hornacheros' and the 'Andalusians', who arrived later and in greater numbers. The Moriscos settled in the 'new town' based on the small village of Rabat across the river to the south of Salé, adjacent to an old fortress commanding the mouth of the river which they rebuilt. For this reason, as noted by the historian Roger Coindreau, terms such 'Corsairs of Sallee or Saletins, which History uses, are inaccurate in the sense they do not describe individuals of whom the greater part were not natives of Sallee'. However, given the frequent conflation of Salé and Rabat in both primary and secondary sources, for convenience the practice is continued in this thesis, except where otherwise required for clarity. See Christopher Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, pp. 93–95, Coindreau translated and cited on p. 93. On processes of emigration and settlement of Moriscos in Morocco, see García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', pp. 286–328. On the Moriscos of Rabat-Salé see *ibid.*, pp. 324–328.

unsuccessful in removing the Spanish, by the early 1630s he had largely eliminated Sa'dian authority from the Gharb, but in the process had also alienated the Moriscos, who subsequently turned against him, and allied themselves with the Dilā'īs.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile the marabout Abū Hassūn had achieved political control of Sus, and with it control of trade with the Sudan, ensuring the economic viability of his rule, and providing him the means to obtain armaments from Europe.¹¹⁷

Unlike the other two factions, the Dilā'īs were Berbers, and descendants of a prominent religious family, which had been held in high esteem by the Sa'dīs. During the turmoil which followed al-Mansūr's death, the leader of the community assumed a political leadership role among the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas, but it was his successor, Muhammad al-Hajj (1636–68), commonly referred to as 'Ben Bucar' by the English, who actively pursued political power.¹¹⁸ Al-Hajj was ambivalent about the Sa'dīs, partly out of deference to their sharifian status, but also because his territorial interests lay towards the ocean, and for this reason he was less accommodating towards al-'Ayāshī, who impeded his plans to gain control of Salé. Under the pretext of defending the Moriscos of Bou Regreg, al-Hajj commenced a campaign against al-'Ayāshī in 1640, and in a final battle in 1641 al-'Ayāshī was killed and his troops were routed. However, those of his followers who escaped would go on to lead a rebellion that in turn contributed to the collapse of the Dilā'īs.¹¹⁹ They would also play a pivotal role in developments during the first decade of the English occupation of Tangier under the leadership of al-Khadr Ghailan.

The Dilā'īs quickly went on to occupy Salé, Fez and most of the key centres in northern Morocco, including Tétouan. Between 1641 and 1651 the Dilā'īs permitted the Moriscos in Salé and Tétouan to maintain their autonomy. It was an arrangement of benefit to them given the inhabitants of these centres were familiar with dealing with

¹¹⁶ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 221–222; Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 239–240. The Gharb refers that part of the Moroccan Atlantic littoral zone which includes the towns of Meknes, Salé, and Ouezzane.

¹¹⁷ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 222.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

Europeans, and managing such relationships indirectly avoided compromising their moral authority, while still permitting access to European trade, especially to military equipment.¹²⁰ But despite their military success and political cohesion, the authority of the Dilā'īs was insufficient to maintain a stable government. Its political structure, dominated as it was by Berbers, did not accommodate the interests of the Arabs, and they did not possess the sacral authority of sharifs. For this reason, the Dilā'īs struggled to maintain control of the important centre of Fez from the beginning of their occupation in 1641, and finally lost control of the city in 1664, at the same time that their last links with Salé were severed, and the 'Alawi sharifs began their rise in the north-east of the country.¹²¹

The Sa'dian dynasty came to an end following the death of its leader Mawlay Muhammad al-Aṣghar in 1654, and the assassination of his son, Abou el Abbas, in 1659. Following a further decade of conflict, it was the 'Alawī sharif Mawlay al-Rashīd who was able to assert his authority across the country and founded the 'Alawid dynasty.¹²² As Jamil Abun-Nasr has observed, the case of the Sa'dīs suggests sharifian descent had become a necessary precondition for recognition of both religious and political authority in Morocco, and through this to achieve unity among the various religious and tribal factions. As was shown by the example of the Dilā'īs, military might was not sufficient on its own. What was required was religio-political status that could unite the entire Muslim community, both Berber and Arab.¹²³ Even then, the multiplicity of Moroccan ethnic and tribal interests had to be respected. As a later English visitor observed: 'So dangerous and impolitick it is in any prince to declare publicly his aversion to any body of his people'.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 227. See also Mojuetan, 'Legitimacy in a Power State', p. 352.

¹²² Mantran, 'North Africa', p. 247; P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, [197?]), p. 43. Mawlay was a title traditionally accorded to all sharifs, and subsequently became a normal honorific for the 'Alawī sultans. See Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 228. Mawlay is also transliterated as Mawlāy, Moulay, Mulay/Mūlāy, Muley, and Mulāi.

¹²³ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 228. See also Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 243–245; Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (London, 2002), chaps. 1 and 2.

¹²⁴ Braithwaite, *History of the Revolutions*, p. 381.

1.3. Mutual Needs: The Beginnings of Anglo-Moroccan Relations

Rather than deter commercial and political relations, the internecine conflicts in Morocco actually helped to encourage the development of closer ties between Morocco and England during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In fact, the two countries were at times drawn together by their mutual need for political alliances in the face of internal dissent or external threat. The relationship between them is surprisingly long for this very reason. In perhaps the earliest account of dealings of this nature, the English chronicler Matthew Paris wrote that King John sent an embassy to the Almohad caliph in around 1213 seeking his support against an unspecified threat. It was a sign of the king's desperation, according to Paris, that John offered to become a tributary of the caliph, and even to convert to Islam.¹²⁵ While the veracity of Paris' account has been challenged, it does indicate just how long Northwest Africa had been a part of the geographic imagination of Britons.¹²⁶ The long history of Anglo-Moroccan relations is often given scant attention by scholars, instead it is often overshadowed by a focus on corsairing, captivity, and the trials and tribulations of the English occupation of Tangier.

But it was trade, not politics, that encouraged the English to return to Morocco some three centuries after John's purported delegation. The exact reasons are unclear, but it appears to have been driven by a combination of factors: the transfer of activities from the eastern Mediterranean;¹²⁷ the decline in demand for English cloth on the Continent; and the country was considered to be a good source of gold and sugar.¹²⁸ The first voyage recorded by Richard Hakluyt left Portsmouth in 1551 under the command of Thomas Wyndham, and arrived in 'Zafia' (Safi). No details of its cargo

¹²⁵ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., vol. II (London, 1874), pp. 559–564.

¹²⁶ It is worth noting that Paris is known for his critical appraisal of John's personal morality, which draws attention, at the very least, to the possibility that the episode was embellished to impugn the king's moral deficiency and lack of piety. On the delegation and its historiography, see the recent study by Ilan Shoval, *King John's Delegation to the Almohad Court (1212): Medieval Interreligious Interactions and Modern Historiography* (Turnhout, 2016).

¹²⁷ See the discussion on this issue in the previous section on the Mediterranean in this chapter.

¹²⁸ T. S. Willan, *Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade* (Manchester, 1959), pp. 94–95. Willan discusses the dating of the beginning of Anglo-Moroccan trade on pp. 92–94.

are provided, however, the Spanish ambassador in England claimed that among the merchandise were pikes and armour. Interestingly, Hakluyt's correspondent notes that they also transported 'two Moores, being noble men, whereof one was of the kings blood, conveyed ... into their countrey out of England'.¹²⁹ How these men arrived in England, and their purpose for being there, is not revealed, but it appears they may have been emissaries of the Wattasids, sent to seek Spanish support against the Sa'dīs.¹³⁰

The results from the voyage were sufficiently promising that Wyndham led a further expedition in the following year. The fleet anchored first in Safi, and then in 'Santa Cruz' (Agadir), where they were well received, and were successful in bartering their cargo. In contrast to their warm reception in Morocco, on their return home they encountered a Portuguese fleet and it was made clear to them that England's entry into the Moroccan trade was unwelcome, and would not be tolerated.¹³¹ But perhaps the Portuguese had concerns that went beyond commercial jealousy, for the Spanish ambassador once again provides further detail about the cargo, claiming that the vessels had also been carrying 'all sorts of munitions of war'.¹³² As an English king had once reached out to Morocco for help to defend his throne, the English were now returning to assist Moroccans to similarly prosecute their own monarchical claims, and defend their country against foreign threat, but only in the pursuit of profit.

It was also for profit that the Sa'dian ruler 'Abdullah al-Ghālib (r. 1557–74) encouraged English commercial activity on the Atlantic coast.¹³³ By 1558, trade with Morocco had sufficiently developed to justify the presence of at least one English factor, who 'travellyd the contreys to provide and buye suche quantitie of gome

¹²⁹ Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, II, pp. 319–[320]. Willan refers to the ambassador's report in *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 98.

¹³⁰ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 96–97.

¹³¹ Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, II, pp. [320]–[321]. The Portuguese had lost both Safi and Agadir in 1541, effectively ending their claimed monopoly on European trade with Morocco. See Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 93. The Portuguese continued to attempt to discourage English trade with Morocco until 1576. See Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 9–10.

¹³² Quoted in Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 99.

¹³³ Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 225–226.

[gum] as he myght gett', and by 1559 at least two English ships were engaged in the trade, one of which carried a merchant who it is claimed had acquired the ability to understand and converse in Arabic.¹³⁴ T. S. Willan remarks that what is remarkable about the development of Anglo-Moroccan trade is how quickly it established itself in the conventional Western European pattern of organisation. But he also highlights that the English in Morocco were operating in a very different environment, one which required them to negotiate the intricacies of royal monopolies and Jewish middlemen, who themselves occupied a delicate position between the two sides.¹³⁵ Commercial disputes of one form or another arising from these arrangements would be the cause of much tension in Anglo-Moroccan relations.

The staples of the trade were English cloth and Moroccan sugar. While English armaments and Moroccan gold are also often cited in the secondary literature as being significant components of the trade, their prevalence is more difficult to identify and assess.¹³⁶ There does appear to have been some illicit trade in arms to Morocco, but claims concerning the extent of such transactions may have been exaggerated by parties who sought to regulate the trade through the establishment of a monopoly, and Portuguese reports identifying shipment of arms were most likely seeking to persuade Elizabeth I to prohibit commerce with Morocco.¹³⁷ While there were attempts to formalise this trade, Elizabeth was concerned that such an arrangement would be viewed with disfavour and hostility by her counterparts in Europe, and Mawlay al-Mansūr was similarly reluctant to do so.¹³⁸ However, from around the 1570s, trade, politics and diplomacy did become inextricably linked in Anglo-Moroccan relations.¹³⁹

English trade with Morocco was conducted by merchants individually or in partnerships through their resident factors. In his examination of Elizabethan foreign

¹³⁴ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 104–105. Quotation is from p. 104.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 116, 120–121.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 116–117.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–119. Cf. Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 218.

¹³⁹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 218.

trade, Willan provides details of the lives and activities of these men.¹⁴⁰ What is particularly interesting about English activity in Morocco at this time is the freedom of movement which they appear to have enjoyed, their close involvement in sugar production, their direct dealings with rulers and officials, and their general immersion in Moroccan society. English factors were not only based in the ports of Safi and Agadir, but also inland in Marrakesh, and even further afield.¹⁴¹ While conventional in its general nature, the relationship between factors and merchants was complicated in Morocco by necessary engagement between factors and local authorities. Factors were required to operate both through Jewish middlemen, acting on the basis of royal grant or favour, as well as, on occasion, directly with the Moroccan ruler. It not only made trade more difficult, but also riskier.¹⁴² The central role played by Jewish middlemen in Moroccan society is apparent from the attention given to them in a brief description of the country and its customs which precedes an account of the Battle of Alcazar published in 1589:

In this countrye are manie Jewes enhabiting, in whose hands consisteth the most parte of the trafique of the country, being the onely merchantes of sugers, mallasses, and other riche marchandise which the same yeldeth: for the which, they paye great sums of money to the king.¹⁴³

Informed by traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes, Jews were generally either depicted as agents of deceit or being subject to exploitation by Moroccan rulers in contemporary English accounts.¹⁴⁴ The relationship between Britons and Moroccan Jews was at times strained, and pre-existing prejudice and the liminal status of Jews in Moroccan society made them a subject of suspicion during the English occupation of Tangier.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, discussion on the dealings between the factor Philip Westcott and the merchant Walter Brook in Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 123–128.

¹⁴¹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 219.

¹⁴² Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 136, 145.

¹⁴³ *A Dolorous Discourse, of a Most Terrible and Bloudy Battel, Fought in Barbarie, the Fowrth Day of August, Last Past, 1578...* (London, 1579), n.p.

¹⁴⁴ Gary K. Waite, 'Reimagining Religious Identity: The Moor in Dutch and English Pamphlets, 1550–1620', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 66 (2013), pp. 1262, 1265–1266.

The difficulties of commerce with Morocco are exemplified by a petition presented by a group of English merchants in 1577. The merchants sought redress for the failure of Jewish intermediaries to secure payment owing to them. The problem was such that Elizabeth dispatched an ambassador, Edmund Hogan, to the court of Mawlay al-Malik to obtain a resolution.¹⁴⁵ Hogan may also have been charged with negotiating a general alliance between the two countries;¹⁴⁶ there is no mention of this matter in Hogan's official instructions, but in his account of the mission he refers to having discussed the 'private affaires' of the queen and sultan.¹⁴⁷ The mission was a partial success, with al-Malik issuing decrees which removed the obstacles to trade complained of by the merchants. Furthermore, in a written response to Elizabeth he proposed to send an ambassador to her to conclude an alliance. But an embassy did not proceed, and an alliance was not concluded before al-Malik's death the following year.¹⁴⁸

As noted in the preceding section, the Battle of Alcazar had significant ramifications for both Morocco and Portugal. It resulted in the consolidation of Sa'dian rule in Morocco, the succession of Mawlay Ahmad al-Mansūr, and the annexation of Portugal by Spain. It also led to the development of plans by Spain's enemies to install Don Antonio on the Portuguese throne. Elizabeth attempted to enlist the assistance of al-Mansūr to this end, and while she was ultimately unsuccessful in doing so, his accession did mark a new stage in Anglo-Moroccan relations.¹⁴⁹ Initially, however, there was concern as to whether al-Mansūr would honour the undertakings

¹⁴⁵ 'Requête de Marchands Trafiquant au Maroc a Burghley', 17 February 1577, and 'Instructions d'Élisabeth Pour Edmund Hogan', April 1577, in Henry de Castries, ed., *SIHMA*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Paris, 1918), pp. 192–194, 211–213; Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 146–149. Hogan's mission is generally regarded as the first official Elizabethan embassy to Morocco. A list of 'Agent. Amdors' in 'Barbarie' produced in 1665 also identifies Hogan's embassy as being the first. See TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 153.

¹⁴⁶ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 149–150.

¹⁴⁷ 'Relation d'Edmund Hogan', May–July 1577, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, p. 249.

¹⁴⁸ 'Édit de Moulay Abd el-Malek en Faveur des Marchands Anglais', 6 July 1577, 'Édit de Moulay Abd el-Malek en Faveur des Marchands Anglais', 7 July 1577, 'Lettre de Moulay Abd el-Malek a Élisabeth', 10 July 1577, and 'Lettre d'Élisabeth a Moulay Abd el-Malek', 2 September 1577, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, pp. 232–233, 234–235, 236–238, 255–256; Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 151–152; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 11–13; Jerry Brotton, *This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic World* (London, 2017), pp. 73–76.

¹⁴⁹ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 152–153.

concerning trade made by his brother. So, in the summer of 1579 Elizabeth dispatched a 'gentleman called Skydmoore' with letters for the sultan concerning these issues. While al-Mansūr provided assurances that he would comply with her requests, a local correspondent, Augustine Lane, notes that the sultan's response was 'a satisfaction in wordes, but nothings in deedes'.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, al-Mansūr continued to show support for the relationship, responding positively to further requests, including representations on behalf of merchants made by the queen in 1580 and 1581, and in that same year, arrangements for the supply of Moroccan saltpetre in exchange for naval timber finally began to be advanced. This scheme was significant because it indirectly led to the establishment of the Barbary Company.¹⁵¹

The first voyage giving effect to the scheme which embarked in December 1582 also carried letters from Elizabeth offering al-Mansūr aid and munitions in response to reports of an expected Spanish assault on Larache.¹⁵² Despite the Queen's initial reluctance to sanction the supply of war materials, and in the face of Spanish threats against English ships found with these goods, the arrangement was of sufficient promise for the earl of Leicester and his associates to seek to establish a monopoly for the control of all trade with Morocco. Existing merchants appear to have been coerced to support the change, and Elizabeth was persuaded to grant a charter by the prospect of the establishment of an agent in the country who could act as her ambassador at no cost to her.¹⁵³ The Barbary Company was granted a charter in July 1585 giving it a monopoly on both English exports to, and imports from, Morocco for a period of twelve years. It had the potential to have a significant effect on both trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In particular, by providing the English with a means for collective bargaining, it held the promise of overcoming the difficulties which they had regularly faced in commerce with the country. However, it proved to be ineffectual and the company was wound up in 1597; rather than

¹⁵⁰ 'Lettre de Moulay Ahmed el-Mansour a Élisabeth', 18 June 1579 and 'Lettre d'Augustine Lane a Ralph Lane', 9 September 1579, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, pp. 352–353, 357–358; Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 153. The gentleman in question was perhaps the courtier John Scudamore.

¹⁵¹ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 153–154.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–183.

having been created to assist the general merchant community, the company, in fact, appears to have been an arrangement imposed on the majority for the benefit of a few.¹⁵⁴ In the meantime, Elizabeth got what she desired: the company's first agent, Henry Roberts, who arrived in Morocco a few months later.

During his three years in the post, Robert's main diplomatic task appears to have been to pursue Elizabeth's plan to secure al-Mansūr's support for Don Antonio.¹⁵⁵ By June 1588, Roberts and an ambassador sent by Don Antonio were in negotiation with the sultan seemingly for this purpose. While they were waiting for a response, news of the departure of the Spanish Armada arrived, leading Roberts to the view: 'that this Kinge dowthe prolounge the times, to knowe howe they spede'.¹⁵⁶ It was also around this time that Roberts delivered a letter from Elizabeth in which she advised the sultan that because of the wars with which her country was involved, she was unable to accede to his request for the supply of 'certaine things', presumably arms, but had commanded that they be supplied 'in part'.¹⁵⁷

Roberts appears to have been correct in his assessment that Al-Mansūr had been prevaricating. The defeat of the Armada evidently led the sultan to quickly reassess the value of continuing dialogue with the English: on his return to England in late 1588 Roberts was accompanied by a Moroccan ambassador, Marzuq Rais, who arrived in London on 12 January 1589.¹⁵⁸ Plans were being prepared by the English at the time for reprisals against the Spanish. Once again, a central element was the restoration of Don Antonio, and the hope of Moroccan assistance to achieve this.¹⁵⁹ Rais advised that his master would provide 'men, money, vycuals, and the use of his poortes'.¹⁶⁰ While the active participation of the Moroccans in the expedition was

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 184–187, 283–284, 295–296.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 225–226.

¹⁵⁶ 'Lettre de Henry Roberts a Leicester', 12 July 1588, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, pp. 500–502. According to a Portuguese source the discussions involved a request from Elizabeth for a port from which the English could operate to disrupt Spain's planned invasion of England. See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 13–14.

¹⁵⁷ Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, II, pp. 119–120; Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 226.

¹⁵⁸ 'Relation de Henry Roberts', August 1585–January 1589, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, p. 512.

¹⁵⁹ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 233.

¹⁶⁰ 'Résumé des Propositions de Moulay Ahmed', January 1589, in Castries, *SIHMA*, I, p. 513.

diplomatically problematic for Elizabeth and was delicately refused as being 'not good' for either party, the provision of money and supplies was welcomed.¹⁶¹ However, al-Mansūr sought more than the 'sownde and perfect leage of amytye' with England which he professed.¹⁶² He also wanted access to ships and crews in the event of war with his neighbours, the hire of 'some carpenters and shipwrightess', and to purchase 'such provisione and commodities' he required.¹⁶³ Elizabeth's response to these demands was equivocal, and was not dispatched until the fleet had sailed.¹⁶⁴ No alliance was brokered, and there was no explicit Moroccan support for the expedition later that year. Despite the failure of her scheme, Elizabeth continued to seek a commitment from al-Mansūr, sending envoys later that same year and in the following year, to no avail, and she made one final attempt in 1595, the year of Don Antonio's death.¹⁶⁵

Following the return of Roberts to England, the Barbary Company did not appoint another resident agent-cum-ambassador. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were maintained through the exchange of correspondence and the occasional dispatch of envoys.¹⁶⁶ However, the failure of earlier diplomatic initiatives had not deterred either monarch. On 15 August 1600 a Moroccan embassy arrived in London led by Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri, the purpose of which was shrouded in secrecy. The ambassador was received with due honour, and had two audiences with the queen before returning to Morocco early the following year.¹⁶⁷ The arrangements for the return of the delegation proved to be problematic: the governor of the Levant Company was unable to accede to a request from the Privy Council to arrange

¹⁶¹ 'Memorandum de Robert Cecil', February 1589 and 'Reponse a l'Ambassadeur Marocain', March 1589 in *ibid.*, pp. 515–517, 522–523. Spanish concern about what they believed to be English efforts to enlist both Moroccan and Ottoman support were sufficient for the Spanish ambassador to seek the support of France against such an alliance, and for the English to seek to negate this concern. See 'Lettre John Wolley a Walsingham', 19 December 1588 in *ibid.*, pp. 508–509.

¹⁶² 'Resume des Propositions de Moulay Ahmed', January 1589 in *ibid.*, p. 513.

¹⁶³ 'Mémemorandum de l'Ambassadeur Marocain', 8 March 1589 in *ibid.*, pp. 520–521.

¹⁶⁴ 'Reponse a l'Ambassadeur Marocain', March 1589 in *ibid.*, pp. 522–523.

¹⁶⁵ Willan provides a good account of the 1589 embassy and its immediate aftermath in *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 233–237. See also Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 14–14, 18–19, and Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 17–19.

¹⁶⁶ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 237.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 305–306.

passage — although the reasons are not stated, the Council considered them ‘very just and reasonable’, and subsequently arranged for an English warship to be made available.¹⁶⁸ The well connected, and prolific, letter-writer John Chamberlain¹⁶⁹ indicates that the reason for the Company’s refusal was religious intolerance: because merchants and mariners ‘thinck yt a matter odious and scandalous to the world to be too friendly or familiar with infidels’.¹⁷⁰ However, this explanation does not accord well with the Council’s response, and the fact the delegation had arrived on an English vessel.¹⁷¹ In any event, Chamberlain personally thought it a great honour that people from ‘nations so far remote, and every way different, shold meet here’.¹⁷² There was also much speculation at the time concerning the purpose of the visit, with a wide variety of ideas being bruited, but it appears that it principally concerned an ambitious scheme proposed by al-Mansūr to capture parts of Spain and Spanish possessions in the East and West Indies. Elizabeth agreed to further discussions on the objectives for an alliance, but, once again, nothing came of the proposal.¹⁷³

Despite the fact that commercial and diplomatic relations were so closely intertwined during this period, the continual failure of both monarchs to achieve their desired political outcomes while maintaining normal trading relations testifies to the somewhat unique nature of the relationship that developed under their reigns. The factor which united them, and yet also frustrated their respective plans, was their

¹⁶⁸ ‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 22 September 1600, ‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 28 September 1600, and ‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 29 September 1600, in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, pp. 184–185, 189, 190.

¹⁶⁹ P. J. Finkelpearl, ‘Chamberlain, John (1553–1628)’, in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 14 July 2016.

¹⁷⁰ ‘Lettre de John Camberlain a Dudley Carleton’, 15 October 1600, in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 192.

¹⁷¹ It is possible that the company’s unwillingness to transport the delegation was due to its proposed itinerary, as the Moroccans wished to travel to Turkey first before returning to Morocco, or it was in response to some risk to English shipping which existed at the time. Cf. Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999), p. 34, and Jonathan Burton, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005), pp. 247–248.

¹⁷² Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 192.

¹⁷³ ‘Mémemorandum D’Abd El-Ouahed’, 13 September 1600, and ‘Mémoire de Moulay Ahmed El-Mansour Pour Élisabeth’, 23 Sha’ban 1009 [17 February 1601], in *ibid.*, pp. 177–179, 206–209; Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 306–307; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 19–20. Stephen Cory provides an interesting discussion on Al-Mansūr’s motivations for the proposed mission in *Reviving the Islamic Caliphate*, pp. 205–208. García-Arenal in ‘Moriscos in Morocco’ highlights the role that strongly felt sentiment among Moriscos in Morocco to return to Spain, or re-conquer parts of it, played in shaping the political and diplomatic strategies of Moroccan sultans.

common fear of Spain; but the dynamics of their individual relations with the Habsburgs varied over time, as did the impact of other factors which influenced the level of their mutual dependency.

Al-Mansūr prevaricated on the issue of support for Don Antonio, and clearly did so in an attempt to maintain good relations with England, without greatly offending Spain.¹⁷⁴ The sultan required external sources of income but of a kind that would not offend local interests, and the participation of the English in the sugar trade achieved this aim. He was also in need of supplies for his army and navy, and the English demonstrated some willingness to meet these needs.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, despite traditional Moroccan antipathy toward the Spanish, al-Mansūr sought to maintain an informal alliance with them as a counter to the Ottomans, but at the same time playing them off against the English by fostering uncertainty about his intentions.¹⁷⁶ But Elizabeth faced similar challenges. Commerce with Morocco had become very important to England, and it was also a source of much needed saltpetre. The queen also used diplomatic brinkmanship in her war against Spain, at first to counter the existential threat of the Armada, and then to prosecute her plans for retribution by attempting to establish political alliances with both Moroccans and their antagonists the Ottomans. Like the situation faced by al-Mansūr, it involved a careful balancing act, not only requiring the extraction of desired concessions at the least cost, while maintaining some measure of good faith, but also avoiding offending the religious sensitivities of their respective internal and external constituencies.

The deaths of both Elizabeth and al-Mansūr in 1603 were important milestones in the histories of their respective countries, but they also marked the end of a rather unique period of Anglo-Moroccan political relations.¹⁷⁷ As one scholar has observed,

¹⁷⁴ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, pp. 235–236; Laroui, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 257; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 16–19.

¹⁷⁵ Laroui, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 257.

¹⁷⁶ Julien, *History of North Africa*, p. 235–236; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 213–214, 218–219.

¹⁷⁷ Willan, *Elizabethan Foreign Trade*, p. 308; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 36; J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism' and Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries: A Case Study in Historicising Concepts of Discourse', *SOAS Journal of Graduate Research*, 1 (2005), p. 5.

while the English remained suspicious, the close diplomatic relations England fostered with Morocco during this time did encourage 'a discourse of wary respect and cooperation', and not one of hostile prejudice.¹⁷⁸ But it was a discourse influenced by *realpolitik*, not ideology; opinions about Moroccans among Britons varied widely, but at the very least prejudice based on religious and ethnological difference was tempered in the interests of trade and politics.¹⁷⁹ However, political, commercial, and social conditions were considerably different at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Morocco was entering into a long period of social unrest and civil war. The death of Elizabeth allowed England to finally conclude a peace with Spain. Furthermore, the Ottomans no longer presented a direct threat to Morocco, negating the need for the rulers of that country to foster cordial relations with Spain. Nevertheless, while Spain was expelling Moriscos from the country, and occupying Larache and Mehdyia, these facts did not deter various Moroccan factions from seeking Spanish assistance from time to time.

The second half of the sixteenth century had been a propitious time for the English in their endeavours to develop relations with Morocco, in that England faced little competition from other European powers; aside from the vexed relations Morocco had with Portugal and Spain, the French were preoccupied with their wars of religion, and the Dutch were only beginning to take an interest in the country.¹⁸⁰ But England would face greater competition in the first half of the seventeenth century as the French and Dutch began to actively pursue their own opportunities for trade with Morocco. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the social and political instability which followed al-Mansūr's death stifled trade with Europe because of a scarcity of the goods sought by merchants.

The resulting division of Morocco also led to other changes. While the conflict was fuelled by anti-Christian sentiment it did not have as significant an impact on European relations with Morocco as might be expected, as it was offset by the

¹⁷⁸ Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 5; Waite, 'Reimagining Religious Identity', pp. 1265–1266.

¹⁸⁰ Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 236, 241.

pragmatic needs of competition between the warring parties. As local and regional factions regained their authority, among them the city-states of Tétouan and Salé, they began to establish their own relationships with the English and other Europeans. Even a *mujahid* like Muhammad al-‘Ayāshī was prepared to set his ideals aside to obtain military supplies from the English or Dutch. Consequently, relations varied greatly according to the nature of the party in question and circumstances which prevailed at the time.¹⁸¹ While France continued to play only a minor role in Morocco during this period, the English maintained a relatively active trade with the country, supplying both licit goods and illicit matériel to legitimate rulers as well as rebels, and as noted in the previous section, the English continued to be very well informed of domestic developments. However, it was the Dutch who conducted the most active trade. Unlike the English who had made peace with Spain, the United Provinces were at war with the Habsburgs and sanctioned the supply of ships and weapons to various parties in Morocco in order to further their own political aims.¹⁸²

Ironically, it was Queen Elizabeth’s former ambassador to Morocco, Henry Roberts, who attempted to establish a new era in relations of a very different kind. Within a few weeks of Elizabeth’s death, Roberts wrote to King James I presenting a ‘true and plaine project’ for the conquest of Morocco which would be to ‘the great glorie of Godd, profite and increase of your ma[jes]ties domynions, traffique of marchantes, ymployment of navies and people, and to the universall good of all Christendome’.¹⁸³ The proposal detailed what the country had to offer, and the size and disposition of its army. He assured the king that the majority of the sultan’s soldiers would flee rather than fight, and that many people would convert to Christianity, or in due course submit to the king for the better governance that he would bring.¹⁸⁴ Roberts may have been the first Englishman to have proposed English conquest in North Africa, but he was acting alone and does not appear to have been inspired by imperial

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 240–241; Laroui, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 258.

¹⁸² Julien, *History of North Africa*, pp. 241–242.

¹⁸³ ‘Memoire de Henry Roberts a Jacques I^{er}’, [3 April 1603], in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 223.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–226.

zeal; rather it was an act of desperation by a destitute man.¹⁸⁵ In any event, nothing came of Roberts' scheme.

It was not the last ambitious strategy involving Morocco which would be proposed by a Briton, but the issue that really came to define Anglo-Moroccan relations in the first half of the seventeenth century was the rise of corsairing in Morocco, and attempts by the English to respond to this development. The activities of the corsairs operating from Salé quickly became a source of political tension, not simply due to the disruption of shipping and trade, but also increasingly in response to the capture of crews and passengers, who were either held for ransom or sold into captivity; although it was the grievances of English merchants that first forced James to send an envoy.¹⁸⁶

Complaints from Morocco had started being received very soon after al-Mansūr's death, expressing concern about the behaviour of the late sultan's son, Abu Faris, who controlled Marrakesh. It was claimed that Abu Faris had reneged on commitments negotiated with his father, and that he was not protecting the interests of the English trading community.¹⁸⁷ The political agent John Harrison arrived in Morocco in June 1610 to deliver a letter from the king to Mawlāy Zaydān, who now ruled Marrakesh and Sus. After a long delay Harrison was finally able to submit to him the details of the grievances. Zaydān refuted the claims, advising Harrison that the merchants had breached the laws of his country. Consequently, he would not compensate them, but he did confirm the maintenance of existing trading privileges given by his predecessors to the English. With this concession Harrison returned to London in April 1611.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 227. See also Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, p. 10, cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 40–41.

¹⁸⁶ Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 22–24.

¹⁸⁷ 'Lettre de George Thomas a Robert Cecil', 30 October 1603, and 'Requête de Thomas Pate a Jacques I^{er}', [late 1603], in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, pp. 229–235, 236–239.

¹⁸⁸ 'Lettre de John Harrison a Salisbury', 10 June 1610, and 'Lettre de John Harrison a Salisbury', 14 October 1610 in *ibid.*, pp. 449–450, 452–454; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 24.

Immediately upon his arrival in Morocco, Harrison had made note of a report of 'pyrats' operating out of Mehdyā on the Atlantic coast. The concern at the time was not the effect of their activity on English vessels, rather the fact that the pirates were selling goods they had seized at discounted prices.¹⁸⁹ But it was the issue of the capture and enslavement of Englishmen by the 'Sallee Rovers' that was the reason for Harrison's next mission to Zaydān. He was dispatched with letters from the king, and finally arrived in Zaydān's camp in November 1614. Harrison was granted an audience with the sultan, who agreed to free any English captives held in his dominions.¹⁹⁰ A possible Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain may have also been discussed, and this could explain why Harrison was accompanied by the sultan's agent in the Netherlands.¹⁹¹ Zaydān provided Harrison with a letter to James in which he reaffirmed his friendship with England, and Harrison was also requested to personally deliver a letter to the States-General of the United Provinces. He returned to Morocco around June the following year to deliver the responses.¹⁹² Harrison was again sent to Morocco by the king in early 1616 to arrange the release of his subjects, as previously agreed, but had still not received a response from the sultan when he departed from the country almost sixteen months later without having even disembarked. It is unclear whether Zaydān's failure to receive Harrison or establish any contact with him at this time was an unintentional snub, or, in fact, a sign of a more significant change in Zaydān's disposition toward England, as asserted by Harrison much later.¹⁹³

Whatever the reason, the incident led to a hiatus in formal diplomatic relations which lasted for some seven years, and only ended when an English monarch once again sought the assistance of a Moroccan ruler against Spain, and to appease the concerns

¹⁸⁹ Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 450.

¹⁹⁰ 'Relation de John Harrison', [end of 1627], in Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de Cossé Brissac, eds., *SIHMA*, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Paris, 1935), p. 67; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 24–25.

¹⁹¹ Nabil Matar, 'Harrison, John (d. 1641x52)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017. On attempts by Moriscos, with the aid of Zaydān's Jewish agent, Samuel Pallache, to engineer an alliance with European powers against Spain, see García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', pp. 312–313.

¹⁹² Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 67–68; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 25.

¹⁹³ 'Lettre de Francis Cottington a John Coke', 31 March 1618, and 'Lettre de John Harrison a Moulay Zidān', Tétouan, [c. July 1625], in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, pp. 509, 571; 'Relation de John Harrison', [end 1627], in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 68–69.

of his subjects about their kin held captive in Morocco.¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the archival records for this period of diplomatic quiescence reveal the strength of the underlying interest that Britons had with Morocco: trade and commerce continued unabated, merchants and officials maintained a close eye on political developments and other happenings, negotiations on the release of captives were undertaken by private agents, and attempts were made to nurture relations with local rulers within a splintered polity.¹⁹⁵

Conclusion

The experience of the English in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century was marked by neither single-minded imperial intent, nor an unchallenged maritime ascendancy. Rather it was defined by uncertainty and caution, and frequent vulnerability requiring necessary compromises and cooperation with both Christians and Muslims alike.¹⁹⁶ They achieved much through the exercise of naval power, but also through pragmatism and accommodation; the English recognised that outright aggression may not only be counterproductive, but also prohibitively expensive. Contrary to Games' belief that accommodation was only a defining characteristic of English behaviour towards the regencies up until 1660, it appears that such a disposition extended long after, influenced by the lack of success the English experienced in their earlier efforts to subdue the corsairs, and necessitated by the complex socio-political environment in which they continued to operate. Furthermore, as demonstrated in later chapters, even their occupation of Tangier between 1662 and 1684 did not represent a marked departure from this traditional pattern of behaviour.

Akin to the general feelings of disorientation and uncertainty experienced by Europeans in the Mediterranean identified by a number of other scholars, Colley

¹⁹⁴ 'Lettre de Charles I^{er} a Moulay Zidân', [27 March–1 June 1625], and 'Lettre de John Harrison a Moulay Zidân', Tétouan, [13 June–30 July 1625], in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, pp. 565–566, 571–572.

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, the correspondence dealing with these issues in *ibid.*, pp. 510–564, *passim*.

¹⁹⁶ Colley similarly argues that aggression and vulnerability were both intrinsic aspects of the early British imperial experience. See Colley, *Captives*, pp. 133–134, 365–366.

observes that relations between Britain and the North African states in the early modern period tended towards ambivalence: although Britain resented the impact that the Muslim corsairs had on trade, its subjects and its status, the states remained important as both markets for British goods, and, perhaps even more critically, in supporting the country's strategic interests in the Mediterranean.¹⁹⁷ But, as will be argued in this thesis, these were not the only factors which could give rise to equivocal responses in the encounter between Britons and Maghribis.

The relationship between Morocco's rulers and foreign powers during the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century was complex and dynamic, changing according to the vicissitudes of the former, and the actions of the latter. The Ottomans and Europeans were both a threat to them and a source of succour, depending on circumstances. Moroccan rulers and factional leaders not only became adept at resisting them, but also using and manipulating them for their own purposes. In Barbary, the English were not the only ones using guile and accommodation to achieve their ends when it suited them. However, the contact which ensued facilitated processes of exchange that went beyond the immediate needs of commerce and warfare: it also enabled the mutual acquisition of knowledge and understanding of the other. But in their relations with the Christian powers, aspirants to the Moroccan throne or regional dominion also came to realise that they had to take great care that their actions did not compromise their moral and sacral authority, which became the foundation of their personal power.

By the middle of the seventeenth century Britons, as testified by their accounts, had acquired a wealth of knowledge of, and experience in, Morocco. While historians have given much attention to the English occupation of Tangier, what is often overlooked, or at least under-appreciated, is that this episode was preceded by over a century of close and generally amicable commercial and political relations which had provided Britons with detailed insight into the country and its culture, religion, society, and politics. When they embarked on their first colonial venture in North

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81. See also Fisher, *Barbary Legends*, p. 224; Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', pp. 19–20.

Africa in 1662 they were not necessarily ignorant of what they faced in attempting to establish a permanent presence there. The central question that this study seeks to answer concerns how Britons between 1625 and 1684 responded to direct encounter with an unfamiliar, although a not altogether unknown, socio-cultural environment. Did they utilise the legacy of knowledge and experience left to them by their predecessors? Did they remain receptive to new cultural and religious understandings? Could they positively adapt to the new environment in which they found themselves? Or was it the case, as argued by others, that during the course of the seventeenth century Britons were increasingly incapable of such reflexivity, blinded by their own sense of cultural and religious superiority, and driven by imperial aspiration? In the following chapters these questions are explored.

2. Imagining Barbary

For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture. (Walter Lippman, 1922)¹

In order to more fully appreciate the psychological impact that contact with Morocco had on Britons it is useful to understand their personal imaginative geographies of that place, and with this knowledge assess how these conceptions may have been either challenged or confirmed by the experience of encounter. More precisely, this means seeking to understand their pre-existing attitudes towards the country and its people, characterised by the nature of the stereotypes, prejudices, or opinions they held relating to them.² While there may have been dominant perspectives held by Britons about Morocco, and North Africa more generally, and the peoples associated with them, it would be wrong to assume that they can be reduced to simple statements which reflect prevailing public opinion. Furthermore, historical sources do not necessarily have either precision or completeness. Their limitations in providing ethnographic and other personal insights were discussed in the introduction to this thesis: they are inherently partial, in being both incomplete and subject to various types of bias. Commentators occasionally provide statements which reveal their personal attitudes, or provide insights into those held by people about whom they wrote, and make explicit references to the impact that encounter had on their understanding or perceptions. Sometimes sufficient information may be gleaned from the sources to enable the impact to be inferred. But the preconceptions held by many subjects are much less clear and, consequently, it is far more difficult to precisely assess just how they were affected.

¹ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion: With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998), p. 81.

² The sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld notes that the contemporary concept of 'attitude' relates to how people see the world, and combines both rational and emotive elements. Attitudes may be characterised as 'stereotypes', 'prejudices', and 'opinions' depending on the mix of rational and emotive elements. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 'A Sociologist Looks at Historians', in Melvin Small, ed., *Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Detroit, 1970), p. 39. The term 'attitude' is used throughout this thesis in this sense.

Unquestionably though, attitudes could vary between individuals, sometimes markedly, with the defining characteristics of group identity becoming less distinct at the personal level. They were influenced by factors such as a person's class, education, profession, beliefs, and broader life experiences (with these invariably informed by gender). The intent of this chapter is to identify the various ways in which contemporary Britons conceived of Morocco and its people, the events and sources that informed these views, and to trace how attitudes changed over time. However, the corpus of scholarship concerning the attitudes of Britons toward racial, ethnological, and religious difference is extensive, and the following discussion can by no means provide a comprehensive survey on these subjects. For this reason particular attention has been given to more common stereotypes and their principal modes of transmission.

The stereotype is a concept popularised by Walter Lippmann in the 1920s. Lippmann conceived of stereotypes as entrenched cognitive habits by which people classify and abstract information about their environment, and which usually provide a distorted picture of the world.³ Stereotypes consist of 'images, categorizations, or generalizations taking a particular view of, or emphasizing or exaggerating traits or characteristics or behaviour patterns' which are assigned to a particular individual or group, and which can arise out of sociological, psychological, or cognitive processes.⁴ They are a means by which people simplify their world in order to extract meaning from it, and make decisions. Similarly, in the context of historical cultural contact, Stuart Schwartz refers to people possessing an 'implicit ethnography'. It was implicit in the sense it was unstated, but it represented a common understanding among members of a society of ideas concerning themselves and others outside their group about those things which they identified as contributing to their collective self-identity, such as language, colour, ethnicity, kinship, gender, and religion, and which

³ Michael Curtis, 'Introduction to the Transaction Edition', in *Public Opinion: With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998), pp. xvii–xix. Lippmann is perhaps most well-known for popularising the term 'Cold War' to characterise the post-WWII confrontation between the USSR and USA.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. xxiv–xxviii. Quotation is from p. 24.

influenced the way in which they thought and acted.⁵ Such shared understandings — in effect stereotypes of self — became (and continue to be) the measures against which others were judged, and the resulting differences were embodied in stereotypes of these outgroups. Therefore, much can be inferred about how Britons saw themselves individually and as a collective from the stereotypes they held about others.

Stereotypes can become deeply entrenched in the individual and collective psyches, and resistant to change, because they, and attitudes more generally, tend to be self-reinforcing; we are subconsciously drawn to evidence that supports our existing beliefs, and reject information that contradicts them — commonly referred to as confirmation bias — particularly when the same beliefs are shared amongst our peers or in the broader society. As observed by Jack D'Amico: 'The interchange between cultures is shaped by ways of framing experience that experience does not easily change'.⁶ Roxanne Euben explains that 'systems of representation can be impervious to mechanisms of verification and argumentation', because they are the means by which we make sense of the world, and they in turn influence our judgements about it, and our actions.⁷ Nevertheless, as Euben also points out, both physical and imaginative encounters with other 'modes of life', can provide 'dislocating mediations' which may challenge existing beliefs, and facilitate more expansive frames of reference.⁸

⁵ Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Introduction', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 2–3. On stereotyping in cultural encounters, see also Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London, 2001), pp. 125–128.

⁶ Jack D'Amico, *The Moor in English Renaissance Drama* (Tampa, FL, 1991), p. 1. Tom Griffiths refers to people having a daily, socialised experience of myth and memory which becomes the source of their understanding, and the basis of their judgement, made independent of more informed and objective sources of knowledge'. See Tom Griffiths, *The Art of Time Travel: Historians and their Craft* (Carlton, Vic., Aust., 2016), p. 91.

⁷ Roxanne L. Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge* (Princeton, 2006), p. 193.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 193–197. The disruptive effects of inter-cultural engagement on human behaviour as explained by psychological theory and Homi K. Bhabha's concept of Third Space are discussed in the introduction to this thesis. Imaginative, as opposed to physical encounters, can also be conceived of as intellectualised engagement. See Rickie Lette, 'The Influence of Inter-Cultural Engagement on the Perceptions of Mendicant Friars in the Thirteenth Century Concerning Islam and Muslims', *Medieval Encounters*, 23 (2017), pp. 504–505.

This sequence is very well demonstrated in the present study: as contact with Morocco and knowledge about it increased during the course of the seventeenth century, perceptions concerning its peoples advanced from simple, predominantly prejudicial, stereotypes to increasingly more ambivalent, nuanced, and even openly positive understandings which existed alongside the old ones. One particular manifestation of acculturative change identified in this and the following chapters which could arise from both physical and imaginatives encounters, were the drawing of what might be called 'equivalences': comparisons made by Britons between things they were familiar with from their own society and culture — including there own sense of identity — with what they found in Morocco, or by reading about it, or even through contact with Moroccans at home.⁹ However, while it is a useful term to categorise such responses, it is important to understand the nature and intent of comparisons when they appear in sources. Some may, in fact, simply be rhetorical analogies intended to provide the reader with familiar examples to reinforce prejudicial judgements. It is necessary to avoid confusing rhetoric informed by bigotry and prejudice with responses, both negative and positive, arising from acculturation, as they are fundamentally different things.

This chapter is concerned with identifying common cultural understandings transmitted through processes of public discourse in the British Isles in the early modern period, particularly those in circulation from around 1600 to the early 1680s, being the formative period for many of the subjects examined in the following chapters. Specifically, it seeks to identify the attitudes of Britons towards Morocco, its people, and their society, culture, and religion. However, while North Africa was not an homogenous entity in any concrete sense, distinctions between its various parts and peoples were not always clearly made. As one contemporary Scottish traveller observed: all the lands between Egypt and Ceuta in Morocco 'by ignorant sea-men and ruide [rough] Moores is termed Barbary, who can not distinguish parts

⁹ Direct comparisons were also made by Moroccans about the English and England, but discussion of these is outside the scope of this thesis.

nor provinces ... and know no further of their ancient nor particular titles'.¹⁰ The racial, ethnological,¹¹ and political complexity of the region was often either overlooked, or misunderstood: North African Arabs, Berbers, and Moriscos could simply be labelled as either 'Moors' or 'Turks', among other generalised epithets.

While attention is often given to the issue of skin colour in scholarship on representations of North Africans, colour was more often a concern of playwrights than of others. In fact, it has even been proposed that the white/black binarism which is evident in the plays of the Tudor period, and which influenced later stage depictions of North Africans, can, perhaps, be best explained not as a product of implicit racism, but rather in terms of symbolism: 'the prejudices of Elizabethans were specifically against blackness, not necessarily against dark-skinned people'.¹² Admittedly, use of the term 'Blackamoor' as opposed to Moor could indicate a perception of racial difference — specifically sub-Saharan African descent — by some writers, but for most Britons in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century the key factors which informed their attitudes to other people were religion and social class, rather than race.¹³ The resultant homogenisation of North African identity, facilitated

¹⁰ William Lithgow, *The Totall Discourse, of the Rare Adventures, and Painefull Peregrinations of Long Nineteene Yeares Travayles from Scotland, to the most Famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia, and Affrica ...* (London, 1632), p. 362

¹¹ As observed by Robert Bartlett the terms 'race' and 'ethnicity' are problematic, with the distinction made between them differing between different people. *Race* may be used to distinguish groups on the basis of biological, somatic difference, while *ethnicity* may be used to identify cultural differences between groups. On the other hand, there are those who reject the term *race* altogether because of its association with racism, and regard *ethnicity* as a suitable alternative. In Bartlett's view, rather than following social trends, usage of terms should be based on the intellectual value of the distinctions they provide. He goes on to state that: 'Ethnicity and race both refer to the identifications made by individuals about the groups they belong to. If one word has a use, then the other does'; they are both ultimately socially constructed concepts. Kim F. Hall similarly notes that 'race was [in the early modern period] (as it is now) a social construct that is fundamentally more about power and culture than about biological difference'. See Robert Bartlett, 'Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 31 (2001), pp. 39–42; Kim F. Hall, *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY, 1995), p. 6. I use both terms as the context dictates, to differentiate between perceptions of difference grounded in either somatic or cultural factors.

¹² Greg Bak, 'Different Differences: Locating Moorishness in Early Modern English Culture', *The Dalhousie Review* (1996), p. 201.

¹³ Leland Barrows, 'Review of Matar, Nabil, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery*', in *H-W-Civ, H-Net Reviews* (2000), at <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4632>; Miranda Kaufmann, *Black Tudors: The Untold Story* (London, 2017), pp. 4–6. Cf. Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999), pp. 6–8. On the distinction which some English commentators made between the two types of Moors, see Eldred Jones, *Othello's Countrymen: The*

by a shared affiliation with Islam, and its association with barbarism, may indeed have become the 'principal frame or prism through which early modern Europeans looked at North Africa'.¹⁴ But, it was certainly not the only one used by Britons. There was a range of other, less prejudicial and essentialising perspectives which emerged with which it coexisted and competed for recognition.

2.1. The Roots of Anti-Islamic Prejudice and the Barbary Discourse

What is often overlooked by scholars, or given scant regard by them, when examining the response of Britons to North Africa is that key elements which underpinned common Christian European perceptions of Barbary and its peoples did not spontaneously emerge in the early modern period; their substantive roots are deeply embedded in medieval images of Islam and Muslims.¹⁵ The medievalist Norman Daniel famously argued that a hostile, 'deformed image of Islam' developed during the course of the Middle Ages which was instrumental in establishing a 'canon of what ... Muslims believe and do', and formed the basis of an integrated European view of the religion that survived until the modern period.¹⁶ While scholars are increasingly recognising that Christian perceptions of the Muslim world were much more nuanced than allowed for by Daniel, it is clear that prejudicial views of Islam and its adherents continued to dominate Western European thinking, despite the availability of increasing knowledge about them.¹⁷ Furthermore, from the time of the

African in English Renaissance Drama (London, 1965), pp. 10, 22–23, incl. n. 49. On the influence of issues of geography, ethnicity and religion in the construction of the image of the Moor in early modern England, see Daniel J. Vitkus, *Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630* (New York, 2008), pp. 90–91.

¹⁴ Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'The General Belief of the World': Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean History', *European Review of History*, 19 (2012), p. 16.

¹⁵ Cf., for example, Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, pp. 12–14.

¹⁶ Norman Daniel, *Islam and The West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh, 1960), pp. 3, 8.

¹⁷ For a good general survey of European perceptions of Islam in the Middle Ages, and discussion concerning their persistence, see John Tolan's influential book, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York, 2002). For a specific study on the influence of medieval polemical writings on Muhammad in the construction of representations of Islam, Muslims, and Islamic culture in early modern Britain, see Ian Jenkins, 'Writing Islam: Representations of Muhammad, the Qur'an and Islamic Belief and the Construction of Muslim Identity in Early Modern Britain', PhD Thesis (Cardiff University, 2007). However, despite the significant attention which has been given to the polemical aspects of Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle Ages, Olivia Remie Constable has observed that scholars remain divided on the issue of an overall interpretation of the respective attitudes of Western Christians and Muslims to each other during this period. See Constable, 'Muslims in Medieval Europe',

First Crusade the Western Christian Church was instrumental in promulgating public perceptions of Islam and Muslims among its followers: according to Norman Housley, the need for the Church to entice people to participate in crusade, and the associated creation of an *imago inimici*, 'shaped a dominant picture of Islam, its founder, and adherents that was inaccurate, stereotypical, and lacking in humanity'.¹⁸ Understanding this medieval epistemological heritage is critical because proper contextualisation of the subsequent development of anti-Islamic discourse in early modern Britain facilitates understanding of the more proximate factors which influenced its precise contemporary form.

But Ben Rejeb suggests that a specific Barbary discourse emerged following the end of the Spanish Reconquista and the expulsion of the Andalusian Moors, who, together with the Ottomans and their North African proxies, came to challenge Portuguese and Spanish expansionism in the Western Mediterranean. In this environment, piracy and captive-taking were not seen by Christian Europeans as legitimate acts of resistance by North Africans, but rather as 'savage acts of vengeance'. The reconceptualisation of North Africa was completed with the adoption of 'Barbary' as a toponym for the region following its use by Martin Waldseemüller in his *Modern Map of the First Part of Africa* in 1513, possibly as a result of an association established in contemporary accounts.¹⁹ By extension, all its inhabitants could be labelled simply as 'Barbarians', and the conflation of the term's pejorative meaning and its use as a geographic identifier by Britons 'was a gift of which generations of polemicists made abundant and predictable use'.²⁰ The

in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds., *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Blackwell Companions to European History (Oxford, 2013), pp. 313–332.

¹⁸ Norman Housley, 'The Crusades and Islam', *Medieval Encounters*, 13 (2007), pp. 189–208. While I disagree with the limits Housley imposes on the positive outcomes which could also result from Christian-Muslim contact during the medieval period, he does provide a useful account of the contribution made by the Church in shaping a general Western Christian ideological perspective.

¹⁹ Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 17. See discussion on the subject in the introduction to this thesis.

²⁰ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), pp. 44. On early modern European understanding of the concept of the barbarian, see Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge, 1982), chap. 2. For an interesting discussion on the concept of the barbarian from a variety of historical cultural perspectives, see K. N. Chaudhuri, 'From the Barbarian and the Civilized to the Dialectics of

resulting discourse not only defined the Otherness of North Africa through the lens of religious difference, but essentialised it as a site of piracy, slavery, and hostility to Christendom, and as being the antithesis of European civilisation.²¹

While Nabil Matar argues that the English 'imposed the moral constructions they had devised to legitimate the colonization ... and destruction' of the Amerindians on Mediterranean Muslims in order to compensate for their 'colonial and cultural inadequacies', to the extent that the two 'became completely superimposable',²² such a discourse is not apparent in the sources which have been examined in this study, and Colley believes that such a degree of superimposition was rare.²³ The association of Muslims with, for example, sodomy and holy war were already well entrenched in European Christian thought without requiring transposition from the New World. Of course, the way in which individual Britons conceived of North Africa could never be entirely isolated from the influence of other factors — people naturally draw on familiar stereotypes in attempting to understand, and in response to, new phenomena — but the region and its people generally appear to have possessed their own distinct character in the minds of Britons, shaped by traditional religious and cultural prejudice, current events, and new experiences and learnings.

The increase in English adventurism and overseas trade during the seventeenth century resulted in a growing volume of publications on voyages, travel, and geography, the popularity of which is impossible to assess. However, it is clear that the circulation of such texts was expanding, and what could perhaps, broadly, be defined as travel literature came to have a widespread and pervasive appeal among literate Englishmen, especially those with an interest in trade. Nevertheless, the quality of the information provided varied considerably: while some authors sought

Colour: An Archaeology of Self-Identities', in Peter Robb, ed., *Society and Ideology: Essays in South Asian History Presented to Professor K. A. Ballhatchet* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 22–48.

²¹ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 101–102; Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 18.

²² Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, pp. x, 16, 170. Quotations are from p. 16.

²³ Colley, *Captives*, p. 106.

to capture current knowledge, there were others who sought to appeal to less sophisticated readers, and simply reworked ancient myths and stereotypes.²⁴

Yet traditional prejudice and tropes could still be found even in the most popular, high-end examples of the genre. Both Colley and Ben Rejeb cite the influential travel books of the clergyman Samuel Purchas as demonstrating the types of stereotypes which were conveyed through the Barbary discourse. In *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, a compilation of travel accounts first published between 1624 and 1626, the author describes Algiers as:

the whirlepoole of these seas, the throne of pyracie, the sinke of trade and stinke of slavery; the cage of uncleane birds of prey, the habitation of sea-devils, the receptacle of renegadoes to God, and traytors to their countrey.²⁵

One of his sources, the Flemish historian Jean-Baptiste Gramaye, delivers a similarly scathing critique of North Africa. Referring to Barbary generally, but ‘chiefly therein Algier’, as:

the whip of the Christian world, the wall of the barbarian, terror of Europe, the bridle of both Hesperias (Italy and Spaine) scourge of the islands, den of pyrates, theatre of all crueltie, and sanctuarie of iniquitie, holdeth in captivity one hundred and twenty thousand Christians.²⁶

²⁴ P. J. Marshall and Williams Glyndwr, *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London, 1982), pp. 51, 54, 56, 60. Kenneth Parker claims that the popularity of works of this kind were perhaps second only to that of sermons. See Kenneth Parker, ‘Reading ‘Barbary’ in Early Modern England, 1550–1685’, *The Seventeenth Century*, 19 (2004), p. 107.

²⁵ Samuel Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimes in Five Bookes ...*, 4 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1625), p. 873. Ben Rejeb also cites a passage from the earlier *Purchas His Pilgrimage*, however, Purchas sourced this material from Leo Africanus’ *Description of Africa* (1550). Africanus was a Berber or Arab born in Granada and raised in Fes, who later converted to Christianity, and on that basis his writing cannot be considered representative of a true European discourse on Barbary. Furthermore, the ‘negative images’ which Ben Rejeb refers to only relate to ‘the mountainer and ruder rustikes’, not ‘the inhabitants of the cities’ who are said to be ‘studious, especially in matters of their law’ although they ‘are very proude and revengefull’. See Ben Rejeb, ‘Barbary as Genre and Discourse’, p. 18, and Samuel Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimage. Or Relations of the World and the Religions Observed in all Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto this Present in Foure Parties ...* (London, 1613), p. 502. The term ‘unclean birds’ may have been inspired by its use as a metaphor for Islam by John Fox in *Actes and Monuments of these Latter and Perillous Days* (1563), or by Edward Brerewood in *Enquiries Touching the Diversity of Languages, and Religions through the Chiefe Parts of the World* (1614). See Nabil Matar, *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 157.

²⁶ Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, 2, p. 1565. The same account can also be found in Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Land Travells by Englishmen and Others*, 20 vols., vol. IX (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 267–284. Whether this

Nevertheless, while the accounts in Purchas' work are peppered with Eurocentric interpretations, much of the content is surprising for its lack of harsh judgement of cultural and religious practices observed, or heard of, by commentators.

Two issues that gave rise to the greatest animosity among writers about North Africa were Christian slavery and apostasy. The French geographer, Nicolas de Nicolay's observations about Algiers, written in about 1550, are largely objective, even when describing brutal events. It is only when he turns to slavery and apostasy that impartiality escapes him. He refers to the prevalence of 'Muhumetised' European Christians among the 'Turkes of Algiers', who are given to 'whoredome, sodometrie, theft, and all other detestable vices ... and with their practike art bring daily to Algier a number of poore Christians' who are subsequently sold, beaten, made 'to worke in the fields, and in all other vile and abject occupations'.²⁷ Given the elapse of time, Purchas felt it necessary to supplement Nicolay's account with details from Gramaye's work, dated 1619, to shed 'some better light on this hel-mouth, the centre of earthly darkness'.²⁸

In the first two-thirds of his account, Gramaye makes repeated references to the number of Christian slaves in the city and Barbary generally, refers to the problem of forced conversion, recounts examples of brutality and arbitrary justice, and ridicules the religious beliefs and practices which Algerians share with other Muslims — some are misrepresented, others are almost certainly contrived, such as claims of prostitution of men's wives to holy men, rampant sodomy, and bestiality. But on the other hand he also notes they do not gamble, swear, or fight each other, that they wash before work, eating, and prayer; and he describes other aspects of their culture and way of life without judgement.²⁹ However, Gramaye reserves his harshest

statement is actually attributable to Gramaye is admittedly uncertain as the distinction between authorial and editorial voice is unclear in much of Purchas' work. Colley in *Captives*, p. 44, includes a quotation obtained from a secondary source which she attributes to Purchas, which, strangely, combines elements from both this passage and the preceding one.

²⁷ Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, 2, p. 875. On the dating of this account, see *ibid.*, p. 1562.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1561–1565.

criticism for the last third of the account, which contains the most sustained polemic against Barbary slavery in Purchas' collection. Gramaye remarks on how the conditions and despair of enslavement force many Christians to convert, and goes on to describe in disturbing detail how they are tortured and forced to make false confessions when captured, and are treated with contempt and brutalised once enslaved. Furthermore, according to him, the Muslims of Algiers are hypocrites, and cannot be trusted. Gramaye makes it clear that no Christian European is safe either physically or spiritually in Algiers; all they can expect from their captors is antipathy, which is required of them by their religion.³⁰ The author's subjectivity is perhaps understandable, as Gramaye himself was held captive in Algiers for six months.³¹ But Purchas sought more than simply to enlighten his readers about Algiers and the deprivations of its Christian population; he also wished to elicit Christian zeal, compassion and charity: either Christians must pursue means to ensure the redemption of their co-religionists, or conspire to destroy Algiers.³²

Even though written media, including books, pamphlets and newspapers increasingly helped inform the views of Britons in the seventeenth century, literacy was still limited and oral forms of communication remained important.³³ The promotion of accounts of Barbary captivity through collection campaigns for the redemption of captives, public ceremonies celebrating their release, ballads, plays, and church sermons, were more common channels for broad public dissemination of information and propaganda concerning Barbary, and for influencing public sentiment.³⁴

A redemption sermon delivered in 1636 by the clergyman Charles Fitzgeffry and the pamphlet in which it was published provide examples of the way in which appeals for Christian charity towards captives and their families could be reinforced by passionate explications of their suffering, and condemnation of those who held them.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1565–1566.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1566.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 1565.

³³ R. A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education 1500–1800* (London, 1990), pp. 6–7, 230–232.

³⁴ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 75–80, 88, 99–101.

The sermon was written in response to increased Muslim corsair activity around the coasts of Cornwall and Devon at that time.³⁵ In it, Fitzgeffry professes his ambition to 'be the drummer...to give the march until the Lords armies, against his, and his peoples enemies'.³⁶ The sermon integrates traditional anti-Islamic polemic with the characterisation of North Africa as a barbaric land: a place of abundance, 'save goodnesse', inscribed historically with Christian significance but which is now despoiled by a 'barbarous, brutish nation', the opposite of a civilised England, whose people are '1 irreligious; 2 covetous, 3 cruell; 4 base and contemptible'.³⁷ With its denigration of Islam and Muslims, evocation of the desecration of holy places and Christian persecution, and its call to spiritual and temporal action, it bears similarities to Pope Urban II's sermon almost six centuries earlier with which he launched the First Crusade. But as Kenneth Parker notes, this condemnation also serves another purpose. Fitzgeffry recounts reports demonstrating the compassion and charity shown by 'Turks' towards birds. In doing so he seeks to use them as a foil to highlight the moral and religious deficiencies of his congregation and readers, and encourage them to be 'as charitable to our brethen under Turks as Turks are to birds'. But even this positive observation is not left to hang: if 'reasonlesse creatures' can be treated such by 'unreasonable creatures', how can Christians face God if they do not do the same for their captive brethren? Christians must aspire to a greater level of piety than that evinced by the barbarian Turk.³⁸

Two decades after Gramaye wrote about Algiers, the persistence of the same essentialised images of Barbary are evident in the account of an English merchant, Francis Knight, of his own experiences of slavery in the city. Knight states he was motivated to write about them for the purpose of 'inlargement of the multitude of my poore country-men groaning under the weight of Turkish thraldome', who suffer 'scoffes, threats, blowes, chains, hunger, nakednesse ... and which is most deplorable,

³⁵ Anne Duffin, 'Fitzgeffry, Charles (c.1575–1638)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017.

³⁶ Charles Fitzgeffry, *Compassion Towards Captives Chiefly Towards our Brethren and Country-Men Who are in Miserable Bondage in Barbarie* (Oxford, 1637), dedication, sig. 2v.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8–12. Quotations are from pp. 8, 9, 10.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, preface, p. [2]; Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 105–106.

their danger of falling from the Christian and most holy faith', driven by 'the extremitie of their sufferings', the memory of which 'doe still increase my zeal for their liberties'.³⁹ He refers to Algiers as 'that citie fatall to all Christians, and the butchery of mankind'.⁴⁰ But while the account includes numerous details of Muslim brutality and depravity, and Christian suffering, he also expresses admiration for the discipline of their soldiers, the bearing of their governors, and the greatness of the city, and acknowledges the obligation he owes to some of them for the kindly treatment he was accorded.⁴¹

As noted by Colley, Knight's account is distinctive among other published English captivity narratives of the period both for its length, and also for his attempt to provide a more multi-faceted perspective on captivity;⁴² in doing so he reveals a significant degree of ambivalence towards the place and its people, which is unlikely to have escaped the attention of his readers. Furthermore, Matar draws attention to the fact that it is much more than an autobiography. Unlike earlier English captivity accounts, Knight devotes considerable attention to describing the place of his captivity, its geography, history, society, culture, and economy. But, as he also notes, Knight's reason for doing so was clearly more than to satisfy the interest of his readers; it was also to cajole the king to take greater responsibility for the redemption of English captives, and convince him of the value of establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with Algiers.⁴³ The inconsistency in the critiques of commentators such as Fitzgeffry and Knight was more than mere hypocrisy. As argued by Jonathan Burton, the juxtaposing of condemnation of Islam and Muslims with praise and exhortations to emulate them demonstrates the uneasy tension which could result from the confluence of traditional perspectives, new insights,

³⁹ Francis Knight, *A Relation of Seaven Yeares Slaverie Under the Turkes of Argeire, Suffered by an English Captive Merchant ...*, 2nd ed. (London, 1640), sig. A3–A3v.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 31–32, 34, 39, 41.

⁴² Colley, *Captives*, p. 88.

⁴³ Knight, *A Relation of Seaven Yeares Slaverie*, pp. 51–54; Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), pp. 62–64. The account consists of 29 pages of autobiographical content on Knight's period of enslavement, and 25 pages describing Algiers, its governance, revenues, army and navy, victories, people, lands, and riches. Oddly, on p. 55, having put his case for how to achieve peace and trade with Algiers, he contradicts himself, and concludes the account, following a description of its riches, with an enticement for the city's conquest.

normative understandings of identity, and domestic concerns.⁴⁴ On the other hand, such dissonance could also be the result of an author seeking to assure the reader that they themselves had not been corrupted by their inter-cultural encounter, rather than being the outcome of a sub-conscious process of attempting to reconcile conflicting attitudes.⁴⁵

The treatment of captivity in public discourse clearly could provide Britons with a distorted understanding of not only the nature and extent of Christian captivity, but also of North Africa and Islam more generally.⁴⁶ The recycling of negative stereotypes was perpetuated by 'fear, anger, ignorance, and prejudice'.⁴⁷ But, it was also driven by simple desperation; accounts of captivity could be deliberately exaggerated in order to engender action by the community and state authorities.⁴⁸ Perceptions about the extent of the problem of Muslim corsairing, the poor treatment of captives, and the associated risks of apostasy became sufficiently important in the minds of Britons to force Charles I to respond to the concerns of captives, their families, and merchants by recalling Parliament in November 1640. After much deliberation the outcome was the passage in December 1641 of *An Act for the Reliefe of the Captives Taken by Turkish Moorish and Other Pirates and to Prevent the Taking of Others in Time to Come*.⁴⁹ Although there clearly was a political dimension to the drafting of the legislation intended to embarrass the king, as argued by Matar,⁵⁰ the language which it employs is instructive in revealing attitudes towards Barbary which prevailed among members of the political class at the time. The Act begins by recalling the:

many thousands of your majesties good and loving subjects with their ships and goods have of late been taken surprised and taken at sea ... and some of them to free themselves of the cruel and barbarous usage of those pirates have renounced the Christian religion and turned Turks and others ... are in great danger thereby

⁴⁴ Jonathan Burton, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005), pp. 25–27.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁴⁶ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 52, 57; Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 20.

⁴⁷ Colley, *Captives*, p. 57.

⁴⁸ Robert C. Davis, 'Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast', *Past & Present* (2001), pp. 101–102; Colley, *Captives*, p. 57.

⁴⁹ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 65–67.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 67–68.

to lose their lives unless they shall also forego the Christian religion.⁵¹

But it is also evident that the supporters of the legislation were as concerned about the impact of piracy on Mediterranean trade as they were about Britons suffering in captivity and 'turning Turk'; piracy not only disrupted trade, but also led to a loss of 'expert and skillful mariners', which was both prejudicial to the interests of merchants, 'and hurtful to the trade and merchandise of your majesties dominions'.⁵² The excoriation of Barbary 'pirats' was a phenomenon not just driven by moral indignation concerning the risks of captivity and apostasy, it also had a significant economic dimension.

2.2. Inter-cultural Learning and the Development of New Perspectives

Notwithstanding ongoing predation on English shipping and the enslavement of English subjects, the foundations of the traditional Barbary discourse began to break down over time. In this respect Colley notes a paradox created by the issue of captive taking: while it exacerbated hostility toward Islam, it also contributed to an improvement in the quality and breadth of information about the religion (and the societies in which it was practised for that matter), and similarly extended the level and complexity of contact between Britons and North Africa.⁵³ Just as notions of Africa based on classical legends and imagination began to be displaced by fact from the middle of the sixteenth century,⁵⁴ the 'deformed image' of Islam which had developed within Western Christendom also began to be seriously challenged as a result of growing trade and diplomacy between the Islamic and Christian states.⁵⁵ The need to train officials and interpreters to support the management of relations with

⁵¹ Matar reproduces the Act at Appendix 1 in *ibid.*, pp. 173–176.

⁵² Quotations are from Appendix 1 of *ibid.*, p. 173.

⁵³ Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), p. 105.

⁵⁴ Jones, *Othello's Countrymen: The African in English Renaissance Drama* (London, 1965), p. vii, chap. 1. Jones and others highlight the important influence in this development in the British Isles played by the works of two particular authors, John Leo Africanus, *A Geographical Historie of Africa*, trans. John Pory (London, 1600) and Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 3 vols. (London, 1599–1600).

⁵⁵ P. M. Holt, 'Introduction', in P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 2 vols., vol. 2. *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization* (London, 1970), p. xxiii.

the Ottoman Empire and North African states helped encourage the study of Arabic and establishment of chairs in Arabic studies at Oxford and Cambridge during the 1630s.⁵⁶ But perhaps more so, the study of Arabic in Europe was driven by the particular interests of antiquarian scholars. First, there was renewed interest in Arab-Islamic learning, and a desire to directly access the works of the Arab-Muslim philosophers and scientists which had so impressed and inspired their medieval forebears. Second, there was a desire to explore biblical texts and other literature written in Arabic to gain a better understanding of the Old Testament.⁵⁷

A new approach to the study of Islam was emerging that was part of a fundamental change to the study of history, which among other things included the publication of texts about the religion.⁵⁸ An English translation of a French version of the Qur'an, *The Alcoran of Mahomet*, was published in 1649. Alexander Ross, to whom responsibility for the translation has traditionally been attributed, claimed in the 'Caveat' to the text that the purpose of its publication was to reveal to the public the absurdity of the Qur'an and reinforce the truth of Christianity. However, it has been argued that its actual translator was Thomas Ross, and that he or the backers of the project were, in fact, motivated by profit rather than piety, aware of the likely public interest in the translated text; if so, their expectations were met, as a second edition was published later that year. The number of other works on the Qur'an proposed by English Arabists during the first half of the century highlights the widespread interest

⁵⁶ G. A. Russell, 'Introduction: The Seventeenth Century: The Age of 'Arabick'', in G. A. Russell, ed., *The 'Arabick' Interest of the Natural Philosophers in Seventeenth-Century England* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 7–10; G. J. Toomer, *Eastern Wisdom and Learning: The Study of Arabic Learning in Seventeenth Century England* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 14–16, 105–112; Nabil Matar, *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 73–89; Colley, *Captives*, p. 105.

⁵⁷ Simon Mills, 'Learning Arabic in the Overseas Factories: The Case of the English', in Jan Loop, Alastair Hamilton, and Charles Burnett, eds., *The Teaching and Learning of Arabic in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 272–274, 285. See also Holt, 'Introduction', p. xxiii; P. J. Marshall and Williams Glyndwr, *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London, 1982), pp. 10, 12, 15; P. M. Holt, 'Background to Arabic Studies in Seventeenth-Century England', in G. A. Russell, ed., *The 'Arabick' Interest of the Natural Philosophers in Seventeenth-Century England* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 26–27.

⁵⁸ Holt, 'Introduction', xxiv.

in Islam which existed at the time, including a belief in the need to base the study of Arabic and Islamic culture on an understanding of the Qur'an.⁵⁹

In the same year, the Orientalist and religious scholar Edward Pococke produced his *Specimen Historiae Arabum*. Pococke had been chaplain to Levant Company merchants at Aleppo between 1630 and 1636, and while he does not appear to have greatly enjoyed the experience of living there, it did prove to be an informative period in his intellectual development and understanding of Islam: according to one correspondent at the time, his sole reason for staying was that he had 'made Arabb his mistress'.⁶⁰ To one of the editions of the *Specimen Historiae Arabum* Pococke included three hundred pages of notes which provided 'a large account of the true opinions of the Mahometans' seeking, where appropriate 'to do them justice, by vindicating them from such things as have been fasten'd upon them without sufficient ground'.⁶¹ The text continued to be an authoritative source for later writers on Islam for a century and a half, and the new understanding of Islam promoted by people such as Pococke was extended by subsequent orientalists who wrote in modern vernaculars, making this knowledge accessible to a wider, less academic audience.⁶²

One such person was the physician, polymath, and outspoken author Henry Stubbe (1632–1676). Stubbe was even less circumspect in proclaiming the rationality of Islam, which is perhaps why his manuscript on the subject was unattributed to him; a number of manuscript copies were produced, but it remained unpublished until the early twentieth century. In *Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism with the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies of Christians*, written sometime between 1671 and 1676, Stubbe made what were controversial claims for the time: that Islam was not a religion 'clogging men's faith'

⁵⁹ Mordechai Feingold, '"The Turkish Alcoran": New Light on the 1649 English Translation of the Koran', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 75 (2013), pp. 476, 480, 483, 485, 496–498.

⁶⁰ Toomer, *Eastern Wisedome*, pp. 117–119. Quotation is from p. 119.

⁶¹ Quotation is from L. Twells, *The Theological Works of the Learned Dr Pocock*, 1740, i, p. 35, cited in Marshall and Williams, *The Great Map of Mankind*, p. 13

⁶² Holt, 'Introduction', p. xxiv.

with notions 'which are often contrary to the dictates of reason and common sense ... nor loading them with the performance of many troublesome, expensive, and superstitious ceremonies'.⁶³ Notwithstanding the positive insights of men such as Pococke and Stubbe, the focus of most Islamic scholarship in England in the seventeenth century was the traditional historical study of religion, with greater importance placed on knowledge of Muhammad and his teachings, rather than on the traditional and current religious practices of Muslims. Nevertheless, while perspectives on Muhammad and the Qur'an which prevailed among academics in the seventeenth century continued to be heavily influenced by medieval polemic, it was becoming recognised that Muslims were neither implicitly hypocritical or cruel.⁶⁴

But increasing familiarity with Islam and Islamicate⁶⁵ societies could also provide other insights which challenged other long held beliefs. While Britons may have generally held firm to their belief in the superiority of Christianity, some could also view the achievements of Islam and its civilisation with admiration, and even awe. During the course of the seventeenth century increasing numbers of Britons and other Europeans came to acknowledge and respect Islamic learning, the extent of Islamic empires and their military power, and the fact that Muslims followed a religion that was not only monotheistic and widespread, but also possessed a demonstrated power to convert.⁶⁶ As a consequence, according to Colley, it became a 'part of polite

⁶³ Henry Stubbe, *Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism With the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies of Christians*, ed. Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani (London, 1911), p. 166. On the authorship and dating of the manuscript see Shairani, 'Introduction', in Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani, ed., *Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism With the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies of Christians* (London, 1911), pp. vii–viii. On the manuscripts, see *ibid.*, pp. viii–xii. For further information on this intriguing character and his work see P. M. Holt, *A Seventeenth-Century Defender of Islam: Henry Stubbe (1632–76) and His Book* (London, 1972); Feingold Mordechai, 'Stubbe, Henry (1632–1676)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017.

⁶⁴ Marshall and Williams, *The Great Map of Mankind*, pp. 13, 99–102.

⁶⁵ As with 'Islamdom', Marshall G. S. Hodgson coined this term to overcome the general tendency toward casual conflation of the religion with the social structures and cultural traditions with which it has been historically associated. He thus restricted 'the term "Islam" to the *religion* of the Muslims, not using that term for the far more general phenomena, the society of Islamdom and its Islamicate cultural traditions'. See Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols., vol. 1. *The Classical Age of Islam* (Chicago, 1977), pp. 58–59.

⁶⁶ Colley, *Captives*, p. 106; Vitkus, *Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630* (New York, 2008), pp. 15–17.

British culture' to have some familiarity with Islam.⁶⁷ Even the aforementioned Francis Knight, who had spent seven years as a slave in Algiers, came to appreciate and acknowledge the wonders possessed of the city he at first decried as sinful and barbaric.

The evident increase in interest among educated Britons concerning Islam, and changes in the way they responded to it, during the course of the seventeenth century was informed by Barbary captivity, commercial relations, and scholarly belief in the value of an informed understanding of Islam, rather than the desire for conquest.⁶⁸ This is undoubtedly true, but captivity and commerce not only contributed to improved understanding among Britons of Islam *qua* Islam, but together with diplomatic relations they also facilitated the acquisition among Britons of wider cultural understanding of Islamicate societies. As shown in chapter 1 and will be discussed further in chapter 3, this was particularly evident in the case of Morocco: between the 1550s and the occupation of Tangier in 1662, the two countries enjoyed close and generally amicable commercial and political relations which provided Britons with detailed insight into the country, and its culture, religion, society, and politics. The recognition of the benefits of commercial and political cooperation helped marginalise the impact of religious, cultural, and ethnic difference, at least among government officials and merchants. This response was chiefly borne out of pragmatism in the pursuit of essentially partisan interest. However, the greater tolerance which was engendered, together with the knowledge that had accrued from experiential engagement, did enable conventional Barbary and Islamic stereotypes to be challenged, and a more genuine, positive understanding of Morocco and its people to develop.⁶⁹

Despite continuing popular concerns about Barbary piracy and enslavement, and about general hostility of Muslims toward Christians, more enlightened

⁶⁷ Colley, *Captives*, p. 106.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 105–106; Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 15–17; Sean Foley, 'Muslims and Social Change in the Atlantic Basin', *Journal of World History*, 20 (2009), p. 394.

⁶⁹ On the impact of engagement of Britons with Morocco, see also J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism' and Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries: A Case Study in Historicising Concepts of Discourse', *SOAS Journal of Graduate Research*, 1 (2005), p. 12.

representations of Morocco could find their way into wider public discourse, at times as a consequence of incidents which also contributed to the perpetuation of prejudicial attitudes. Only a year after Charles Fitzgeffry delivered his scathing attack on Muslims inspired by the activities of corsairs, it was the release of Britons held at Salé and negotiation of a treaty that resulted in the sultan of Morocco deciding to send an ambassador to England in 1637. A pamphlet, *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, lauded the visit of the sultan's envoy, and presented Britons with a very different perspective on the Moroccan people and their religion.⁷⁰ Undoubtedly, one reason for the official and popular enthusiasm which the visit occasioned was the release of the captives, and the promise of the cessation of predation on English shipping and coastal villages by the 'Sallee Rovers'. But the pamphlet also reveals the existence of an ideology and epistemology which provided the public with another way to conceptualise relations with that part of Barbary represented by Morocco: one grounded in the experience of long standing political and commercial relations between the two countries, which elicited a more sympathetic and informed understanding of Moroccan society and its cultural and religious practices. Muhammad may have been a 'false prophet', but the author acknowledges the piety and morality of Moroccan Muslims, and in doing so recognises a shared humanity between the people of the two nations.⁷¹ Rather than conflict and difference, the author emphasises concord and commensurability.

The influence that singular events could have on the promotion in the public sphere of more positive representations of Morocco and Moroccans is again demonstrated in accounts of the visit of another ambassador almost five decades later. Muhammad bin Haddu had been dispatched by Mawlay Ismā'īl to meet with Charles II to resolve remaining issues concerning a treaty following the concerted, but unsuccessful, assaults by the Moroccan army against Tangier in 1680.⁷² Despite the bloody events which had preceeded it, and public expressions of anti-Moroccan sentiment and

⁷⁰ *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador, Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdella, with His Associate, Mr. Robert Blake from the High and Mighty Prince, Mulley Mahamed Sheque, Emperor of Morocco, King of Fesse, and Suss* (London, 1637).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–40.

⁷² On these events and the negotiations, see chap. 6 of this thesis.

jingoism which had accompanied them,⁷³ the ambassador's arrival in January 1682 was greeted with surprising enthusiasm, at least within official and elite social circles.

The ambassador's entrance into London did not attract the same fanfare and crowds that greeted his predecessor, but he was still accorded the honour of being conducted in the king's state coach, accompanied by a large contingent of members of the nobility and other dignitaries.⁷⁴ The excitement associated with the visit was undoubtedly fostered by expectations of a resolution to the stand-off at Tangier, but also inspired by genuine interest in this representative of faraway Barbary, whose bearing and conduct clearly impressed many observers. Narcissus Luttrell recorded that: 'The court are very pleased with [him], and he with them, he proveing a person of the blood royall. And very intelligent in most matters'.⁷⁵

Luttrell's fellow diarist Sir John Evelyn observed upon first seeing him that bin Haddu 'was a handsome person, well featured, of a wise look, subtle, and extremely civil'.⁷⁶ Evelyn goes on to describe the exemplary behaviour of the ambassador and his retinue at a dinner, and, as do Luttrell and others, remarks on bin Haddu's popularity among members of English elite society, as well as the Moroccans' impressive displays of horsemanship and martial skills.⁷⁷ Compared to bin Haddu, the Russian ambassador 'behaved himself like a clown', opined Evelyn; the Moroccan may have been a heathen, but he was, in Evelyn's estimation, a 'civil heathen'.⁷⁸ His positive opinion of bin Haddu and his attendants is even more marked when compared to his assessment of two ambassadors from the East Indies in London at the same time, whom he describes as 'very hard-favoured, and much resembling in countenance

⁷³ See discussion of the responses in chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁷⁴ *CSPD: Charles II, 1 January–31 December 1682*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, 28 vols., vol. 23 (London, 1932), p. 7, entry for 3 January 1681/2; Narcissus Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714*, 6 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1857), p. 155. Routh provides a reasonably good account of the embassy and the response to it in E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912), pp. 223–228.

⁷⁵ Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation*, I, p. 158.

⁷⁶ John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed. William Bray, 2 vols., vol. II ([London], 1901), p. 163, entry for 11 January 1681/2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, II, p. 164, entry for 24 January 1681/2; Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation*, I, pp. 158, 160; P. Wynne to Henry Sheres, Whitehall, 30 January 1681/2, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 81r.

⁷⁸ Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, II, p. 164, entry for 24 January 1681/82.

some sort of monkeys'.⁷⁹ While Evelyn gives only a cursory description of the 'Moorish habit' of the former, he provides a much more detailed critique of the physical appearance and dress, of the latter, which is less than flattering: he does not appear to have discerned the same level of ethnic and cultural difference with the Moroccans as he did with the 'exotic guests' from Java.⁸⁰ But in both cases their religion appears to have been of little concern to Evelyn; his only comments on the subject were to note that Javanese royalty had in recent times converted to Islam, and that one of the Javanese ambassadors had been to Mecca, and was 'deemed a holy man'.⁸¹

The difference in Evelyn's assessment of the two groups perhaps reflects the extent to which Moroccan Moors had become a familiar part of the cultural landscape for some Britons by this time.⁸² His observations also reinforce the way in which Islam too was becoming more understood and accepted in England. Certainly, neither bin Haddu's ethnicity nor religion deterred important institutions of the English establishment from honouring him. During his stay he was admitted as an honorary member of the Royal Society,⁸³ was received and entertained by the vice-chancellors and masters of the universities of Cambridge and Oxford,⁸⁴ and was admitted as a member of Lincoln's Inn.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, there were others who were not so enthusiastic about meeting the Moroccans; in the estimation of the mayor and alderman of Cambridge, the occasion of the ambassador's arrival in the town was not worthy of their official presence, as the visitors from Barbary were not of sufficient 'quality'.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II, p. 169, entry for 19 June 1682.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 163, 169–170, entries for 11 January 1681/2 and 19 June 1682.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, II, p. 169, entry for 19 June 1682.

⁸² On the domestic exposure of Britons to Ottoman Turks, North Africans, and sub-Saharan Africans during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Jones, *Othello's Countrymen*, pp. 11–13; Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999), chap. 1, esp. p. 39; Kaufmann, *Black Tudors: The Untold Story* (London, 2017), *passim*.

⁸³ Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, II, p. 169, entry for 31 May 1682.

⁸⁴ *CSPD*, 1682, pp. 117, 222, entries for 11 March and 30 May 1682; Samuel Newton, *The Diary of Samuel Newton, Alderman of Cambridge (1662–1717)*, ed. J. E. Foster (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 82–83; Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation*, I, pp. 176, 190.

⁸⁵ Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation*, I, p. 169.

⁸⁶ Samuel Newton, *The Diary of Samuel Newton*, p. 83.

Aside from the possible slight by the burghers of Cambridge, the diarists are silent about any discontent associated with bin Haddu's visit. However, a poem published in February of that year, which is effusive in its praise of the ambassador, alludes to the existence of disaffection with the presence of the Moroccans among the common people of London, chastising the uncivil behaviour of the ignorant 'multitude' toward a man 'That out of love comes to us about Tangier'.⁸⁷ The writer is keen to placate any insult felt by bin Haddu over the incident, beseeching him to 'let it pass over', and not 'record it with your good red oker'. This unattributed work was quite possibly sponsored by the English authorities to help counter negative sentiment arising from the visit which might have compromised the critical negotiations that would determine not only the future of Anglo-Moroccan relations but also the fate of English Tangier. Clearly, not all Britons were prepared to leave old hostilities and prejudices behind in the interests of a new era of peaceful relations.

The three Moroccan ambassadorial visits undertaken between 1600 and 1682 provided a means for Britons, possibly for the first time, to see Moors in the flesh, and in a reassuringly safe environment. In addition to the written testimony of observers, there are also visual artifacts from these visits which provide insights into how these representatives from Barbary may have been perceived by Britons who encountered them. Portraits of Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri — who was Ahmad al-Mansūr's ambassador to Elizabeth I in 1600 — Jaudar ben Abdellah, and Muhammad ben Haddu (figs. 4–6) were produced under different circumstances and by different artists.⁸⁸ The works were also, possibly, commissioned for different purposes. Aside from these factors, it is generally accepted that images do not necessarily depict objective reality, but rather their reality is mediated through the personal perspectives — both conscious and unconscious — of the artist, as well as through those of the viewer, including the retrospective judgement of the historian. Function,

⁸⁷ *A Congratulatory Poem Dedicated to His Excellency, the Ambassador, from the Emperor of Fez and Morocco* ([London], 1682), pp. 1–2.

⁸⁸ See chap. 1 for details of al-Annuri's visit. Bernard Harris provides a useful discussion of the visit in 'A Portrait of a Moor', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, eds., *Shakespeare and Race* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 23–36. An account of ben Abdellah's visit is provided in chap. 3.

context, and personal bias complicate the analysis of historical images to discern the contemporary mentalities associated with them.⁸⁹ However, as Peter Burke argues, it is more difficult for the artist to obfuscate. Unlike writers who can conceal their true attitudes, the act of physical representation requires artists to adopt a more committed position, where they are required to represent 'individuals from other cultures as either like or unlike themselves'.⁹⁰ Informed by these considerations one scholar has analysed two of these portraits for signs of how English attitudes towards Moroccans may have changed in the eight decades which separate them, and has argued that there is a distinct, but ambiguous, change in treatment between them.

91

Rather than Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri's image possessing a 'stern face and fierce look' indicative of the painter feeling alienated from, and intimidated by, his subject, as proposed by Matar,⁹² J. A. O. C. Brown instead suggests 'the hint of a wry smile', the artist seeking to convey the strangeness of his subject, yet at the same time presenting him realistically, and with respect.⁹³ I concur with Brown. Al-Nurri's image does not convey a sense of threat; it is perhaps enigmatic, conveying some sense of difference, of foreignness, but it is not insensitive.⁹⁴ The treatment accorded ben Abdala is similar in this respect, although this is perhaps less surprising given his Portuguese origin.⁹⁵ On the other hand, Brown sees the depiction of ben Haddu as

⁸⁹ For a useful discussion on issues relating to the use of images in historical research see Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London, 2001).

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁹¹ Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', pp. 6–7.

⁹² Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, p. 34.

⁹³ Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', p. 7. Virginia Mason Vaughan similarly interprets the image as being that 'of a man of dignity and high status who merited respect'. See Virginia Mason Vaughan, 'Representing the King of Morocco', in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2009), p. 84.

⁹⁴ However, I do not accept Brown's suspicion that the emptiness of the background in the painting is significant, suggesting 'a sense of distance and fear in the mind of the artist', or the artist's inability to relate his subject to conventional categories or symbols. Such treatment in Tudor portraits was not uncommon: the piece is in fact reminiscent of a Holbein 'costume piece'. According to Ellis Waterhouse this style, with its 'tendency to flat pattern, with elaborate dresses and aloof, inscrutable figures, persisted in England right up to the reign of James I'. See Ellis Waterhouse, *Painting in England 1530–1790* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1978).

⁹⁵ It was known that the ambassador was born in Portugal, taken captive at the age of eight, and subsequently, 'by command...hee distesticled, or Eunuch'd'. See *The Arrivall and Intertainments of the Ambassador*, p. 5.

being 'Europeanised and romanticised', the ambassador being contained 'within preconceived European categories',⁹⁶ with the trope of the warrior-prince perhaps the most apposite; an interpretation which appears more apt than the image's being an invocation of belief by the artist in the 'notion of the Moor as an energetically violent figure'.⁹⁷

But Brown is unclear as to what he believes these differences in treatment mean in terms of changes in English attitudes toward Moroccans during the period. In the present author's view they highlight two important points. First, all three portraits humanised their subjects and, in doing so negated a key element of alterity implicit in the traditional Barbary discourse. Second, the assimilation of ben Haddu into English cultural norms indicates a preparedness by some Britons by this time to accept Moroccans, at least some, as equals. Such acceptance is evident in the ambassador's reception in England, and in the previously mentioned poem which was composed for him:

Serene sir, you'r welcome to the nation,
A man of honour, and splendid in your station,
Whose noble worth, and ever-matchles fame,
Does cause the vulgar to applaud the same
...
And when you'r gone, this we will proclaim,
You left behind you a sweet and rosie name.⁹⁸

While North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans were evidently not an uncommon sight in the streets and ports of Tudor England, particularly in London, the critic Bernard Harris remarked that the painting of al-Annuri 'presents 'ocular proof' of what the Elizabethans saw as a Moor of rank'.⁹⁹ The same can be said of the paintings of ben Abdala and ben Haddu for later generations. The visits of these three

⁹⁶ Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', p. 7.

⁹⁷ See Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm>, under II—Colonialism and the Discourse of Resistance.

⁹⁸ *A Congratulatory Poem*, pp. 1–2.

⁹⁹ Harris, 'A Portrait of a Moor', p. 23. Harris in fact appears to have been the first critic to speculate whether Shakespeare's depiction of Othello may have been modelled on al-Nurri. On the presence of North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans in England see n. 81 in this chapter.

ambassadors may not have significantly negated any sense of incompatibility generally held by Britons about Moroccans,¹⁰⁰ but they, perhaps, did help to rehabilitate the image of the Moor as someone not too dissimilar to themselves, and worthy of some level of respect. Such visits remind us, as one scholar has put it, of 'the political forces that frame a society's 'racial imagination' just as effectively as the literary ones',¹⁰¹ with another similarly observing that how the Islamic Other was judged 'depended on not only ideological stereotype, but also on the particularities of diplomatic liaison and changing allegiance'.¹⁰²

Further evidence of changing popular attitudes towards Moroccans during the period, founded on an increasing acceptance of a shared humanity — as well as a further demonstration of the way events could effect unexpected changes to perceptions — can also be observed in a surprising source. Despite the ferocity of the siege of Tangier in 1680, and the patriotic sentiment it elicited among Britons, a ballad which was composed for a company of Scottish grenadiers on their way to defend Tangier at that time is remarkable for the moderate way it represents the enemy. While such a song could be expected to utilise hostile imagery to motivate the men, in fact, it does not denigrate their adversaries in any way, labelling them only as 'proud Mores', presumably because of their successes in besieging the town. The writer of the song wanted the grenadiers to help '[b]eat the Mores from Tangiers', but obviously did not see that it was necessary to vilify them using traditional ethnological or religious epithets.¹⁰³ Instead, he was prepared to accept them on their own terms, as a proud people, and worthy adversaries, perceptions well established by this time as a result of the Tangier garrison's earlier encounters with them. However, another ballad composed around the same time, and also intended

¹⁰⁰ Harris in *ibid.*, p. 35, believes that for Londoners, al-Nurri's visit emphasised the 'nature of the deep difference between themselves and their visitors'. He may well be correct, but such a generalisation is difficult to sustain on the basis of the limited sources concerning the visit which are available.

¹⁰¹ Margo Hendricks, 'Surveying 'Race' in Shakespeare', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, eds., *Shakespeare and Race* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 3.

¹⁰² Jonathan Bate, 'Introduction', in Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, eds., *Othello* (New York, 2009), p. ix.

¹⁰³ *A proper new ballad, entitled, The Granadeers Rant. To its own proper new tune, H[e]y the Brave Granadeers, Ho* (London, 1681?) (my interpolation). On the song and its background, see J. Woodfall Ebsworth, ed., *The Roxburghe Ballads*, 9 vols., vol. VII (Hertford, UK, 1893), pp. 528, 532–533; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 323–325.

to inspire the fervour of soldiers departing for Tangier, does resort to negative stereotypes of the Moor, referring to them as 'swarthy devils' and 'barbarians', and appealing to jingoistic sentiment in response to the garrison's recent defeats.¹⁰⁴ Once again, more enlightened perspectives coexisted alongside older prejudices and insecurities.

¹⁰⁴ *The English Courage Undaunted: Or, Advice to those Brave Valiant Blades Now Going to Tangier, to Maintain the Old English Courage against the Moors* (London, 1680), cited in Margarete Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 77 (2014), pp. 423–424.



Fig. 4 Portrait of Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri, by unknown artist, 1600.



Fig. 5 Portrait of Jaudar ben Abdellah from frontispiece of *The Arrivall and Intertainments of the Ambassador*, by G. Glover, 1637.



Fig. 6 Portrait of Muhammad ben Haddu, by Sir Godfrey Kneller and Jan Wyck, 1684.

2.3. The (Disruptive) Influence of Theatre

One medium that has not yet been addressed is theatre. It is instructive to consider the influence that it had during the period in shaping the perceptions of Britons towards Morocco as not only was it a means of cultural production readily accessible to the illiterate, but it was also potentially influential among all levels of early modern society. It is cited frequently by scholars as evidence of prevalent attitudes which existed among Britons about Moors and North Africa, but frequently without sufficient explication of implicit themes and meanings, consideration of the receptivity of the audience, and its general influence in society.

Of particular relevance to this thesis is the observation by Daniel Vitkus of the role the theatre played in English culture in ‘adapting, articulating, and disseminating foreignness’; drama enabled differences between peoples — their appearance, behaviours, and beliefs — to be imported into society, and subsequently ‘distorted, mimicked, and displayed’.¹⁰⁵ But, according to Vitkus it was not the representation of the exotic that principally occupied the English, but rather the various types of exchange which could occur with, or between these other cultures. In this way the theatre performed a pedagogical function providing an ‘imaginary geography’ in which examples of different actions and reactions could be played out, thereby providing ‘scripts for the practice and performance of cultural behaviour’.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, given its increasing political and commercial importance to England from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, it is not surprising that the Mediterranean world features so prominently in plays written during the late Elizabethan and Jacobean periods.¹⁰⁷ In particular, D’Amico has shown how the close commercial and diplomatic relations which developed between Morocco and England during the Elizabethan period drew the attention of English playwrights and shaped their representation of the Moor on the English stage.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, Eldred

¹⁰⁵ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ On the importance of the Mediterranean to England, see chapter 1 of this thesis. On why the Mediterranean was of particular interest to English playwrights, see Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁰⁸ D’Amico, *The Moor in English Renaissance Drama* (Tampa, FL, 1991), esp. part 1.

Jones suggests that North Africa served as a useful setting for their work because it allowed 'the dramatic effectiveness of the Negro's blackness' to be combined 'with the excitement and conflicts of the North African scene' conveyed through increasingly common published tales of travel and adventure.¹⁰⁹

As has been demonstrated in the preceding sections of this chapter, perceptions of the Moor in the imaginative geography of early modern Britons were constructed through the interplay of contemporary understandings of racial, ethnological, and religious difference. Matar comments on how the image of the Moor in English drama has attracted the attention of scholars interested in its literary derivation, issues of European racial and cultural identity, and Christian-Muslim relations.¹¹⁰ Between 1587 and 1630 there were at least seventeen plays, masques and pageants composed in England which feature the image of the Moor, Moor-like figures, or which evoked North Africa or Africa more generally.¹¹¹ These were part of a much more extensive corpus of compositions produced for the stage during the late sixteenth century and seventeenth century set within the Mediterranean or Near East, and concerned with issues of racial, cultural and religious difference.¹¹² It is outside the scope of this study to survey these works in detail. Rather an overview of general observations and some of the more insightful perspectives provided by critics on the subject should suffice

¹⁰⁹ Jones, *Othello's Countrymen*, p. 15.

¹¹⁰ Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 12.

¹¹¹ D'Amico in *The Moor* identifies the following productions: Christopher Marlowe – *Tamburlaine the Great, Parts I and II* (1587); George Peele – *The Battle of Alcazar* (1588–1589); Unknown – *Captain Thomas Stukeley* (1596); Robert Greene – *The Historie of Orlando Furiosi* (1591); Thomas Dekker – *Lust's Dominion* (1599); Ben Jonson – *The Masque of Blackness* (1605); William Shakespeare – *Titus Andronicus* (1589–1590), *The Merchant of Venice* (1596?), *Othello* (1604?), *The Tempest* (1610–11); Thomas Middleton – *The Triumphs of Truth* (1613); Francis Beaumont – *The Knight of Malta* (1616); William Rowley and Thomas Middleton – *All's Lost by Lust* (1619?); Philip Massinger – *The Renegado* (1624); Thomas Heywood – *The Fair Maid of the West, Part I* (1600–1603); *Part II* (1630?). Dating is only indicative. Dates quoted in different sources may vary, partly because they relate to different reference points — composition, first performance, or publication — although frequently the nature of the date is unspecified. For consistency, the above dates are based on those provided in Appendix 1 of Jones, *Othello's Countrymen*, pp. 145–149, except that given for *The Tempest* which is omitted by Jones. While not stated, it appears the dates used by Jones refer to the year of composition, which may or may not also be the year of first performance.

¹¹² Shakespeare alone wrote twenty plays with a Mediterranean setting. See Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 39. Furthermore, Burton in *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005), p. 11, asserts that between 1579 and 1624 there were in excess of sixty dramatic works produced in England which feature Islamic characters, or associated themes or settings.

to highlight the ways in which drama may have influenced the attitudes of Britons in the seventeenth century toward Moroccans and Morocco.

Matar has argued that the creation of Muslim alterity in England was principally undertaken within the context of literary (by which he means principally dramatic literature) and theological discourse. He asserts 'it was the stereotype developed in literature that played the greatest role in shaping the anti-Muslim national consciousness' in England, as it did in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. According to Matar, in England 'Eleazer and Othello became the defining literary representation of the "Moor," and Bajazeth, Ithamore, and Amureth of the "Turk"': as long as the authors of such works, such as Marlowe and Shakespeare, 'were viewed, rightly, as supreme icons of European imagination, the polarization with Islam and Muslims could only continue'.¹¹³ It is an astounding claim which, aside from failing to demonstrate the extent of the popular influence of the works of playwrights such as Marlowe and Shakespeare in the Jacobean and Caroline periods, also overlooks the diverse perspectives which had begun to develop in English society about Islam and the Muslim Other. As remarked by Linda McJannet in relation to Matar's assertion, in making such generalisations in order 'to arrive at a "bottom line" about cultural matters', scholars risk losing sight of evidence to the contrary, and entrenching the very prejudices and ideologies which we seek to challenge.¹¹⁴ A more nuanced approach is required if we are to attempt to understand how "Moorish" characters and themes developed by English playwrights may have actually been interpreted by contemporary audiences and readers. In this respect, while D'Amico acknowledges that the representations of the Moor on the Elizabethan stage drew 'on certain racial, religious, and cultural preconceptions that form part of the Western tradition', he insists it is important to identify the ideas and experiences which shaped these representations in order to understand how a playwright might have exploited such preconceptions.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ Linda McJannet, *The Sultan Speaks: Dialogue in English Plays and Histories about the Ottoman Turks* (New York, 2006), p. viii. Burton also finds Matar's position 'problematic'. See Burton, *Traffic and Turning*, pp. 20–21.

¹¹⁵ D'Amico, *The Moor*, p. 1.

Vitkus has observed that with their increasing exposure to foreign cultures during the 'Age of Exploration' the English were subject to a powerful set of contradictory perspectives about other cultures and peoples. They were 'both demonized and exalted, admired and condemned', and the resulting xenophobic and xenophilic tendencies of English culture were played out on the early modern stage.¹¹⁶ The English harboured anxieties about the Mediterranean as a site of transgression, of potentially contaminating cultural exchange, but being unable to fully subvert this process they often found it necessary (and even useful) to accommodate cultural, ethnic, and religious difference, and it was such developments which were keenly observed by Elizabethan and early Stuart playwrights, and articulated by them in their work.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the Moor and Barbary were also often used by playwrights as foils and metaphorical devices to enable them to explore other contemporary concerns about domestic cultural, societal and religious developments.

Thomas Heywood's play *The Fair Maid of the West, Part I* (1600–1603) and *Part II* (1630?) provides an instructive example, having been described as 'a particularly useful mirror of English attitudes at the turn of the century'.¹¹⁸ The play is not pure fantasy; it demonstrates that Heywood had some familiarity with the history of North Africa, the region's socio-political structure, and understanding of Anglo-Moroccan relations as they stood at the time it was composed. In this respect there are parallels which can reasonably be drawn between the play and the relationship which existed between Queen Elizabeth I and Mawlay al-Mansūr, and English hopes of establishing beneficial relations with Morocco.¹¹⁹ At one level that may be true, but the play displays far greater thematic complexity. As argued by D'Amico, Heywood does not use either part of the play to expand the repertoire of the representation of the Moor, or significantly exploit existing stereotypes. Rather, he uses the setting of Morocco as a foil for English court life, and to explore the outcomes which arise when

¹¹⁶ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 22.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23, 42–44.

¹¹⁸ D'Amico, *The Moor*, p. 84.

¹¹⁹ Observations also made by others. See, for example *ibid.*, pp. 86, 88; Jean E. Howard, 'An English Lass Amid the Moors: Gender, Race, Sexuality and National Identity in Heywood's *The Fair Maid of the West*', in Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker, eds., *Women, "Race," and Writing in the Early Modern Period* (London, 1994), pp. 112–114; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 33–35.

different socio-cultural perspectives meet.¹²⁰ Although the Moroccan sultan in the play, Mullisheg, may be subject to some racial slurs, and is perhaps stereotyped as a lustful Moor in his pursuit of the English female protagonist, Besse, he is also portrayed as an essentially good, if tyrannical, ruler; and at times noble.¹²¹ There is clear ambivalence in Heywood's treatment of Mullisheg.¹²² But aside from this, as D'Amico points out, the themes of power, lust and emasculation played out in Mullisheg's court would have been understood as not being unique to Morocco.¹²³

In fact, other critics have also reflected on the way in which contemporary issues in English society concerning class, sexuality, gender, and national identity are evident in the subtext of plays such as *The Fair Maid of the West*, and Philip Massinger's *The Renegado* (1624).¹²⁴ Consequently, while Muslim women could be negatively portrayed as wanton, sexual predators, and the antithesis of non-Muslim characters, the construction of these characters had less to do with perceptions of otherness, than in developments regarding the discourse on gender, and varied according to prevailing concerns in this respect. For this and other reasons, characterisations of Turkish and Moorish women both on the stage and in travel accounts were notably ambivalent.¹²⁵

Arguably, the aspect of contact with Islam that most disturbed the English was the threat of religious conversion.¹²⁶ Burton observes that while the issue of 'turning Turk' was a subject often addressed by English writers, rather than responding directly to the actual perceived threat, they 'invariably turned the subject on its head', often by

¹²⁰ D'Amico, *The Moor*, pp. 89–91, 96–97.

¹²¹ See, for example, Part I, 4.1 (pp. 46–47, 53–55), and 5.1 (p. 61) of Thomas Heywood, *The Fair Maid of the West. Or, A Girle Worth Gold* (London, 1631). This edition contains both parts of the play.

¹²² D'Amico refers to Mullisheg wavering 'between lust and nobility'. See *The Moor*, p. 85. Similarly, see also Jones, *Othello's Countrymen*, pp. 19, 116. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 33.

¹²³ D'Amico, *The Moor*, p. 97.

¹²⁴ See, for example, Howard, 'An English Lass', esp. p. 102; Barbara Fuchs, 'Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and the English Nation', *ELH*, 67 (2000), esp. p. 61.

¹²⁵ Lamiya Mohamed Almas, 'The Women of the Early Modern Turk and Moor Plays', PhD Thesis (University of Minnesota, 2009), pp. 153–155.

¹²⁶ Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety and the Muslim Power of Conversion: Five Perspectives on 'Turning Turk' in Early Modern Texts', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 2 (2002), p. 52; Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 77–78.

either turning apostasy into comedy, or treating it as a providential 'saintly trial'.¹²⁷ He notes that insistence on the existence of a providential order was an important structuring device in various literary genres, including travel accounts. Use of providentialism extended beyond polemic, providing the English with a means to understand the course of events in the world, particularly in times of adversity and cataclysm. It allowed such events to be understood as tests of faith, and demonstrations of its power, providing reassurance of the righteousness of Protestantism in the face of Islamic hegemony.¹²⁸ Recourse to providentialism is evident in a number of the personal accounts that are examined in this study.

However, Burton demonstrates how plays, such as *The Fair Maid of the West*, and *The Renegado*, use comedy rather than reliance on predestination to mediate concerns about conversion. Both these plays involve clownish servants who seek preferment while in the court of a North African Muslim ruler, and are subsequently threatened with castration, circumcision, or conversion.¹²⁹ Critics have interpreted the meaning implicit in the emasculation of Heywood's character Clem in various ways: 'punishment for social mobility' and symbolic of the way in which the English viewed their relationship to other contemporary empires;¹³⁰ or a warning about the dangers of submitting to another culture.¹³¹ But Burton argues that the comic element of the *The Fair Maid of the West* was a means to allay contemporary anxiety about conversion to Islam by first deconstructing the process of 'turning Turk', and then restricting the threat only to common fools, not proper Englishmen.¹³²

This review of the representation of the Moor and Barbary in early modern drama is admittedly cursory, but it does help reinforce several points pertinent to considering the impact that theatre may have had on English society in informing public perceptions. The inter-articulation of domestic concerns, universal issues, traditional

¹²⁷ Burton, 'English Anxiety', p. 59.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 41–45.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53.

¹³⁰ Fuchs, 'Faithless Empires', pp. 61–62.

¹³¹ D'Amico, *The Moor*, p. 85; Howard, 'An English Lass', p. 115.

¹³² Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety', pp. 52–55.

assumptions, and new insights by English playwrights helped inform the construction of particular characters and relations between Christians and Muslims that transcended simple stereotyped representations. As noted by D'Amico, while issues of difference presented in plays would have been assessed by audiences against contemporary norms, drama 'had the potential to force a reassessment of those norms and of the cultural judgement' exemplified by the play.¹³³ The figure of the Moor could be used by playwrights to reinforce traditional stereotypes and assert Western superiority, but conversely, could also be a means for them to challenge assumptions based on conventional binarisms, such as English–foreign, friend–enemy, black–white, Christian–infidel.¹³⁴ This is vividly exemplified in *Othello*, where the eponymous protagonist is possessed of an unstable spiritual identity which is 'neither "white" nor "black"'.¹³⁵ Through the disruption of such binaries, early modern English playwrights left 'a space for questioning, rethinking, reacting, and reconstructing' ideas of cultural, ethnic, and religious difference.¹³⁶

Besides the uncertain influence which the theatrical representation of Moors and Barbary actually had on prevailing attitudes, another question which has to be considered is the extent of its impact into the seventeenth century. Following the accession of James I, there was both a political and imaginative withdrawal of the English from Barbary and the Mediterranean world more generally, evidenced by a decline in interest in the Moor on the stage.¹³⁷ Aside from a lack of interest in the subject, there was also a significant change in the nature of stage productions. Alexander Johnston notes that while a 'seriousness of purpose' is evident in English drama between 1560 and 1625, during the reign of Charles I public theatre 'sank to the portrayal of cynical violence', and productions held for the court became 'shallow

¹³³ D'Amico, *The Moor*, p. 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3, 212–213; Patricia Parker, 'Preposterous Conversions: Turning Turk, and its "Pauline" Rerighting', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 2 (2002), p. 27; Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 22–24, 30, 42–43. On the complexity and contradictory nature of images of Barbary and the Moor in early modern England, see also Virginia Mason Vaughan's essay 'Representing the King of Morocco', pp. 77–94, *passim*.

¹³⁵ Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, p. 23.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24. See also D'Amico, *The Moor*, pp. 215–216.

¹³⁷ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 36; Jerry Brotton, *This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic World* (London, 2017), pp. 298–304.

masques divorced from reality'.¹³⁸ In a further blow to English theatre, in 1642 the Long Parliament ordered the closure of public theatres within the city of London, with the ban not being lifted until 1660. Furthermore, rather than representing an expansion of their reach, the movement of Elizabethan plays from the realm of mass public spectacle in London to personal consumption as expensive printed reading editions signalled the start of their long restriction to a more elite audience. For these reasons it is unlikely that drama once again played a significant role in reinforcing, let alone shaping, popular sentiment toward Moors and Barbary until the 1670s, with the appearance of a series of plays featuring Moors or North African settings.

John Dryden's two-part play, *The Conquest of Granada*, first performed in 1670–1671, was followed by Elkanah Settle's *The Empress of Morocco* (1673), Aphra Behn's *Abdelazer, or the Moor's Revenge* (1677), and Settle's *The Heir of Morocco* (1682). This resurgence of interest is likely to have been, at least partly, inspired by the English occupation of Tangier, and developments concerning it, particularly sporadic attacks by Moroccans.¹³⁹ But Karim Bejjit observes a paradox: despite more factual information about Morocco than ever before being available to Britons, the dramatic treatment of the Moor in plays such as *The Empress of Morocco* and *Abdelazer* continued to be largely based on the same themes and structures that characterised English Renaissance plays.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, while earlier generations may have accepted the blurring of fact and fiction in the interests of dramatic impact, by the latter part of the seventeenth century Britons were clearly becoming better informed and less forgiving of factual error, if the ridicule suffered by Settle from his peers over the perceived deficiencies of *The Empress of Morocco* is any indication.¹⁴¹ However, despite these flaws, Bejjit discerns a preparedness by Settle to portray Moroccans 'in their intellectual and moral diversity', not simply as foils for 'good-natured white Christians'.¹⁴² Anthony Barthelemy elaborates: 'in Settle's Morocco plays there are

¹³⁸ Alexandra F. Johnston, 'Tudor Drama, Theatre and Society', in Robert Tittler and Norman Jones, eds., *A Companion to Tudor Britain* (Malden, MA, 2004), p. 444.

¹³⁹ See, for example, Matar's observations concerning this influence in *Britain and Barbary*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁰ Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', under I—From Dramatic to Colonial Space. Matar in *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 145–146, 148, 161, also identifies parallels with earlier works.

¹⁴¹ See discussion in Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 148–149.

¹⁴² Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', p. 3 of 12, and n. 7.

virtuous and evil Moors, forthright and duplicitous Moors. Settle's plays present the range of humans we generally expect to find in drama'.¹⁴³

Restoration playwrights may have potentially been better informed than their predecessors, but it is not evident that the period saw a 'radical shift' in the way in which Moors were perceived and represented by them as a result of the occupation of Tangier and the frequently hostile encounters this elicited.¹⁴⁴ There were changes regarding the issues which playwrights wrote about and the social-cultural context in which they did so, but there were also continuities. As was the case with their Elizabethan and Jacobean antecedents, Restoration drama was not necessarily polemical in nature, and while admittedly it could at times misinform, and convey and reinforce prejudicial attitudes, it could similarly destabilise the traditional stereotypes on which it drew, and by doing so contribute to the development of a more diverse and nuanced discourse on Moors and Barbary.¹⁴⁵ However, it is important not to overemphasise the role of theatre. It was only one medium of many which informed the perceptions and beliefs of early modern Britons, and it remains uncertain what audience members actually 'read' into plays and just how influential theatre was in reinforcing or changing attitudes about North Africa and its peoples.

Conclusion

Early modern Christian Europeans were the inheritors of already well entrenched, strongly prejudicial stereotypes concerning Islam and Muslims. But over the course of the sixteenth century, with new tensions arising as a result of European and Ottoman expansionism, the traditional Otherness of Islamic North Africa, defined as it was by religious and cultural difference, was further reinforced by its association with piracy, slavery, and overt hostility to Christianity, resulting in the development

¹⁴³ Anthony Gerard Barthelemy, *Black Face Maligned Race: The Representation of Blackness in English Drama from Shakespeare to Southerne* (Baton Rouge, 1987), p. 198.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', under I—From Dramatic to Colonial Space.

¹⁴⁵ As Stuart Sherman observes in relation to many of Dryden's theatrical works, 'the emphasis on topicality can sometimes obscure the deliberate densities and intensities of dramatic texture. See Sherman, 'Dryden and the Theatrical Imagination', in Steven N. Zwicker, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to John Dryden* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 17.

of a specific Barbary discourse. Accounts of Christian captivity in North Africa, and associated fears of violence and apostasy, played an important role in promulgating and inculcating this discourse within Europe. The discourse reified a particularly negative set of images of the region and its people: North Africa was viewed as uncivilised, iniquitous, a sanctuary for pirates and European renegades, the antithesis of Europe, and a place unsafe for good Christians; while its Muslim inhabitants were variously characterised as evil, violent, cruel, deceitful, covetous, lustful, sodomites, effeminate, hypocrites, pagan idolators, and possessing an irredeemable hatred of Christians.

However, ironically, over time, captivity narratives, through the less partial insights their authors often provided into the customs and practices of the people who enslaved them, contributed to destabilising the very discourse they had helped to construct. These insights, together with observations made by sojourning Britons resulting from an increasing level of diplomatic and commercial contact with the region, fostered progressive development of a more informed understanding about Islam and Islamic societies. Furthermore, the expansion of England's activities in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century and renewal of academic engagement with the language, as well as with Islam and Arab-Islamic learning, encouraged the incorporation of Arabic studies into university curricula. These developments were accompanied by increasing interest in, and respect for, Muslims and their religion within broader circles of English polite society.

Nevertheless, Morocco held a particular place in the imagination of many Britons with respect to Islamdom, and North Africa in particular. One very important reason for this was the extended period of close and generally positive relations enjoyed by the two peoples up until England's occupation of Tangier. Although born out of pragmatic mutual needs, the cooperation which ensued, albeit often tinged with suspicion and involving discordant ends, did attenuate the impacts of conflict and religious, cultural, and ethnic difference, and the fear and anxiety which they engendered, allowing a less biased, more human, perspective of the Moor to emerge. The unique nature of this relationship attracted the attention of English playwrights.

Using old tropes and new insights, and navigating an imaginative geography situated between fact and fiction, the depiction of Barbary and the Moor on the stage became means by which playwrights explored a range of issues of contemporary social and cultural relevance through their work. By doing so, they could unsettle traditional paradigms and provided another medium which encouraged Britons to reassess, and possibly reconfigure, their attitudes towards Morocco and Moroccans, and the stereotypes on which they were based.

Through reports and accounts based on the direct experiences of their compatriots and other Europeans, more informed and objective exegesis of Islam, and increasing public dissemination of information about them in a variety of forms, Britons began to have access to a wide array of alternative perspectives of North Africa and its peoples which challenged the binarism implicit in the Barbary discourse and other traditional stereotypes, providing Britons with the capacity to understand them more clearly on their own terms.¹⁴⁶ As Burton observes, scholars often overlook the significance of the ways in which the Other can, in effect, “write back” through tales of encounter to reconfigure the prevailing narrative.¹⁴⁷ Britons had long appreciated Barbary’s abundant natural resources and strategic location, which inspired among some of them imperial and colonial aspirations. But they were also becoming aware of the region’s cultural and ethnic diversity, socio-political complexity, and rich material culture and heritage.¹⁴⁸ Such factors were important in informing positive attitudes among early modern Europeans about non-Western societies, despite religious difference continuing to be an essential point of reference.¹⁴⁹

The region’s Muslim inhabitants became appreciated by some Britons for being other than what the traditional Muslim/Moorish stereotypes prescribed them to be: they

¹⁴⁶ Burton similarly refers to Britons drawing from an ‘experiential inventory’ of knowledge about Islam acquired from cultural contact through trade, travel, captivity, and diplomacy from the sixteenth century. He argues that this inventory of ideas was ‘triangulated’ with ‘textual-historical’ and ‘domestic’ (normative concepts of self-identity) inventories. See Burton, *Traffic and Turning*, pp. 22–24.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 52.

¹⁴⁸ On this issue see Colley, *Captives*, pp. 109–112.

¹⁴⁹ Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY, 1989), p. 64.

became accepted for being not wholly different, even equals. In fact, they were at times even elevated to role models; their piety and civil conduct were often remarked upon and praised by observers, and contrasted with that of Britons and other Christians. But this new 'more measured and multifaceted discourse', not just concerning North Africans but Muslims more generally, did not replace conventional, more prejudicial stereotypes; instead, it existed alongside them.¹⁵⁰ The ostensibly contradictory perspectives which could result from this inter-articulation of old and new ideas is evident when an author could seek to deride Islam by declaring that Muhammad was a 'false prophet' while also confidently asserting that the adherents of his religion 'surpass many Christians in righteousness and just dealing toward men'.¹⁵¹

Walter Lippmann argued that until we know what people think they know, that is, until we have gained insight into their understanding of the world, we cannot fully understand their acts. If we seek to do so, we have to 'appraise not only the information which has been at their disposal, but the mind through which they have filtered it'.¹⁵² This is the challenge which underlies this study, and is the subject of the following chapters. In fact, it is a two-fold challenge, for it not only involves appraising the minds of Britons who had contact with Morocco, but also how those minds may or may not have been changed by their encounter with the 'great blooming, buzzing confusion' of that country.

¹⁵⁰ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 107–108. On the persistence of traditional representations and beliefs concerning Islam in early modern Britain, see Jenkins, 'Writing Islam', esp. pp. 21–27. Jenkins' study is interesting and useful, but he too readily dismisses the influence of direct cultural encounter on informing new perspectives about Islam and Muslims among Britons.

¹⁵¹ *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador, Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdella, With His Associate, Mr. Robert Blake From the High and Mighty Prince, Mulley Mahamed Sheque, Emperor of Morocco, King of Fesse, and Suss* (London, 1637), p. 40.

¹⁵² Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 79–85. Quotation is from p. 85.

3. Pragmatism (1625–1660)

I thought it my dutie both out of the love I beare to my owne native countrie, and lykewise this your countrie, where I have bin so often employed, to publish to all to whom his majesties letters cannot be communicated ... this his princely intendment and disposition, the rather in respect of the present tymes and occassions, for the benefite and behoofe of both nations. (John Harrison, Tétouan, 27 June 1625)¹

While relations between Christian Europe and the Islamicate societies of North Africa during the early modern period have begun to attract increasing attention from scholars, there remains much work to be done to properly historicise the events of this period, and understand the repercussions for each party's subsequent economic, political, and socio-cultural development. In this respect, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there is a fundamental question that remains to be satisfactorily addressed concerning the activities of Britons in North Africa during the seventeenth century, and that concerns the impact that their encounters with this part of the world actually had on the development of British self-identity, and, by extension, Britain's imperial progression.

The challenge for anyone seeking to answer this question is to establish a clear relationship between cause and effect: to distinguish the particular influence that experience in North Africa may have had on shaping the worldview of early modern Britons and nurturing imperial and colonial aspiration, and separating this influence from the many and varied other factors which undoubtedly contributed to this development. For this reason, in a departure from previous work on the subject, the focus of this study is not so much on generalised interpretations, but rather on elucidating a deeper understanding of the impact of encounter at the individual level amongst Britons who had actual lived experience in that part of North Africa in which they had the most consistent, and broadest range of, relations during the early modern period, Morocco. In this chapter, and the three which follow, the impact of

¹ 'Lettre de John Harrison aux Maures', 27 June 1625, in Henry de Castries, ed., *SIHMA*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Paris, 1925), pp. 567–568.

encounter is examined by reference to the affective, cognitive, and behavioural responses of some of the many thousands of Britons who set foot in that country, not as captives, but as free men between 1625 and 1684 — from the start of a more assertive English presence in the Mediterranean to the demise of English Tangier. These observations will be used to help identify the personal and other proximate factors which influenced those responses, and in assessing the impact that their experiences had on them, and in shaping Anglo-Moroccan trade and diplomatic relations more generally.

What is particularly notable is the dearth of detailed studies on the period between the close of the Elizabethan period — commonly regarded by both contemporaries and modern scholars as marking the end of a golden age of Anglo-Moroccan relations — and the more turbulent period of relations associated with the occupation of Tangier. While perhaps this is not surprising given the events by which it is bookended, the lacuna results in a prolonged discontinuity in understanding what their experience in Morocco reveals about English colonial and imperial aspiration, and attitudes to other peoples during what has been recognised as a particularly tumultuous period of ideological and social change associated with what has been characterised as a ‘general crisis’ in Europe. According to Hugh Trevor-Roper, one of the early proponents the concept, the crisis was the result of a widespread breakdown in relations between expanding and wasteful state structures and the societies they governed, tensions exacerbated by changes in intellectual thought and religious developments.²

The anxieties arising from the developing sense of crisis that emerged in the late sixteenth century reached their zenith in the middle of the following century, and are, I believe, very much evident in the thinking and behaviour of Britons who were

² H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'The General Crisis of the 17th Century', *Past & Present*, 16 (1959), pp. 31–64. Other notable proponents of the ‘general crisis’ thesis are Theodore K. Rabb, and Geoffrey Parker. See, for example, Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1975); Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2001), [first published in 1979]. Parker, and others, have also discerned the phenomenon had a global dimension. On this reappraisal, see Parker’s more recent book *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, 2013).

active in Morocco during this time. This is particularly the case with the key protagonist of this chapter, John Harrison, as well as in proposals for trade and settlement in the country which were floated by those who followed after him, including the traveller Stephen Scott, the naval commander George Carteret, and the merchant Robert Blake, which are also examined.

As will be shown, the experiences of these men and their responses to them were influenced by conditions which differed markedly from those which prevailed at the beginning of the century. Aside from the general anxieties felt by Europeans at the time, Morocco was experiencing political anarchy and England was facing a new set of geo-political challenges. It is only when this context is fully appreciated that their thinking about Morocco can be properly understood as not being the product of imperial and colonial aspiration but rather pragmatic, creative, if unrealistic, responses to these particular circumstances. Notably, their actions were also generally premised on an understanding of the need to demonstrate mutual benefit.

Much time is devoted to an examination of the exploits of Harrison, because unlike the other Britons who feature in the chapter he left an extensive record of not only his activities but also his thoughts. His story not only emphatically reveals the role that religious conviction and ideological belief could play in personal acculturation, but also provides a very good introductory case study clearly demonstrating how a focus on the processes of acculturative change can provide novel, more nuanced insights into the consequences of historical encounters between European and non-European peoples.

3.1. The King's Agent: Negotiating National Interest and Personal Belief

In 1625 James I died and was succeeded by his son, Charles. James had never embraced relations with Morocco, at least beyond the necessity for prosaic diplomacy to negotiate the release of captives. The factors which had helped drive and define Anglo-Moroccan diplomatic relations during the latter part of the sixteenth century were no longer extant: both architects of the entente, Elizabeth I

and sultan Ahmad al-Mansūr, were dead, and, critically, the threat from Spain had diminished with the signing of the Peace of London in 1604. Furthermore, there was no longer a central government in Morocco. With al-Mansūr's passing, Morocco had descended into political and social anarchy, making it difficult for merchants and officials alike to negotiate the everchanging landscape of sovereignty across the country, and disrupting traditional trading patterns. But, conversely, it encouraged illicit trade by English merchants with the warring parties, particularly in weapons, which exacerbated diplomatic tensions.

Preparations for the resumption of hostilities with Spain in 1625 motivated the new English king to attempt a rapprochement with his country's past ally, and he dispatched his father's former envoy, John Harrison.³ In a letter to Mawlay Zaydān, Charles reminded the sultan of the 'greate amyty and corespondacy' which had existed between Elizabeth and al-Mansūr, and expressed his desire that it 'continewe for the good of the subjects of both our dominions, and other reasons he [Harrison] can more at large informe yow'.⁴ Harrison subsequently arrived in Tétouan in June that same year. It was his fifth mission to Morocco since 1610, and he would undertake a further three.

Harrison's extensive experience both as a commercial and political agent provided him with a sound knowledge of Moroccan history, society, culture, religious practices, and political structures. One scholar has gone as far as describing him as having 'laid the foundations for England's commercial and ideological relations with Morocco',⁵ but this claim cannot be substantiated based on the available evidence. England's commercial relationship with Morocco was already well established by the time Harrison appeared, and there is little proof of his having had a direct, long-term impact on shaping either English geopolitical or commercial thinking about the region. Nevertheless he was highly regarded, and an important figure in Anglo-

³ Refer to chapter 1.

⁴ 'Lettre de Charles I^{er} a Moulay Zidān', [27 March–1 June 1625], in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 566.

⁵ Nabil Matar, 'Harrison, John (d. 1641x52)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017.

Moroccan relations in the first third of the seventeenth century, and his life and writings about Morocco warrant more attention than they have been given by historians. He is an excellent subject for a study of the present kind because of the extended period over which he worked in Morocco, the breadth of his experiences there, and the detailed accounts that he left.

There is little currently known about Harrison's early life. He appears to have served in the English army in Ireland under Elizabeth I, and upon the accession of James I Harrison was appointed to the privy chamber of his son, Prince Henry, remaining in that position until Henry's death in 1612. He then joined the retinue of James' daughter Elizabeth, the Countess Palatine of the Rhine, until at least 1619, later being appointed sheriff, or governor, of the Somers Isles (Bermuda), before he once again returned to Morocco.⁶ The following discussion contributes to the limited information available on this intriguing figure by revealing new insights into his beliefs and motivations.

While they were undoubtedly important to him, Harrison's interests in North Africa were clearly more than just his desire to serve his country and to achieve financial gain. His writings reveal him to be a deeply religious man, staunchly anti-Catholic, and possessed of 'a deep evangelical zeal'.⁷ The way in which the interarticulation of these elements of Harrison's character and motivations helped shaped his thinking about Morocco is well demonstrated in a pamphlet he published in 1613, *The New Prophetical King of Barbary*, which was introduced in chapter 1 of this thesis. The pamphlet is purported to reproduce correspondence from an English merchant in Morocco concerning the latest political developments there. Harrison's correspondent, 'R.S.', recounts the success of the marabout Abu Mahalli against

⁶ 'Harrison, John (fl.1630)', in *Dictionary of National Biography*, 63 vols., vol. 25 (London, 1885–1900), p. 33; Matar, 'Harrison, John'.

⁷ Matar, 'Harrison, John'.

Mawlay Zaydān. The majority of the account is particularly noteworthy for R.S.'s support for, and admiration of, the rebel leader.⁸

R.S. records that Abu Mahalli announced that he came to make peace, having been sent by God to challenge the ruling dynasty, 'to stablish their Prophets religion ... and recover those parts of Christendome the king of Spaine holds from them ... and tels his people they shall yet see great wonders come to passe'. One such wonder would be the appearance of a bridge across the Strait by which his followers would invade Spain, Italy, and France, and having achieved this he would reign for forty years until the coming of Christ and the final judgement, but, he insisted, 'for England, Flanders or other parts they have not to doe, they will have friendship with us'.⁹ R.S. recounts all this without any hint of alarm or scepticism. But the treatment of subsequent details of the marabout's life and achievements becomes distinctly ambivalent.¹⁰ By the end of the account the tone changes once again, from ambivalence to outright hostility, with R.S. purporting to state:

For my owne part I am perswaded, they be delusions of the divell done by witchcraft, and permitted by the Lord, to seduce them to further error. God deliver us Christians well from among them, and grant us the use, and true knowledge of his holy word preached in Christian countries *which here we want*.¹¹

During the course of the letter Abu Mahalli has been transformed from a saviour of the country, and a potential ally of Protestant nations, to an agent of the devil. The combined text is inherently contradictory — Abu Mahalli is both lauded and demonised — so much so that the exercise of editorial licence by Harrison appears to be the only plausible explanation.¹² At the very least the account, as with others

⁸ See, for example, R.S., *The New Prophetical King of Barbary or the Last Newes from Thence in a Letter Written of Late from a Merchant There, to a Gentl. Not Long Since Employed into that Countrie from His Maiestie*, ed. John Harrison (London, 1613), sig. B3v, B[4]v–Cr.

⁹ *Ibid.*, sig. B3r–v.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, sig. Cr–C2v.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sig. C[3]r (my emphasis).

¹² Gary K. Waite compares and contrasts this account and two Dutch pamphlets which also deal with the conflict between Mawlay Zaydān and Abu Mahalli during this time. However, Waite overlooks the inherent dissonance in the English text. See Waite 'Reimagining Religious Identity: The Moor in Dutch and English Pamphlets, 1550–1620', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 66 (2013), pp. 1278–1285.

from this period, is marked by ambivalence, of conflicting perceptions concerning the indigenous peoples, particularly their leaders.¹³

The pamphlet as a whole appears to be intended to serve as an apocalyptic and cautionary tale, warning of the dangers of false prophets (including the Pope),¹⁴ highlighting the risk of civil conflict arising from pride and self-interest,¹⁵ and defending the doctrine of the divine right of kings, 'whether Christian, or heathen'.¹⁶ But Harrison also teasingly remarks in the epilogue that the civil unrest 'may serve for another use: a finall use of all, either that hath passed, or may hereafter fall out'.¹⁷ It is a cryptic statement, but he appears to be implying that an opportunity may arise as a result of the disorder. It is possible that Harrison was conveying a millenarian expectation, but more likely he was alluding to the more immediate possibility of political and evangelical intervention in Morocco, proposals for which he would later develop and promote. However, the timing of the publication and its nature indicates that Harrison had a motivation beyond patriotic and religious service. In the previous year he had lost his patron, Prince Henry, and the pamphlet appears to have been a means by which he sought to promote himself as a man of true Protestant conviction, having significant knowledge of, and experience in, Morocco, and possessing a mysterious, yet beguiling, plan.

Harrison's lack of gainful employment again appears to have been a motivation behind his publication of another text which also appeared in 1613, the treatise *The Messiah Alreadie Come*.¹⁸ It was dedicated to Maurice, Prince of Orange, from whom

¹³ Kenneth Parker also makes this observation in 'Reading 'Barbary' in Early Modern England, 1550–1685', *The Seventeenth Century*, 19 (2004), p. 101.

¹⁴ R.S., *The New Prophetical King*, sig. A[4]r–v.

¹⁵ 'Non unquam tulit documenta, fors majora quam fragili loco starent superbi' = Never did fortune give larger proofs on what shaky ground stand the proud (my translation). See epilogue in *ibid*.

¹⁶ Preface in *ibid*.

¹⁷ Epilogue in *ibid*.

¹⁸ John Harrison, *The Messiah Alreadie Come. Or Proofs of Christianitie, Both Out of the Scriptures, and Auncient Rabbins, to Convince the Jewes, of their Palpable, and More then Miserable Blindnes (if More May Be) for their Long, Vayne, and Endles Expectation of their Messiah (as They Dreame) Yet For to Come* (Amsterdam, 1613). A second edition was printed in Amsterdam in 1619, and a third edition appeared in London in 1656, entitled *A Vindication of the Holy Scriptures. Or the Manifestation of Jesus Christ. The True Messiah Already Come*.

Harrison undoubtedly sought favour.¹⁹ But it is an altogether different document from *The New Prophetical King*; written by Harrison while he was residing in Morocco in 1610, it provides insights into his attitudes to Moroccan society and his theological beliefs. The treatise reveals Harrison as a millenarian Protestant who was also influenced by a movement promoting a more positive interest in the Jewish people, and their culture and history, a general disposition that has been termed philo-Semitism, which developed in England from the early seventeenth century.²⁰ It is a detailed apologetic intended to convince Jews of the truth of Christianity, and encourage them to convert, not simply to save their souls, but, together with the destruction of the Catholic Church, as a precondition for the arrival of the Apocalypse and the Second Coming.²¹ The identification of Harrison as a millenarian is reinforced by his continued interest in the dispossessed elector of the Palatinate, Frederick V (the 'Winter King'), and his wife, whose cause became the focus of various portentous ideas among Protestants with chiliastic beliefs.²²

During his mission to Morocco in 1610, Harrison spent a period of almost six months in Safi on the Atlantic coast, during which time he was befriended by a local rabbi, and a further three and a half months living among the Jewish community in Marrakesh.²³ While in *The New Prophetical King* Harrison does not express any views about Arab or Berber Moroccans, beyond criticising them for their gullibility for having been deceived by 'idle and superstitious vanities',²⁴ in *The Messiah Alreadie Come* he openly reveals his feelings and perceptions about Moroccan Jews. He notes

¹⁹ Refer to the last paragraph of the dedication. To ensure that was there no doubt about the reasons he was giving Maurice the honour, nor about his current circumstances, the dedication was also translated into Dutch while the remainder of the document is only rendered in English.

²⁰ Ronald H. Fritze, 'Jews in England', in Ronald H. Fritze and William B. Robison, eds., *Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, 1603–1689* (Wesport, CT, 1996), pp. 269–270. For a more detailed account of the development of philo-semitism in England, see David S. Katz, *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655* (Oxford, 1982).

²¹ Harrison acknowledges that much of the content is not original, but 'borrowed' from another text, '*The Christian Directorie or Resolution*', by which he undoubtedly means Robert Persons' *The Christian Directorie, Guiding Men to their Salvation*, originally entitled *The First Booke of the Christian Exercise, Appertayning to Resolution*, published in 1582. See Harrison, *The Messiah Alreadie Come*, sig. A2v. On the importance of the Jews to English millenarian thought, see Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, chap. 3.

²² John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War', *Parergon*, 32 (2015), p. 166.

²³ Harrison, *The Messiah Alreadie Come*, pp. 61–62.

²⁴ R.S., *The New Prophetical King*, sig. A[4]r.

that while in Safi, the rabbi helped better acquaint him with Hebrew, and Harrison found him to be 'of grave, and sober cariage, and pleasant otherwise', and was glad to have his company during what he describes as 'that tedious time'.²⁵ In Marrakesh he 'grewe familiarly acquainted' with various members of the Jewish community, attending wedding ceremonies and 'solemne feasts', and was introduced to their 'dainties' (food) which he 'tooke very kindly, and ever since have studied'.²⁶ It is unclear whether his experiences in Morocco in 1610 encouraged Harrison to embrace philo-semitism, or he had already done so, but they undoubtedly contributed to his convictions. His account of that time reveals him to be a person who was genuinely interested in Jewish culture, and who possessed a level of concern about the situation of Jews, particularly that of 'the forlorne, and distressed Jewes in Barbarie',²⁷ that went beyond the requirements of pure eschatological belief.

The exact purposes for which Harrison had been sent to treat with the sultan in 1625 are not clearly stated in the letters provided to him by Charles I and Harrison. Charles' earlier letter indicates that captives remained a source of grievance, and Harrison confirms that he had been charged to negotiate their release.²⁸ But the king also referred to 'other reasons' that would be expounded on by Harrison. While Harrison did not elaborate in detail, it is clear that Charles was seeking assistance from Zaydān in his war with Spain. In a letter to Zaydān written shortly after his arrival, Harrison reminds the sultan that he had requested Harrison to advise him 'if there were any lykelyhood of wars' and he would give assistance to the English. He goes on to insist that 'now is the tyme or neaver' for both parties 'to right themselves against their enemies'.²⁹

However, in a report to Charles, Harrison later reveals that the mission had been initiated, at Harrison's suggestion, to 'sound the affectiones and dispositions of that

²⁵ Harrison, *The Messiah Alreadie Come*, p. 61.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁸ 'Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique', 20 July 1625, in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 575.

²⁹ 'Lettre de John Harrison a Moulay Zidân', [13 June–30 July 1625], in *ibid.*, p. 572.

people [Moroccans], and especiallie the Moriscoes or Andaluzes banished out of Spaine' who, as a result of their hatred for the Spanish and knowledge of that country, may be useful in many ways, including in the provision of supplies and other necessities for the English navy.³⁰ But it is unclear if, when Harrison embarked on the mission, he possessed a clear plan for how Morocco could be engaged in prosecution of the war.³¹ A plan would emerge, shaped by Harrison's subsequent experiences in the country, and detailed in a proposal that he sent to the commander of an English fleet which he had been advised would visit Morocco shortly after his arrival.

Harrison had intended to travel first to Salé, 'there to have understood the state of the countrie', and then to meet with the sultan.³² But he was convinced by the *muqaddams* (leaders) of Tétouan that due to the conflict within the country it was far too dangerous to do so by land, and he was otherwise dissuaded by them from meeting with Zaydān. His hosts proceeded to impugn Zaydān's character and power before revealing that they no longer paid allegiance to him, and set about attempting to take advantage of the good fortune of having the king's representative in their midst.³³ They offered Harrison, 'freelie, and of their owne accord', in excess of ten thousand men to assist the English to take the Spanish enclave at Ceuta, 'or any other place near'. All that they requested in return was a supply of gunpowder and the repair of some ordnance.³⁴

Harrison was very much enamoured of this offer and was clearly convinced that there was not only widespread popular support for war with Spain, but also a 'generall disposicion and inclination both towards our nation, and even to Christian religion'.³⁵ He was not necessarily misguided in these conclusions. As Mercedes García-Arenal

³⁰ 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 30.

³¹ C. f. Matar, 'Harrison, John'

³² 'Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique', 20 July 1625, in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 580.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 575–576, 581.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 576. In this account Harrison implies that the offer of the ten thousand men was the initiative of the *muqaddams*, but in a much later account indicates that this had been his aim from the beginning. See 'Mémoire de John Harrison', 15 July 1631, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 145.

³⁵ 'Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique', 20 July 1625, in Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 578.

points out, the Moriscos not only considered the English and Dutch as potential allies in their long-held plans to reconquer their former lands in Spain, but also found the form of Christianity which they professed easier to identify with than Catholicism.³⁶ Inspired by his positive reception and 'to blow the fire already kindled',³⁷ Harrison drafted two public letters (an extract from one of these is provided as an epigraph to this chapter) to express England's amity with 'Moores, Turkes, Jewes and others', and highlight their common cause against the Catholic powers.³⁸ The events in Tétouan also gave him cause to reflect on his mission and consider new possibilities. In his report to the commander of the English fleet, Harrison outlines an ambitious plan. He explains that with the help of the people of Tétouan, Ceuta could be taken and become an *entrepôt* for English trade. Jews and Moriscos, most of whom were 'alreadie Christian in heart', and even Moors, would flock to the enclave providing it both with men and other supplies. He further suggested dispossessing Spain of Gibraltar and 'Mamora' (Mehdya) on the Moroccan Atlantic coast to provide England both control of the Strait, and an operating base from which to attack Spanish shipping, and disrupt supplies to their other possessions in Morocco.³⁹

What Harrison proposed, at least in part, was a strategy to help prosecute the war with Spain. But like Henry Roberts over two decades earlier,⁴⁰ Harrison was also offering a means to further England's religious, political and commercial interests in Morocco itself. However, unlike Roberts, Harrison was not recommending that this be achieved through the conquest of the country, but rather by nurturing the continuation of political instability, and the development of relationships with all parties which were advantageous to England's interests.⁴¹ While Roberts had been principally motivated by impecuniousness, Harrison was inspired by evangelical zeal

³⁶ Mercedes García-Arenal, 'The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros of Salé', in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain* (Leiden, 2014), p. 314. In fact, García-Arenal also notes that following their arrival in Morocco many Moriscos proclaimed to be Catholics, and were treated as apostates. See *ibid.*, pp. 317–318.

³⁷ Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 578.

³⁸ 'Lettre de John Harrison aux Maures', 27 June 1625, in *ibid.*, pp. 567–568.

³⁹ 'Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique', 20 July 1625, in *ibid.*, pp. 579–580.

⁴⁰ See chapter 1 of this thesis.

⁴¹ Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 580.

and a belief that Moriscos and Jews were crypto-Christians awaiting release from Muslim thralldom. Harrison's religious myopia even allowed him to envisage a general flight of people from tyranny in Spain, Portugal, and Morocco following the execution of his plan.⁴²

In this respect, the report appears to indicate a significant change in his attitude toward Zaydān, and perhaps Morocco's traditional political leadership more generally, which may have helped inform his plan. Whereas, Harrison had previously defended Zaydān as the divinely appointed ruler of Morocco, his report reflects disillusionment with the sultan. Concerned with what he had heard about the sultan's usage of his people and Christian captives, and his complicity in corsairing, 'even to the English Channell',⁴³ Harrison began to question Zaydān's legitimacy, allowing him to conceive of usurping his authority in the interests of England's Protestant cause. It was a bold but naïve plan, and, as with such proposals in the past, it came to nothing, as was also the case when Harrison presented a similar proposal to Charles I some two years later.⁴⁴ These proposals were no more than fantasies based on an overestimation of English military power, and either a flawed understanding of Moroccan motivations and aspirations, or an overriding desire to believe otherwise. Yet while they may not represent a milestone in the evolution of English colonial adventurism, they certainly indicate a marked development in Harrison's thinking.

Harrison left Tétouan and travelled to Salé in early 1626 where he met with the marabout and rebel leader Muhammad al-'Ayāshī, who was keen to foster relations with England, particularly to enlist assistance to take Mehdya. Harrison also concluded an agreement with the Moriscos to provide them with armaments and ammunition in exchange for the release of captives, before embarking for England in May.⁴⁵ However, it was not long before he returned, arriving in January 1627 with

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 581. Cf. Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 42–43.

⁴³ Castries, *SIHMA*, II, p. 580.

⁴⁴ 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 53–54, 56. See also Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 43.

⁴⁵ 'Lettre de Sidi Mohammed el-'Ayyachi a Charles I^{er}', 7 May 1627, and 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 23, 32–34.

instructions to treat with the 'King, Princes, Governors and Commanders of the parts of Barbary' for both the redemption of captives and to establish relations for 'our common utility and safety'.⁴⁶ The king was clearly not concerned at the time with whom Harrison treated, so, it is unsurprising that he first contacted the Moriscos of Salé with whom he had developed a close relationship. It was around this time that the Salétins withdrew their allegiance to the Sa'dīs and formally announced their independence. Notwithstanding this development, Harrison negotiated an agreement with the town's leaders which guaranteed freedom of trade with Salé and protection of English vessels, and provided for the release of Britons held captive there.⁴⁷ Despite receiving an order from Zaydān soon after the agent's arrival, that Harrison be sent to him, the Salétins refused to release him, and Harrison made no effort to meet with the sultan before embarking for England in late May 1627.⁴⁸ As well as returning with almost two hundred emancipated Britons, Harrison also brought with him a draft treaty which may have been of great potential benefit to England.

However, Charles declined to endorse the treaty on the advice of the Court of Admiralty that the Moriscos were not suitable treaty partners, as they were considered to be both pirates and rebels.⁴⁹ Without their maritime activities being sanctioned by a recognised sovereign power, the Moriscos of Salé could not even claim the questionably superior status of corsairs.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, not wishing to antagonise the Salétins, the king, in a carefully worded letter, did express his gratitude for the release of his subjects and for the promise of freedom of trade, and

⁴⁶ 'Lettre de Commission pour John Harrison', 5 December 1626, in *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ 'Projet de Traité Entre Salé [Rabat] et L'Angleterre', 30 April 1627, in *ibid.*, pp. 16–20.

⁴⁸ 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in *ibid.*, pp. 39–40, 48.

⁴⁹ P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, [197?]), p. 27; Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 169. The House of Lords had earlier agreed that a treaty was the best means to achieve the release of the captives and that the king be advised to this affect, but members had assumed that any treaty would be with the sultan. See 'House of Lords Journal Volume 3: 19 April 1626', in *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 3, 1620–1628*, BHO ed. (London, 1767–1830), accessed 15 July 2016. See p. 564 in printed edition.

⁵⁰ On the legal status of corsairs and prize law in the Mediterranean in the early modern period, see Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard University, 2012), pp. 208–211.

assured them that they would receive similarly favourable treatment from the English.⁵¹ While Charles did not intend to formally acknowledge the treaty, he clearly desired the terms which had been negotiated; it was to be a treaty in all respects but in name.

Harrison subsequently prepared a report for the king on his last two missions. But it is more than a simple account of events and observations; he uses it as a means to undermine the perceived legitimacy of Zaydān's rule, and argues fervently in support of alliances with the Moriscos of Tétouan and Salé, and with Muhammad al-'Ayāshī. In doing so, it also reveals more on Harrison's personal beliefs, and what effect his experiences in Morocco may have had on them. His disdain for Zaydān is obvious throughout the account. In Harrison's view, the sultan is not only a cruel tyrant, but the 'originall of all these evils' committed against Christians at Salé;⁵² the instigator of the enslavement of the king's subjects;⁵³ and, treacherous.⁵⁴ Furthermore, he insinuates that Zaydān's hold on power is tenuous,⁵⁵ he is regarded with suspicion by even his own men, and is in league with Spain.⁵⁶ In contrast, he asserts al-'Ayāshī was an enemy of Spain, and a friend of England, whose followers held the king in 'great honour and love'.⁵⁷ The Moriscos also held the king in high regard, grateful for the assistance he had provided, and offering their services to him.⁵⁸ According to Harrison, the Moriscos possessed 'a verie great affection and inclination to our nation', as do many Arabs and Berbers.⁵⁹ He argues that this sentiment must be patiently nurtured.⁶⁰ He also questions whether they, in fact, should be regarded as rebels. If England was prepared to treat with Algiers, why should it not also do so with the Moriscos? And in any event, to whom should they be loyal when they were born Christians in Spain, banished and delivered 'into the hands of infidels', and now after

⁵¹ 'Lettres de Charles I^{er}', 12 October 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 58–59.

⁵² 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in *ibid.*, p. 42.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 51.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40. On Harrison's views regarding Zaydān and his rule, see also 'Relation de John Harrison', [end 1627], in *ibid.*, pp. 65–67.

⁵⁵ 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in *ibid.*, pp. 32, 36–37, 53.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32, 38, 40–42.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

establishing a 'Christian government', they profess their love for Charles and seek his protection.⁶¹ Overlooking the obvious difference in religion, Harrison questions whether in this respect they are any different from the States General of the Netherlands, which England was supporting.⁶²

Harrison was attempting to convince the king to support the Moriscos in what he believed to be the furtherance of England's religious and secular interests, but in doing so he reveals genuine empathy for them. In particular, he laments their forced exodus from Spain, drawing parallels with those other people of Morocco with whom he also had affinity, the Jews:

Never the like desolation of people since that and of the Jewish nation ... yea, more then lamentable ... banished and betrayed, not only their bodies but their soules as a praie of the Devill into the hands of the Turkes and Moors ... as a forlorne people scattered and dispersed like the Jewes to this daie.⁶³

Harrison did not express any significant general prejudice against either Moroccan Arabs or Berbers, but it was the Moriscos, with their knowledge of Christianity and Europeanised culture, whom Harrison held in greatest favour, along with the Jews.

The religion with which the majority of the people for whom he was eliciting support were affiliated warranted little critical attention from Harrison. His only explicit comments depict Islam as an oppressive system of idolatrous belief opposed to Christianity.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, he comments favourably on marabouts,⁶⁵ and, in particular, thought highly of al-'Ayāshī, even though he was a committed *mujahid*. Harrison's relationship with al-'Ayāshī is interesting; he obviously believed him to be a friend of England and useful for that reason, and, as with his relationship with the people of Tétouan and Salé, went no further to question his motives. Instead Harrison seems less concerned with understanding their religion than with finding signs that

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52. Quotations are from p. 51.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 41. Mercedes García-Arenal also remarks on the obvious sympathy which Harrison felt for the Moriscos. See García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', p. 314.

⁶⁴ 'Relation de John Harrison', 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 42, 52.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 44, 46.

confirmed to him that the people of Morocco were potential allies, and critically, ultimately religiously redeemable.

However, Harrison was eventually forced to acknowledge that the issue of religious difference did present a major problem for any cooperative endeavours against the Spanish. Asked by al-'Ayāshī to help enlist the support of a Dutch fleet for an attack against Mehdyā, Harrison, in consultation with the Dutch admiral, had to concoct an excuse against their involvement. Despite the Spanish being 'of a contrarie profession and enemies', he did not believe it to be honourable 'to betraie them into the hands of infidels to be made slaves'.⁶⁶ He even anguished over wishing al-'Ayāshī 'good successe'.⁶⁷ Harrison clearly possessed a sense of fundamental Christian unity which overrode his anti-Catholicism. But this was not his only reservation. He also demonstrates a general abhorrence of slavery irrespective of the nature of the victims. Misquoting Exodus 21, he states: 'Condemned by the law of God ... Manstealers and mansellers both alike, were they never so great enemies either to nation or religion; they [those enslaved] are the image of God by creation as the first, and so to be respected'.⁶⁸ While Harrison's attitudes and actions were clearly informed by religious conviction, they also appear to have been influenced by more general humanistic belief.

Harrison was clearly frustrated that his warnings about Zaydān and plans for fostering closer relations with Tétouan and Salé were falling on deaf ears. Toward the end of 1627 he wrote again to the king expressing criticism of the sultan. He questioned Zaydān's integrity, and contrasted his behaviour with that of the Moriscos, and the outcomes which had been achieved by treating with them. Harrison even went so far as advocating that a naval squadron be sent to the sultan's stronghold at Safi to coerce him to release captive Britons and to correct other alleged wrongs. Once again, Harrison asserts his belief in the imminent conversion of the Moriscos, and

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

emphasises the strategic value of their ports for the supply of English vessels, particularly now that England was at war not only with Spain, but also with France.⁶⁹

Notwithstanding Harrison's unwaveringly positive assessment of the Moriscos' disposition toward England, attacks on English vessels and captive taking by their corsairs continued to escalate. But the Moroccans in turn alleged that their ships were being preyed upon by English merchants and privateers, despite a proclamation by Charles prohibiting attacks on vessels from Algiers, Tunis, Tétouan and Salé.⁷⁰ In response, Harrison was again sent to Morocco to negotiate the release of captives and to re-establish peaceful relations.⁷¹ After a long delay due to his impecuniousness, Harrison arrived in Morocco in March 1630. He claims to have successfully allayed the concerns of the Salétins, confirmed their commitment to peace, and negotiated proposals for the improvement of trade. Harrison proposed to the king that he return with 'a mynister or twoo' to attend to the local merchants and proselytise among 'bothe Moores and Jewes, whose conversion we daylie expecte'. Before departing for England in late August he dispatched a letter to the new Sa'dī sultan, Abd al-Malik II, who had assumed the throne following his father's death in 1627, but made no effort to meet with him, concerned with how he would be received, and regarding al-Malik even less favourably than his father.⁷²

Harrison had not given up on his plans for expanding England's interests in the region, appending to his report a revised, and more detailed proposal for the taking of Mehdyā.⁷³ In his view the action was justified because the place was held by the Spanish, 'enemies of both our nation and religion'.⁷⁴ Furthermore, he believed the town would provide a good harbour for the resupply of vessels, a base from which to suppress the activities of both the Spanish and Muslim corsairs, and a trading centre

⁶⁹ 'Relation de John Harrison', [end 1627], in *ibid.*, pp. 63–72.

⁷⁰ 'Proclamation de Charles I^{er}', 22 October 1628, in *ibid.*, pp. 80–81. On these developments, see Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 169–170.

⁷¹ 'Lettres de Commission pour John Harrison', 21 January 1629, and 'Relation de John Harrison', 28 September 1630, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 82–84, 111.

⁷² 'Relation de John Harrison', 28 September 1630, in *ibid.*, pp. 111–112, 115–116.

⁷³ 'Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora', [28 September 1630], in *ibid.*, pp. 124–131.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

for the whole area. Harrison envisaged a fortified plantation fully maintained by customs duties. He assured the king that the Moroccans 'earnestlie desire it', and that Jews and Moors would come seeking the king's protection from their own rulers and the civil unrest they had created.⁷⁵ There was no risk, he states, that the Moroccans would retake it, 'for they desire it not to be in their owne hands', yet still advised that, just to be sure, fifty percent of customs duties should be paid to al-'Ayāshī.⁷⁶

But that was not the limit of Harrison's vision. He suggested that the people of Salé might also wish to join with the English enclave, and enticed the king with a sign of their imminent conversion and a report of a nearby secret silver mine.⁷⁷ Perhaps inspired by a French attempt to colonise the city the previous year, he went on to propose that given the contempt which the sultan had shown towards the king and his subjects, an island off the coast of 'Mogodore' (Essaouira) be taken from him, and another plantation established there on the same terms with the local leaders. From these two sites, Harrison conjectured, the English could monopolise trade across the country, and obtain the supplies necessary to attempt to take from Spain 'the Maderars' (Madeira), or possibly Gibraltar and Ceuta.⁷⁸ These plans and expectations of popular support were not simply the products of Harrison's own devising, they had been actively nurtured by the leaders of Tétouan and Salé, al-'Ayāshī, and even 'Captain John', the notorious Dutch renegade corsair better known as 'Murat Reis', the former president and grand admiral of the republic of Salé,⁷⁹ with whom he had developed a close relationship; and they continued to press him for a response from the king. Harrison concludes by suggesting that if the king does not wish to take advantage of these opportunities, he commission his brother-in-law, the exiled Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, to work with the Dutch to do so. For Harrison,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 125–126.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 127–128.

⁷⁸ 'Relation de John Harrison', 28 September 1630, and 'Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora', 28 September 1630, in *ibid.*, pp. 117–118, 130.

⁷⁹ Jan Janszoon van Haarlem. Among van Haarlem's exploits was the so called 'Sack of Baltimore' in June 1631, in which he captured 109 English inhabitants of the town of Baltimore, on the coast of County Cork in Ireland, and sold them into slavery in Algiers.

it was not solely an English cause, but more generally a Protestant one, and one he felt compelled to pursue one way or another. Whether the king provided a response to Harrison is unknown, but in any event it quickly became redundant with the signing of a treaty the following month which ended the war with Spain.

Harrison returned to Morocco in September 1631 with instructions to meet with al-Malik's successor, his brother Mawlay al-Walid (r. 1631–1636), and negotiate the release of captives.⁸⁰ He had also intended to visit Salé to reassure the town's people that action was being taken to address their grievances, but by this time the Salétins had lost faith with the English because of ongoing breaches of the peace, and became openly hostile toward them.⁸¹ Harrison was extremely disheartened by the situation. He was critical not only of the actions of his compatriots, but also the failure of the government to act on his advice. He was concerned about the prospects for escalation of corsair activity, and, ultimately, the impact on the reputation of his nation and religion, and England's interests in Morocco.⁸² His concerns appear to have been heightened by both the concurrent efforts by the French to establish diplomatic relations with al-Walid, and the start of a new entente between the Salétins and the Sa'dis which he seems to have believed also threatened English trade and influence.⁸³ Too 'afraid and ashamed to go ashore' at Salé, Harrison proceeded to Marrakesh to meet with the new sultan.⁸⁴

He already held high expectations for al-Walid,⁸⁵ and the sultan indeed proved more receptive than his father and brother to normalising relations with England and releasing captives. By February 1632 they had negotiated a draft treaty.⁸⁶ The document principally concerns the rights of the English in the conduct of business in

⁸⁰ 'Lettre de Charles I^{er} a Moulay El-Oualid', 19 July 1631, and 'Lettres de John Harrison a A. Carnwarth', 29 September 1631, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 152, 161.

⁸¹ 'Lettre de John Harrison a John Coke', 3 August 1631, and 'Lettres de John Harrison a A. Carnwarth', 29 September 1631, in *ibid.*, pp. 154, 160–162.

⁸² 'Lettre de John Harrison a John Coke', 3 August 1631, and 'Lettres de John Harrison a A. Carnwarth', 5 October 1631, in *ibid.*, pp. 155, 164–166.

⁸³ 'Lettres de John Harrison a A. Carnwarth', 5 October 1631, in *ibid.*, p. 163.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.

⁸⁵ 'Mémoire de John Harrison sur le Maroc', 15 July 1631, in *ibid.*, p. 150.

⁸⁶ 'Projet de Traite Entre Moulay El-Oualid et Charles I^{er}', [6 November 1631–February 1632], in *ibid.*, pp. 174–178.

Morocco, and the obligations of the sultan and his subjects in this respect, although, interestingly, it does provide Moroccans with the right to both buy and sell goods in England.⁸⁷ It is notable for the recourse in its construction to the 'favours and priviledges auntiently belonging to the English nation',⁸⁸ with specific references made to those existing under the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr, which were part of the perceived golden age of Anglo-Moroccan relations frequently evoked in correspondence by parties on both sides during this period. While the treaty focussed on English interests, it was conditional on acceptance of the sultan's own demands. As al-Walid explained in a letter to Charles, his subjects had been taken captive because English merchants had been trading in contraband arms with his enemies, and if the king wished to restore traditional relations he must put a stop to this trade.⁸⁹ Harrison returned to England in May 1632 and presented the draft agreement to Charles, but the king, for reasons which were not revealed, failed to endorse it, and did not call on Harrison ever again.

Clearly unhappy with the outcome, in 1633 Harrison published an account of the reign of al-Malik II in which he detailed his 'cruel acts, and mad-pranks', none of which he had in fact witnessed himself, instead relying on the testimony of 'such both of our owne nation and others'.⁹⁰ Harrison claims to have written it as a present for Charles Louis, the new Elector Palatine, and to assist him 'discerne betwixt a blessed Christian government ... and a cruel-tyrannous Mahometan government'.⁹¹ But this detail appears to simply have provided the context for its true purpose, a proposition and petition appended to the account. Expressing guilt and remorse for not having completed his mission of freeing the remaining Britons in Morocco, Harrison calls on Protestant rulers to unite and act to redeem all Christians held in North Africa, 'all those poore soules that are in miserie, both under the Turks and Moores'.⁹²

⁸⁷ See article 11.

⁸⁸ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 178.

⁸⁹ 'Lettre de Moulay el-Oualid a Charles I^{er}', 21 December 1631, in *ibid.*, pp. 170–173.

⁹⁰ John Harrison, *The Tragical Life and Death of Muley Abdala Melek the Late King of Barbarie. With a Proposition, or Petition to all Christian Princes, Annexed Thereunto: Written By a Gentleman Employed Into Those Parts* (Delph, 1633), p. 1. An extract from the pamphlet is provided in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA* III, pp. 191–206.

⁹¹ Harrison, dedication in *The Tragical Life and Death*, sig. A2r.

⁹² *Ibid.*, sig. A2v–A3r (dedication), 20–24. Quotation is from p. 22.

Harrison's utility as a diplomatic agent had perhaps come to an end due to the convergence of a number of factors, which had less to do with his capabilities as an envoy than with his beliefs. Under James I there had been a move away from the more radically inclined Calvinist predestinarianism adhered to by Harrison. Furthermore, by the 1630s Spain was no longer seen as England's implacable enemy. In the interests of trade and the Exchequer, Charles I adopted a position of pro-Spanish neutrality; as a result, support for Protestant internationalism, of which opposition to Spain was a central component, was no longer only a minority view, but also a potentially treasonable one.⁹³ Moreover, while interest in philo-semitism and millenarianism would not peak until the middle of the century, the promotion of Jews as being central to Christian eschatology was a contentious issue.⁹⁴ Therefore, Harrison's confessional and millenarian beliefs were, if not yet all outmoded, potentially problematic. While over the following decade responsibility for guiding Anglo-Moroccan relations would be assumed by men who were less concerned with religious dogma than with trade, they were similarly sensitive and pragmatic in their dealings with Morocco.

3.2. Competing Agendas, Different Understandings

Having received no response from Charles, al-Walid wrote to him around July 1634 again complaining that his subjects were continuing to supply ammunition to rebels and requesting (or demanding) that the king take action to put a stop to this trade.⁹⁵ The reason for the failure of the king to address the issue in some way to this point is unclear, but the Privy Council's consideration of a matter subsequently referred to it,

⁹³ Reeve, 'Carleton and Roe', pp. 164, 175.

⁹⁴ Katz, *Philo-Semitism*, pp. 1, 5, 95, 97. The decline in millenarianism and other mystical beliefs after this time can be seen as a sign of the subsidence of common anxiety associated with the seventeenth century 'crisis' discussed in the introduction to this chapter. See Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability*, pp. 51–52.

⁹⁵ 'Lettre de Moulay el-Oualid a Charles I^{er}', [17 July–14 August 1634], in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 214. On the softening of tone effected in the translation from Arabic to English of an earlier letter to Charles by al-Walid, see Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 122. Whether such diplomatic editorial changes in translations may have led to a failure by Charles to properly appreciate the gravity of the situation in an interesting question.

reveals the existence of competing agendas within the English merchant community, premised on different understandings of how best to progress trade and diplomatic relations with Morocco, which may have played some part in forestalling action by the authorities. In November 1635 Edmund Bradshaw petitioned the Council, claiming that a group of English merchants continued to trade with the rebels, leading to more of the king's subjects being taken captive, and the non-payment of debts, specifically a large debt owed to him by the sultan. He further notes these men had failed to effect the release of any captives with the money which had been collected and provided to them for this purpose. Bradshaw argued that neither the release of the captives nor payment of his debt could be effected until amicable relations had been restored with the sultan, which required the merchants in question to desist in their trade with the rebels.⁹⁶ Over the following three months a series of accusations and rejoinders were submitted to the Council by the two parties.

In their defence the accused merchants claimed that the captives held in Marrakesh had long before been enslaved, and those now held in Salé had been taken because of a previously reported attack on a vessel from that town and the sale of its crew by the master of an English ship, not by their own actions. Furthermore, all English merchants conducted trade in ports not controlled by the sultan. They sought to justify their actions by explaining that after initially visiting the sultan's port of Safi they would then seek to sell the remainder of their goods elsewhere, as do the Dutch. They also asserted that conditions for trade in Safi and Morocco are 'quiet and peaceable', and Bradshaw could easily recover any debt, because their own factors had never been denied justice. As for the collection moneys, the merchants advised that they were still awaiting direction from the Council.⁹⁷ In a subsequent rebuttal, the group highlights considerations which went to the crux of the matter. Firstly, the sultan had not issued a proclamation prohibiting trade at other ports, nor punished those who had conducted such trade. Rather, he had specifically requested that English traders cease supplying ammunition to the rebels. Secondly, Salé was clearly

⁹⁶ 'Requête d'E. Bradshaw au Conseil Privé', 17 November 1635, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 215–217.

⁹⁷ 'Réponse des Marchands Accusés par Bradshaw', 4 December 1635, in *ibid.*, pp. 218–221.

not under the authority of the sultan, as had been demonstrated by the treaty negotiated by Harrison with the leaders of that town, without reference to the sultan; a treaty with the sultan would, therefore, not resolve the problem of the Britons held there. Thirdly, they claimed that the petition was motivated by personal interest: the recovery of Bradshaw's debt, and to facilitate an associate obtaining rights over the collection of customs duties payable at the sultan's ports.⁹⁸

Bradshaw instead proposed that English merchants only be permitted to trade in ports and other places agreed upon by the two rulers.⁹⁹ He does not address the claims of pecuniary interest, but argued that preventing merchants from trading in Sus would neither reduce trade nor decrease the king's customs revenues, as claimed by the defendants, because the bulk of English goods sold there found their way into Marrakesh and other areas controlled by the sultan in any event. He further assured the Council that the restriction of trade would not benefit England's competitors; indeed, concluding a peace with the sultan would protect English ships from being taken by the French under the terms of a treaty they had themselves recently concluded with him. Furthermore, even if the sultan did not possess the authority to demand the repatriation of the captives held in Salé, the prospect of substantially increased customs duties from English trade in his ports would encourage him to make every effort to ensure their release.¹⁰⁰

The veracity of the protagonist's claims in this matter is less important than what the issues underlying the dispute demonstrate. Commerce with Morocco clearly remained important to the English, despite a claimed ten-fold decrease in its value since the 'league' between Queen Elizabeth and Mawlay al-Mansūr.¹⁰¹ Undoubtedly, the respective positions of the parties were framed by their personal interests, which were defined by two different models for trade with Morocco — one based on

⁹⁸ 'Réponse des Marchands a un Mémoire d'E. Bradshaw', [4 December 1635–26 February 1636], in *ibid.*, pp. 225–229.

⁹⁹ 'Projet d'Articles Relatifs aux Esclaves et au Commerce Anglais au Maroc', [after 4 December 1635], in *ibid.*, p. 224.

¹⁰⁰ 'Reponse d'E. Bradshaw et de R. Pickford', [4 December 1635–26 February 1636], in *ibid.*, pp. 230–234.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

centralisation through ports controlled by the sultan, the other on a more *laissez-faire* approach. But, critically, their positions also reflect opposing perspectives on an issue that was fundamental to the management of Anglo-Moroccan relations at this time which the king had earlier tried to skirt in relation to a peace with the Salétins, and that was the issue of political legitimacy.

The problem for the English was determining by what measure they should judge the legitimacy of the various fraternities which exercised control across Morocco. Reliance on customary authority did not always provide a satisfactory solution. For while the Sa'dis had been the dominant political power for over a century, as the merchants pointed out to the Council, the family of al-Walid's adversary in Sus, the marabout 'Cidi Ally' (Abū Hassūn), had in fact governed much of that region since the time of his grandfather, Ahmad Abu Mahalli, and he had even received correspondence from the king, which, in effect, affirmed acceptance of his status.¹⁰² John Harrison instead had invoked considerations of moral authority, popular sentiment, and territorial control to either support or challenge the legitimacy of various Moroccan leaders. It was an issue that would continue to vex the English in their activities in Morocco for several more decades, and perhaps not coincidentally, it was also one that assumed great significance within England itself from around the same time as Parliament began to vigorously challenge the authority of the Stuarts, and as the country commenced its own descent into civil war.¹⁰³

However, the immediate problem confronting the English authorities was the status of the Bou Regreg republic, the people of which had been doubly damned as being both rebels and pirates. But as the king's earlier actions concerning relations with this group demonstrates, the achievement of national interests could justify some level of pragmatic accommodation with so-called rebel groups. However, on this occasion, the Privy Council accepted Bradshaw's argument and on 9 March 1636, an order was

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹⁰³ On contemporary thinking concerning monarchical legitimacy and associated developments leading up to the civil war, see Robert Zaller, *The Discourse of Legitimacy in Early Modern England* (Stanford, CA, 2007), esp. chap. 7.

issued that prohibited any of the king's subjects trading at any port or other place not under the control of the sultan. Shortly after, the Council also agreed to recommend to the king that Bradshaw be dispatched to negotiate with the sultan the release of captives, and the means to prevent the taking of further Britons in the future.¹⁰⁴

Bradshaw arrived in Marrakesh in September 1636 only to find that a man named Robert Blake had already arranged for the release of the thirty-six Britons held there. Blake is an enigmatic character, who has at times been confused with the contemporaneous naval commander of the same name.¹⁰⁵ Despite the role he later played in an important development in Anglo-Moroccan relations, nothing is known about his life before his arrival in Morocco in 1636 as the factor for two prominent English merchants. Following his arrival, he quickly ingratiated himself with the new Sa'dian sultan, Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Asghar (r. 1636–1654), obtaining the rights to farm the customs duties of the ports of Safi and 'Aer' (the lagoon of present day Oualidia), and was granted a monopoly over the production and export of saltpetre. Although Bradshaw initially praised Blake's achievements, the relationship soured as he found that Blake was involved in a heated dispute with other members of the local English merchant community, and was also attempting to undermine his own standing in the eyes of the sultan.¹⁰⁶ In any event, Bradshaw's mission was not a success, as the merchants had foreshadowed in their response to the Privy Council. The sultan requested the Salétins desist in their attacks on English shipping and negotiate the release of their existing captives, but they refused to do so, claiming that the peace had first been broken by the English.¹⁰⁷ Bradshaw was still hopeful of

¹⁰⁴ 'Ordres du Conseil Privé', 26 February, 28 February, 11 March 1636, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 239–244.

¹⁰⁵ See Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 38, and Christopher Lloyd, *English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast* (London, 1981), p. 97, cf. Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 247, n. 1; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁶ Aside from associating Blake with his naval namesake, Cenival and Cossé Brissac provide a useful summary of Blake's reception and activities in Morocco, and the associated sources, in *SIHMA*, III, pp. 247–248, n. 1. For details, see in particular, pp. 247–248, 250, 252–253, 256, 385–388. See also the account in *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, pp. 28–30. In the sources 'Blake' is occasionally rendered as 'Blange'.

¹⁰⁷ 'Lettre d'E. Bradshaw a John Coke', 16 November 1636, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 255.

a positive response in March 1637, but by this time another plan to deal with the problem was well advanced.

3.3. Convenient Alliances: The Siege of Salé and the Promise of Peace

Charles was under pressure to resolve the matter, having received an increasing number of reports, complaints, and petitions about attacks on English ships and the enslavement of Britons by North African corsairs, not only in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, but also, of greater concern, around the coasts of England and Ireland.¹⁰⁸ This is despite the king's having taken the unprecedented initiative in 1634 to request the collection of ship money in a time of notional peace, and extend it the following year to inland towns and counties. They were measures contested both in principle and in their application, but also created an expectation that this impost would achieve results.¹⁰⁹ Among other things, Charles promulgated these measures to provide his navy with the means to mount a more effective response against piracy; a focus which became more pronounced from the summer of 1636.¹¹⁰ He was not only urged to take action by family members, mayors, merchants, and ship owners, but also publicly criticised for what at least one member of the clergy saw as his profligacy at the expense of the freedom of captives.¹¹¹ Towards the end of 1636, the king decided that he must act decisively, and that the only way to free the

¹⁰⁸ Examples of the more significant of these reports and appeals relating to the period September 1635 to December 1636 can be found in the following sources *CSPD: Charles I, 1635*, ed. John Bruce, 23 vols., vol. 8 (London, 1865), pp. 389, 398, 476; *CSPD: Charles I, 1635–1636*, ed. John Bruce, 23 vols., vol. 9 (London, 1866), p. 15; *CSPD: Charles I, 1636–1637*, ed. John Bruce, 23 vols., vol. 10 (London, 1867), pp. 60–61, 111; Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 258–262. On the increase in corsair activity and its impact, see also Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, p. 170.

¹⁰⁹ See Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven, CT, 1992), chap. IX, esp. pp. 567–583, concerning the contentious nature of these changes.

¹¹⁰ Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 130–139; Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, pp. 587, 596; David Delison Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642* (Aldershot, UK, 1994), pp. 234–236. But Kenneth Andrews argues that the emphasis which was given at this time to piracy, particularly to the activities of Muslim corsairs, to justify the levy was 'misleading, and was presumably meant to mislead'. Instead the real aim was to provide the means for a general increase in sea power to protect England's wider strategic interests. See Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 131, 138–139. See also Andrew Thrush, 'Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money', in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., *War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650* (Manchester, 1991), pp. 137–138.

¹¹¹ See Charles Fitzgeffry, *Compassion Towards Captives Chiefly Towards our Brethren and Country-Men Who are in Miserable Bondage in Barbarie* (Oxford, 1637), preface, p. [4]. The sermons were delivered in Plymouth in October 1636. On Fitzgeffry's sermons, see also chap. 2 of this thesis.

captives held in Salé, and stop the attacks by the corsairs originating from there, was with a demonstration of English naval power.¹¹² The desperation felt by the king and his councillors at this time can perhaps be gauged by comparing their response to the advice provided by a committee some four years earlier concerning the redemption of captives held in Tunis and Algiers, which concluded that military action by sea or land was not only too costly, but also too risky.¹¹³ But what, in fact, unfolded at Salé changed the immediate course of Anglo-Moroccan relations, and briefly provided the prospect of a positive new era of engagement between the two countries.

The instructions issued by the admiralty on 17 February 1637 were, at face value, straightforward. The commander of the mission, Captain William Rainsborough, was to sail to Salé 'and there to imploye' himself 'with industry and courage', 'principally for supressing of Turkish pyrates and redeeming his majestyes subjects'. However, they go on to state that once there, the commander is to act in accordance with any instructions subsequently issued by the king.¹¹⁴ Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de Cossé Brissac note that while the king's instructions had not yet been found, they were intended to answer questions posed by Rainsborough, which among other

¹¹² Matar, in *Britain and Barbary*, p. 59, has queried whether the mission might have been precipitated by a request for assistance from al-Asghar. However, the document he refers to was clearly written after the events at Salé, and what the sultan in fact proposed were further joint endeavours against 'Tunis, Algiers and other places'. See *A Letter from the King of Morocco, to His Majesty the King of England Charles I* (London, 1680). On the background to this letter, see n. 146 below. It is also clear that the king's decision was not motivated, as claimed by Karim Bejjit in *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance*, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), p. 9, by a desire to preserve a privileged commercial order, although attacks on ships from Salé by English merchant vessels, possibly were. Andrews provides a good, balanced account of the background to, and details of, the expedition in *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 160–183.

¹¹³ '[T]he best means how to redeeme those your distressed subjects', 1632, TNA, SP 71/1/Pt. 2, ff. 130r–132v. The committee instead recommended a trade embargo, withdrawal of diplomatic relations, and the granting of letters of mart for those wishing to undertake reprisals at their own charge, based on an assessment of the effectiveness of these measures which appears overly optimistic. The ransoming of captives was considered by the committee to be not only too expensive but imprudent. While the unwillingness of Charles' regime to procure the release of captives through ransom is often attributed by scholars to either the king's penury or parsimony, or both, and a generally callous disregard for the welfare of the captives, a number of sources, including this one, indicate that there was a real concern, as there is today among governments concerning ransom demands, that such payments would only further encourage the perpetrators. For perspectives about the regime's attitude toward redemption of captives, see, for example, Colley, *Captives*, pp. 53–54; Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 94–97; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 50–59.

¹¹⁴ 'Instructions pour W. Rainsborough', 17 February 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 277. The captain's name is also spelled Rainborow, or Rainborowe in some sources.

things, concerned the nature of his relations with al-‘Ayyashi, and what conditions of peace were to be imposed on the Salétins.¹¹⁵ While the timing of the fleet’s arrival in Salé has been portrayed as being serendipitous,¹¹⁶ the fact that Rainsborough was asking about how he was to deal with al-‘Ayyashi indicates that both the timing of the mission, and the commander’s actions at Salé were more than fortuitous; rather they had been informed by useful intelligence. Furthermore, whatever benefit that was derived from the mission was not principally due to English naval power, Rainsborough’s skill, or his shrewd manipulation of the Moroccans, as some have claimed, but rather the willingness of the English protagonists to work within the Moroccan polity to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.¹¹⁷

In fact, a merchant by the name of Giles Penn, who claimed exceptional knowledge of ‘those people and country’ acquired over thirty years, had been closely involved in the conception of, and planning for, the mission, having spent eight months since his return from Morocco ‘soliciting for the good of his majesties subjects liberties’.¹¹⁸ Penn had been involved in discussions with the king and his councillors concerning Salé since at least June 1636, and his counsel had been well received.¹¹⁹ A letter he wrote to the lord commissioners of the Admiralty in December 1636, presented to them the following month, appears to contain his final advice on the matter. In addition to advising on the preparation of the fleet, he also apprises the commissioners of the current political situation. He notes that the two Morisco factions, the Andalusians and the Hornacheros, were in conflict, and that the former has assumed control of the fortress in the new town. Furthermore, he points out, al-

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277, n. 1.

¹¹⁶ Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 31; Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, p. 97.

¹¹⁷ Both the noted Victorian historian of seventeenth century England, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, and Kenneth R. Andrews also conclude that any success attributable to the expedition was due to the particular circumstances Rainsborough encountered in Salé and the accommodations he subsequently made with the warring parties. See Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603–1642*, 10 vols., vol. VIII (London, 1884), p. 270; Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, p. 180. Cf. Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, pp. 96–97; Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government*, 248–252, 260–263; David Loades, *England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690* (London, 2000), pp. 156–157; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 38.

¹¹⁸ ‘Mémoire de Giles Penn’, December 1636, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 268–269; Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 171–173. Penn was the grandfather of William Penn, the founder of the North American colony of Pennsylvania.

¹¹⁹ *CSPD, 1636–1637*, p. 19.

'Ayyashi had joined forces with the former governor of Tétouan against the Moriscos, and is intending to take the fortress himself. Penn proposed seeking an alliance with the marabout whereby his forces besieged the fortress by land, and the English navy by sea. In this way the English could both destroy the corsairs, and recover the captives. However, he cautioned that it was necessary for the squadron to be at Salé before the middle of March, by which time the corsairs commenced leaving the port for their annual predation.¹²⁰

Rainsborough and his squadron did not arrive until 3 April but found that the port still hosted more than forty vessels.¹²¹ He initially had hoped that by blockading the harbour he could force the Andalusians to concede to his demands, but claims that he found them unwilling to negotiate, and was frustrated at being unable to either maintain an effective blockade, or destroy their vessels in the harbour.¹²² However, as Giles Penn had foreshadowed, the 'Saint', Muhammad al-'Ayāshī, was also besieging the new town. Within five days of the squadron's arrival al-'Ayāshī had established contact with Rainsborough, and almost immediately the English began providing assistance to his forces.¹²³ Rainsborough then proceeded to 'treat and conclude a peace with him', noting that this was in accordance with his commission.¹²⁴ By 15 May a formal treaty had been decided, under which, among other matters, the marabout agreed the following: to release all Britons held in the

¹²⁰ 'Mémoire de Giles Penn', December 1636, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 263–270; *CSPD*, 1636–1637, pp. 362–363.

¹²¹ The squadron was to consist of two naval vessels (*Leopard* and *Antelope*), and two merchant vessels (*Hercules* and *Mary*), supplemented by two new pinnaces (*Providence* and *Expedition*) which could readily navigate the bar in front of the port, and were to play an essential role in the commander's plans to blockade the port. However, the pinnaces did not arrive until 20–21 June. See 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a W. Aston', 18 April 1637, 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a H. Vane', 9 May 1637, 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 20 May 1637, and 'Journal de W. Rainsborough', 21 February–13 October 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 282, 295–296, 310–311, 345, 349.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 282, 295–297, 309–313.

¹²³ 'Lettre de Foulke Powell', 19 May 1637, in *ibid.*, pp. 306–307; John Dunton, *A True Journall of the Sally Fleet with the Proceedings of the Voyage*, ed. Ralph Hall (London, 1637), pp. 5–6. Based on Penn's memorandum, it was not the Hornacheros who were in control of the fortress at this time, cf. Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 31. In addition, Matar in *Britain and Barbary*, p. 59, in discussing this episode refers to the 'Old Saletians' inhabiting Rabat, and the 'New Saletians' being in Salé, however, it was in fact the converse. Balleine in G. R. Balleine, *All for the King: The Life Story of Sir George Cartaret* (St Helier, Jersey, 1976), p. 14, also makes the same error.

¹²⁴ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 20 May 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 312.

areas he controlled and to take no more; not to make peace with the Moriscos without ensuring the release of Britons held by them; and the means to repatriate those already sold in Algiers and Tunis. In exchange Rainsborough agreed to maintain a blockade while the marabout's forces attacked the dissidents, and, notably, he was not to make peace with the Moriscos without the consent of al-'Ayāshī.¹²⁵

It is possible that Rainsborough may have been premature in so quickly aligning himself with al-'Ayāshī. In a report dated 30 May, his deputy, George Carteret, recounts advice they received that the governor of the new town had complained to the sultan that the English 'had entered in league with his enemies before he could send us an answer of our letter'. The governor further claimed that if he had been given the opportunity to negotiate fairly, he would have given Rainsborough 'all the satisfaction [he] could desire'.¹²⁶ It was perhaps a ruse, or the governor was protecting himself from possible recrimination from the sultan. But the fact that this claim was made may explain why Rainsborough makes no mention of his earlier assistance to al-'Ayāshī in his report to the Admiralty of the same date, only noting that the marabout sent a representative aboard to negotiate a treaty on 11 May.¹²⁷ After all, Rainsborough himself admits to being 'not skilled in making articles of peace', perhaps acknowledging he lacked skills of diplomacy more generally, but, more importantly, he had a clear desire to make most of the corsair fleet 'unserviceable' before returning to England.¹²⁸ In any event, over the course of almost four months, the English worked closely with their Moroccan allies, providing them with logistical and artillery support, to force the capitulation of the Moriscos.

It is useful to note at this point, that despite the length of time they spent in Salé, the letters, reports and memoirs of the Britons who participated in the mission reveal

¹²⁵ 'Traité Entre Charles 1^{er} et Sidi Mohammed El-'Ayyachi', 5 May 1637, in *ibid.*, pp. 292–294. The remaining matters dealt with in the treaty concerned mutual rights and obligations relating to trade and the provisioning of vessels. Seventeen captive Britons were eventually released by al-'Ayāshī.

¹²⁶ 'Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas', 20 May 1637, in *ibid.*, p. 316.

¹²⁷ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 20 May 1637, in *ibid.*, pp. 309–313.

¹²⁸ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a H. Vane', 9 May 1637, in *ibid.*, p. 296. Andrews in *Ships, Money and Politics*, p. 175, remarks that Rainsborough was not well qualified to deal with the complexities of Moroccan politics which prevailed at this time, the mission being essentially a diplomatic operation rather than a naval one.

little about their perceptions of, and attitudes about, the country and its people. Accounts, perhaps not surprisingly, were focussed on events, not personal reflections. At the very least they appear to have been largely indifferent to the religious and cultural character of their allies and enemies, although Rainsborough's criticism of the governor of the new town was at least partially framed by cultural and religious bias.¹²⁹ More generally though, the character of the inhabitants of the new town was defined by their perceived status as pirates; the commander himself declaiming that they were 'wicked fellowes', and the place nothing 'but a denn of theifes'.¹³⁰ More surprising perhaps is the fact that despite al-'Ayāshī being a central figure and frequently mentioned, little is said by commentators about what they thought about him; all Rainsborough reveals is that he had 'great confidence' in the marabout,¹³¹ and the master of his flagship, John Dunton, acknowledges him as 'our friend'.¹³²

By early July the combined assault was starting to show results; food shortages and desertions began to be reported, and the Andalusians were making overtures for peace.¹³³ By common consent they had also deposed their governor, apparently in an attempt to placate al-'Ayāshī whom the governor had earlier offended, and had dispatched him to the sultan.¹³⁴ The sultan, Al-Asghar, in fact, was preparing his own

¹²⁹ See, for example, 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a W. Aston', 18 April 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, p. 282.

¹³⁰ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 8 August 1637, in *ibid.*, p. 326.

¹³¹ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough au Caïd de Salé', 15 July 1637, in *ibid.*, p. 320.

¹³² See Dunton, *A True Journall*, pp. 11, 17. Dunton's journal provides a useful consolidated account of the mission. It is also useful to compare it with Rainsborough's own journal, particularly to identify where the captain may have exaggerated his success against the Saletin fleet, given some obvious discrepancies with Dunton's account in this respect. It was not Dunton's first visit to Salé. He had first been introduced to the town as a captive after the vessel on which he was sailing was taken by a corsair from Salé off the coast of England. However, his seafaring skills were soon recognised and he was induced to join the crew of a corsair vessel. But his career as a renegade was short lived; he mutinied with a number of other Europeans, who captured the vessel and brought it to Southampton. Charged with piracy late the previous year, he was acquitted, and because of his experience was appointed to his present position. See Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 175–176; Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, pp. 96–97. See also the preface to Dunton's journal. On claims of exaggeration of success by Rainsborough, see Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, p. 177, incl. n. 155.

¹³³ 'Journal de W. Rainsborough', 21 February–13 October 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 349; Dunton, *A True Journall*, pp. 15–16.

¹³⁴ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 8 August 1637 and 'Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas', 21 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 324, 340; Dunton, *A True Journall*, p.

assault on the new town — a prospect welcomed by Rainsborough — but was prevented from doing so by al-‘Ayāshī, who was determined to take control of the town after having invested so much in his siege.¹³⁵ However, the marabout’s ambitions were foiled when the sultan in the first week of August issued a general pardon for the inhabitants, ahead of the arrival of the former governor, in the company of one of his *qā’ids* (commanders), and his adviser, the controversial Robert Blake.¹³⁶

Despite the treaty which Rainsborough had entered into with al-‘Ayāshī, the English agreed to the sultan’s request for his representatives to enter the new town, and within days the Moriscos had released all the Britons they held captive. In total some three hundred, including eleven women, were liberated before the squadron departed.¹³⁷ While Rainsborough attempts to take credit for the outcome by insinuating that he forced the hand of the Moroccans to release the captives, Carteret reveals that the sultan, in a letter to the commander, had already given this undertaking.¹³⁸ Despite being so close to delivering a decisive blow to the Salé corsairs, the English instead accepted a diplomatic solution, and, not surprisingly, Carteret notes that ‘the Saint was much displeased’ with the outcome.¹³⁹ But in any event, the timing of the arrival of the sultan’s delegation had been fortuitous for the English, for the Moriscos were determined not to surrender to al-‘Ayāshī and had

13. The dates given for this event differ between commentators from between 15 or 16 June (Dunton and Carteret) to 1 August (Rainsborough).

¹³⁵ ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 8 August 1637 and ‘Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas’, 21 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 323, 340.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 341; Dunton, *A True Journall*, p. 19.

¹³⁷ Figures for the number of captives released vary between sources. In part, the differences are due to whether or not the Britons freed by al-‘Ayāshī and some forty other Europeans who were liberated from Salé are also included. See Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 325, n. 1. As a reminder that the English were not the only Britons concerned with Morocco, the captives included ‘English, Scottish, Irish, and of the Isles of Garnsey, and Jarsey, and of other places of his Majesties dominions’. See *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, p. 16. This pamphlet puts the number of Britons who were returned at three hundred and two, with a further forty-six French, Dutch, and Spanish captives liberated. See *ibid.*, pp. 25–26.

¹³⁸ ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 8 August 1637, and ‘Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas’, 21 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 325, 341. See also Dunton, *A True Journall*, pp. 19–20.

¹³⁹ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 325.

been negotiating to hand the town to the Spanish, only ceasing entertaining this option upon receiving the letter of pardon from the sultan.¹⁴⁰

For al-'Ayāshī the siege had been a no-win situation, but for the English it now promised a means of not only addressing the problem of the corsairs, but also of normalising commercial and political relations with the sultanate. Whether at the invitation of the sultan or, as indicated by Rainsborough, at his own instigation, Rainsborough, accompanied by Blake, left Salé on 30 August for Safi to negotiate a formal treaty with al-Asghar in Marrakesh.¹⁴¹ A treaty consisting of twenty-one articles was subsequently concluded on 22 September.¹⁴² While there are many similarities with the treaty negotiated by Harrison with Mawlay al-Walid in 1632 in terms of the issues which it addresses, there are also some very significant differences. The treaty was more comprehensive, and balanced, providing the sultan and his subjects with the same rights as the English, and imposing on the English the same obligations as the Moroccans. Notably, it retained an article providing reciprocal rights of free trade in the dominions of each ruler (article 4). In an attempt to mitigate attacks on the vessels of each party, it imposed on local governors a responsibility to take measures to avoid such attacks, and an obligation on them to provide redress in the event of a breach (article 15). There were also two significant concessions by the English. First, the treaty sanctioned the taking by the Moroccans of any English ship, along with its crew and goods, found trading with the sultan's

¹⁴⁰ 'Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L'Amirauté', 8 August 1637, and 'Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas', 21 September 1637, in *ibid.*, pp. 324–325, 341. It was one of several attempts made by the Moriscos of Salé between 1614 and 1663 to negotiate an agreement with Spain under which they either became vassals, or acquired the right to return to Spain. See García-Arena, 'Moriscos in Morocco', pp. 325–328.

¹⁴¹ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, pp. 325–326; Dunton, *A True Journall*, pp. 21–22.

¹⁴² 'Traité entre Charles I^{er} et Moulay Mohammed Ech-Cheikh', 12 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 328–335. Rogers in *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 32, claims the document served as a model for all future Anglo-Moroccan treaties. However, while there are some similarities in the issues addressed and the wording of specific articles, neither the 1637 document nor the final form of the treaty finalised the following year appear to have been used as a template for the preparation of later treaties, which have obviously been prepared to address different circumstances. See, for example, the Articles of Peace with the 'King of Asowia' of 1657 and 1661 in TNA, SP 103/1, ff. 259–261 and BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 2r–v, and *Articles of Peace Concluded and Agreed Between His Excellency the Lord Bellasyse His Majesties Governor of His City and Garison of Tangier in Affrica, &c. and Cidi Hamet Hader Ben Ali Gayland, Prince of West-Barbary, &c. The Second of April, 1666* (London, 1666)

enemies (article 9). Second, it held out the possibility of the sultan obtaining use of English ships should they be required by him to deal with rebels or trade with his enemies (article 16).

In recognition of this new era of Anglo-Moroccan détente, al-Asghar sent his ambassador, Jaudar ben Abdellah, to England to finalise the treaty with King Charles. The ambassador was accompanied by Blake.¹⁴³ The delegation arrived in England on 8 October 1637, and entered London on 19 October. Details relating to the embassy are provided in an account, *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, published that same year, which was introduced in the previous chapter. It describes how the ambassador and his retinue were received on their approach to the city, heralded by a cannonade of 'Love and Welcome', 'in state as was fitting and honourable', met by members of the Privy Council, attended by thousands of spectators on their arrival at Tower-wharf, conveyed in coaches, including the king's own, and escorted by Barbary merchants and city officials to their lodgings.¹⁴⁴ The general tone of the pamphlet is one of approbation of relations with Morocco. In particular, the author appears to actively seek to identify areas of affinity between the two nations and their cultures rather than differences. Even his treatment of Islam is moderate, and relatively well informed, and while he wishes 'they [Muslims] were all inspired by holinesse from God', he is 'sure that they do surpasse many Christians in righteousness and just dealing towards men'.¹⁴⁵

The theme of Anglo-Moroccan affinity was echoed by the sultan himself when he wrote to Charles on 15 November 1637, not only emphasising the interest which they shared in rooting 'out the generacions of those, who have been soe pernicious to the good of our nations',¹⁴⁶ namely the corsairs of Salé, but also the common bond which

¹⁴³ 'Lettre de Moulay Mohammed Ech-Cheikh el-Asghar a Charles 1^{er}', 12 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 336–338.

¹⁴⁴ *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador*, pp. 8–9.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40 (my interpolation). See also J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', pp. 5–6.

¹⁴⁶ 'Lettre de Moulay Mohammed Ech-Cheikh el-Asghar a Charles 1^{er}', [5 November 1637], in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 356. On dating of the letter, see p. 355, n. 1. On the location of reproductions of the letter see p. 357, n. 2. It was also reproduced by Lancelot Addison in *West Barbary, or, A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, Sacred, Civil, and Domestick* (Oxford, 1671), pp. 9–14, where it is incorrectly

existed between them as legitimate rulers: 'The regall power allotted to our charge, makes us first commen servants to our creator, then of those whome wee governe'.¹⁴⁷ To emphasise the potential mutual importance of the relationship, the sultan goes on to suggest Charles join with him, as they did at Salé, waging 'warr against Tunis, Argeire and other places';¹⁴⁸ it was a plan, as Giles Penn argued, that the sultan had no hope of ever effecting.¹⁴⁹

3.4. Practical Opportunism: Working within a Fractured Polity

At the same time as their compatriots were celebrating the start of what they believed to be a new epoch in Anglo-Moroccan commercial and political relations, there were others who provided contrary opinions based on deeper insight into the prevailing situation, informed by their knowledge of, and actual experience in, that country. Penn offers a sober assessment of issues concerning peace and trade in Morocco. The whole of Sus, he notes, is under the control of Abū Hassūn, who is unlikely ever to be defeated by al-Asghar. Further, he 'hath alwayes bene a greate freind to our English nacion', for unlike the rulers of other areas of the country he does not hold Britons captive, and trade and commerce is far greater in that region than in the territories controlled by the sultan.¹⁵⁰ He goes on to explain that if English merchants were forced to cease this trade not only would it result in a direct loss to them and the nation, but would open this market to the French and Dutch. In relation to the territory of Marrakesh held by the sultan, it is both weak in trade and military power, he claimed. Furthermore, aside from being unable to recover either Sus or Fez, al-Asghar's hold on power in the new town of Salé is tenuous; the only thing preventing the Moriscos rebelling again was the risk of another attack on the port by English ships, to which the sultan may have recourse under the proposed peace. Penn

dated 1625. The letter was published in 1680 as *A Letter from the King of Morocco*, as cited in n. 112 above, and was again published in 1682, under a different title. On the reasons for the later publication of the letter, see chap. 6.

¹⁴⁷ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 355.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 356. See also Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism', p. 10; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 158.

¹⁴⁹ 'Memoire de G. Penn sur le Maroc', 20 November 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 362.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

also responded to reports that a treaty would require all English trading to be conducted through Safi. He counsels that any attempt to prevent merchants trading in Sus would lead to conflict with Dutch and French traders who attempted to access this market, and a possible wider escalation of national conflict. Furthermore, he accuses Blake of monopolising trade in Safi, and for this reason believes that limiting trade to there would prejudice both English merchants and the king's customs.¹⁵¹

Penn then turns to the issue of Salé, observing that trade in that area had been far better when al-'Ayāshī had controlled both towns, but believed that it was doubtful whether he would assist the English again in any action against the new town if that proved necessary. But irrespective of whoever controlled that town, if they wished to have peace and trade with England, Penn's advice was that an agent or consul should be appointed to monitor their activities. With a similar indifference to political regime, he notes that Tétouan had always been a good place for the English to trade, and continues to be so, despite its Morisco inhabitants no longer being subject to the authority of either al-'Ayāshī or the sultan.¹⁵²

The influence of vested interest in the way in which Penn framed his advice cannot be discounted — after all, he was appointed as the first English consul in Morocco, with specific responsibility for affairs at Salé, not long after¹⁵³ — but he was not alone in questioning the wisdom of reliance on the fragile Sa'dian regime, and suggesting other means to pursue England's interests in the country. Another commentator, a Stephen Scott, who claims to have travelled extensively throughout Sus for seven years, also wrote about the advantages of relations with Sus, and asked that his experience be taken into consideration in negotiating any treaty with the sultan.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 360–362.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 363–364.

¹⁵³ 'Ordre en Faveur de Giles Penn', 30 December 1637, in *ibid.*, pp. 389–390; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 39, n. 2.

¹⁵⁴ 'Stephen Scott to [Coke?]', 4 April 1638, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 1, /58 (volume index reference given as folios of manuscript are not numbered). On dating of the letter, see Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 393, n. 1. Although queried in the index entry, the letter does not appear to have been addressed to Secretary of State John Coke. The 'Right Hon[our]ble' to whom the advice is addressed is not identified by name, but Scott remarks that about two months earlier he had discussed the matters which it relates with Coke.

In his advice, Scott first details the riches which Sus had provided Mawlay al-Mansūr and reflects on the destruction of the sugar industry and the change in political control which had occurred there since his death.¹⁵⁵ Given that al-Asghar had not been able to regain Sus, he asks the king to consider how his interests are best served, given that trade with the kingdoms of both Marrakesh and Fez was of little value on its own, and the greatest benefit of any peace with their rulers he could hope for was to avoid the payment of ransoms for his subjects taken captive. He then goes on to optimistically propose that Charles make an offer jointly to both Abū Hassūn and al-Asghar to contract the purchase of sugar from Sus to enable the industry there to be re-established. Oddly, Scott also thought that in addition to purchasing sugar at an agreed price, the offer would be made even more attractive by requesting rights to the town of Agadir, and for the construction of a small fort in the nearby port of Santa Cruz, which would not only provide for the safety of the king's subjects, but would allow the king to 'defend that port from all invaders', presumably as a service to the sultan.¹⁵⁶ Scott's principal rationale for this proposal was the profit that could be made from sugar at a time when England was importing vast quantities at great cost, and the Dutch were developing their own sources in Brazil. But he concludes by warning the king against ignoring Abū Hassūn: doing so runs the risk of Britons in Sus being held captive, and the financial opportunities which exist there being lost to others.¹⁵⁷

Scott clearly believed that Morocco could be a source of great profit for England, but he was not advocating exploitation of the country by the use of force and usurpation of political control. Like John Harrison's earlier proposal for Mehdyā, he envisaged that the benefits of a permanent English presence could be achieved with the support of the Moroccans themselves on the basis of the identification and fulfilment of mutual interests. But, like Harrison, Scott appears oblivious to the efforts made by

¹⁵⁵ 'Mémoire de S. Scott sur le Commerce Marocain', [4 April 1638] in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 393–394.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 394–395.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 395–396.

Moroccans to rid their land of European enclaves for over a century, and the importance of those sites that remained under European control in leveraging religio-nationalistic sentiment by factional leaders in their bids for territorial control and necessary sacral and political legitimacy.

Despite the warnings offered by Penn and Scott, Charles maintained his faith in the Sa'dian regime and the final form of a treaty of peace and commerce with the sultan was ratified by the king on 8 May 1638.¹⁵⁸ The document differs significantly in tone and content from the one negotiated the previous year. While still offering (notional) protection to the sultan's subjects from being held as slaves in the king's dominions (article [4]), and prohibiting trade with his enemies (article [10]), its focus is squarely on English rights. Gone are the reciprocal rights of free trade and supply of vessels; the obligation on the king's governors to prevent attacks on Moroccan vessels and provide redress when necessary; the sanctioning of the seizure of vessels found trading with rebels; and the explicit right of the sultan to request the use of English vessels. The treaty was framed around England's commercial interests and was supported in this respect by two important developments.

The first of these was the king's appointment of Robert Blake as his agent 'for Barbarie', a role for which the 'cheif indevor' was to 'protect our marchants in the priveleges and freedom of their trade' according to the treaty.¹⁵⁹ As the king's agent, Blake was also to be the 'keeper and conservator' of the articles of the treaty.¹⁶⁰ The second development was the issuing shortly after of a charter for the establishment of a joint-stock company which was to have a monopoly on all English trade into and from an area extending from 'Cape Blanco' (on the Atlantic coast between Mauritania and Western Sahara) to 'the port of Tremezeene' (Oran in Algiers), for at least three years.¹⁶¹ The proposal appears to have originated with Blake, who became one of the members, but the prospect for such an arrangement had been contested by other

¹⁵⁸ 'Traité entre Charles I^{er} et Moulay Mohammed Ech-Cheikh', before 8 May 1638, in *ibid.*, pp. 400–404.

¹⁵⁹ 'Instructions pour Robert Blake', 8 May 1638, in *ibid.*, p. 406.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹⁶¹ 'Lettres Patentes de Charles 1^{er}', 18 May 1638, in *ibid.*, pp. 409–410, 422–423.

merchants operating in the region, the latest episode in their long battle against changes to traditional trading arrangements.¹⁶² However, the king had supported the idea, and provision for the establishment of such an entity was incorporated into the final treaty, which required the sultan to permit any such company to have the right to 'determine all differences and controversies', which arose among its members, and to enforce decisions in accordance 'to such orders and commission as they shall receive from their owne king'.¹⁶³ Through these means, and the appointment of Penn as consul at Salé, the English authorities were not only attempting to ensure compliance with the terms of the treaty by the Moroccans, but also asserting England's extra-territorial jurisdiction over its own subjects.¹⁶⁴ It is in relation to the latter concern that the rationale for the establishment of a trading company differs from that of its predecessor in the previous century; no longer was the issue one of simply improving the political and commercial leverage of England in overseas markets, but also of controlling the overseas activities of Britons.¹⁶⁵

The ambassador, in the company of Blake, left England on 31 May and arrived off Salé on 19 June in a vessel under the command of George Carteret. What the captain found there and observed over the course of the following months exemplifies the challenges faced by the English in Morocco during this period. Carteret left a journal of his voyage in which he describes a complex and fluid situation, involving multiple parties and uncertain allegiances, about which he appears to have acquired a sound understanding.¹⁶⁶ He notes that through discussions with one of the sultan's commanders (a French renegade who governed Safi) and with English merchants, some of whom had lived in Morocco for two decades, 'I did informe my selfe of theise

¹⁶² 'Ordre du Conseil Privé', 18 April 1638, in *ibid.*, pp. 397–398.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 402–403.

¹⁶⁴ See the discussion on the extension of English jurisdiction and authority in the Mediterranean in chap. 1 of this thesis. See also Blake's later response to the sultan's concerns about the establishment of the joint-stock Barbary Company and its control of trade pricing, in 'Journal de Robert Blake', 21 May 1638–26 December 1638, in *ibid.*, pp. 508–509. Blake explains to the sultan that such companies are 'noe newe thinge', and 'upon this coast it was most necessary', to enable, among reasons, King Charles to ensure that his subjects did not trade with the rebels.

¹⁶⁵ See the discussion on the original Barbary Company in chap. 1 of this thesis.

¹⁶⁶ See George Carteret, *The Barbary Voyage of 1638*, ed. Boies Penrose (Philadelphia, 1929). An extract from the journal for this part of Carteret's voyage is provided as 'Journal de G. Carteret', 20 April–30 October 1638, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, pp. 442–460.

three theings especially (viz.) the trade, the government, and the extent of the [Moroccan] king's dominions which he hath in present posesion'.¹⁶⁷ Described by one biographer 'as a sober, hardworking servant of the King, whose Royalism was his Religion',¹⁶⁸ his contemporary Samuel Pepys considered Carteret to be intemperate, stating he was 'the most passionate man in the world', but also believed him to be an honest one.¹⁶⁹

Upon his arrival in Salé, Carteret found the Moriscos were again in conflict, and al-'Ayāshī was continuing to besiege the new town. He reflects on the duplicity of both al-'Ayāshī and the Andalusian governor in their dealings with the sultan. The marabout had shown himself to be a particularly adept manipulator of allegiances during the earlier siege, and Carteret describes how he now feigned support for the sultan to enact a plan to infiltrate the new town with his supporters. He also details the desperate measures taken by the garrison to survive. Short of supplies and holding little hope of being relieved by the sultan, the men reached out for assistance from Spain, and even the sultan's rebellious half-brother in Fez.¹⁷⁰

While the sultan failed to make good his promises of relief, the Spanish provided the beleaguered garrison the prospect of reprieve with the arrival around July of soldiers and supplies. The Andalusians in the fortress were receptive to accepting the assistance, but the sultan's commander declined the offer.¹⁷¹ However, by the beginning of September, he was reconsidering the possibility of handing the fortress to the Spanish if help did not arrive soon. Carteret saw the opportunity to resolve the problem of Salé once and for all. He advised the commander that he strongly approved of the possibility of 'putteinge it into the Christian hands' rather than deliver it up to the rebels, but pointed out the risk to the sultan of Spanish possession of another strategic site in Morocco by which they may be emboldened to launch a

¹⁶⁷ Carteret, *The Barbary Voyage*, p. 24 (my interpolation).

¹⁶⁸ Balleine, *All for the King*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹ Samuel Pepys, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, eds. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 6 (London, 1970–1983), p. 175, entry for 31 July 1665; *ibid.*, 8, p. 165, entry for 12 April 1667.

¹⁷⁰ Carteret, *The Barbary Voyage*, see, for example, pp. 16–19, 28–29.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

wider conquest. Instead, the captain shrewdly suggested that it would be 'farr safer' for the sultan to offer the fortress to the king of England, whose friendship and support had been amply demonstrated.¹⁷² The commander promised to convey the offer to his master, but Carteret had received no response before he departed for England six days later.¹⁷³

The new treaty was ratified by the sultan on 25 July 1638.¹⁷⁴ However, it was not long before the strength of the newly forged relationship was tested by news that English merchants were continuing to trade with the rebels; the sultan was understandably incensed.¹⁷⁵ He was also troubled about the power the joint-stock company had over the pricing of imports and exports,¹⁷⁶ and he was not alone in having concerns about the company's monopoly. The trading arrangements were unravelling in the face of infighting within the company itself, and resistance from the traditional traders.¹⁷⁷ On 4 February 1639, the Privy Council requested that representative of the two sides meet to attempt to negotiate a resolution to their differences, but with the clear expectation that the joint-stock company would be maintained.¹⁷⁸ However, by 13 March there had been a significant change in direction: the king had decided that in the interests of trade, the company be dissolved and merchants should no longer be limited to conducting their business in ports in the sultan's domains, but be at liberty to trade in any port to avoid the loss of commerce to their competitors. But they held that an entity should continue to manage trade with Morocco, although rather than a joint-stock company it was decided it should be a regulated charter company, allowing all traders to participate equally.¹⁷⁹ While the sultan did not agree with the merchants' complaints about the existing restrictions of trade, he was prepared to accept the change on the basis of a prohibition on the trade in arms and ammunition,

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

¹⁷⁴ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 401, n. 1.

¹⁷⁵ 'Journal de Robert Blake', 21 May–26 December 1638, in *ibid.*, pp. 504–505.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

¹⁷⁷ Blake's journal entries for this period detail the emerging issues in relations with the sultan, with members of the company, and with other merchants. See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 503–513.

¹⁷⁸ 'Ordre du Conseil Privé', 25 January 1639, in *ibid.*, pp. 515–518.

¹⁷⁹ 'Ordre du Conseil Privé', 3 March 1639, in *ibid.*, pp. 520–521.

which had been imposed by Charles as a condition of the new arrangements.¹⁸⁰ The Barbary merchants had finally achieved the outcome they had fought so long for.

In what would be his last notable attempt to influence English involvement in Morocco, on 5 September 1641 Robert Blake submitted a proposal to the House of Lords for authority to negotiate with the defenders of the fortress at Salé which had been under almost continuous siege for some four years. Blake claimed that the sultan's garrison was prepared to surrender the fortress in exchange for being transported to safety elsewhere, and argued there were strategic and commercial benefits to be gained from possessing not only the fortress, but the whole new town. According to Blake, it would not only secure the port from being a haven for corsairs, but also provide a supply point for English vessels. More significantly, he also proposed driving the inhabitants out of the town, taking over control of the nearby salt pans, and limiting production of tin from a nearby mine, and selling it with Cornish tin to maximise its price.¹⁸¹ It has been claimed by one scholar that Blake intended to enslave the population and 'was eager to begin the age of African imperialism' by following the Spanish model of exploitation in South America.¹⁸² However, this is a misreading of Blake's proposal. Nowhere does he even imply an intent to enslave Moroccans, and nor did he hint at having an interest in areas outside the immediate vicinity of the town. In fact, his aims were well defined and limited, and his motivations not totally unreasonable. He stresses that it would be important to reassure people in adjoining areas that the occupation of the fortress and demolition of the town was 'not anie ways to offend them, but onlie to preserve ourselves from the piracie and spoyle of those who inhabit that towne'. He also expected that by assuaging the concerns of the local people, the English could develop 'the greatest trade of all the coasts of Barbary' with them, and exclude the French and Dutch from commerce in the region.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ 'Lettre de Moulay Mohammed ech-Cheikh el-Asghar à Charles I^{er}', 20–29 July 1639, in *ibid.*, pp. 530–533.

¹⁸¹ 'Mémoire de R. Blake', 26 August 1641, in *ibid.*, pp. 548–549.

¹⁸² Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 44–45.

¹⁸³ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 549.

Blake was neither necessarily being disloyal to his benefactor, the Sa'dī sultan, nor the harbinger of English imperialism in North Africa, rather he was just being practical and opportunistic; either the English took Salé, or it fell to the sultan's enemies, or even to Spain, both of which outcomes would be the cause of ongoing problems for both the sultan and the English. What is notable about Blake's proposal is not that he conceived it, but rather, despite his intimate knowledge of Moroccan politics and society, his expectation was that Moroccans would accept any attempt by a Christian state to sequester their land. It is difficult to get a measure of Blake's character, beyond the fact he was a shrewd businessman, and a conniving opportunist, and given this, it is not surprising that his celebrity and role in Anglo-Moroccan relations was short lived; despite the favour shown to him by Charles I, he was hanged in 1643 on the order of Prince Rupert for betrayal.¹⁸⁴

3.5. Needs Must: Finding Common Ground for a New Rapprochement

However, by the time Blake submitted his proposal the political landscape in both Morocco and England was changing, and the period of rapprochement between the two countries which had begun in 1625 was drawing to an end. The paucity of official documents in the archives for 1642 to 1657, concerning England's relations with Morocco, reveals a total political disengagement.¹⁸⁵ Charles had been unable to stop the trade in arms with the rebels by his subjects as required under the treaty with the Sa'dī sultan, but in any event by 1642 Salé was effectively under the control of the Dilā'īs and the preoccupation of the English with their own civil war allowed the corsairs to quickly renew their predation on English shipping. Nevertheless, despite the political turmoil, and the risk of attack and enslavement, English merchants continued to ply their trade in Morocco, and were even engaged as intermediaries by the English government to negotiate ransoms for the release of their captured countrymen.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ On Blake's execution, see Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 38; Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, p. 97.

¹⁸⁵ See the indexes for the two principal manuscript volumes of state papers relating to Morocco for this period, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 1 and TNA, SP 102/2/Pt. 2. See also the overview for the period 1642–1660, 'Les Rapports de l'Angleterre et du Maroc', provided by Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de Cossé Brissac in *SIHMA*, III, pp. 552–555.

¹⁸⁶ Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 552–553.

It was Oliver Cromwell's more aggressive foreign policy following the end of the first Anglo-Dutch war in 1654, that reignited England's interest in renewing political relations with Morocco. War with Spain in 1656 and a desire to maintain a naval presence in the Mediterranean necessitated that the English find a port near the Strait of Gibraltar from which to supply the fleet. Gibraltar had been considered, as had another site (probably on the Alhucemas Islands off the Mediterranean coast of Morocco), but both options had been ruled out as being unfeasible, and so they turned to Tétouan.¹⁸⁷ Admiral Robert Blake attempted to finalise a peace with both Salé and Tétouan in the summer of that year. Negotiations with the Salétins broke down over the redemption of captives, but despite his response to Tunisian intransigence the previous year, and reports at that time that he intended to take punitive action against the Salétins,¹⁸⁸ he instead attempted to coerce them by maintaining a blockade of the port.¹⁸⁹ Blake found the governor of Tétouan, 'Abd el-Krim en-Neksis, more receptive: 'Abd el-Krim not only proposed a treaty, but also the appointment of an English agent to monitor its adherence. Blake was required to depart before finalising negotiations, but his vice-admiral, Richard Badiley later submitted an application to the Admiralty to pursue the matter.¹⁹⁰ By November 1657, a young merchant operating in Tétouan, Nathaniel Luke, had been appointed provedore for the navy in the port, and as the English consul for the ports of Salé, Asilah, Tétouan, Safi, and Santa Cruz, with responsibility for directing and assisting 'our merchants and people aforesaid in their commerce and business', among other

¹⁸⁷ Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1904), pp. 318–334. On Cromwell's thinking about the Mediterranean see *ibid.*, chap. XVI. There is nothing to directly relate Cromwell's interest in establishing a permanent base for a fleet with the earlier proposals of men such as Harrison, Carteret and Blake to establish bases in Morocco, but it was driven by the same strategic considerations concerning Spain and the importance of protecting England's geopolitical and commercial interests in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

¹⁸⁸ 'Venice: June 1655', in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 30, 1655–1656 (London, 1930), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol30/pp61-73#highlight-first>, accessed 13 April 2017. See entry no. 94, 26 June, in online edition, and p. 71 in printed edition.

¹⁸⁹ 'Lettre d'E. Montagu a J. Thurloe', 8 August 1656, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, pp. 573–574.

¹⁹⁰ 'Attestation de R. Badiley', 29 December 1656 and 'Letter d'E. Montagu a Ch. Fleetwood', 10 January 1657, in *ibid.*, pp. 575–576, 577–579.

things pertaining to the duty of a consul.¹⁹¹ Nathaniel and his older brother John would go on to assume roles in the governance of English Tangier.

The prospects for peace and commerce in Morocco looked promising for the English at this time. A peace was finally concluded with the Salétins in July of that year,¹⁹² and a treaty with the Dilā' leader Muhammad al-Hajj was signed the following month.¹⁹³ The Dilā' regime had been ascendant in northern Morocco since the early 1640s, and with control of Fez and the demise of the Sa'dian dynasty, al-Hajj had gained effective sovereignty of the region. Also joined in the treaty was Abd el-Krim, as governor of Tétouan, and one of the other signatories was possibly al-Hajj's son Sidi Abdallah, who would become governor of Salé.¹⁹⁴ The treaty is succinct, consisting of only eight articles. It included, *inter alia*, rights to access the ports of the other party for the purposes of trade (article 1); safe passage for the vessels of each party (article 3); protection of the subjects of each party from verbal abuse and ill treatment (article 6); and access for the warships of each party to provisioning at the ports of the other (article 7). In the balance it provides between the rights and obligations of the parties, if not the detail, it mirrors the preliminary treaty negotiated with Mawlay al-Asghar in 1637, as opposed to the one-sided document that was eventually settled upon. In this respect, these two treaties represent a departure from the approach which was adopted in other treaties between European and North African states, at least from the 1650s, which provided a general advantage to the Europeans.¹⁹⁵ It indicates that the English who negotiated these documents not only possessed a desire at this time to establish a viable peace with the Moroccans, but

¹⁹¹ 'Ordre du Conseil D'Etat', 3 March 1657 and 'Lettre de Nomination de Nathaniel Luke au Consulat de Tetouan', [3 March–30 October 1657], in *ibid.*, pp. 584–585, 586–587.

¹⁹² *CSPD: Interregnum, 1657–1658*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Greene, 13 vols., vol. 11 (London, 1858), p. 395, entries for 5 July.

¹⁹³ 'Articles of peace made with king of Asowia and governor of Tituan', 9 August 1657, TNA, SP 103/1, ff. 259–261.

¹⁹⁴ Cenival and Cossé Brissac suggest that the other Moroccan signatory, aside from the notary public, was possibly al-Hajj's brother. See 'Traité entre l'Angleterre et Sidi Mohammed El-Hadjdj', 9 August 1657 in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, *SIHMA*, III, p. 590, n. 1.

¹⁹⁵ C. R. Pennell, 'Treaty Law: The Extent of Consular Jurisdiction in North Africa from the Middle of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 14 (2009), pp. 238.

recognised, as did their predecessors, that the only means to do so was by attempting to ensure that the interests of both parties were satisfactorily accommodated.¹⁹⁶

Conclusion

Anglo-Moroccan relations were maintained following Mawlay al-Mansūr's death, but were inconsistent, and at times uncertain. In correspondence and treaties over the following decades the commerce and amity which prevailed between the two countries in the late sixteenth century was frequently evoked, but could not be replicated. This is because key parameters had changed. Trade continued to be important to both sides, but no longer were they bound as strongly by a common fear and antipathy toward Spain. But, most importantly, as state authority contracted in Morocco, the English were challenged by a far more complex political terrain, uncertain as to what direction to take, or which path would provide the best commercial and strategic outcomes. Although they would seek to do so, they found they could not profit from the disunity in Morocco without consequence.

It was war with Spain that helped encourage an English ruler to once again reach out to Morocco for assistance. The king's agent, John Harrison, was no stranger to the country, and it is his accounts which best demonstrate that the political conditions in Morocco during the period over which this chapter ranges not only affected diplomatic and commercial relations, but could also deeply impact the perceptions and responses of Britons who came in contact with the country at this time. Harrison's perceptions, particularly of Islam and Islamic government, were conditioned by the circumstances which prevailed in Morocco, characterised as they were by bloody disputes over control of territory and resources, and the associated

¹⁹⁶ There is another document which J. A. O. C. Brown has interpreted to be a renewal of the treaty, dating it to 1661. However, both documents were negotiated on behalf of Oliver Cromwell, and both refer to his envoy, Admiral John Stokes, being situated off the coast of Spain at the time. It is more likely the undated document is a draft misfiled with later records. There is a date on one of the folios but it obscured and could have been added later. There are some differences. Article 7 is missing from the undated document, and a right that 'ships of the fleete have the liberty to abroad' is included in a notation at the end. All other rights and obligations are essentially the same. See BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 2–3; J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash, 1706–1708', *The Historical Journal*, 51 (2008), pp. 604–605.

propaganda bruited by partisan interests. He interpreted his personal interactions, events he experienced, and stories which he heard through the filter of his strong Protestant faith and millenarian beliefs, but he also manifested responses which reveal tensions arising from his adherence to more fundamental Christian and humanistic convictions; in these respects, his disposition, ideas, and actions very much reflect the general anxieties of his particular age, and which by the 1660s were subsiding, marking the beginning of a new age which would become more ordered, more assured, less divided, and far less zealous.¹⁹⁷

In the extent to which he reveals his attitudes to what he found in Morocco, Harrison stands apart from others examined in this chapter, who provide little direct insight into their thoughts and feelings beyond those aspects which were of immediate importance to their interests. This variance is undoubtedly due to differences in a range of factors, including personality, the purpose for which they were in Morocco — most were there for specific business, not as casual sojourners — their experiences, and the nature of the sources they left, which, apart from several personal journals, largely consist of official correspondence and reports. Nevertheless, some general observations can be made. Firstly, religious and ethnological differences elicited little critical attention. In fact, they were given little attention at all, and, moreover, the men expressed no marked general prejudice against Moroccans, or conveyed a sense they considered themselves culturally superior. Even Harrison had little to say on these issues aside from his sympathetic observations about Jews and Moriscos, and his traditionally framed polemic against Islam; like Rainsborough, he tended to direct his prejudice toward specific individuals. If anything, they appeared to be unconcerned by such differences, and, like the Britons residing in Salé and elsewhere in the country, displayed a surprising degree of pragmatism and adaptability, dispositions which other Britons also amply demonstrated in their activities in the wider Mediterranean region.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability*, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸ See discussion on this issue in chap. 1 of this thesis.

While the subjects examined in this chapter may not have revealed their inner-most thoughts, what they do clearly demonstrate is that they acquired considerable knowledge and, to some degree, understanding about Morocco, or at least about those aspects which were of most use to them. They also show how this knowledge and understanding influenced their thinking about the opportunities which the country could afford them personally, their nation, and their religion. Of particular concern to the men were issues affecting trade and national strategic interests. It has been argued by others that the proposals developed by Harrison and Blake for the acquisition of enclaves in Morocco were the products of British imperial aspiration and a change in ideology from a focus on trade to conquest of land and control of natural resources.¹⁹⁹ But, as discussed in chapter 1, there is no evidence of a normative imperial ideology directing such proposals at this time; they were essentially the products of individual men, and specific circumstances. Furthermore, these proposals, if anything, were demonstrably self-conscious and delimited; I believe that they can better be regarded as renderings of a more traditional understanding of a 'colony' as 'the plantation of nucleated settlements within a foreign landscape', not the 'exploitation and cultural domination' that are implicit in the much later concept of 'colonialism'.²⁰⁰

What men like John Harrison, Stephen Scott, George Carteret, and the merchant Robert Blake were expressing were not imperial aspirations, but rather means by which England could navigate the challenges of an unstable political environment and external military and commercial threats, to establish new forms of engagement to address geo-political concerns and capitalise on commercial opportunities in Morocco. Their various plans did not directly pre-figure subsequent colonial thinking in Morocco or elsewhere. They were idealistic in their ambition, but their responses were ostensibly pragmatic, conceived under the confluence of general anxieties about competition, opportunistic circumstances, and, notably, in the belief they would be accepted by Moroccans on the basis of recognised mutual benefits.

¹⁹⁹ See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 42–43, 45, 134.

²⁰⁰ David Armitage, 'Literature and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *OHBE*, 5 vols, vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 109.

While possessing different motivations and aims, Harrison, Scott, Giles Penn, and the Barbary merchants who opposed the schemes of Bradshaw and Blake, realised that England could no longer just limit its diplomatic engagement to the increasingly fragile Sa'dian regime. During the late 1620s and the 1630s, the king and his advisors had vacillated over issues relating to trade and diplomatic policy for Morocco, torn between opposing positions within the seafaring and trading communities,²⁰¹ uncertain about convention and direction, but eventually they resigned themselves to the realities of the Moroccan political situation. However, by this time England was concerned with its own internal problems, and its merchants were left to their own devices in their dealings in Morocco until the late 1650s, when an English government once again courted Morocco in response to war with Spain.

The treaty between England and the Dilā' regime in 1657 was a promising re-start of a relationship which had spanned over a century. Characterised as it had been for much of that time by general accommodation of mutual interest, if not open amity, instead of recrimination and hostility, up until the beginning of the 1660s it demonstrated a very different dynamic from the relations England had with the other Barbary States. The promotion of mutual benefit and the exercise of *realpolitik* by the English had in the past helped align the interests of the parties and marginalise the effects of religious, cultural, and ethnic difference in interactions between Britons and Moroccans. But this *modus vivendi* would be compromised when England finally succumbed to temptation and sought to establish a permanent presence in Morocco, and in doing so ceased being seen as a trading partner and potential ally, and, instead, became an invader.

²⁰¹ An observation also made by Andrews in *Ships, Money and Politics*, pp. 182–183.




Fig. 7 A contemporary plan of English Tangier showing its defences and the disposition of English and Moroccan forces on 27 October 1680.

4. Aspiration (1661–1666)

Our main designe in puting our self to this great charge for this addition to our dominions, being to gaine our subjects the trade of Barbary, and to enlarge our dominions in that sea, and advance thereby the honour of our crowne and the general commerce and weale of our subjects. (Charles II, 6 September 1661)¹

At the beginning of 1662 the English took possession of the town of Tangier — located on the Moroccan coast adjacent to the Strait of Gibraltar — from the Portuguese. Tangier was England's first colony in the Mediterranean region, although it was not its first in an area dominated by Islam.² The occupation of Tangier represented a fundamental break with the generally pragmatic and cooperative approaches to commercial and diplomatic activities pursued by Britons and successive English monarchs in Morocco over the preceding 110 years, and has become the most studied period of Anglo-Moroccan relations due to the dramatic developments which ensued in Tangier over the following two decades. Within an admittedly limited corpus, much has been written about the political and commercial thinking, and European diplomatic machinations, associated with the acquisition of the town by Charles II, as well as the subsequent development of the colony and the daily life of the inhabitants.³ It is not the intention of the present author to examine these issues

¹ 'Instructions for the Earle of Peterburgh', 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 29r. Copies of the instructions can also be found in BL, Harl. MS 1595, ff. 10–11v; BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 68–69v.

² That dubious honour perhaps goes to the tiny island of Pulo Run at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago, which became an English possession in 1616, although it was only held by them for four years (cf. Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 133). John Keay has described the island as the 'seed from which grew' the British Empire, and as important to British imperial history as 'the island of Runnymede is to British constitutional history'. See John Keay, *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company* (London, 1993), p. 3.

³ On politics, commerce, and diplomacy, see in particular Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), chaps. XIX–XXV; E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912); R. A. Stradling, 'Spanish Conspiracy in England, 1661–1663', *The English Historical Review*, 87 (1972), pp. 269–286; Gerald L. Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661: A Reassessment of Charles II's Foreign Policy at the Restoration', *Journal of British Studies*, 15 (1975), pp. 67–88; Jerome B. Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the First Decade of the Occupation of Tangier, 1662–1672', *Hespèris Tamuda*, 18 (1979), pp. 63–75; Tristan Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), pp. 985–1011. On development of, and daily life in, the settlement under English rule, see John Davis, *History of the Second Queen's Royal Regiment Now the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment*, 7 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1887); Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*; W. B. T. Abbey, *Tangier Under British Rule, 1661–1684* (Channel Islands, 1940). On the history of the built environment of Tangier see Martin Malcolm Elbl, *Portuguese Tangier (1471–*

in detail, except to the extent they help to enlighten the impact that an encounter with Morocco had on Britons at this time, in terms of differences in attitude and response, not only compared with their compatriots at home, but also how they varied over time as a result of subsequent developments which affected the fortunes of the colony. In this respect it is important to understand that the English occupation of Tangier intersected with major developments in Morocco, within Europe, and within the British Isles, all of which would influence, to various degrees, and often in interrelated ways, the development and fate of English Tangier, and contribute to shaping the attitudes, behaviours and self-perceptions of Britons residing there.

Before proceeding to examining these events, it is useful to make some observations concerning the historiography and sources relating to this particular period of English activity in Morocco. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, scholarship from the late Victorian and Edwardian periods has cast a long shadow over the the study of how Britons interacted with the Islamicate societies of the Mediterranean in the early modern period. Despite their evident subjectivity and insularity, these works remain valuable sources but they have bequeathed a legacy which has been long-lived and influential, about which any scholar undertaking a study of this kind must be cognisant. Because of the didactic and symbolic importance ascribed to it by earlier historians, nowhere is this more evident than in the reconstruction and interpretation of events and personal interactions associated with the English occupation of Tangier.⁴

1662): *Colonial Urban Fabric as Cross-Cultural Skeleton* (Peterborough, Canada, 2013). See also Budgett Meakin, *The Land of the Moors: A Comprehensive Description* (London, 1901), pp. 120–131; P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, [197?]), chap. 4; Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), chap. 1; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, chap. 5; Karim Bejjit, 'Introduction' in Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance*, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015). In addition to Davis and Abbey, the connection between English Tangier and British military history has also attracted the attention of a number of other authors, notably Noel T. St John Williams, *Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth of the British Army (1660–1690)* (London, 1994); A. J. Smithers, *The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army* (Stroud, UK, 2003).

⁴ For instance, see Malcolm Elbl's critique of the historiography of the built environment of English Tangier in *Portuguese Tangier*, pp. 66–74. On the treatment of interactions with, and representations of the Moor, in late Victorian and Edwardian scholarship see Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm>, under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space.

As Karim Bejjit discerns, there are two dominant attitudes which emerge from the traditional historiography. The first is a sense of nostalgia, in which the eventual surrender of Tangier is conceived as having been both unfortunate and perhaps unnecessary, an ill-considered decision which deprived England of a potentially important asset. The second, he characterises as 'an apologetic tendency' which stresses the ability of the English to 'adapt to an unfamiliar and hostile environment' supported by their patriotism.⁵ While I agree with Bejjit concerning the first, with respect to the second I do not believe that it is so much adaptation that someone like Enid Routh was concerned about; in fact, like many of her early modern forbears, she possibly felt that the prospect of an English man or woman adapting to a foreign environment was anathema. Rather, in my view, the traditional historiographical narrative of English Tangier, viz. Routh, is based on a belief that a stout Englishman was not only capable of overcoming the challenges presented by an unfamiliar and hostile environment, but could do so without compromising those personal, cultural, and religious beliefs and values which defined their essential Englishness. Moreover, the general standards by which she judged the actions of Britons of the period were in fact anachronistic, being those set by British imperialists some two centuries later.⁶

However, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, signs of positive acculturation, if not cultural adaptation, are in fact amply evident among Britons who had experiences in Morocco before the Tangier period, and surviving records reveal that Britons continued to experience positive attitudinal and behavioural responses to the new geographic and socio-cultural environment in which they found themselves, even as occupants of an isolated and frequently beleaguered settlement. Routh remarks that the story of the English occupation is recorded in hundreds of letters and documents from the period. While most only concern public affairs, occasionally they contain a 'chance remark', which, together with a number of contemporary diary accounts, 'affords a glimpse of the daily life of the English inhabitants'.⁷ While

⁵ Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 40.

⁶ See, for example, Routh's reference to Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Harry Lumsden, who were instrumental in establishing the Corps of Guides in India in the mid-nineteenth century. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 21–22.

⁷ E. M. G. Routh, 'The English at Tangier', *The English Historical Review*, 26 (1911), p. 469.

Routh and others have used these fragmentary accounts to attempt to reconstruct a picture of the quotidian lives of Britons residing in the settlement, the archival and published sources for this period as a whole provide a richer and more diverse range of accounts than for any time up to that point concerning the engagement of Britons with Morocco.⁸ They allow us to not only acquire understanding of what they did, but also provide a means to gain insight into what they thought and felt, and thereby challenge the ideologically inspired interpretations implicit in the traditional historiography of the Tangier period.

This chapter challenges the generally accepted view that Charles II initially acquired and developed Tangier to be a bridgehead to an African empire. Instead, it is argued that from the very beginning the king and his advisors had more benign plans in which cooperation with Moroccans was seen as being pivotal to the success of the colony. It also re-examines the dynamics of encounter between the new occupants of Tangier and the indigenes in the light of this revisionist perspective. Notably, it finds that rather than their often violent confrontations increasing hostility and prejudice, they in fact helped foster respect for the Moroccans, and that throughout the period Britons maintained a willingness to engage with the people and learn more about them. It also reveals that in the turmoil of this initial stage of English Tangier's establishment there are also the first hints of the important role which European principles of honourable conduct could play in relations between Britons and Moroccans at this time.

4.1. A Divisive Issue: The Birth of English Tangier

As has been shown in chapters 1 and 3, Morocco had very much been a contested space since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the locus at which a wide range of political, religious, diplomatic, commercial, and geopolitical interests converged

⁸ The vast majority of the manuscript sources for the Tangier period of English activity in Morocco are found in the State Papers (SP) 71 series, or the Colonial Office (CO) 279 series. As G. E. Aylmer has also observed in 'Slavery Under Charles II: The Mediterranean and Tangier', *The English Historical Review*, 114 (1999), p. 381, n. 4, many of the volumes in the latter series are, in fact, boxes of loose papers covering six-monthly periods, but are not necessarily arranged by date or by item number. They are also in generally poor condition.

and intersected. In addition to persistent internal political conflict, and Ottoman interference, Morocco also began to attract increasing attention from the European powers. While Portugal, and then Spain actively staked territorial claims, and in doing so attracted the enmity of the Moroccans, the English, Dutch and French had, mostly, been satisfied to seek to establish profitable trading arrangements, and to this end maintained generally cordial relations with the various factions which controlled Morocco. Though divided among themselves concerning the best way in which to manage their commerce with the country, their essentially pragmatic approach had paid significant dividends for the English, and Britons more generally. However, all of this was to change with the occupation of Tangier. Not only would the decision of Charles II to accept Tangier as part of his dominions raise the ire of the Moroccans, but it would also incur the jealousy and suspicion of the Spanish, Dutch, and eventually the French, adding to existing geopolitical tensions, and contribute to domestic political intrigues, all of which increased the risks faced by an already speculative venture.

Contrary to the impression sometimes given in the literature,⁹ the way in which the settlement fell into the hands of the English was more serendipitous than planned; it was a product of the dynastic machinations of the European powers rather than an initiative of the newly crowned king, although interest in Tangier by the English was not new. As noted in the previous chapter, it was during the Anglo-Spanish war in 1656 that Oliver Cromwell had demonstrated a strong desire to establish a permanent base in the Mediterranean near the Strait of Gibraltar from which to support English naval operations in the region until it had been decided that an arrangement with Tétouan was more expedient. However, General Monck had also suggested to Cromwell that Tangier be used as a base through a treaty with Portugal, and it is possible that Monck shared this advice with the king.¹⁰

⁹ See, for example, Meakin, *The Land of the Moors*, p. 120; Colley, *Captives*, pp. 23–25; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 133.

¹⁰ Cited in Budgett Meakin, *The Land of the Moors*, pp. 119–120. Routh in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 6, states that Charles II was aware of Monck's advice to Cromwell but does not provide a source to support this assertion.

The Spanish had taken possession of Tangier in 1580 following the Portuguese succession crisis which had been precipitated by the Battle of Alcazar. The settlement was eventually recovered by the Portuguese in 1643 after they had regained their independence from Spain, but Spain continued to lay claim to Tangier and the inhabitants found themselves hemmed in by the Spanish from the sea, and by the Moroccans on land.¹¹ Under these circumstances, Tangier was a costly and expendable possession, but not without value as a bargaining chip. In need of support against Spain, the Portuguese king John IV had offered Tangier to the French in 1648, and in 1656 Louis XIV had promised military assistance in exchange for the town.¹² But what the Portuguese required was a more substantial alliance sealed through a marriage treaty, and Charles II's accession in 1660 provided a timely means to achieve this aim. However, the Portuguese were not alone in seeking to capitalise on Charles' eligibility in order to achieve their own dynastic plans.

Already suffering from years of war, the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 further exposed Portugal to the threat of invasion by Spain, so following Charles' restoration, the Queen Regent of Portugal sought to resurrect plans for a marriage between him and her daughter.¹³ However, at this time there existed a clear expectation by the Spanish, and within the broader European diplomatic community, that the king would give preference to an alliance with Spain.¹⁴ But within a year of his return to England, Charles had repudiated such an arrangement by entering into a marriage alliance with Portugal. The Spanish were not only incensed by the unexpected turn, but the alliance also frustrated Philip IV's plans to recover Portugal and negotiate the return of Dunkirk and Jamaica from the English.¹⁵ The Dutch were also antagonistic toward an arrangement which threatened their commercial interests.¹⁶

¹¹ Meakin, *The Land of the Moors*, p. 119; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 11; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 42.

¹² Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 18–19.

¹³ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 301; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 2.

¹⁴ Stradling, 'Spanish Conspiracy', p. 270; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 68–71.

¹⁵ Stradling, 'Spanish Conspiracy', pp. 270–271; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 70–71; Ronald Hutton, *Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 158–160.

¹⁶ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 303; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 3.

The outcome had been helped by offers of assistance to Charles from Louis XIV who supported the match to frustrate Spain, but it had ultimately been sealed by an exceedingly attractive dowry.¹⁷ In exchange for providing the Portuguese with military support, in addition to a bride, Charles was to receive specie and goods with a value equivalent to about £500,000, possession of Bombay and Tangier, and the right to trade with Brazil and the Portuguese East Indies.¹⁸ Gerald Belcher argues that in accepting the offer Charles had his eye on his domestic political needs rather than diplomatic expediency: the commercial and financial benefits which an alliance with Portugal promised were simply too great to refuse, providing a means both to placate the merchants of London, and of overcoming the financial restrictions imposed by Parliament, thereby helping secure the restored monarchy.¹⁹

Although it is unclear as to how much interest Charles had in Tangier before the Portuguese proposal, it is evident that he quickly attempted to gain some appreciation of Tangier's potential, seeking advice as to its suitability as a naval base from two of his admirals, the earl of Sandwich and Sir John Lawson.²⁰ Despite the recent experience of the Portuguese, Lawson, if the account can be relied upon, proffered a hyperbolic assessment. He argued that it was of such importance that if possessed by the Dutch they would quickly, and easily, construct a mole to protect their vessels; by doing so they could readily defend the place, and impose their will on Mediterranean trade. Perhaps understandably, the earl of Clarendon notes that

¹⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 3–4; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 72–73; Hutton, *Charles the Second*, pp. 159–160. Hutton also draws attention to the prodigious inducements provided to the king's counsellors by the Portuguese ambassador as a contributing factor.

¹⁸ The marriage portion was in fact two million Portuguese crusados, which has been variously converted as being equivalent to amounts ranging from £300,000 to £500,000. See, for example, Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, *The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, in which is Included a Continuation of His History of the Grand Rebellion*, 3 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1827), p. 491; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 301; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 3; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', p. 74; Hutton, *Charles the Second*, p. 160. Using the highest of these figures, the marriage portion alone would have been equivalent to around £64,940,000 in 2016 in terms of relative purchasing power (based on the calculator provided by MeasuringWorth.com at <https://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/>, accessed 5 June 2017).

¹⁹ Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 72–74.

²⁰ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 6.

following this discussion 'his majesty seemed very much affected'.²¹ It was, therefore, with some basis for optimism that on 8 May 1661, the king assured members of both houses of Parliament that they would find that the treaty contained 'many great advantages to the kingdom'.²² There were Britons who could have perhaps offered other perspectives, but, according to one account, the king and his courtiers may not have been receptive to dissenting voices,²³ and once the treaty had been signed in June, Charles lost no time in claiming his prize. By September a fleet had been dispatched to secure Tangier until the arrival of a garrison, and a governor had been appointed, the earl of Peterborough.²⁴

But a key question is, with what intent did the fleet embark? Clarity on this issue is important because it is critical to ensuring proper understanding of the motivations and responses of the inhabitants of the colony. Much has been made by some scholars of Peterborough's commission and instructions as evidence of the emergence of a new expansionist and assertive colonial and mercantile agenda among the English, in which the Mediterranean and North Africa figured heavily.²⁵ Like the instructions issued by the king to his new ambassador to Portugal around this time,²⁶ these documents, admittedly, reveal that the king possessed imperial aspirations inspired by his deal with the Portuguese. But to what extent do they in fact represent a 'bold and ambitious policy which contained the elements of success' for Tangier, a 'well-designed plan of commercial and colonial expansion' as claimed

²¹ Clarendon, *The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon*, I, p. 494.

²² 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 8 May 1661', in *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 1660–1666*, BHO ed. (London, 1767–1830), accessed 15 July 2016. See p. 241 in printed edition.

²³ Gilbert Burnet, *A Supplement to Burnet's History of My Own Time*, ed. H. C. Foxcroft (Oxford, 1902), p. 80.

²⁴ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 306–307; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 9.

²⁵ See, for example, Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 311–312, 325–326; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 17–18; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 134; Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 3, 7–8. Linda Colley in *Captives*, p. 28, does not cite either document but states that from the start the official vision for Tangier included an agenda of 'expansion, commerce and anglicisation'. In a notable departure from this view of the king's plans, Walter Frewen Lord argued, unconvincingly, that Charles placed no great value on Tangier, and initially 'considered it merely as a nursery for a standing army by whose aid he might subvert the liberties of England'. See Walter Frewen Lord, *England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830* (London, 1901), pp. 22–25, 62. The quotation is from p. 62.

²⁶ 'Charles II to Richard Fanshaw', 23 August 1661, *Historical Manuscripts Commission: Heathcote MSS* (London, 1899), pp. 18–20.

by Routh?²⁷ Certainly, at face value, statements such as that which appears as the epigraph to this chapter and the following extract from Peterborough's commission can be interpreted as being part of such a policy or plan:

Whereas we intend forthwith to settle and secure our citty of Tanger and the territories and dominions adjacent in or neere the coastes of Barbary or the kingdomes of Sus, Fez, and Morocco ... and for the purpose have resolved to [provide] such forces [necessary] for our service in the defence of our said citty of Tanger, and our dominions and territories in or neere the said kingdomes of Sus, Fez, and Morocco.²⁸

But such an interpretation overlooks the fact that it is difficult to obtain a clear understanding of Charles' thinking directly from the documents. Any vision and direction for practical action beyond Tangier's becoming a free port and the investigation of the construction of a mole²⁹ is vague in its scope and intent: the wording of the documents is formulaic, and informed by the contemporary language of royal imperiousness, and by necessity they provide for a wide range of real and imagined contingencies.

The king's optimism for the future of Tangier and expectation concerning the opportunities which it could provide were certainly shared by many of his subjects, and they were reinforced by reports such as the one prepared by the English consul in Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, at the end of 1661. Purportedly based on his discussions with Portuguese who had resided there, Maynard provides an adulatory assessment of Tangier, and the prospects for the colony: it is as situated 'as convenient for trade as any place in the world, and may be made a magazine for all the Levant'; it could attract Spain's West Indies fleet; and it had strategic value in the event of war. Furthermore, Tangier 'stands in as fertill soyle as any in the world' and, though the Portuguese had not done so, through peace or war the adjoining land could be cultivated to enable the garrison to be provisioned at lower cost there than in England, 'being the most plentiful cuntry in the world for corne and cattell'. He also

²⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 17. In her assessment Routh appears to be echoing Corbett. See Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 325.

²⁸ Charles II's commission to the Earl of Peterborough, 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 25r.

²⁹ See 'Instructions', *ibid.*, f. 29v.

provided reassurances about security, remarking that the Moors were a 'very efeminate people', so that the Portuguese had been able to defend the town with a relatively small garrison, and claimed that with '1000 horse and 6000 foote' it would be possible 'to keep all the cuntry in subjection, that the Moors will not dare to come out'.³⁰ Maynard's assessment is so positive and at odds with the experience of the Portuguese that it gives cause to believe that he had been deliberately deceived by his informants.

However, at the same time there was also concern in England about the recent turn in the nation's foreign policy.³¹ In response to the naysayers, a lawyer by the name of John Brydall felt compelled to launch a spirited defence of the king's plans by publishing, in early 1662, a pamphlet in which he sought to demonstrate 'by cleere political reasons how much [Dunkirk, Tangier, Bombay, and Jamaica] may conduce to the honor, security, and advantage of this nation'.³² He was not alone in defending the Portuguese alliance. The principal architect of what would, arguably, become the defining project of the English occupation of Tangier, Hugh Cholmley, observed that those who supported the alliance 'were not wanting to cry up the acquest [of Tangier] with all imaginable circumstances of advantage; and those who were engaged in contrary designs, as sedulous, to lessen it by all the ways they could'.³³ The acquisition of Tangier was seen by many as the greatest benefit of the alliance, but even among those who did so, there were significant differences in how they thought this new possession could best be used to achieve national (and personal) interests.

³⁰ Consul Maynard to [Secretary Nicholas], 8/18 December, 1661, TNA, SP 89/5, f. 73.

³¹ Undoubtedly, this was stirred by the controversial public distribution by the Spanish ambassador the previous year of material intended to undermine the Portuguese alliance. See the earl of Clarendon's account of this episode in Clarendon, *The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon*, p. 515.

³² John Brydall, *Tangier in A Short Discourse of the Late Forren Acquests which England holds, viz., of Dunkirk in Flanders, Tangier in Barbary, Boombay in the East Indies, Jamayca in the West Indies...In Answer to some Pamphlets which have bin Obtruded to the World, both at Home and Abroad*, cited in *CSPD: Charles II, 1661–1662*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1861), p. 327 (my interpolation). Brydall is most notable for his jurisprudential works. See Michael de L. Landon, 'Brydall, John (b. c.1635, d. in or after 1705?)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 15 June 2017.

³³ Hugh Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier* (unpublished, 1787), p. 10 (my interpolation). Cholmley outlines the points put forward both for and against the acquisition of Tangier on pp. 10–14. The text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmarks 614.k.15.(2.) and G.2179.(2.) (imperfect), and bound with the *Cholmley Memoirs*. Cholmley's original manuscript, written in about 1672, can be found in BL, Lans. MS 192.

Tangier's position and harbour provided it with both strategic significance, and commercial potential, but the settlement also came with a wide variety of intrinsic issues which would marginalise its viability and test the commitment of both the king and Parliament to its maintenance. It was not long before signs of one of the problems which would regularly trouble the colony to emerge: the threat of assault by the native people. On 12 January a Portuguese foraging party of 140 mounted troops returning to Tangier with their plunder, which included captured women and children, had encountered a large contingent of Moroccans and had suffered heavy losses.³⁴ The Portuguese governor was sufficiently alarmed by this development that he sought assistance to protect the town from the earl of Sandwich, whose fleet was stationed in Tangier Bay awaiting the arrival of Peterborough.³⁵

Only a short time after, the English, with the consent of al-Khadr Ghailan, who controlled much of northern Morocco, were collecting wood near the town.³⁶ It was on this occasion that one of the sailors, Edward Barlow, had the opportunity to closely observe the Moroccans. The son of a poor husbandman, Barlow had left home at thirteen, taught himself to write, and maintained a carefully written and illustrated journal of his life at sea. He was not yet twenty when he arrived at Tangier.³⁷ His experience contrasts vividly with the recent encounter between the Portuguese and the local people, which he was aware of when writing. As well as having received

³⁴ Edward Montagu, *The Journal of Edward Montagu: First Earl of Sandwich, Admiral and General at Sea, 1659–1665*, ed. R. C. Anderson ([London], 1929), pp. 114–115. See also 'A Short Narration of the Affairs of Tanger' in *Accounts of Voyages and Travels by T. Fisher, 1661–63*, BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 87–88. Routh in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 9, claims that the sortie was in response to local Moroccans 'pressing round the town hoping to take possession of it before it changed hands', but she cites no source and it is contradicted by Sandwich's account.

³⁵ Edward Barlow, *Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen and other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703*, ed. Basil Lubbock, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1934), p. 70; Montagu, *The Journal of Edward Montagu*, pp. 115–116. Montagu had been keen to get men into the town to secure it, and had already made an offer to provide assistance. See the earl's journal entries for 4 and 6 January 1662 on p. 114.

³⁶ It was not the first time that the English had been permitted to go ashore to obtain supplies of water and wood — they had been doing so since early December the previous year. See Montagu, *The Journal of Edward Montagu*, pp. 110–111.

³⁷ Basil Lubbock, 'Introduction', in Basil Lubbock, ed., *Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen and other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703*, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1934), pp. 11–12.

permission to land and gather firewood, a concession not afforded the Portuguese, he recounts people coming to observe them and offering to sell livestock and produce. He provides a description of the Moroccan men which is notably unmarked by fear, animosity or prejudice; on the contrary, he was obviously impressed by them, reflecting on the quality of their horses, the intricacies of their clothing, and their martial skills and horsemanship.³⁸ It was a promising start to a new era of Anglo-Moroccan relations, but an episode of a kind that would not be repeated for some time, although not for lack of want by the English; for, as will be shown in the following section, they clearly arrived in Tangier seeking peaceful trade, not to subdue the people and pillage their land.

4.2. Entrepôt or Bridgehead to Empire?

On 30 January 1662 the English garrison, consisting of just over 2,700 foot-soldiers and almost 100 mounted troops — accompanied by the families of two to three hundred of the soldiers — marched into Tangier, and Peterborough formally took possession of the town.³⁹ Routh provides a vivid picture of the problems arising in the early days of the English occupation, providing a sense of the decrepitude of the town, and the hardships faced by the newly arrived Britons.⁴⁰ There was insufficient accommodation and some two-thirds of the troops had to be quartered in the homes of the existing inhabitants, adding to the resentment already felt by the Portuguese toward the English. Tensions between the two communities were further heightened by claims of theft and damage caused by the soldiers, and concerns among the Portuguese about how the soldiers fraternised with their wives and daughters.⁴¹ Despite efforts by Peterborough to address these concerns, and an invitation from

³⁸ Barlow, *Barlow's Journal*, pp. 66–67. Bejjit provides an extract of this episode from Barlow's account in *English Colonial Texts*, p. 14.

³⁹ Montagu, *The Journal of Edward Montagu*, p. 117. The estimate for the number of families is provided by Routh in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 12. On the composition of the garrison during the period of occupation see *ibid.*, chap. XVI. Routh notes that while the nominal initial establishment was 3,100 men, excluding officers, the first muster shows only a total of 2,723 foot, and 98 mounted troops. See *ibid.*, p. 310.

⁴⁰ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 14–16.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

him for them to stay, most of the Portuguese decided to leave, taking with them everything they could carry, including, according to Peterborough, 'all other materials of economic and household subsistence, to the very ffloers, the windowes and the dores'.⁴² Peterborough describes the general condition of the town as having been left 'very little better than a ruine of walls', and even the artillery left by the Portuguese was largely unserviceable.⁴³

Of the original inhabitants, all that remained behind were a small number of Portuguese settlers, some six Catholic priests, and a number of Jewish families, 'a kinde of retayling dealers', who 'in the infancie' of the settlement proved 'not unuseful', given the men of the garrison 'were altogether ignorant and helpless as to furnish themselves with any of those accomodacions necessary to human life'.⁴⁴ As Routh notes, with the departure of the bulk of the Portuguese population the English had lost both the services of necessary trades-people as well as valuable knowledge and experience concerning the conduct of general trade and relations with the Moroccans.⁴⁵ Cholmley attributes this outcome and the other early problems in the town to what he believed to be an excessively large garrison, which he blamed on the intriguing of the Portuguese ambassador, whom he suspected had hoped that a large detachment of English troops across the Strait would distract the Spanish.⁴⁶

Whether the garrison's establishment was too large is a moot point. Peterborough was not convinced that he could secure the town with the forces he possessed. Undoubtedly aware of the problems which had been experienced by the Portuguese,

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15. The quotation provided, partly reproduced by Routh, is from a report 'Peterborough to the Lords of the Council', Tangier, 17 February 1661[2], TNA, CO 279/1, f. 97v.

⁴³ Report of the Council of Officers, Tangier, 12 February 1661[2], TNA, CO 279/1, f. 112r, which accompanied Peterborough's report of the 17th, but is no longer filed consecutively with it as it was in Routh's time.

⁴⁴ A survey of Tangier and its prospects, n.d., TNA, CO 279/33, f. 142v. A further, rougher, copy of the survey can be found at *ibid.*, ff. 134–137. They appear in a volume with manuscripts from 1684–1735 but definitely predate this period. Stein in 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 996, n. 40, has suggested this document is probably the report that Peterborough was ordered to draw up for the earl of Teviot who succeeded him in 1663. See 'Instructions for the earl of Teviot', n.d., BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 90, article 3.

⁴⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 14–19.

even at this early stage the governor and his officers recognised that it was necessary to make a peace with the local people if development of the settlement was to succeed.⁴⁷ In fact, the prospects for a peace looked promising. Following an approach from a local tribal chief 'expressing a desire to have trade and commerce with us', the earl of Sandwich had already commenced communication with Ghailan even before Peterborough's arrival, with the admiral remarking on the civility of the treatment of his men by the Moroccans, and even entertaining Ghailan's 'majordomo' on board his ship for several nights.⁴⁸

Sandwich's disposition in his dealings with Moroccans stands in contrast to his approach with the Algerines. Faced with intransigence over negotiation of new treaties with Tétouan and Algiers a few months earlier, in the case of the former he departed and left the matter in the hands of the consul, asking that the governor be informed 'that I went away with intentions of friendship and good correspondence'; whereas in the case of Algiers he launched an attack on the harbour.⁴⁹ There are a number of possible reasons to explain these different responses, in particular the legacy of past Anglo-Algerine relations and the forthcoming occupation of Tangier, but these contrary outcomes further highlight the importance of differentiating between the attitudes and responses of Britons to Morocco and the other Barbary states.

Charles II may not have been prepared to entertain advice which questioned the value of Tangier, but he was not oblivious to the state of affairs in Morocco; in fact, the English were reasonably well informed about current developments while preparing for the expedition. Sandwich had used his time waiting for the arrival of the garrison to collect intelligence and had been providing regular reports concerning 'the state of Barbary, of the government, present wars, of the nature of the people,

⁴⁷ Report of the council of officers, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 111.

⁴⁸ See the earl's journal entries for 13 and 28 November 1661, 2 and 10–13 December 1661, 19 January 1662, and 8 February 1662 in Montagu, *The Journal of Edward Montagu*, pp. 107, 109–111, 115, 119.

⁴⁹ Journal entries for 29 July–5 August, and 25 August 1661 in *ibid.*, pp. 91–94, 96–97.

and condition of the soyle'.⁵⁰ Shortly before the occupation, he prepared a further detailed report which would have given the king cause to temper any expectations he might still have possessed about extending his territorial dominions there; in it can be seen considerations concerning diplomatic relations and trade which clearly prefigured subsequent English strategy in Morocco.⁵¹ Moreover, contrary to Routh's assertion that most Englishmen at the time would have known 'nothing at all of the Moors',⁵² as shown in preceding chapters of this thesis, it was not a case of *tabula rasa*; given the long history of trade, diplomatic relations, maritime conflict, and captive-taking between the two nations, it is unlikely that many of the key protagonists associated with the occupation had not acquired at least a modicum of generally reliable knowledge of the land and its people, albeit together with many popular misconceptions.

Aside from concerns expressed about the condition of the town and the scarcity of basic equipment and commodities, initial perceptions among the arrivals of their new home were not all negative. Among the first to record their thoughts was the governor himself, Henry Mordaunt, the second earl of Peterborough (bap. 1623, d. 1697). Of noble birth, he had been educated at Eton College and in France, and had been described by one of his tutors as a 'noble and hopefull ... cavalier'.⁵³ In 1643, after initially commanding a horse troop in the parliamentary army, Peterborough defected to the royalist cause. He remained committed to the Stuarts, and following Charles II's restoration, was rewarded with the governorship of Tangier for what Julian Corbett described as 'his heroic but hare-brained plotting against the Protectorate'.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ 'A coppie of a discourse of Barbary sent his royal highness by my Lord Sandwich', 1662, BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 26. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 135.

⁵¹ See BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 25-27.

⁵² Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 22. In his book *The Moorish Empire: A Historical Epitome* (London, 1899), on which Routh draws on for Moroccan history, Budgett Meakin gives scant attention to the diplomatic and commercial ties which existed between Morocco and England before the occupation of Tangier. This may help explain why Routh appears oblivious to this extensive heritage.

⁵³ Victor Stater, 'Mordaunt, Henry, Second Earl of Peterborough (bap. 1623, d. 1697)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 21 June 2017.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 307.

Routh draws attention to a hopeful and brief statement made in a letter penned by Peterborough in which he asserted his belief that if the necessary resources were provided Tangier could become 'soe considerable as to pay back all'.⁵⁵ However, a more revealing insight into the governor's thoughts is provided in a report a few months later, in which he observes how protective the Moroccans were of their land and attributes this to its evident qualities: 'Jealous they are beyond all measure of there land, the goodnesse whereof I confesse I think capable to invite all the world'.⁵⁶ Peterborough had obviously acquired an appreciation of the strength of Moroccan sentiment against European encroachment, but he does not appear to have recognised their right to feel aggrieved, let alone grasped the religio-nationalistic dimensions of the issue.⁵⁷

While the governor anticipated a bright future for Tangier, it was an outcome that was unlikely to have been envisaged by many others in the town. In October he reported on the deleterious effects of poor accommodation and the change of climate on the garrison, noting that there had been many deaths and desertions.⁵⁸ Peterborough was beset with problems which required his urgent attention, but perhaps the most pressing one was relations with Ghailan.⁵⁹ The need to settle a peace with the Moroccan leader had earlier been recognised, and while the state of the town and its fortifications added urgency to the matter, it is clear that there was a growing realisation that the success of Tangier, if not its very survival, depended on establishing a mutually beneficial relationship with the local people; skirmishes with Ghailan's forces had already commenced, and as many as thirty members of the

⁵⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 16. No source cited.

⁵⁶ Peterborough to [?], 2 April 1662, TNA, CO 279/1, ff. 128r–v. Much of the detail in this manuscript is also provided in Peterborough to Sandwich, 1 April 1662, Bodl., Carte MS 75, ff. 36–37. See also Peterborough to Lord [?], Tangier, n.d., BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 107–109; John Luke to Lord [?], Tangier, 29 March 1662, BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 16–17.

⁵⁷ On the significance of religion in resistance to European colonisation in Morocco see chap. 1 of this thesis. B. A. Mojuetan provides a very good overview of the role of religion in Moroccan politics in the seventeenth century, particularly during the Interregnum in Mojuetan, 'Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth Century During the Interregnum', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), pp. 347–357.

⁵⁸ Peterborough to Sandwich, Tangier, 27 October 1662, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 80.

⁵⁹ Bejjit in 'Introduction', p. 13, notes a number of common contemporary renderings of Ghailan's name by Britons: Gayland, Guylan, Guyland, and Guilan. A further variation is Guiland, with another derivation being Cid Kader from Sidi al-Khadr.

garrison had already been killed.⁶⁰ The governor's report at the beginning of April, in which he outlines the progress of negotiations, provides an early indication of the problems the English would face in their dealings with Ghailan over the following years.

Peterborough had written to Ghailan on several occasions, but had only received 'dilatatory answers' until 24 March, at which time two messengers arrived with a message that their master was ready to meet. The governor affirmed his desire to conclude a peace such that it provided 'security unto both parties'.⁶¹ Ghailan then dispatched 'three very considerable persons' to conduct the negotiations, claiming that once concluded all that would be left for him and Peterborough to do was to 'shake hands and imbrace and have no further occasion for dispute'.⁶²

Unfortunately, it would not be that straightforward. The negotiations broke down over the issue of access to wood, with Ghailan's envoys refusing to allow the garrison to collect it within nine miles of the town. As Peterborough noted, not only was this inconvenient, but it would expose them to the risk of attack. Knowing it to be foolhardy to risk hostilities given the condition of the town, the governor and his officers proposed a six-month peace as a compromise so as to begin trade 'and to show the Mores by practice ... we were men of such manners and dealing, as might cause a love and confidence'.⁶³ This was agreed, and they then proceeded to mark out the area to which the English were entitled so that disputes might be avoided. However, Ghailan then claimed that his people would not accept the concessions he had made, and put forward his own demands,⁶⁴ which included fifty barrels of gunpowder; that should he require the use of English ships they would be made available; the prohibition of trade with Tétouan and the recall of the English consul residing there; use of English ships on their way to Salé to deliver supplies to his forces there; and, the English were to refuse entry to Tangier to any Moroccan

⁶⁰ BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 16.

⁶¹ Peterborough to [?], Tangier, 2 April 1662, TNA, CO 279/1, ff. 127r–v.

⁶² *Ibid.*, f. 127v.

⁶³ *Ibid.*,

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 128r.

seeking refuge. Peterborough acceded to each of the terms except the second and third. With respect to use of vessels, he undertook to intercede with any admiral with vessels in Tangier, or the king himself, when Ghailan had such need. On the issue of Tétouan, he explained that it was not possible until such time as trade in Tangier was sufficient to replace the use of that port.

Ghailan subsequently decamped with his army, providing no response to the governor before he left.⁶⁵ Peterborough notes that the army not only consisted of 'about 5000 horse', but that they were 'able, dexterous, sober, valiant and comparably well armed, and clothed, and horsed to very much use, if they were not the fairest that I ever saw'.⁶⁶ He was clearly impressed by what he had seen, but also alarmed and suspicious of Ghailan's motivations for he goes on to reflect: 'But for themselves it must be a greate feare, or an exceeding interest, that brings them to bee kinde to any stranger, especially to a Christian'.⁶⁷ As Routh suggests, it is possible that Ghailan simply used the pretext of negotiation to assess his new foe.⁶⁸ But Peterborough not only suspected Ghailan had plans other than peace; because of intelligence which had been provided to him, he also had cause to believe that Ghailan was conspiring with the Spanish.⁶⁹

It was perhaps natural for the English to suspect the Spanish were working with Ghailan, knowing their resentment towards the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and their concern about the English occupation of Tangier. However, it demonstrates that they lacked understanding of the Moroccan political landscape, and Ghailan's motivations and aspirations. In this context it made little sense for Ghailan to simply help another group of Christians occupy the town. As Jerome Weiner has argued, Ghailan had his own agenda, with the aim of consolidating his rule across north-western Morocco. To achieve this, he did what other Moroccan pretenders had done for over a century

⁶⁵ 'Guylan's demands and my answers thereunto', [April 1662], *ibid.*, f. 129r–v, which accompanied Peterborough's letter at ff. 127–128.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 128r.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁶⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 25.

⁶⁹ 'Guylan's demands and my answers thereunto', [April 1662], TNA, CO 279/1, f. 130r.

and a half, and allied himself to the various European powers. By doing so, he sought both to avoid hostilities with them, and, more importantly, obtain military supplies and other support to prosecute his campaigns against his domestic competitors. But it was a risky strategy, given that the achievement of political legitimacy was dependent on the ability of a leader to free the land of Christian occupation. Any concessions granted to the Europeans had to be seen to be sufficiently advantageous to Moroccan interests. Moreover, Ghailan was not at this stage desperate, in fact he had every reason for confidence; in June of the previous year he had won a decisive victory against the Dilā'īs, leaving just Salé and Tétouan to be conquered.⁷⁰ Ghailan's rise to power following the death of his mentor, Muhammad al-'Ayāshī, had been slow but by the mid-1650s, he had been able to attract sufficient supporters to begin to seriously challenge Dilā'ī hegemony in the region and launch an attack against Portuguese-occupied Tangier.⁷¹ The figure of Ghailan looms large over the early history of English Tangier. He would at first represent an existential threat to the colonists, but over time their relationship would change and their fates would become intertwined.

Peterborough provides few insights into his thoughts about Ghailan in his reports and correspondence, but a description of him appears in a pamphlet published a few years later:

His person looks handsomer than his condition; his look is fat and plain, but his nature close and reserved. He is plump, yet melancholy; valiant yet sly; boisterous, yet of few words; watchful, and lustful; careful and intemperate; a contradiction in nature. Although he hath a sadness and a heaviness by nature, that becometh a priest, yet he hath gained a complaizance by art that becomes a prince. He hath two qualities that may do anything: 1. perfidiousness, and 2. cruelty.⁷²

⁷⁰ See Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 65–66.

⁷¹ Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 226; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 64–65; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 13.

⁷² *A Description of Tangier, the Country and People Adjoyning. With an Account of the Person and Government of Gayland, the Present Usurper of the Kingdome of Fez, and a Short Narrative of the Proceedings of the English in those Parts* (London, 1664), pp. 12–13. The provenance of the content of the pamphlet is unclear, but the editor claims that the document was written by a 'Spanyard', presumably excluding the separate narrative of developments since the arrival of the English, given that it is written in the first person, and evidently by someone who was present there at the time. Bejjit provides an abridged transcript of the pamphlet, and discusses its peculiarities in *English Colonial*

The picture painted of Ghailan is certainly not flattering but it is also not totally prejudicial, and possibly not totally fictitious. Ghailan did, indeed, possess a contradictory nature. Ghailan could be belligerent and cunning, but as Britons would also find he could be surprisingly affable and open, and despite, and perhaps because of, the death and misery for which he was responsible, he managed to earn some measure of respect from the garrison. But, not only were Britons uncertain about his character and motivations, they were also unclear about his status, often according him the title of prince or emperor rather than recognising him for what he was, simply an ambitious tribal leader.⁷³

Ghailan's men continued to harass the settlement and small melees ensued. But on 3 May Lieutenant-Colonel Fines led five hundred men into the field in pursuit of the Moroccans. Over confident, they pursued the enemy far beyond their own lines and were ambushed in the hills surrounding Tangier, losing almost 400 men.⁷⁴ The incident not only had a marked impact on the morale of the young colony,⁷⁵ it became a portentous day for both the garrison and Ghailan, leading to one of the most traumatic events experienced by the settlement in its short and troubled history.⁷⁶ Further skirmishes followed, and within less than nine months the garrison had lost 605 men, more than a fifth of its initial establishment.⁷⁷ Reliable estimates of Moroccan losses are not provided in English accounts for this period, but clearly such a rate of attrition could not be sustained by the garrison.⁷⁸

Texts, pp. 62–77. Similarities between at least one section of the *Short Narrative* at pp. 27–29, and correspondence found at TNA, CO 279/2, f. 36, indicates that the pamphlet, if not written by the same person, drew on personal accounts provided in official correspondence. Links to other reports have not been investigated, but, as noted by Matar, its publication was officially sanctioned, and it was clearly intended to promote the settlement and counter the concerns of its critics. See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 137. On Ghailan, see also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 23–24; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 13.

⁷³ The uncertainty about his status may have been encouraged by Ghailan himself. He is alleged to have even claimed descent from Mohammed. See *A Description of Tangier*, p. 12.

⁷⁴ Draft of a long narrative of affairs at Tangier, extending from December 1661 to May 1664, Bodl., Rawl. MS D.916, ff. 76v–77v; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 39.

⁷⁵ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 39–40; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 89–90.

⁷⁶ 'Colonel Roger Alsopp to Sir Richard Fanshaw', 13 June 1664, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 156.

⁷⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 27.

⁷⁸ Such estimates are notoriously unreliable, but accounts from 1664 and 1666 put the number of men under Ghailan at between 10,700, excluding irregular levies, and 17,500, although he could not sustain a campaign beyond three months due to logistical constraints. See Lancelot Addison, *West Barbary*,

Peterborough was aware that a forced peace with Ghailan was not the only option available to him. In late April, the governor wrote to Sidi Abdallah, son of the Dilā' leader Muhammad al-Hajj Abū Bakr, who was frequently referred to by Britons as the Saint because of his religious devotion.⁷⁹ Peterborough's reasons for doing so are unclear; it could have been a bluff to encourage Ghailan to settle a favourable peace, or been a genuine attempt to investigate the possibility of an alliance with the Dilā', who were just as troubled by Ghailan.⁸⁰ In any event, an approach to them is not surprising given that Muhammad al-Hajj had entered into a treaty of peace and commerce with the English as recently as 1657.⁸¹ Abdallah responded enthusiastically to Peterborough's letter: he professed his desire for peace and friendship, criticised Ghailan, undermined his achievements, asserted that the Dilā'īs were close to victory, and requested that the English hold 'no commerce with our enemys either of Arzilla or Salley' claiming that both were 'lost and undone'.⁸² The Dilā' had been besieged in the fortress at Salé for some time, and it has been claimed that in his desperation, Abdallah had even offered to handover the fortress to the English in return for assistance against his enemies.⁸³ Certainly the English developed an expectation of such an outcome, with Admiral Lawson maintaining a vigil before Salé a few months later 'with hopes of having the castle delivered to him'.⁸⁴ It is uncertain what specific interest they had in possessing the fortress at this time: while it appears to have been an opportunistic endeavour, the site's position held many benefits, not least of which was the ability to control both trade and the activities of corsairs in the port.⁸⁵ More generally, the English began to openly favour the Dilā'

or, *A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, Sacred, Civil, and Domestick* (Oxford, 1671), pp. 40–42; *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 17–18. There is an error in the figure quoted by Routh concerning the number of mounted troops cited in *A Description of Tangier*: the figure is 2,700, not 27,000.

⁷⁹ Muhammad al-Hajj was also referred to by Britons as Ben Bucar, with variant spellings of Ben Boukir, Ben Buker, Ben Bowcar, and Benbooker.

⁸⁰ Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 136.

⁸¹ See chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁸² Cidi Abdalah to Peterborough, 2/12 May 1662, BL, Harl. MS 6844, ff. 91–94. Quotation are from f. 94r.

⁸³ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, p. 226. A source supporting this claim is not identified by Abun-Nasr.

⁸⁴ [?] to [?], Whitehall, 26 August 1662, Bodl., Carte MS 222, f. 5r.

⁸⁵ Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 46.

over Ghailan, with instructions given to the navy to 'countenance the affairs of Benbucar' at Salé, a move ostensibly calculated to frustrate both Ghailan and the Spanish.⁸⁶

The prospect of an Anglo-Dilā' alliance does indeed appear to have given Ghailan cause to rethink his position. In a letter the following month to Peterborough, who had returned to England for consultations, Captain James Wilson advised the governor of developments concerning Ghailan, noting that he hoped to take both Fez and the fortress at Salé, but would not take the latter until 'he had secured himself a peace with us'.⁸⁷ Whether this was due to Ghailan expecting naval assistance from the English, or an undertaking from them not to support the Dilā', Wilson does not say,⁸⁸ but the circumstances had obviously changed sufficiently to make a peace with the English much more desirable.

A cessation of hostilities was accompanied by a noticeable improvement in conditions in the town. The inhabitants once again had access to supplies from the local area, and Spanish vessels commenced trading with the town despite a prohibition against doing so, issued by the governor of Andalusia, the Duke of Medinaceli, a decision which they believed had been encouraged by Ghailan.⁸⁹ The only thing they required, according to Captain Wilson, was more men for the depleted garrison.⁹⁰ In a report to the king following his return to England in late September, Peterborough was more circumspect about the situation. While he noted that the condition of the garrison had improved and assured Charles that Tangier 'will be a great place if you majesties designs proceed', he predicated this assessment on the 'constant attendance of ships' in the harbour, which, he observed, was threatened by the Spanish embargo and their efforts to prevent Ghailan from

⁸⁶ 'Lieutenant Colonel Fitzgerald to Sir Thomas Fanshaw', 19/29 August 1662, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 32.

⁸⁷ James Wilson to Peterborough, Tangier, 13 June 1662, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 137r; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 27. Routh states that Wilson acted as an interpreter in dealings with the Moroccans.

⁸⁸ Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 27.

⁸⁹ TNA, CO 279/1, f. 137; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 27.

⁹⁰ Cited by Routh in Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 27. No source is given.

finalising a peace.⁹¹ But unbeknown to Peterborough, the quick and ostensibly successful occupation of Tangier by the English had also given cause for anxiety to another European power; despite his initial support of the Portuguese alliance, Louis XIV now feared that the English would use Tangier to control navigation through the Strait of Gibraltar.⁹² French concerns about the increasing influence of the English in the Mediterranean added a further level of complexity to the issues which they would face in attempting to secure their presence in Tangier.

The king's designs alluded to by Peterborough were soon made clear. On 16 November 1662, a proclamation was issued by Charles which confirmed his intentions. In it he states that by gaining Tangier his principal aim was 'the advancement and security of' the general trade and commerce of his subjects. To this end the settlement 'shall be a port free to all merchants, as well as foreigners as others', only excluding ships sailing from other English colonies or beyond the Cape of Good Hope.⁹³ What is more revealing and pertinent to this study is the debate which had preceded the proclamation, which was grounded in the same issue that had divided the English merchant community in the 1580s and the 1630s; this was the question of what was the best model for the conduct of trade with Morocco: free trade or corporate monopoly.

Around the time Sandwich departed England to secure Tangier, a patent had been granted authorising the incorporation of a Morocco Company with exclusive rights to trade from the north-western tip of Morocco down the coast as far as Salé. However, the company never became operational, quite possibly as a result of concerted opposition from officials and merchants who were concerned it would directly compete with Tangier for trade with Morocco, and thereby not only compromise the town's potential to become a *entrepôt*, but also undermine the king's prestige and

⁹¹ Peterborough to Charles II, Tangier, 27 September 1662, BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 105.

⁹² Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 323-325; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 27-28. See also Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 997-998.

⁹³ *By the King. A Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Pleasure to Settle and Establish a Free Port at His City of Tanger in Africa* (London, 1662). A transcript of the text is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 57-60. The restrictions specified were in accordance with the requirements of the Navigation Act, and the trading rights of the East India Company.

authority.⁹⁴ But this was not the only concern. Whereas in the 1580s, corporatisation of trade with Morocco had been seen as a means of improving England's political and commercial leverage in overseas markets, and in the 1630s was promoted as a way to also control the activities of the king's subjects, the debate in 1661 points to an emerging recognition of the importance of developing approaches to trade which were sensitive to prevailing local political conditions in order to promote peaceful commerce.⁹⁵ In the view of those who argued against the Morocco company, if Tangier was to be secured as a centre of trade, it was necessary to not only actively engage Moroccans in commercial relations, but also to avoid actions that would provoke concern and incite hostility.⁹⁶ It was understood that any attempt to establish further fortified trading centres would require Moroccan support, as the country was populous, and the people were well armed and belligerent, or else they would believe 'the designe of the English to bee the same with that formerly of the Spaniards and Portugals'.⁹⁷ Similarly, another group of merchants warned:

[T]o erect and build new forts and castles ... is the only way to create and stir up jealousies and provoke the people of that country to believe, that the English nation intends to enslave them and make a conquest of their country, and by these means cause the people to become implacable enemies of the whole nation'.⁹⁸

More optimistically, Thomas Povey, a member of the council of trade and the secretary of the committee for foreign plantations, was confident that the Moroccans would 'surely bidd us welcome more or less according to the good they are to expect to their city and them by our arrival there'.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 990–991, 993. The charter's instigator, Robert Starr, was a well-known London merchant and former navy agent in Salé. See Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford, 1957), p. 309.

⁹⁵ See Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 993–994.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ 'The humble reasons of all the marchants that have beene the antient traders to Barbary without the straights', BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 63v–64r. A copy of the memorial can also be found in BL, Harl. MS 1595, ff. 18v–19r. The position of this memorial and the others cited below concerning establishment of the Morocco company relative to other documents in the two manuscript volumes, and a date of 'September 1661' on BL, Sloane MS 1956, f. 46, indicates that they were all prepared around that time. Stein, on p. 992, n. 22, notes that Povey's memorial in Sloane MS 1956 appears between documents dated 21 and 30 September 1661.

⁹⁸ 'The merchant's reasons against the Morocco Company', BL, Harl. MS 1595, f. 17r. A copy of the memorial can also be found in BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 61v–63r.

⁹⁹ 'Reasons against the same [establishing a Morocco Company]. By Mr Povey', BL, Harl. MS 1595, f. 16r. A copy of the memorial can also be found in BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 50v–51r. Povey had been

The English had underestimated the difficulties they would face when they took possession of Tangier, particularly the resistance of the Moroccans. But it is evident that they came to Tangier with the intention from the very beginning of nurturing peaceful trade. While Elizabeth Games has contended that English plans for Tangier drew on 'coercive habits of colonization and commerce' learned from their activities in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as Tristan Stein has shown, the issue which preoccupied the English authorities was not territorial acquisition in North Africa, but how trade in the region should be organised and whether it should be managed by the crown or a corporate body.¹⁰⁰ In this respect, rather than the king's proclamation being an acknowledgement of the failure of plans for a territorial empire in North Africa, as claimed by Nabil Matar, it was in fact a formalisation and elaboration of his original designs encompassed within his instructions to Peterborough;¹⁰¹ it clarified Tangier's proposed place within England's expanding maritime trading empire. This view is further tellingly evidenced by the Privy Council's decision to decline Peterborough's request for more mounted troops, citing that 'their intentions were not to make a warr with the Moores but a peace, which they no waie questioned but the great appearances of advantage by trade would sooner doe than any hostility'.¹⁰²

The response of the earl of Sandwich to a proposal presented by a merchant, James Wilson, in October of 1661 is also revealing of the thinking at the time. Wilson outlined a plan which encompassed a colonial vision that extended as far as Tripoli in the east and Safi, or even the Gambia, in the south. Wilson proposed a program of conquest and subjugation that extended along the coast in both directions, and as far inland as Fez, together with a recruitment program for colonisation. In Wilson's view, North Africa could provide profits which exceeded those to be derived from

closely involved in fitting out Cromwell's 'western design' fleet, was an investor in colonial trading schemes, and considered an expert on colonial matters. See Barbara C. Murison, 'Povey, Thomas (b. 1613/14, d. in or before 1705)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 6 July 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 293–294, 298; Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 987,

¹⁰¹ See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 136.

¹⁰² 'Mr Lukes reasons against erecting of a Marocco Company', BL, Harl. MS 1595, f. 13r. A copy of the memorial can also be found in BL, Sloane MS 1956, f. 45.

either the East or West Indies. He emphasised the potential of the land for agriculture, and claimed knowledge of a silver mine which he believed could even rival Potosi, and like that site, could be worked by slaves.¹⁰³ In a report to the king, the earl of Sandwich dismissed the proposal as unrealistic:

[T]he designes proposed, meethinkes are ill considered, for, to propose the possessing Africa from Gamboa to Tripoly is a vast thing, and one that sees what charge & trouble a towne is possest that is given and delivered up, will conceive a great deale more difficulty to posses townes we must fight for, and not vary certain to prevaile neither.¹⁰⁴

As observed by Stein, it was not that the English eschewed the use of force, particularly in pursuit of the nation's maritime interests; rather, the issue was the way in which it should be wielded, and who possessed authority to sanction its use.¹⁰⁵ A desire for peaceful trade with Moroccans and a limitation of their territorial claims to what was sufficient to sustain and secure the colony was stressed by successive governors of Tangier. Nevertheless, just as the English were using naval blockades to suppress the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Salé, there was a commonly held conviction that blockading Moroccan ports was an option to encourage peace or trade with Tangier.¹⁰⁶ In Peterborough's view, 'obstructing the trade of Salley and Tittuan will bring a want upon the people of the commodities they neede', which 'may shew them the errors of their govenours and procure a change'.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ 'Mr James Wilson: Account of Tangier and Barbary', 5 October 1661, BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 11–14. On Wilson's proposal see also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 21; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 134–135; Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 13–14, 295–296. The source cited by Routh, Harl. 1595, f. 23b, is anonymous, but clearly concerns the same proposal. Games cites her source as Add. 4191, but this appears to be an error. Based on a comparison of the handwriting, the James Wilson in question is almost certainly the same person as Captain James Wilson whom also appears in other sources from this period.

¹⁰⁴ BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 26r.

¹⁰⁵ Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 995.

¹⁰⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 995–996. In the sources cited by Stein relating to Peterborough (TNA, CO 279/33, f. 136r) and Belasyse (Sloane MS 3509, f. 104r), both governors are in fact proposing the use of a blockade to encourage Ghailan to negotiate a treaty, rather than forcing the inhabitants of the towns to trade with Tangier as the principal aim. On use of blockade as a method of coercion, see also Middleton to Hon. Mr. Wren, Tangier, 10/20 July 1672, TNA, CO 279/15, f. 207r–v, and Middleton to Arlington, Tangier, 12 October 1673, BL, Sloane MS 3511, f. 218v.

¹⁰⁷ Peterborough to Charles II, Tangier, 27 September 1662, BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 105.

4.3. Promising Developments

Recognition of the importance of good relations with the local people in order to secure Tangier and enhance trade and commerce, or at least acceptance of this mandated policy, inevitably played a role in shaping the behaviour of Britons in Morocco, and determining how the English managed their affairs during the period of Tangier's occupation. But while the governors were accorded a wide range of powers and a significant amount of discretion under their commissions, activities in Tangier were closely overseen by the king and his advisors in London. A particularly influential figure on matters pertaining to Tangier until 1674 was the recently appointed Secretary of State, Henry Bennet, later ennobled as Lord Arlington.¹⁰⁸ In the same month as the proclamation, the king adopted a further measure to secure his interests in the new colony by establishing a 'Committee for the Affairs of Tangier'. Accountable to the Privy Council, from which its principal members were drawn, it was responsible for regulating the administration of Tangier, financial management of the colony, and establishing supply contracts for the garrison. Among the committee's notable members were the Duke of York; the Earl of Sandwich; George Monck, Duke of Albemarle; George Carteret; and Thomas Povey.¹⁰⁹ The committee also included Samuel Pepys, who, through his membership, not only influenced decisions made concerning the colony, but also left a useful record of the committee's deliberations, perceptive assessments of many of the key developments and protagonists, and a detailed account of his own later experiences in Morocco.

In May 1663 Andrew Rutherford, the newly created Earl of Teviot (b.?, d.1664), arrived in Tangier to replace Peterborough as governor. Peterborough was recalled for reasons which were never made public,¹¹⁰ but his replacement was seemingly well

¹⁰⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 32; Alan Marshall, 'Bennet, Henry, First Earl of Arlington (bap. 1618, d. 1685)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 11 July 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 31–32.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36. Corbett asserts that given the problems experienced with Ghailan it was decided that a more experienced officer was required. However, he presents no evidence to support this belief. Cholmley's account of the episode is somewhat ambiguous, but implies that Peterborough's decision to resign his commission was voluntary. See Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 328; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 40. On Teviot's instructions for the handover, see 'Instructions for

qualified to lead the troubled colony. Scottish by birth, Teviot was the youngest son of an Edinburgh merchant. He attended the University of Edinburgh, and then entered French military service in which he served with distinction, rising to the colonelcy of the *gardes écossaises* regiment. He returned to Scotland in 1660, and in January 1661 was created Lord Rutherford, before being appointed governor of Dunkirk until its sale in 1662.¹¹¹ Pepys provides his own perceptions of the man, which paint a picture of a complex and contradictory character. In a rather apt testimonial following Teviot's death in 1664, Pepys recounts William Coventry stating that he was 'the boldest adventurer of his person in the world', noting that while he came from humble origins he had quickly achieved greatness, but had done so 'only by the death of all his officers, he many times having the luck of being the only survivor of them all, by venturing upon services for the King of France that nobody else would'.¹¹²

Pepys did not at first support Teviot's appointment for confessional reasons, noting that like almost all the other officers of the garrison Teviot was a Catholic; his only saving grace was being Scottish, thereby preventing the Irish from having complete control of the place. Finding him 'careful and thoughtful', Pepys also believed Teviot to be 'cunning' and avaricious, using his appointments at Dunkirk and Tangier to

the earl of Teviot', n.d., BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 90, article 2. Later perceptions of Peterborough's poor performance as governor have perhaps been informed by an account provided by Lancelot Addison, the garrison chaplain who accompanied Teviot to Tangier. But he was not an impartial commentator; there is reason to question Addison's assessment given his evident admiration for Teviot, and desire to enhance the governor's legacy following his untimely death. See Lancelot Addison, *The Moores Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger, Especially when it was Under the Earl of Teviot* (London, 1681), pp. 3–6. Addison's account of the conditions in the town when Peterborough departed certainly contrasts markedly with those provided in Captain C. Harbord to Sir C. Harbord, Tangier, 6 March, 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 16, [Nathaniel Luke?] to [Henry Bennet?], Tangier, 11 April 1663, *ibid.*, f. 36, and *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 28–29. *The Moores Baffled* was also published under the title of *A Discourse of Tangier Under the Government of the Earl of Teviot* in 1685, and once again using the original title in 1738. Bejjit discusses the tract and reproduces the document in *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 85–101. He believes that the original title of the pamphlet is pejorative, one perhaps chosen by the publisher and not Addison given that the content is not particularly prejudicial towards Moroccans. However, it is more likely the term 'baffled' is being used to convey that the Moroccans had been foiled in their efforts to take Tangier, rather than implying that they were bewildered.

¹¹¹ David Parrott, 'Rutherford, Andrew, earl of Teviot (d. 1664)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017.

¹¹² Samuel Pepys, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, eds. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 5 (London, 1970–1983), p. 170, entry for 4 June 1664.

enrich himself.¹¹³ But his estimation of the governor evidently improved over time, remarking after hearing news of his death, that he had been a 'great man'.¹¹⁴ Teviot's time as governor would be a defining period in the history of English Tangier, and provides among the most detailed insights into the attitudes of Britons toward Moroccans in the early modern period, and how they were influenced by events and their experiences.

Routh has characterised Teviot's tenure as having been 'the most hopeful period of the English Occupation',¹¹⁵ and his arrival and actions over the following weeks did elicit expressions of admiration, and optimism for the future of English Tangier. The instructions issued to Teviot confirm Charles' desire to establish Tangier as a polyglot entrepôt: the governor was to promote the town as a free port in accordance with the king's earlier proclamation, ensure equal justice was accorded to all people, and provide freedom of religious observation (articles 3–6). The instructions go on to state that orders could not be provided concerning the issues of restraint of trade with Tétouan and Salé, or peace or war with Ghailan without further information on these matters, but Teviot was given 'latitude' in the exercise of his powers to deal with them in the meantime (article 7). Finally, he was to reduce the establishment of the garrison to two thousand men, excluding officers, and reform it into two regiments, one English, the other Irish (article 10).¹¹⁶ Scots were incorporated into both, although the regiments were later remodelled to diminish national distinctions within the garrison.¹¹⁷

Teviot immediately set about making an assessment of the condition of the town and its needs, reorganising the garrison, and commenced work extending its fortifications.¹¹⁸ The attention which Teviot gave to the fortification of the town at

¹¹³ Parrott, 'Rutherford, Andrew'; Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 4, p. 408, entry for 8 December 1663.

¹¹⁴ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 5, p. 166, entry for 2 June 1664.

¹¹⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 37.

¹¹⁶ BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 90. Routh cites instructions for Teviot dated 27 April 1663, 'sent by Mr Luke' being found in CO 279/2, f. 66: this folio has not been sighted, but it is likely that the instructions in the former folio are a copy of these cited by Routh. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 310, n. 3.

¹¹⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 310.

¹¹⁸ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 4–6.

this time is remarked upon in a number of accounts, and the priority he accorded to this work was perhaps due to intelligence received a few months earlier of preparations being made by Ghailan to mount a siege.¹¹⁹ Within a fortnight the first of five redoubts had been completed, entrenchments and lines of communication prepared, and land cleared, providing the town with a more secure external perimeter, and, as a result of the pasture land that it encompassed, the promise of increasing self-sufficiency.¹²⁰

Teviot's arrival also marked the start of the much mooted mole. While the concerted efforts embarked upon to fortify the settlement attest to the resolve of the English to establish themselves securely in a potentially hostile environment, the most tangible demonstration of their aspirations for Tangier is represented by the ambition evident in plans for a mole. As the project's resident engineer, Hugh Cholmley, noted, 'mole' in Latin can mean 'a great heap', and from that derived its contemporary usage denoting an artificial structure 'making land into the sea, to gain within the shelter of it, a secure station for ships'.¹²¹

It is not intended to dwell on issues concerning the construction of the mole except to comment on its significance. It was a massive, and demanding project. Having achieved a length of 1,436 feet, a 'mean breadth' of 110 feet, and a height above low water of 18 feet, even after fifteen years of work and some three to four hundred thousand pounds had been expended it had still not been completed by the time the English abandoned Tangier.¹²² Consequently, it is unsurprising that there has been much significance accorded to this project in the historiography of the English occupation. As a result of its sheer scale and the vicissitudes experienced in its construction, the mole has been conceived of by some scholars as the reification of

¹¹⁹ TNA, CO 279/2, f. 16.

¹²⁰ *A Description of Tangier*, p. 29; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 6–7; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 63–64; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 36–37.

¹²¹ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 44.

¹²² Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 357–358, 361–363. Routh provides a useful overview of the construction of the mole in chap. XVII.

Restoration imperial aspiration.¹²³ Certainly, as Bejjit observes, Cholmley himself envisioned an imperial destiny for England, a 'great empire' which would be 'the envy of the world', and conceived of the mole as a tangible expression of that aspiration,¹²⁴ but the extent to which the king and others attributed such symbolic value to the mole is unclear. It was undoubtedly appreciated as a major piece of engineering,¹²⁵ but ever since the project's inception during the king's conversation with Admiral Lawson, its fundamental rationale was practical rather than symbolic; it was conceived as an essential piece of infrastructure to support the success of the colony, creating a harbour which afforded protection from tide, wind and enemy attack, a purpose which it ultimately failed to fully achieve.

Chomley's contribution to this study is not his work on the mole, but rather his observations and thoughts during the period he was engaged on the project, and his reflections following his return to England in 1672. Among the principal characters on whose accounts this study draws, Cholmley, like his colleague and successor, Henry Sheres, and the garrison chaplain Lancelot Addison, is somewhat exceptional, for like them he was not a military man, a government official, or a merchant; they were men of different backgrounds, vocations, experiences, and sensibilities, who provide different perspectives as to how Britons perceived Morocco and developments in Tangier, and the way they responded to them.

¹²³ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 31–32; Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 20, 27. On issues concerning the general significance of the mole, see also Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, *passim*.

¹²⁴ Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 27; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 40–43, 95. Quotation is from p. 95.

¹²⁵ See, for example, the adulatory assessment of the almost completed mole by 'G[eorge] P[hilips]' in *The Present State of Tangier: In a Letter to His Grace, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and One of the Lords Justices There. To which is Added the Present State of Algiers* (London, 1676), pp. 31–32. The text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.a.33. A transcribed copy of the text is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 111–127. The bibliographic details for one of the versions of the document in EBO states that the initials G. P. are 'sometimes attributed to George Philips'. However, given the subject and nature of the text, and the date of the letter on which it is based, the author is almost certain to have been George Philips, secretary to Lord Inchiquin, the governor of the colony. Evidently unaware of the identity of its likely author and oblivious to its obvious biases, Routh identifies the letter as the most detailed contemporary account of Tangier. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 292–293.

Cholmley, Teviot, and Sir John Lawson had entered into a contract for the construction of the mole in March 1663, and Cholmley arrived in Tangier in June to commence work.¹²⁶ Born in 1632, he was the youngest son of Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby, first baronet. Hugh junior attended St Paul's school in London until he joined his family in exile in France in 1645. In 1649 he returned to England, became involved in the family's new alum business, and was privately tutored by his cousin, a Fellow of Trinity College.¹²⁷ Cholmley's only previous experience with the construction of a mole, or any major engineering project for that matter, appears to have been his work on rebuilding the old Whitby west pier.¹²⁸ Concerned with the ease with which the terms of the contract for the project were agreed to by the Tangier commissioners, Pepys appears to have been initially suspicious of Cholmley, but over time he came to appreciate both his moral character and industriousness.¹²⁹ Like his father, he demonstrated a propensity for speaking his mind, however unwisely: on one occasion he proffered the view that he expected that Britain would once again become a commonwealth because of the moral and financial excesses of the Stuart regime.¹³⁰

In keeping with his opinionated nature, Cholmley was highly critical of the conditions in the town during the early days of English occupation, but he evidently developed an admiration for the land in which it was situated. Writing a decade later, he states that the region possessed a 'common excellency', and commented favourably on its climate, air, water, and the fecundity of its fields and coastal waters. He also

¹²⁶ Hugh Cholmley, *A Short Account of the Progress of the Mole at Tangier, From the First Beginning of that Work* ([London], [1680]), pp. 2–3; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 343–344. Cholmley's text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(1.). A transcribed copy of the text is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 153–160.

¹²⁷ Hugh Cholmley, 'Preface', in *The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, Knt. and Bart. Addressed to His Two Sons* (Unpublished, 1787), pp. ii–vii, xxi; Jack Binns, 'The Memoirs: Introduction', *The Memoirs and Memorials of Sir Hugh Cholmley*, ed. Jack Binns (Woodbridge, UK, 2000), pp. 41–42; Jack Binns, 'Cholmley, Sir Hugh, first baronet (1600–1657)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 17 July 2017.

¹²⁸ See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 344. The pier in question was not the current west pier, which dates to 1814. Cholmley's efforts to improve the old pier were either not particularly effective or remained unfinished. See George Young, *A Picture of Whitby and Its Environs* (Whitby, UK, 1824), pp. 184–186.

¹²⁹ Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 19–20.

¹³⁰ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 8, pp. 377–388, entry for 9 August 1667.

emphasised that he did not regard the people as being significantly ethnically or culturally different, observing that while 'dark and swarthy', they were not 'black' like the people of sub-Saharan Africa, and 'in features and in manners more resembling some of their neighbours, inhabitants of Europe'.¹³¹

Contrary to Cholmley's assessments of the town, Teviot is reported to have been 'highly contented with the place'.¹³² Indeed, by this time general conditions in Tangier were improving, partly assisted by trade with Moroccans,¹³³ although the settlement seems to have acquired such a poor reputation among Britons that people were deterred from coming.¹³⁴ But these positive developments were tempered by continuing hostile encounters with Ghailan's men,¹³⁵ and while Teviot accepted the advice of those who counselled against 'acts of hostility' against the Moroccans, he was concerned about the likelihood of an imminent major attack provoked by the construction of the second redoubt in a strategic location on a hill overlooking the town:

It giveth such jealousie and inquitetude to Guyland that this three dayes bypast, by the intelligence we receive from his fugitives, we have been under armes all night, he having 4000 horse and 2000 foot to attaque our little new fort, at this instant I expect his falling on us.¹³⁶

Teviot was particularly concerned about avoiding such a confrontation, given he believed that the forces of Tétouan had joined with Ghailan's army after that city's recent capitulation to him.

¹³¹ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 3–6.

¹³² 'Sir Richard Fanshaw to Sir Henry Bennet', 7/17 June 1663, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 110.

¹³³ Capt. Charles Harbord to Sandwich, Tangier, 14 March 1663, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 102; TNA, CO 279/2, f. 16; 'Captain B. Gilpin to Sir Richard Fanshaw', 8 June 1663, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 111; *A Description of Tangier*, p. 28.

¹³⁴ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 18; Cholmley, *A Short Account*, p. 2.

¹³⁵ Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 102; TNA, CO 279/2, f. 36r; *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 27–28; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 63–64.

¹³⁶ Report by Teviot, Tangier, 15/25 June 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 98r. The date on the letter is incorrect. See the following footnote.

4.4. Learning to Respect the Enemy

Teviot's concerns were well founded. Ghailan attacked the redoubt the following day, Sunday 14 June around midday.¹³⁷ While many of the officers and men were inside the town having their meal, the Moroccans launched a surprise assault against the unfinished redoubt and other outposts. The men who held the latter retreated in disarray, but a relief party was quickly dispatched, and with the Moroccans already hampered by caltrops which had earlier been distributed in the area, successfully repelled them from the entrenchments and forced them to retreat.¹³⁸ Moroccan casualties possibly exceeded one hundred killed and wounded, with around twenty bodies left on the field, some of whom 'were of a very good quality', while the English lost about twenty, with a further twenty wounded.¹³⁹ The significance of this encounter is not what happened on the field, but rather its aftermath, for immediately after the battle Teviot wrote to Ghailan. What transpired is a notable exchange, for it provides insights into the character of the two men and heralded the beginning of a promising relationship between them. The correspondence includes the usual courteous flourishes, but what is intriguing is the approach adopted by Teviot.¹⁴⁰ Despite having only been in the country less than three months, in his initial

¹³⁷ There is an inconsistency between the date that Addison provides on p. 8 for the day preceding the attack, Saturday, the 15th, and the dates of the subsequent correspondence between Teviot and Ghailan, being the 14th, 15th and 16th. If the attack occurred on the Sunday as claimed by Addison, under the Julian calendar this would make it the 14th of June, not the 16th, and the account is then chronologically consistent.

¹³⁸ Broadly consistent accounts are provided in John Luke to [?], Tangier, 14 June 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, ff. 102–103r; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 97–101; *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 30–32; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 8–9. See also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 39.

¹³⁹ Estimates of casualties do vary between accounts. Quotation is from TNA, CO 279/2, f. 102r.

¹⁴⁰ Copies of the original correspondence in Spanish can be found at *ibid.*, ff. 100–102. Translations of the letters are provided in *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 32–34; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 9–11; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 40; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 45–46. Rogers has only included the first two letters. All the translations are broadly consistent except for the following differences: in Addison's translation of the first letter Teviot claims the disturbance of a meal was contrary to local custom (see following footnote), whereas the other three simply have him stating that it was not usual to do so; in Addison's translation of the second letter Ghailan claims he did not welcome him because he was not aware of his arrival, as opposed to the others in which Ghailan states that it is him that has cause for complaint; in the translation of the second letter in *A Description of Tangier* Ghailan's attribution of blame for the failure to have already achieved a peace to Peterborough is absent; Addison's translation of the third letter omits Teviot's reference to earlier discussions which Peterborough had with Ghailan. As Addison was present during the event, preference has been given to his translations, but acknowledging his clear bias against Peterborough. See also the brief account of the exchange provided in BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 101–102.

overture to Ghailan he admonishes him in a way that appears to be an attempt to engage with his adversary on his own cultural terms: 'But instead of giving me the parabien [welcome], you have disturbed my hour of eating, which according to your own customs, ought to be secured from visits'.¹⁴¹

Teviot goes on to say that notwithstanding the discourtesy shown to him, if Ghailan wishes 'better correspondence' — pointedly adding that it could be achieved 'either by peace or war' — he will be similarly inclined. Identifying himself as not only a soldier, but an honourable one, the governor offers to bury any of Ghailan's men left on the field, or give leave for them to be collected so they may be buried 'in your own manner'.¹⁴² In his response the following day, Ghailan admonishes Teviot in turn for not formally announcing his arrival, and for his building works and use of resources outside of the town walls. However, he assures him that a soldier who had been captured had been well-treated, thanks Teviot for his treatment of the dead, blames Peterborough for what has transpired, and offers to open negotiations.¹⁴³ The day after, Teviot subsequently acknowledges that if he was at fault 'in not observing the rites of your country', it was simply as a result of 'a sin of ignorance', for which he has been 'sufficiently chastized'. He expresses appreciation for the treatment accorded to the soldier, promises to reciprocate the gesture, and accepts Ghailan's offer to treat.¹⁴⁴ Through the use of a combination of cultural sensitivity, placation, congeniality, and assertiveness Teviot attempted to establish a rapport with Ghailan to encourage the Moroccan to negotiate a peace. Nevertheless, Addison notes that Teviot, still uncertain of Ghailan's intentions, continued building new fortifications.¹⁴⁵

Teviot's concerns were reinforced by Ghailan's ambivalent behaviour, with Addison remarking that '[e]veryday brought him from Gayland a present or an ambush'. He

¹⁴¹ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 9 (my interpolation). As noted in the preceding footnote the reference to a custom, whether Muslim or specifically Moroccan, appears to be a later addition. The most likely reason for the inclusion of this post hoc addition is that Addison wished to clarify the implicit meaning of Teviot's statement, of which he was aware. There appears to be little reason for him to have done so otherwise. But, an alternative explanation, which is more consistent with the other sources, is that Teviot regarded the timing of the assault as a breach of honourable conduct.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* Ghailan does not elaborate on why he believed Peterborough was responsible, simply stating 'as you may inform your self'.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

describes the relationship between the two men at this time as 'a sort of amicable hostility' and suggests that there was nothing but their own pride that kept them from establishing a friendship.¹⁴⁶ However, on 15 July there was a serious escalation of hostilities when some of Ghailan's men were found hiding near the outer lines. The ferocity of the engagement was such that the garrison had to be reinforced by more than five hundred sailors from a visiting fleet. In the fighting which ensued over the course of the day the Moroccans suffered significant casualties and by the early evening they had been forced to withdraw. Shortly after, Ghailan sent an envoy to Teviot offering a peace.¹⁴⁷ On the following afternoon, against the counsel of his officers, Teviot rode out from the town to meet with Ghailan in his camp to commence discussions on the terms of a peace. Articles for a six-month peace were finally executed by the parties on 23 July. A copy of the articles does not appear to have survived, but they evidently required the cessation of construction of further defensive works and restrictions on what the English could source from outside the town.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it was described by the English consul in Lisbon as 'a very honourable peace',¹⁴⁹ and was an outcome which seems to have been warmly welcomed by both the inhabitants of Tangier and Ghailan's supporters.¹⁵⁰

Following the signing of the treaty, pleasantries and gifts continued to be exchanged between the two leaders, and the turn in the relationship was such that Addison optimistically opined that the 'English and Moors seem'd to differ in nothing but religion'.¹⁵¹ In fact, while their engagements with the Moroccans may have inspired confidence in some Britons in their abilities to defeat them and secure their place in

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 103–109; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 15–17. The involvement of the naval crew is only mentioned in the former source. There is also a brief, and more partisan, account provided in *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 34–35.

¹⁴⁸ See Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 65; *Articles of Peace Concluded and Agreed Between His Excellency the Lord Bellasyse, His Majesties Governour of His City and Garrison of Tangier in Affrica, &c. and Cidi Hamlet Hader Ben Ali Gayland, Prince of West-Barbary, &c. The Second of April, 1666* (London, 1666), p. 7.

¹⁴⁹ Maynard to Sandwich, Lisbon, 8/18 August 1663, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 116r.

¹⁵⁰ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 17–18. See also the response of Moroccans recounted in BL, Sloane MS 505, f. 109.

¹⁵¹ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 18. On the exchange of gifts, cf. BL, Sloane MS 505, f. 110.

Morocco,¹⁵² they did not elicit a general antipathy among Britons in Tangier toward them. Invective or prejudice directed at the Moroccans is notably absent in personal accounts around this time. They are occasionally referred to as 'barbarians', but the context in which the term is used does not imply that it was intended as a slur, but rather the result of convenient conflation.¹⁵³ The absence of the pejorative use of the term by inhabitants of Tangier contrasts with, for example, the description of Moroccans as 'barbarous people' by the English consul in Cadiz.¹⁵⁴ Situations where comparisons are being made on the basis of religious difference may have occasioned the use of 'infidel'.¹⁵⁵ More often though Moroccans are simply given the arguably neutral appellation 'the Moores'.

When some characterisation of Moroccans is made, it is predominantly complimentary, in particular Britons noted and admired their bravery and, as mentioned earlier, their martial and riding skills. Addison refers to meeting an envoy from Muhammad al-Hajj, whom he describes as a 'strict, zealous Moor', who possessed a 'grave and reserved carriage', yet could also participate in 'very obliging conversation'.¹⁵⁶ He also acknowledges their 'great resolution and courage' in battle.¹⁵⁷ One observer, a Thomas Fisher, who recorded the events of this period in a section of his journal entitled 'Affairs of Tangier', similarly expresses admiration for their valour.¹⁵⁸ Even in *A Description of Tangier*, a collection of accounts which was probably compiled to defend the colony against its detractors, the editor retained an admission from a British commentator that Moroccans 'are men of order and resolution, and have the most excellent firearms and lances'.¹⁵⁹ The Moroccans that these men observed were definitely not the effeminate Moors envisaged by Thomas Maynard. However, although free from obvious prejudice, the extent to which new,

¹⁵² See *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 34–35.

¹⁵³ Teviot uses the term 'Barbaroni' in Teviot to [?], Tangier, 11/21 July 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 108r. Perhaps it was an affectation acquired while he was residing on the Continent.

¹⁵⁴ Wescombe to Fanshaw, Cadiz, 15 March 1665, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 182.

¹⁵⁵ For example, see BL, Sloane MS 505, f. 105.

¹⁵⁶ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 12.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

¹⁵⁸ BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 100–101. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 136.

¹⁵⁹ *A Description of Tangier*, p. 31. On p. 25 it provides a much more fanciful account of the capabilities of Ghailan's men obtained from another source.

informed perceptions of Moroccans among Britons in Tangier could fully develop was limited by the nature of the contact they had with them; unfortunately, over the following two decades the substantive mode of encounter for many inhabitants and visitors would be restricted to the conflictual. But it is important to reinforce the point that it was by no means the only one.

As a result of the resolution of tensions with Ghailan, Teviot returned to England for consultations on 27 August. However, before doing so, according to Addison, he 'took all opportunities to caress the Moors'.¹⁶⁰ It appears that Teviot enjoyed some success in establishing amicable relations with his neighbours, aside from Ghailan, including a father-in-law to Ghailan, the sheikh of Anjera (Anjra), and the governors of Tétouan. Ghailan also wrote to Charles II, praising Teviot's character and his efforts at concluding a peace, and offering his support to the king.¹⁶¹ Addison also stresses that Teviot attended to two other issues as part of his diplomatic strategy. Firstly, he sought to maintain good relations with the Moroccan Jewish community. His motivations for this were predominantly practical: they were part of Moroccan society and therefore could influence perceptions about the English, and they also conducted trade with Tangier. Both men appear to have possessed at the least a jaundiced view of Jews, but Addison also asserts that Teviot was 'inclined to an impartial justice' by both nature and religion, and did not wish the Moroccans to think otherwise about either him or his religion. Second, he claims that Teviot wished:

to remove from the Moors all suspicion of any intended invasion of their country, with which they seem'd sturdily possessed. To this end, he let them plainly and sincerely know, that the king his master had not sent him to conquer, but to rent their land: that the chief design of his being sent thither was not to make war, but to settle a peace: and to promote such a friendly and safe traffique, as might conduce to the advantage of both.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 18.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18–22. Letters from all three are reproduced by Addison. A manuscript of Ghailan's letter to the king can be found at TNA, CO 279/2, f. 118.

¹⁶² Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 20–21 (underlining by me). If Teviot did use the word 'rent' it is most likely he was simply referring to the land outside the walls of the town, and not questioning the king's sovereignty over the town itself.

By the careful nurturing of relationships and provision of reassurances concerning English intentions, Teviot hoped to win both the trust and regard of Moroccans.

As well as improving access to supplies of local produce, the peace allowed Britons, for the first time since their arrival, to safely venture from the town to explore the countryside and civilly interact with the people.¹⁶³ Among those to do so was Addison, who visited the house of the Sheikh of Anjera.¹⁶⁴ He recounts in detail not only the furnishing of the room in which they dined, what they ate and drank, and how it was presented, but also their customs — removing one's shoes, eating without the use of utensils, reclining around a short table — and explains why they followed these practices. He also records listening to 'Moresco music' and having the company of their host's son, 'a debonair gentile person'. The impression he provides is of a pleasant and interesting evening, with the only thing that offended his English sensibilities being the confined communal sleeping arrangements with a group of Moors and Jews.¹⁶⁵

The attention given by Addison to this experience is not surprising given his life before Tangier. A contemporary of Henry Stubbe and a fellow Oxonian, Addison attended Queen's College where he had been a member of a group of students who shared an interest in Oriental studies during a period of increasing academic interest in Islam and Islamic culture. After graduating and gaining a master of arts in 1657, he was secretly ordained as a minister of the Church of England. He subsequently became a member of the Anglican underground in the final years of the Interregnum, and in 1660 was appointed as the chaplain to the English garrison in Dunkirk. Addison's education and seven years' experience in Tangier provided him with an understanding of Morocco and its society and culture that is unlikely to have been rivalled by many of his contemporaries. But while he possessed some familiarity with Arabic, he does not appear to have been proficient in the language. In addition to

¹⁶³ *A Description of Tangier*, p. 36; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 18.

¹⁶⁴ The text is also reproduced as 'An Account of West Barbary' in John Pinkerton, ed., *A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in all Parts of the World*, 17 vols., vol. 15 (London, 1814), pp. 403–441.

¹⁶⁵ Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 123–126. Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 42.

West Barbary (1671), which concerns the recent political history of Morocco, the natural resources of the country, and the people and their customs and beliefs, Addison also produced a number of notable works on Moroccan Jewry and Islam. Like John Harrison before him, he was strongly influenced by religious faith and ideology, and was concerned about the status and treatment of Jews in Morocco — although he demonstrates more ambivalence in his attitude towards them. He was critical of some aspects of Islam, but, like Stubbe, he also sought to correct the many misconceptions about the religion, and possessed a generally sympathetic perspective about the Moroccan people themselves.¹⁶⁶ It has been argued that Addison was 'an agent of empire' and that his work was co-opted for the purposes of advancing the interests of the English church and state,¹⁶⁷ nevertheless, it has also been observed that he was notably open-minded in the type of information he used as the basis for his work.¹⁶⁸

Teviot's absence coincided with growing concerns about Spanish plotting against Tangier and their efforts to enlist the assistance of Ghailan to that end.¹⁶⁹ As some in Tangier suspected at the time, there was little likelihood of such an outcome; after all, it was not in Ghailan's interest to enter in an alliance with the Spanish, but it would enrich him with the money and armaments he required by keeping them guessing.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, despite continued displays of mutual amity, there remained deep suspicion among the English about his objectives.¹⁷¹ It was amidst this concern and the imminent expiry of the treaty, with no idea when Teviot would return, that the

¹⁶⁶ On Addison, see Alistair Hamilton, 'Addison, Lancelot (1632–1703)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB Online* ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017; William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge, 2015), *passim*, esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Simon Mills, 'Learning Arabic in the Overseas Factories: The Case of the English', in Jan Loop, Alistair Hamilton, and Charles Burnett, eds., *The Teaching and Learning of Arabic in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2017), p. 284.

¹⁶⁷ Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 42–44.

¹⁶⁸ Hamilton, 'Addison, Lancelot'; Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 45, 80–84. Addison's attitudes to Muslim and Jewish Moroccans, and their cultures and religions are examined further in chap. 5 of this thesis, as are the factors which may have influenced the way in which he wrote about them.

¹⁶⁹ Consul Wescombe to Bennet, Cadiz, 27 and 29 October 1663, and Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 25 November 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, ff. 145, 162, 165–166. See also Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 330–331; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 49–52. On the visit of the Spanish envoy to Ghailan at this time, see also Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 106–111.

¹⁷⁰ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 52–53.

¹⁷¹ Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 9/19 December 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, ff. 173–174.

lieutenant-governor, Colonel John Fitzgerald, negotiated a two-month extension with Ghailan.¹⁷²

However, Teviot returned to Tangier on 14 January 1664, shortly before the expiry of the Articles of Peace, and advised Ghailan that he could not agree to an extension, stating that he was under instructions from the king not to renew the treaty unless he was permitted to further develop the town's fortifications.¹⁷³ Ghailan in turn advised he could not accede to this condition because it was forbidden by Islamic law for Christians to erect fortifications in Africa.¹⁷⁴ The further fortification of Tangier proved to be an intractable issue, with neither party prepared to give ground, and on 11 February hostilities recommenced; not open warfare, but rather 'ebuscades and surprizes'.¹⁷⁵ Regular skirmishes continued over the following two months, but there were two major encounters during March, and it was following the last of these that Teviot once again demonstrated surprising sensitivity, by having the bodies of two of the slain Moroccans washed, shrouded, and returned to Ghailan with a military escort. Addison asserts it was simply diplomatic canniness on Teviot's behalf to contrast his treatment of the Moroccan dead with that of the Moroccans toward slain Britons.¹⁷⁶ Perhaps it was a gesture intended to elicit reciprocity. But equally, it could

¹⁷² Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 31 December 1664, *ibid.*, ff. 190–191.

¹⁷³ Teviot was perhaps being disingenuous on this point. While obviously intent on achieving a peace, it is unlikely that he disagreed with his orders concerning the continued development of the fortifications because, as Pepys observed, the governor exercised a considerable influence on the Tangier Committee. See, for example, Samuel Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 4, pp. 269–270, entry for 10 August 1663. See also Routh's observations in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 48.

¹⁷⁴ Teviot to Bennet, Tangier, 29 January, 9 February, 18 March 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 16–17, 20–21, 34–35; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 23–24; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 65–66; [Henry Muddiman], *A Brief Relation of the Present State of Tangier and of the Advantages which His Excellence the Earle of Tiveot has Obteyned against Gayland* (London, 1664), pp. 3–4. A transcribed copy of the last text is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 79–84. There are significant similarities between *A Brief Relation* and *The Moores Baffled*. William J. Bulman has noted that the content draws on a letter sent by Addison to his friend Joseph Williamson, undersecretary of state (see TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 32–33) supplemented by embellishments and possibly other correspondents from Tangier. He has plausibly suggested that the pamphlet was composed by the royal journalist, Henry Muddiman, as a propagandistic piece. See *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 52. On Teviot's instructions from the king concerning the renewal of a peace and fortification of the town see 'Instructions for the Earle of Teviot', 2 December 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 183r (article 2).

¹⁷⁵ Memorial by Teviot, 16/26 February 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 22–23.

¹⁷⁶ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 24–25. See also Addison to Williamson, Tangier, 14 March 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 32–33; [Muddiman], *A Brief Relation*, pp. 4–7; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 61–66.

also have been to signify a soldier's respect for a valorous enemy, in accordance with Teviot's evidently strong sense of honour.

In the meantime, Muhammad al-Hajj's commander was still holding the fortress at Salé. Teviot had been visited by emissaries from al-Hajj in June the previous year to congratulate the earl on his arrival, to seek his assistance in the relief of Salé, and to settle a 'fair correspondence', and Teviot had responded by providing a shipment of supplies to the beleaguered troops.¹⁷⁷ The English remained hopeful that the fortress would be surrendered to them. In his latest instructions, Teviot was advised that if he was in a position to do so he should accept the offer, subject to suitable terms and conditions. The principal concern by this time was not what the fortress could offer the English, but how its possession by Ghailan might strengthen him.¹⁷⁸ However, by this time he was sufficiently challenged in securing Tangier without the distraction of also defending the fortress. Ghailan finally captured it in October, and with the loss of the stronghold went any real hope the English may have possessed of working with the Dilā to help check Ghailan's ascendancy.

As also observed by Bejjit, the religious and political dimensions of the civil war in Morocco were complex; they were never fully comprehended by the English, at least at the official level, and, as they would discover, neither were the forces at play readily amenable to manipulation by them.¹⁷⁹ Unlike their experiences in the Americas, the English in Tangier faced indigenous adversaries who were not only zealous, but also reasonably well organised, disciplined, and armed. Their recent successes against Ghailan's forces and Teviot's leadership did inspire confidence in the English garrison, but a belief that 'European canines and gun powder would inevitably prove victorious', as the Spanish had demonstrated with the Indians, as claimed by Matar, is not evident in the accounts for this period.¹⁸⁰ The confidence of

¹⁷⁷ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 12. See also Teviot's report, Tangier, 15/25 June 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 99r; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 91, 101–102; *A Description of Tangier*, p. 36.

¹⁷⁸ TNA, CO 279/2, f. 183v (article 5); Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 47.

¹⁷⁹ Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 11.

¹⁸⁰ See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 137. On the prevailing sentiment of the garrison concerning their position, see, for example, 'A relation on the state of Tanger received from the Earle of Teviot from 14th of January to 21st of March 1664', TNA, CO 279/3, f. 41; Teviot to Wescombe, Tangier, 15/25 April

the garrison did not diminish their general respect for the conduct and capabilities of Moroccans as adversaries, and what they did come to put their faith in, other than their commander, was the extensive system of fortifications which was emerging around the town.

In fact, the tenuous position of the English was starkly highlighted by an event that would have a significant and long term effect on the morale of the inhabitants of the colony. The need for the fortifications and the vulnerability of the English outside them was amply demonstrated on 3 May when Teviot led a party of around 460 officers, gentlemen, and soldiers out from the town which was subsequently ambushed, with the loss of the governor and 430 of his men.¹⁸¹ Linda Colley has opined that Teviot's approach in Tangier was 'ultimately unwise', with the foray that led to his untimely death motivated by a desire 'to prove that Charles II's imperial power' could extend beyond the walls of the colony.¹⁸² However, as has been shown, this interpretation of Teviot's governorship does not accord well with contemporary evidence.¹⁸³ Admittedly, he did have a reputation for reckless valour, and there does appear to have been a symbolic element associated with the timing of the expedition, but the reasons for it appear to be far more prosaic.

The day was the second anniversary of the defeat of Lieutenant-Colonel Fines and his troop, and it is evident that its significance was not lost on Teviot, who had perhaps decided that a show of force, or even a successful encounter with the Moroccans, on this occasion would help redress the legacy of the incident in the memory of both the garrison and the Moroccans.¹⁸⁴ But while he may have been imprudent, the governor

1664, *ibid.*, f. 43; *A Description of Tangier*, pp. 28, 34–35, 45; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 92, 94; Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, pp. 7, 23–24; [Muddiman], *A Brief Relation*, pp. 7–8.

¹⁸¹ For details, see Tobias Bridge to His Majesty, Tangier, 5 May 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, f. 54; Bridge to Fanshaw, Tangier, 5 May 1664, *ibid.*, f. 45r; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 66–69.

¹⁸² Colley, *Captives*, pp. 36–37.

¹⁸³ For an exception see James Wilson to Peterborough, Tangier, 6 April 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 81–82. Wilson clearly developed a close relationship with Peterborough, and was later accused of sedition for his criticism of Teviot following the governor's death. See 'Colonel Tobias Bridge to Richard Lord Fanshaw', 14 June 1664, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 158; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 73.

¹⁸⁴ See 'Colonel Roger Alsopp to Sir Richard Fanshaw', 13 June 1664, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 156; Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 5, pp. 166–167, entry for 2 June 1664; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 68. Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 66–67.

had certainly not been incautious. As well as being accompanied by a sizeable force, he had ordered that the area be carefully reconnoitred, and been assured that it was clear. As contemporary accounts reveal, Teviot's main aim in venturing outside the town appears to have been to clear some nearby woods to reduce cover afforded enemies approaching the town, and, perhaps, to also collect firewood.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, if these were his reasons, the outcome left the town even more vulnerable and disconsolate than it had been.

Aside from the huge loss of life and the death of a high-ranking and esteemed English official, what is significant about this event is the nature of the responses which it elicited. There was sufficient concern about the impact that the episode may have had on support for the colony, that 'a kind of prohibition' on reporting had been imposed following the event, 'lest, by scribbling, things might be falsely represented'.¹⁸⁶ Possibly, it is for this reason that the response of the printed media was more muted than that following later major events in Tangier, when the political environment encouraged public reporting for propagandist purposes. But it could also support the view held by some historians that the English public was generally indifferent, if not opposed, to their country's colonial endeavours during the seventeenth century.¹⁸⁷ In England the incident occasioned the publication of two pieces of doggerel praising Teviot and lamenting his death.¹⁸⁸ While evoking a traditional image of the cruel and deceitful Moor, the authors reserved their harshest criticism for Ghailan. Moreover, they both adopt a defiant tone, affirming that the English will obtain retribution for what they portray as a treacherous act: 'We are not conquer'd yet, the sooty Moore ... Yet we shall make this bold usurper bow',

¹⁸⁵ Heathcote MSS, p. 156; Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 67–68; *A Description of Tangier*, p. 41. See also the later account of the incident provided by S.L. in *A Letter from a Gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue to His Friend in London* (London, 1670), pp. 7–9.

¹⁸⁶ Heathcote MSS, p. 156.

¹⁸⁷ For details of the historiography see Adam R. Beach, 'Satirizing English Tangier in Samuel Pepy's Diary and Tangier Papers', in Goran V. Stanivukovic, ed., *Remapping the Mediterranean World in Early Modern English Writings* (New York, 2007), pp. 228–229.

¹⁸⁸ There was also a brief article of the incident and Teviot's death in the *Intelligencer* on 6 June: 'London, June 4', *Intelligencer Published for the Satisfaction and Information of the People*, 6 June 1664 (London).

proclaimed one,¹⁸⁹ while the other exclaimed that 'No blade of grass grow near that fatal wood, till it be dung'd with Mauritanian blood'.¹⁹⁰

But the responses of the men of the garrison and other inhabitants of Tangier were markedly different, or at least far more nuanced, than those of their compatriots at home. They were dismayed and disheartened by the loss of their comrades and beloved commander and governor. Addison was unable to narrate the details of that day, finding the experience too painful.¹⁹¹ Cholmley, writing many years later, describes how with Tevot's death Tangier acquired a sense of 'loss almost irreparable'.¹⁹² Furthermore, the event appears to have reinforced within the soldiers respect for their Moroccan antagonists: while not personally subscribing to their sentiments, one commentator claims that the major defeats experienced by first, Fines' company, and then Tevot's, 'have struck a great terrour into our English hearts, and caused us to look upon a Moor as an excellent souldier.'¹⁹³ Matar has claimed that Tevot's death marked a turning point in the way Moroccans were viewed by Britons, with 'subhumanization and animalization of the Moors' becoming part of the general discourse.¹⁹⁴ However, such tropes were already long established in the pejorative depths of the Barbary discourse. Undoubtedly, there were recriminations, abuse, and vows of revenge, but there is no evidence that the incident precipitated a prolonged turn to increased general prejudice against Moroccans.

The soldiers' assessment of the Moroccans was undoubtedly one that would have been shared by their late commander. Despite their different cultures and religions, he and Ghailan had much in common. Both were proud and charismatic leaders who revelled in warfare. Their dealings over a short period had fostered between them a mutual respect, which, as Addison suggested, may have developed into a genuine

¹⁸⁹ Jeremiah Rich, *Brief Memorial of the Losse of the Late Incomparable and Excellent Andrew Lord Rutherford Earle of Teveot, &c. Killed by an Ambuscadoe of Moores* (London, 1664).

¹⁹⁰ John Crouch, *An Elegie Upon the Much Lamented Death of that Noble and Valiant Commander the Right Honourable the Earl of Tiveot, Governour of Tangiers, Slain by the Moors* (London, 1664).

¹⁹¹ Addison, *The Moores Baffled*, p. 25.

¹⁹² Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 68.

¹⁹³ *The Present Interest of Tangier* (London, 1679), p. 3. A transcribed copy of the text is provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 147–152.

¹⁹⁴ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 138.

friendship given time and a change in circumstance.¹⁹⁵ It was a sentiment also seemingly shared by Ghailan.¹⁹⁶ In any event, the relationship demonstrated the possibility for an affinity between an English governor and a Moroccan leader that would not be repeated again for many years. The engagement on 3 May had exacted a heavy cost on the Moroccans as well, so much so that Ghailan did not pursue his advantage against the lightly defended lines of the town. In fact, the encounter appears to have had such an adverse impact on Ghailan and his supporters, perhaps compounded by earlier losses, that he never again attempted an all-out assault on the colony.¹⁹⁷

4.5. Imperatives for Peace

However, hostilities did not entirely abate, with regular skirmishes with Ghailan's forces occurring over the following months.¹⁹⁸ In response, the English officers set about further strengthening the colony's defences,¹⁹⁹ although the acting governor, Colonel Fitzgerald, and his successor, Lord Belasyse were both specifically instructed not to extend the perimeter of the colony beyond an area that could be safely maintained. While the instructions issued to Fitzgerald and Belasyse clearly indicate that the English authorities were concerned with ensuring the security of the town, that imperative was by no means intended to compromise its principal function as a free port, with the men required to ensure that they promoted everything that was conducive to improve trade and commerce.²⁰⁰ To this end, there was a desire to normalise relations with the local people, with Colonel Bullen Reymes charged with,

¹⁹⁵ On this point, see also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 41.

¹⁹⁶ See Ghailan's reflections on his relationship with Teviot in TNA, CO 279/3, f. 218r. While Ghailan may have thought highly of the governor, the bodies of Teviot and his men do not appear to have been returned for burial.

¹⁹⁷ See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 69.

¹⁹⁸ Colonel Bridge to Richard Fanshaw, 14 June and 9 July 1664, *Heathcote MSS*, pp. 158, 159.

¹⁹⁹ Colonel Alsopp to Fanshaw, 13 June 1664, *ibid.*, p. 157.

²⁰⁰ 'Charles II: June 1664', in *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, BHO ed. (London, 1939), accessed 1 August 2017, entries for 7 June 1664; 'Charles II: February 1665', in *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, BHO ed. (London, 1939), accessed 1 August 2017, entries for 24 February 1665. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 139.

among other things, assessing 'the disposition of Gayland and other neighbouring potentates towards a further peace or truce'.²⁰¹

The first steps toward re-establishing a peace commenced in July at Fitzgerald's instigation, and exchanges between him and Ghailan on the subject continued into August. While the tone of the correspondence was cordial and Ghailan was receptive, the sticking point remained the issue of the fortifications, with the Moroccan insisting that unless the English pulled them down 'there was noe other way' to proceed, insisting that he had explored all other options.²⁰² By early October a peace had still not been finalised, but with work on the town's defences now having been completed, Fitzgerald felt unconcerned whether there was peace or war with the Moroccans, although he affirms that for the reputation of the town and in the interests of trade 'he will endeavour to bring them to a good correspondency'.²⁰³ However, the English officers in Tangier still failed to accept that Ghailan's issue was with the maintenance of the outer defensive works, instead preferring to believe that he was colluding with the Spanish, and expecting him to be amenable to peace once England had resolved its affairs with Spain.²⁰⁴

The new governor, Lord John Belasyse (bap. 1615, d. 1689), arrived in Tangier on 8 April, only a month after the commencement of the second Anglo-Dutch War; a conflict in which the port and its developing mole would play some part, helping justify the expense incurred by the king on the project.²⁰⁵ Belasyse was born into a noble family, raised as a Catholic, educated at home, and for a brief period in Paris. He became a member of Parliament shortly before the English civil wars in which he served as a Royalist army officer. He distinguished himself during the first civil war, being created Baron Belasyse in January 1645, and actively conspired against the

²⁰¹ 'Charles II: June 1664', see entry for 9 June.

²⁰² 'Copy of transactions between the Governor of Tanger and Gayland', 17 September 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 217–218. Quotation is from f. 218r.

²⁰³ Colonel Fitzgerald to Fanshaw, 8/18 October 1664, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 167.

²⁰⁴ Fitzgerald to Fanshaw, 6/16 November and 28 November/8 December 1664, *ibid.*, pp. 168, 169; Colonel Norwood to Fanshaw, Tangier, 15 December 1664, *ibid.*, pp. 171–172.

²⁰⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 81–82.

Commonwealth during the Interregnum.²⁰⁶ Belasyse was a close friend of Sir Henry Bennet, who described him as 'as a very gallant man', and who was instrumental in Belasyse gaining the governorship.²⁰⁷ However, Bennet's high opinion of Belasyse was not shared by Pepys, who found him to be self-centred, dishonest, corrupt, and cunning.²⁰⁸

Belasyse was clearly impressed with what he found when he arrived in Tangier, providing the most effusive description of the place of any English governor. Highlighting 'the nobleness of its situation and greate importance to the crowne', he goes on to add:

His majesty who understands and delights in all curiosities both by sea and land this place is capable off would possess a greater esteame off it than any off his dominions weare he heare to see the prospects off the Streights uppon Spain, the shippes that pass, the frutefull mountagnes off Affrique, the fragrant perfumes off flowers, rare frutes and sallads, excellent ayre, meats and wines, which this place most seamingly affords, or shall doe.²⁰⁹

Later that year, he wrote that regardless of what transpired with Ghailan, he had no doubt that 'Tanger will prove advantageous to the Crowne of England, as [?] it was hoped for', as it was presently demonstrating in the war with the Dutch.²¹⁰ At around the same time, others also observed with satisfaction the colony's condition and prospects. Hugh Cholmley reflected on its importance as a supply depot for the European powers when they were at war with each other, and a safe harbour for English vessels threatened by Muslim corsairs. Furthermore, he notes that there were 'all sorts of delicacys' available and fresh produce was plentiful and cheap. He also states that things were such that he could discern 'no difference between this place

²⁰⁶ Andrew J. Hopper, 'Belasyse, John, first Baron Belasyse of Worlaby (bap. 1615, d. 1689)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004).

²⁰⁷ Bennet to Wescombe, 1 March 1665, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 181; 'Charles II – volume 99: June 1664', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1663–4*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1862), accessed 2 August 2017, entries for 5 and 14 June 1664.

²⁰⁸ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 7, pp. 99, 130, entries for 14 April and 23 May 1666; *ibid.*, 8, pp. 45, 100, entries for 5 February and 6 March 1667.

²⁰⁹ Report by Belasyse, Tangier, 13 April 1665, TNA, CO 279/4, f. 85.

²¹⁰ [Belasyse] to the Lords Commissioners, [1665], BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 104r (my interpolation).

and England', and nor did he 'ever know it so well'.²¹¹ Early the following year a naval officer, Thomas Browne, the son of the well-known physician and author of the same name, visited Tangier and provides a more independent assessment. He remarks that while the town had been 'of little force and lesse profit' under the Portuguese, it was 'now very much mended as to the former, and in great hopes of raising the latter' for the protection of merchant vessels.²¹² But, whatever way Tangier might have reminded Cholmley of home, it was certainly no 'little England'. Charles' dream of Tangier becoming a cosmopolitan trading centre was being realised, for despite his subjects' troubles with Ghailan and Barbary corsairs, Muslims were not excluded from the town, with Cholmley proudly proclaiming to the English ambassador to Portugal and Spain, Sir Richard Fanshaw, that 'wee daly entertaine Christians and Turks that come to see us'.²¹³

Furthermore, unimpeded by territorial disputes, relations with the people elsewhere in Morocco continued to be favourable, with the English entering into a treaty of peace and commerce with the governor of Santa Cruz in the south of the country in November. Interestingly, the treaty states that the citizens of Santa Cruz 'shall enjoy reciprocally the same privileges in the King of England's dominions' (article 12).²¹⁴ The treaty had been negotiated by a London merchant, Thomas Warren, who had been commissioned, apparently at Warren's suggestion, by Charles II in 1665 to 'conclude a peace with the King of Morocco, the Governor of Santa Cruz, the people of Sallee or one or any of them'.²¹⁵ While Warren had evidently been unable to conclude the other two treaties, he did contract with Abdul-Karin al-Shabbani, the

²¹¹ Cholmley to Fanshaw, 3 May 1665, *Calendar of Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1907), p. 149. See also Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 69.

²¹² Thomas Browne, 'Journal of Mr. Thomas Browne', in Simon Wilkin, ed., *Sir Thomas Browne's Works*, 4 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1835–36), p. 122. Browne's manuscript journal can be found under 'Journal of a Voyage in the Mediterranean, in the Fleet Commanded by Sir Jeremy Smith, 1665–66', BL, Sloane MS 1831A/8.

²¹³ Cholmley to Fanshaw, 3 May 1665, *Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath*, p. 150.

²¹⁴ 'Articles of Peace and agreement made and concluded the 23 Day of November 1665', TNA, SP 108/5, ff. 2v–3r.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*; 'Entry Book: July 1668', in *Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 2, 1667–1668*, ed. William A Shaw, BHO ed. (London, 1905), accessed 17 October 2017, entries for 16 July. On Warren, see also the following chapter. For his services, Warren was eventually paid the sum of £5,500, a generous amount given the greatest beneficiary of the mission appears to have been Warren himself.

last member of the Sa'dī dynasty to rule Marrakesh, for the supply of seven hundred barrels of gunpowder, an arrangement which had been sanctioned by the English government, at least *post hoc*.²¹⁶

Despite these developments, Tangier effectively remained under siege from the land, with Belasyse noting that no Britons had travelled beyond the lines for 'a long time', nor would they do so, 'for our going out is useless and dangerous'.²¹⁷ The third of May had become such an inauspicious date for the garrison that Belasyse delayed contacting Ghailan until the day had passed, having been 'informed they have a designe to attaque us then'.²¹⁸ Confident they could repel any assault, he was more concerned at the time about the possibility of a blockade of the port by the Dutch.²¹⁹ The day passed without incident,²²⁰ but like his officers he believed Ghailan maintained his hostile stance against the English because he was being incited to do so by Spain. Under these circumstances, Belasyse thought that the only means available to resolve the issue was to send two frigates to blockade Tétouan and Salé 'where theire trade being obstructed, they will importune Guylan as author of theire misfortunes to make a peace with us';²²¹ it was the same coercive approach adopted by the English in earlier disputes with Salé and the other Barbary States, but on this occasion it is clear that the intention was to prevent English and Dutch vessels trading with these ports in order to force Ghailan's hand. The war with the Dutch added to the garrison's general anxieties and contributed to suspicion of collusion between

²¹⁶ 'Charles II: March 1669', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1668–9*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1894), accessed 17 October 2017, entries for 18 March.

²¹⁷ Report by Belasyse, Tangier, 13 April 1665, TNA, CO 279/4, f. 86r.

²¹⁸ Report by Belasyse, Tangier, 29 April 1665, *ibid.*, ff. 91v–92r. See also Martin Wescombe to Fanshaw, Cadiz, 15 March 1665, *Heathcote MSS*, pp. 181–182.

²¹⁹ Belasyse to Fanshaw, Tangier, 15 April 1665, *Heathcote MSS*, pp. 185.

²²⁰ Belasyse to Fanshaw, Tangier, 4 May 1664, *ibid.*, p. 190.

²²¹ Belasyse to the Lords Commissioners, Tangier, 13 April 1665, Bodl., Rawl. MS D.916, ff. 60–61. See also Belasyse to Lord Arlington, Tangier, 12 April 1665, TNA, CO 279/4, f. 84; BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 104r. The idea of a blockade of these ports may not have been Belasyse's own. It appears to have first been raised with the new governor in a document titled 'Proposals delivered unto the Lord Belasyse' dated 5 January 1664/65, which may have originated from the Tangier Committee. See *ibid.*, f. 85r, point 9. As noted in preceding discussion, it had certainly been raised as an option earlier by Peterborough.

Ghailan and European powers intent on frustrating their occupation of Tangier, believing that the Dutch were now also preventing him from settling a peace.²²²

The real issue is not whether or not the Spanish and Dutch were encouraging Ghailan to continue hostilities against the English. As Jerome Weiner points out, while the English were preoccupied with explaining Ghailan's obstinacy in conspiratorial terms, they failed to address the actual stumbling block that he had consistently raised, that is, the removal of the external fortifications.²²³ But the English may have simply considered this an unfeasible option. Based on their past experiences with Ghailan, they had every reason to fear a concerted assault, a belief which was further fuelled by a deep mistrust of Ghailan which appears to have had little to do with ethnological or religious prejudice towards Moroccans, but rather was the consequence of prevailing tensions between England and the other European powers which were translated to Morocco. For these reasons, the destruction of the fortifications may not have been a concession the English were willing to make, but they do appear to have failed to recognise that Ghailan's demand was more than a personal whim, when, in fact, it was associated with a deeply-felt and long-standing general antipathy to European colonial activities, with the actions of the English directly challenging Ghailan's authority and status in Moroccan society.

A more likely factor explaining Ghailan's intransigence up to this point was the relative strength of his position: he was not under any immediate threat from other Moroccan factions, and consequently was not dependent on obtaining supplies or support from the English.²²⁴ The situation in fact held a number of potential benefits for him. He could play off the divisions between the Europeans to obtain what he could from them, and any concessions by the English on the fortifications or, more importantly, the capture of the town, would have added greatly to his prestige.²²⁵

²²² Belasyse to Arlington, Tangier, 20 May and 22 June 1665, TNA, CO 279/4, ff. 112, 124; Belasyse to the Lords Commissioners, 20/30 July 1665, BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 101–102.

²²³ Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 68.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 68–69.

²²⁵ On the benefits derived by Ghailan through his dealings with the Spanish, see Mojuetan, 'Legitimacy in a Power State', pp. 353–354.

Given the impasse, it was fortunate for the English, at least in the short term, that circumstances began to change very shortly after Belasyse's arrival. In April and May there were reports that Muhammad al-Hajj was advancing on Ghailan with a large army, and in August Belasyse revealed that Ghailan's problems had escalated: 'He is so "hard put to his defence against the armies of Ben Bowcar [al-Hajj, Muhammad] and the King of Taffaletta [Mawlay al-Rashīd] ... as he may soon lose all his holds ... and Sally and Tituan will revolt from him most certainly when Ben Bowcar is master of the campania"'²²⁶ These new circumstances forced a change in Ghailan's disposition toward the English, with Belasyse also advising in the same report that 'Guyland has sent me a present of fresh provisions and overtures tending to a peace'.

The English had perhaps overestimated the severity of the immediate threat to Ghailan because he appeared to be in no hurry to conclude a peace. Belasyse reported in late October that contrary to other intelligence, Ghailan had not been defeated and slain, and had himself been advised that Ghailan 'was in no way inclined to a peace with us, being courted by the Duke of Medinaceli and the Hollanders to the contrary'. While he believed they 'lay many designs to engage him to attack or distress us', Belasyse claimed he was unconcerned, confident in the garrison's ability to repel any attack by land or sea.²²⁷ However, once again the English had either been misinformed or had misjudged Ghailan, and it was, in fact, the Spanish against whom he turned, attacking Larache in early 1666. The assault was unsuccessful and Ghailan had suffered considerable losses. Hearing of the incident, Belasyse offered to reopen negotiations, and on 2 April 1666 a treaty between Belasyse and Ghailan was finally signed, to the governor's evident joy.²²⁸

The treaty differed from that negotiated by Teviot in a number of ways, as Belasyse keenly highlighted. Most importantly, for the English it was perpetual, and allowed the English to complete their defensive works, but not extend them beyond the

²²⁶ Fanshaw to Lord Holles, Madrid, 19/29 April 1665, *Heathcote MSS*, p. 186; Belasyse to Fanshaw, Tangier, 4 May 1665, *ibid.*, p. 190; Belasyse to Fanshaw, Tangier, 10/20 August 1665, *ibid.*, p. 202 (my interpolations).

²²⁷ Belasyse to Fanshaw, Tangier, 10/20 October 1665, *ibid.*, p. 210.

²²⁸ Belasyse to [Arlington?], Tangier, 4 April 1666, TNA, CO 279/6, ff. 49–50.

existing perimeter. It provided the colonists with greater access to fresh produce, firewood and building supplies, use of a larger area outside the perimeter for grazing and cropping, the promise of assistance against attack by 'all Christian enemies', and protection from attacks by corsairs on vessels in the vicinity of the town. In return Ghailan was to receive 200 barrels of gunpowder and, in a significant concession by the English, whatever assistance could be provided by any of their vessels in Tangier against his enemies not at the time at peace with England, when required. The parties were to forgive past injuries, return offenders seeking refuge, and permit free trade in their respective ports.²²⁹ In addition, Belasyse provided Ghailan with a quantity of guns and pistols.²³⁰

By entering into the long-awaited treaty, the English had hoped to achieve the security they required for peaceful trade and improve the self-sufficiency of the colony, thereby establishing a sound foundation for its long-term future. For a short time at least, the alliance showed promise, with Ghailan cooperating with the English on developing plans to respond to a feared attack by a French fleet, and the commencement of a pattern of exchange of correspondence and supplies between the parties which would define the relationship for the following two years. At this point in time they shared a common interest in their mutual security.²³¹ However, the questionable long-term value of the treaty to the English, and Ghailan's reasons for insisting on access to use of English vessels, soon become apparent. Following a decisive victory by Mawlay al-Rashīd against his forces toward the end of June, Ghailan and his remaining supporters were forced to flee to his stronghold of Asilah. From there he wrote to the recently appointed lieutenant-governor, Colonel Henry Norwood, requesting a surgeon to tend his wounds, a ship to remain moored off

²²⁹ *Articles of Peace Concluded and Agreed Between His Excellency the Lord Bellasyse His Majesties Governor of His City and Garison of Tangier in Affrica, &c. and Cidi Hamet Hader Ben Ali Gayland, Prince of West-Barbary, &c. The Second of April, 1666* (London, 1666). A copy of the printed treaty can be found in TNA, CO 279/6, ff. 43–46. For other copies see TNA, SP 103/1, f. 301; TNA, SP 113/2, f. 23. A manuscript copy in Spanish can be found in Bodl., Carte MS 75, ff. 428–429. A transcript is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 103–108.

²³⁰ Ghailan to Belasyse, Asilah, 22 April 1666, TNA, CO 279/6, f. 51.

²³¹ Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 70. See, for example Colonel Norwood's assessment in Norwood to Sandwich, Tangier, 18/28 June 1666, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 446. Many of the copies of letters sent to Ghailan during this period in the archives are in Spanish.

Asilah should he require assistance, and sanctuary for any of his supporters who arrived in the town.²³² In turn, Norwood offered his condolences and assured Ghailan that he would comply with the recently signed Articles of Peace and provide refuge for his allies and followers.²³³ For the following two years, Ghailan remained largely confined to the town, able to do little to support the English, other than providing fresh supplies from time to time and, by his continued resistance, distracting al-Rashīd from focussing on Tangier as his next conquest.²³⁴

Tangier's situation toward the end of 1666 was aptly summed up by Colonel Norwood. Discussing a conflict between his obligations under the treaty with Ghailan and entreaties for assistance from 'Abd el-Krim en-Neksis, governor of Tétouan, he sardonically quipped that 'I am now like a horse between 2 bottles [bundles] of hay, ready to starve for not being able to chuse the best'.²³⁵ Despite its light-hearted nature, Norwood's statement seems to reflect a recognition that the fate of the English colony remained uncertain, and ultimately dependent on factors outside his direct control.

Conclusion

In this chapter it has been argued that understanding of events relating to the English occupation of Tangier and the meaning of the encounter between Britons and Moroccans during this period has been strongly influenced by the historiographical legacy of late Victorian and Edwardian scholars. However, returning to the contemporary sources and reviewing them with a more critical and objective eye reveals a number of important aspects about the foundation of English Tangier that

²³² Sir Joseph Skelton to Arlington, Plymouth Fort, TNA, CO 279/6, f. 94; 'Charles II – volume 163: July 15–20, 1666', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1665–6*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1864), accessed 4 August 2017, entries for 15 July 1666; Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 57–59. For another account of Ghailan's defeat and assistance offered to him by the English, see *A Short and Strange Relation of some part of the Life of Tafiella the Great Conqueror and Emperor of Barbary by One that hath lately been in His Majesties Service in that Country* (London, 1669), pp. 18–23.

²³³ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 60.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 61–70; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 92–94; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 70–71.

²³⁵ Norwood to Sandwich, Tangier, 11/21 September 1666, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 480r (my interpolation).

challenge the received wisdom of earlier historical interpretations, allowing subsequent developments and the responses of the inhabitants of the new colony to be considered in a very different light.

Many of the king's subjects did enthusiastically embrace the manifold opportunities presented by Tangier. However, proposals publicly bruited following the announcement of the marriage alliance with Portugal were nothing more than unofficial, often self-seeking, expressions of national aspiration, and were certainly not endorsed by all Britons. The king and his advisors, in fact, quickly adopted an ostensibly pragmatic vision for his new dominion. Tangier was not to be the bridgehead for imperial expansion into North Africa, rather the colony was to play a key role in England's developing maritime empire. Central to fulfilment of this vision was the requirement that Tangier be a self-sustaining free port, which they felt confident would be supported by the Moroccan people once they had been assured of the character of the English and recognised the mutual benefit of peaceful trade. But the English authorities had not anticipated the practical and political challenges that would be encountered in maintaining the colony.

In particular, they failed to appreciate the traditional resentment that Moroccans felt towards the colonial activities of the Europeans, both Catholic and Protestant, and the critical role that resistance to European encroachment played in establishing political legitimacy in Moroccan society. The English, for their part did not see the occupation of Tangier as a hostile act of territorial sequestration: the site had been a Portuguese possession for almost two hundred years which, from the perspective of the English, had been legally ceded to Charles II. They, therefore, had no reason to question the legitimacy of the king's sovereignty over this piece of land. Furthermore, mistrust of Ghailan, exacerbated by a belief that he was colluding with other European powers, made it impossible for the English to concede to his demands for the destruction of the external fortifications which provided them with so much reassurance. This left a forced peace as the only option to resolve the impasse available to the English until the arrival of the 'Alawīs encouraged Ghailan to reappraise his position.

Nevertheless, what is remarkable about this period of the occupation is that despite the bloodshed and significant loss of life that transpired over the course of the first four years, those Britons who were present during this time and committed their experiences to writing, maintained an essentially balanced view of the enemy. Their perceptions were heavily influenced by the nature of their encounters, but despite this, there was a distinct lack of animosity and prejudice directed toward the Moroccans in the sources, and these men also demonstrated a continuing willingness to engage with them during periods of peace. Moreover, the inhabitants of Tangier were also attempting to gain an understanding of the country; they did not simply seek to learn about its resources and military capabilities, but were also inspired by a genuine interest in its history and culture. Evidence of this engagement is provided in the accounts on which this chapter has drawn, in particular those by Cholmley and Addison, who both attribute their knowledge to direct contact with Moors and Jews.²³⁶ The observations and attitudes of both men are explored further in the following chapter.

The ability of Britons to overcome prejudice and hostility, and apply their cultural learning in an attempt to forge positive relationships with the local people, is well demonstrated in the efforts made by Teviot to establish a peace with Ghailan, and in the rapport these two men developed. The actions of Teviot also draw attention to the importance given by early modern Britons to adherence to principles of honourable conduct in their interactions with others, friends and enemies alike; a subject that is considered further in the following chapter. Teviot's death is instructive of how knowledge and experience can alter attitudes, and shape responses. The reaction of the garrison to the event stands in marked contrast to that of the few polemicists who responded to it in the English media, highlighting, more

²³⁶ See Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 19; Addison, 'Preface', *West Barbary*, sig. A3. One further source not cited elsewhere in this chapter is an interesting and detailed treatise, entitled 'Revolution of Morocco. Of uncertain provenance, but seemingly written by an English author, it provides an account of the political history of Morocco between 1508 and 1666. The treatise is possibly a compilation from other accounts. It can be found in BL, Sloane MS 3495.

generally, the risk of extrapolating the views expressed by a small group of domestic commentators to generalise about the attitudes of all Britons.

Routh, Colley, and Matar have seen Teviot's death as a signal moment in shaping English policy toward Morocco, marking the end of English aspiration for a territorial empire in North Africa.²³⁷ But as has been shown in this chapter, Charles II did not possess such expectations by the time he enacted his plans for the occupation of Tangier in late 1661. The disaster of 1664 did have a deep impact on Britons both in the colony and at home and gave them pause to reflect on their situation in Morocco, but the English government remained steadfast in its desire that Tangier succeed as a free port and naval station. By 1667, Britons demonstrated more realistic expectations about how it could contribute to their enrichment, but with conditions in the town improving and the recent treaty with Ghailan, there was some basis for hope for Tangier's future, although tempered by uncertainty concerning the threat posed by the 'Alawīs.

²³⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 113–114; Colley, *Captives*, p. 37; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 139.

5. Hope (1667–1677)

If [Tangier] could be wall'd and fortifi'd with brass, it would repay the charge: and I doubt not, if our misfortunes or sins do not prevent it, but posterity, in the annals of our history, shall read the acquisition and improvement of Tanger among the felicities of his majesty's reign whom God almighty prosper, and send us a happy meeting; which is [my] constant prayer. (Henry Sheres, Tangier, 20 October 1676)¹

By the late 1660s, any expectations which had been held by perspicacious Britons that Tangier could be the bridgehead for a territorial empire in North Africa would have been dashed. A concerted resistance mounted by Ghailan to even limited expansion of the colony to better meet its defensive needs and sustain its population, had amply demonstrated the martial capabilities and zeal that Moroccans could bring to bear to prevent further European encroachment. Even those Britons who continued to subscribe to a more realistic vision of Tangier as a lucrative entrepôt and useful naval station would have held reservations about achieving those ends, in light of the ongoing difficulties faced by Charles' government in adequately financing and supplying the colony, and the continuing political instability in Morocco. Nevertheless, well into the following decade there were people who continued to hold out hope that long-term amicable relations with the indigenes could be achieved and that Tangier would finally realise its perceived potential as the brightest jewel in the king's overseas dominions, 'a jewel of so many extraordinary virtues, and so peculiar to the use and service of the English nation'.²

¹ Henry Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger on these Heads, 1. The Service Tanger has Already Rendred the Crown. 2. What Service it May Render it, if Improv'd. 3. The Mischief it May Do Us, if Possess'd by any Other Powerful Prince. 4. Some General Observations Touching Trade. In a Letter to a Person of Quality* (London, 1680), p. 53 (my interpolation). Authorship of the pamphlet is attributed to Sheres in the British Library Catalogue. Sheres is sometimes rendered as Shere or Sheeres. A transcription of the text is provided in Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 129–145.

² Quotation is from Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, p. 31. Sheres also used the jewel analogy when describing Tangier's value in Henry Sheres, *A Discourse Concerning the Mediterranean Sea, and the Streights of Gibraltar* (London, 1705), p. 20. The original text of the later was probably written around 1674–75. See Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), p. 366, n. 2.

Such hope was not unfounded: with peace finally established with Ghailan, and Mawlay al-Rashīd preoccupied with suppressing domestic resistance within his expanding dominions, after five turbulent years, the inhabitants of Tangier finally enjoyed an extended period of relative peace, and the English could now focus on improving the operation of the colony and the development of its infrastructure. With time, its supporters believed, Tangier could not only start to repay the considerable sums of money which had been outlaid by the king for the project, and become self-sustaining; but of equal importance, the English could convince Moroccans of their good intentions and of the mutual value which could be derived from the colony. However, while Tangier enjoyed a reprieve at the beginning of this period, a long-term peace was not guaranteed and the domestic civil conflict was far from resolved. Hostile relations with the indigenes were not only costing the king's exchequer scarce funds to secure the colony, but also stifling its commercial development. Consequently, more concerted efforts began to be made from this time to achieve a long-term diplomatic solution.

This diplomatic activity was not only a notable aspect of the English occupation of Tangier between 1667 and 1677 in itself, but, importantly for this study, it provided many Britons with diverse opportunities to travel within the country and, therefore, to closely observe the Moroccan people and their society outside the limitations of hostile encounters. Reflecting increasing popular interest in Islam and other cultures, the sources from around this time begin to offer not just richer levels of detail about general observations and attitudes. Commentators also demonstrate a greater preparedness to commit to writing their own reflections about the impact that their experiences had on them; they even make comparisons which go beyond perceptions of equivalence, of recognition of a shared humanity, and offer assessments of their discoveries which reflect poorly on the state of their own society and culture. Some of the most profound examples of how intercultural experience can provoke such comparisons are found in the didactic musings of the garrison chaplain, Lancelot Addison. Through such frank admissions they provide not only greater insight into how acculturative change may have affected them, but also into the factors which influenced such change. However, while cultural understanding, and even genuine

feelings of amity which it helped foster, supported attempts to achieve an accord with their neighbours, recourse to basic pragmatism continued to be important to England's efforts to reach an accord with the Moroccans. But another factor, separate to acculturation, and whose influence on inter-cultural relations is identified for the first time through this study, can also be seen to play an increasingly significant role in the behaviour of Britons in their dealings in Morocco, and that is the concept of honour, particularly as it is manifested in various military contexts.

5.1. Reconciling Honour and Expediency

By May 1667 the prospects for trade were promising and good progress was being made with construction of the mole. However, the lieutenant-governor, Colonel Norwood, had two concerns. The first was that Tangier, in his view, was not receiving adequate attention from Whitehall, believing it to be due to the colony being 'farr from the heart'. The second was the challenge in meeting Ghailan's demands for supplies sufficient to feed 'at least 5000 mouths'. Peace for the colony had been achieved for the past year, but only at 'great expense'.³ Norwood was anxious about the situation, and for good reason. The governor, Lord Belasyse, had left for England very soon after the signing of the treaty and had not returned,⁴ and Norwood had been having difficulty obtaining timely responses on important issues from the principal Secretary of State, Lord Arlington, since the previous August.⁵ Critically, the strategic situation had not only changed considerably but also quickly, since the treaty had been concluded. The desirability of a peace had been premised not only on a cessation of hostilities but also as a means to provide the town with local

³ Colonel Norwood to Lord Arlington, Tangier, 22 May 1667, Bodl., Carte MS 75, ff. 548–549. Quotations are from ff. 548r, 549r, 549v, respectively. On Ghailan's dependence on the English, see also Jerome B. Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the First Decade of the Occupation of Tangier, 1662–1672', *Hespèris Tamuda*, 18 (1979), p. 71. On improvement in trade and commerce at this time, which was largely as a result of the war with the Dutch and French, see also Hugh Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier* (unpublished, 1787), pp. 72–73.

⁴ Less than a week later Belasyse was in Seville, and by the end of the month had landed in England. See 'Consul Westcombe to Sir Richard Fanshaw', Cadiz, [8]18 April 1666, *Heathcote MSS* (London, 1899), p. 246; 'Charles II – volume 154: April 17–30, 1666', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1663–4*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1864), accessed 26 September 2017, entry for 24 April. See p. 363 in printed edition.

⁵ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 31 August 1666, TNA, CO 279/6, ff. 110–111.

supplies of fresh produce and materials, and to create an environment conducive to development of trade. The rapid 'Alawī expansion into the north-west of the country presented a new threat and required a change in strategy.

The approach adopted by the English in Morocco at this time, which appears to have been heavily influenced by Norwood, was framed by several considerations. What they sought to do for the first time was make a concerted effort to influence the dynamics of the Moroccan civil conflict through providing overt material aid to Ghailan in an attempt to achieve a balance of power in the region, between the warring factions. By supporting Ghailan at Asilah, Norwood hoped that the Moroccan chief could continue to resist al-Rashīd, and thereby prevent him turning his forces on Tangier.⁶ They were also hedging on the outcome. There were risks in so closely aligning themselves with Ghailan, but these were mitigated in Norwood's mind by the value of demonstrating consistency in their support for an ally. Such a show of good character, Norwood believed, would facilitate negotiation of terms with the 'Alawīs should the need arise.⁷ However, Norwood and some of his colleagues also possessed a less mercenary view of their relationship with Ghailan. It was neither expediency nor friendship which bound them so closely to the Moroccan at this time, but rather a deeply-held sense of honour.

Despite the depredations he had visited upon the colony, some of the key inhabitants of Tangier felt morally-obliged to adhere to the terms of their treaty. Hugh Cholmley acknowledged that the English 'were bound up by the treaty, so that they could not forsake Gayland in honour'.⁸ Lancelot Addison believed that Norwood's dogged adherence to the treaty was a means for him to affirm to the Moroccans a direction issued by the king for his ministers to observe all commitments made in his name, as well as 'vindicate the honour of the English nation' from accusations which had been

⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 99, 110r; E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912), p. 92; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 72.

⁷ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 3 July 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, f. 104v; *A Short and Strange Relation of some part of the Life of Tafeletta the Great Conqueror and Emperor of Barbary by One that hath lately been in His Majesties Service in that Country* (London, 1669), p. 25; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 72.

⁸ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 31.

made by Ghailan against the late Earl of Teviot about the reasons for the commencement of hostilities between them, a view to which he himself evidently ascribed.⁹ Even by the middle of 1667, when it became demonstrably clear that providing further support to Ghailan was pointless, Norwood remained resolutely committed to supporting him.¹⁰ Advising Arlington of his intentions, he explains: 'I will take care to observe all points of honour on his majesty's behalf as far as I can made a judgement, and will not leave him [Ghailan] till himself confesse the reasonableness thereof'.¹¹

As a result of this self-imposed moral constraint, the English could not establish relations with the 'Alawīs if it meant abandoning Ghailan. But that did not prevent Norwood attempting to advance the possibility of a peace by seeking to 'ingratiate' himself with the sultan, and appealing to what he thought was their common interest in trade.¹² The situation required deft diplomacy, and, according to Addison, Norwood enjoyed some success. Addison notes that the English were invited by al-Rashīd to trade with Tétouan — that town by now under his control — and Norwood quickly responded positively to the offer.¹³ Around this time the lieutenant-governor was also consulted 'in matters of moment' by the governors of Tétouan and 'other grandees of the country and chief ministers of the king [al-Rashīd]'.¹⁴ Addison asserts that Norwood was able to negotiate these relations such:

that the continuance of his friendship [with Ghailan] could not be suspected by the one, nor want of disposition to contract a new one by the other. Tafilite [al-Rashīd] could not so much esteem him his enemy as *Gaylan's freind*; and his fidelity to a *distressed confederate* removed all suspicion of being otherwise to a *prosperous*.¹⁵

⁹ Lancelot Addison, *West Barbary, or, A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, Sacred, Civil, and Domestick* (Oxford, 1671), pp. 59–60.

¹⁰ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 13 June 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, f. 91r; Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 69; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 72.

¹¹ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 19/29 June 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, ff. 103v–104r.

¹² Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 13 June 1667, *ibid.*, f. 91r.

¹³ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 68. Another source refers to al-Rashīd attempting to entice the English with 'great promises of rewards and priviledges'. See *A Short and Strange Relation*, p. 24.

¹⁴ Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 68–69 (my interpolation)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69 (words italicised as in the original text, my interpolation).

However, if such exchanges did occur they can be seen as providing further evidence of the agency of the Moroccans and their adeptness in their dealings with Europeans, as much as it perhaps was a testament to Norwood's own diplomatic skills. Through this contact the 'Alawīs were undoubtedly learning about the English, and assessing their strengths, weaknesses, and interests. Moreover, despite Addison's optimistic assessment, the actual amount of goodwill between the parties was evidently far less. In his report to Arlington of 13 June, Norwood requested that some frigates be sent as a demonstration of English naval power to encourage al-Rashīd to settle a peace or risk the disruption of trade.¹⁶ In a report less than a week later, he reveals, with obvious embarrassment, that while the garrison had been prepared for an imminent attack, a party of Moroccans had entered the lines and killed four workmen and wounded five others.¹⁷

But Norwood appears to have possessed the requisite skills and experience to provide the type of leadership the colony required at this critical juncture. The son of a member of the English minor gentry, little is known of his early years. He fought for the Royalist cause during the Civil Wars, and in 1649 he travelled to Virginia, and was, for a time, the treasurer for the colony. In 1653 he was implicated in a Royalist plot and was imprisoned for several years. But his fortunes changed with the restoration of Charles II. He obviously enjoyed the new king's favour, being admitted as an esquire of the body in 1660, and in early 1661 was commissioned as a lieutenant-colonel in the then Lord Rutherford's regiment in Dunkirk, where he also served as deputy-governor.¹⁸

As well as having gained experience both in the military and colonial administration, by the time of his appointment as lieutenant-governor of Tangier in February 1666, Norwood was also no stranger to the town. He had arrived there with Rutherford in 1663, although he did not stay long, leaving shortly after the earl's death to return to

¹⁶ TNA, CO 279/8, f. 91r–v.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 103r.

¹⁸ J. H. Trye, 'Colonel Henry Norwood of Leckhampton, Co. Gloucester', *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society*, 47 (1925), pp. 113–117.

North America to participate in the expedition to take New Amsterdam. In late 1665 he was charged with recruiting soldiers for Tangier, before returning to Morocco in late March the following year, only days before the signing of the treaty with Ghailan.¹⁹ While his principled treatment of Ghailan was lauded, views among his compatriots about his character and disposition were mixed. Addison clearly admired him, as he had Teviot, and described him in similar terms: 'that excellent person', and one 'whose honourable proceedings rendered him so esteemed among the Moors'.²⁰ In contrast Hugh Cholmley thought little of him, and convinced Samuel Pepys that Tangier would be no better managed under Norwood than it had been under Belasyse, believing both men were only concerned with their own interests.²¹ However, Cholmley's professed opinion of Norwood may have been influenced by his own desire to obtain the governorship, and he sought to undermine Norwood for this reason.²² In any event, his low estimation was later compounded by the lieutenant-governor's critical appraisal of progress with the mole.²³ Norwood's relationship with the civic leaders of the town was also fractious, and Pepys' views about his unsuitability for the post were reinforced by what he saw as the poor treatment he accorded them.²⁴ These different perspectives of Norwood and insights provided by his correspondence convey the sense that he was a man of principle, who was prone to intolerance, possessed of an acerbic wit, and, despite his apparent diplomatic astuteness, one who could also be intractable in his dealings with others.

Ghailan held on for a further year, but by the middle of 1668 it had become obvious that nothing was going to stop the 'Alawīs, with Norwood acknowledging this fact in a letter in July in which, among other disturbing developments, he reported that Ghailan had fled Asilah.²⁵ After having alienated the people in the hinterland of the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²⁰ Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 57, 66.

²¹ Samuel Pepys, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, eds. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 7 (London, 1970–1983), p. 99, entry for 14 April 1666.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, 9, p. 455, entry for 22 February 1669; Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 24–25.

²⁴ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 9, pp. 392, 430–431, entries for 14 December 1668 and 29 January 1669.

²⁵ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 19 July 1668, TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 145–148. The folio numbering for this document is in reverse order, with f. 148 being the first folio of the letter.

town as a result of foraging raids,²⁶ and recently learning that his remaining allies, the Dilā'īs, had been decisively defeated, Ghailan began to suspect the loyalty of those around him, and finally abandoned his stronghold with the help of Algerine corsairs. He subsequently sailed directly to Algiers, with Norwood pointedly noting he did so without even bidding 'us farewell'.²⁷ However, he did not have to wait long to find out what had transpired when the majority of Ghailan's entourage of around 190 men, women, and children was temporarily deposited in Tangier. The lieutenant-governor graciously admitted them and 'gave them houses to repose themselves much for their contentment'.²⁸

The inhabitants took a great interest in the new arrivals, particularly the women — if Norwood's response is any indication. Usually restrained in his correspondence, apart from the odd quip, he reveals he was rather excited by what he observed. Describing them as 'ladyes of orange and tawny complexion' from 'divers nations', he notes that while many of them are 'old and ill-favoured', others were 'young and tolerable'. He was especially taken by Ghailan's sister, whom he thought to be 'very fayre and lovely, and a co[u]sin as amiable as herselfe'. With propriety obviously eluding him under the circumstances, he remarks to the Secretary of State that Ghailan's 'concubines possessing here are enough to people this place with a little help of our soldiers'.²⁹ It was perhaps not an entirely flippant observation, given the difficulties which had been experienced in attracting settlers to the colony and the prevailing gender imbalance. Notably, while attentive to their skin colour, there is no indication he discriminated between them on that basis.³⁰ While Norwood does not appear to have attempted to entice any of the women to remain, he did contentiously agree to the release of a Portuguese girl who had been captured and sold into slavery, and

²⁶ Addison notes this in his own account of the episode in *West Barbary*, pp. 70–71.

²⁷ TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 147r–148v.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 147r.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 147v.

³⁰ While Norwood states that Ghailan's sister was 'fayre', it is unclear whether he is referring to her skin colour or using the word with its more traditional meaning relating to beauty. Even if he was commenting on her complexion, it was not necessarily the factor that Norwood thought made her 'lovely'.

who wished to return to her parents, earning him the resentment of Ghailan, despite his previous unwavering support for the Moroccan leader.³¹

With the defeat of Ghailan and the Dilā'īs the English had lost two important buffers against the 'Alawīs. In his report to Arlington, Norwood again turned to the progress made by Mawlay al-Rashīd to emphasise the dire threat to which Tangier was now exposed: 'Every day we get newes of Taffaletta's successes, and every success a new instance of his mortall hatred of Christians'. Despite the promise hopefully gleaned from earlier contact, Norwood's assessment was that there was now little prospect for a peace treaty 'during his reigne who now will have no kind of division to limit his attempts uppon the Christian garrisons' unless he was distracted by a 'warre with the Algerines'.³² Norwood also understood that al-Rashīd was not only religiously zealous but also 'very formidable, and the more because he is the first potentate of Barbary that for a 100 years past has kept an army in pay'.³³ The irony of the present situation was possibly not lost on some of the inhabitants of Tangier; while al-Rashīd was expelling European Christians from towns he had conquered under the threat of 'payne of death' if they did not depart,³⁴ the English in Tangier were providing sanctuary to some three hundred Moroccans, many of whom had been the most high-ranking men of the region,³⁵ and undoubtedly complicit in earlier hostilities against the colony.

Enid Routh argued that 1668 was the year that the fate of English Tangier was decided. In Routh's view, the conditions at the time were propitious for the English to advance further into Morocco and consolidate their colonial presence: England was at peace with the Dutch, relations with Spain were normalising, trade was expanding, a treaty with Ghailan had been signed, and the 'Alawīs had yet to fully establish their authority in the north. In a counterfactual and anachronistic assessment informed by later British imperial ideology and practice, Routh asserts

³¹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 95–97.

³² TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 146r–147v.

³³ *Ibid.*, f. 146r.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 147v.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 146r.

that if the English had only committed greater military resources, Mawlay al-Rashīd might 'have been induced to listen attentively to the proposals of an English Ambassador, for the Moorish Court was always ready to agree to just so much as the English were prepared to enforce'. Furthermore, the people 'had a deep-rooted contempt for all foreigners, and a strong-belief in their own self-sufficiency'; consequently, 'an effective demonstration of power was the only possible way of winning their respect'.³⁶ She sees the crux of the problem as an aversion to risk, which arose from the disastrous events of 1664, with 'Teviot's daring policy' giving way to 'one of inaction, almost of timidity' under Belasyse.³⁷

Even on the basis of historical fact, Routh's assessment is wrong-headed on several counts. First, it is likely that fiscal constraints and political concerns would have precluded the establishment of a larger garrison. Second, no Moroccan leader to that time had been forced to concede anything to the English simply on the basis of coercion; in fact, they had instead demonstrated canniness in extracting generous concessions from the English at little cost to themselves. Third, Routh failed to understand that the cause of the deep antipathy felt by many Moroccans towards European Christians had been the very colonial activities which she proposed. Fourth, Teviot was not promoting a program of colonial expansion. As argued in the preceding chapter, it had already been decided at the beginning of the occupation that pursuit of a territorial empire in North Africa was not practical, and that the future of Tangier lay in peaceful trade as part of an expanding maritime empire. The year 1668 would be a pivotal one for the colony, but not for the reasons given by Routh. It was the year that the 'Alawīs affirmed their dominance in Morocco, introducing a new dynamic to Anglo-Moroccan relations, and it also ushered in substantial change in the administration of Tangier.

³⁶ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 113–114.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

5.2. Time for some Housekeeping: Developing Tangier

While the English policy of appeasement and emphasis on promotion of peaceful trade in Morocco had been well considered, plans for Tangier had suffered from conflict with Ghailan, war with the Dutch, tensions with Spain and France, and maladministration. Despite the potential benefits afforded by Tangier's status as a free port, as a result of the ongoing attacks on the town and the interruption of trade and supplies, Britons remained reluctant to settle there, and, consequently, the economy of the town stagnated, and it continued to be a significant drain on the exchequer.³⁸ Tangier had had its detractors ever since the announcement of the acquisition of the settlement, but as time went by, even its staunchest supporters began to become disillusioned. In 1663 Pepys had agreed that Tangier was 'likely to be the most considerable place the King of England hath in the world'.³⁹ Yet less than four years later, he and other members of the Tangier Committee began to voice concerns about the future of the colony amid claims of mismanagement, corruption, discord, and immorality. With a tangled web of personal rivalries and vested interests it is difficult to distil the truth of some of the claims made by Pepys, but it was agreed by the Committee that reform of the financing and administration of Tangier was necessary. It was during this period of introspection and recrimination that Lord Belasyse, who was still in England, appears to have been forced to resign his commission as governor.⁴⁰

³⁸ The financial pressures on Charles' government had been exacerbated by the recent war with the Dutch, and the catastrophic plague and fire in London. On issues concerning the funding of Tangier at this time see *ibid.*, pp. 115–116.

³⁹ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 4, p. 319, entry for 28 September 1663.

⁴⁰ On Pepys' views about Tangier, and details of the concerns and deliberations of the Tangier Committee, around this time, see *ibid.*, 7, p. 109, entry for 24 April 1666; *ibid.*, 8, pp. 60–61, 160, 201, 207, 210, 215, entries for 14 February, 10 April, 5 May, 9 May, 11 May, 14 May, 1667. On Pepys' changing views about Tangier see also Margarette Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 77 (2014), pp. 418–420. Other insights into Pepys' treatment of matters pertaining to Tangier are provided by Adam R. Beach in 'Satirizing English Tangier in Samuel Pepys's Diary and Tangier Papers', in Goran V. Stanivukovic, ed., *Remapping the Mediterranean World in Early Modern English Writings* (New York, 2007), see esp. pp. 230–233. Beach overreaches in his characterisation of Pepys observations and opinions as being satirical in nature, but provides some interesting perspectives on the diarist's views about Tangier and its administration, and on attitudes to colonial activity in English society in the seventeenth century.

While the principal reform proposed by the committee was the establishment of a civilian government, rather than the military authority under which the colony had been managed, Routh, not unreasonably, asserts that the singular objective of the committee was to identify means to put Tangier on a sustainable financial footing. A municipal authority, the commissioners believed, would facilitate better financial control and provide a legal framework much more conducive to trade and settlement, both of which would contribute to the financial viability of the colony.⁴¹ In addition, the garrison would be reduced from two regiments with a nominal establishment of two thousand men and a troop of horse, to one regiment of sixteen hundred men and a reduction in the number of horse of more than half. These changes were given effect by order of the king in March 1668.⁴² The decision to make such a substantial reduction to the strength and capability of the garrison appears to be short-sighted, given Ghailan's tenuous position by this time, however, it had not been unilaterally imposed. In fact, the restructuring had been based on a plan prepared and presented to the Committee by Belasyse in October 1666, and Norwood had earlier that year also put forward his own plan involving even deeper cuts, which had been rejected.⁴³ When these proposals were first considered they may have been appropriate in light of the recent peace signed with Ghailan, but over the ensuing year, while the measures were debated, the situation on the ground had changed significantly. The risks of the move were increased by likely delays in obtaining suitable reinforcements in response to illness, death, or an escalation in hostility, at least partly due to the poor reputation that Tangier had developed.⁴⁴

Tangier was incorporated as a free city in June 1668, and the associated reforms which were implemented around this time promised fundamental change to the

⁴¹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 114, 117.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 312–314.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 311–313.

⁴⁴ On problems with recruitment, see *ibid.*, pp. 314–317. The aversion that prospective recruits had toward service in Tangier is well evidenced in the following advice from Portugal concerning the forthcoming embarkation of soldiers for Tangier: 'And now that I mention the soldiers, I cannot but acquaint you with the greate feare their officers have, that many of them will turn away rather than goe unto Tanger, of which place there is a strange ill opinion among them bread by some who have formerly fledd from thence but I use the best meanes I can to have them undeceived in that matter'. See Sir Robert Southwell to Joseph Williamson, Lisbon, 20/30 July 1668, TNA, SP 89/9, ff. 87r–v.

nature of the colony, transforming it from what was little more than a military outpost to a cosmopolitan trading centre. Under its royal charter, voting and other legal rights were accorded to all 'the inhabitants thereof as well our native borne subjects, also aliens and strangers being Christians', Protestant or Catholic.⁴⁵ Tangier's remaining Portuguese population, and the town's situation and function, had always dictated the need for some level of religious toleration, but this acceptance did not extend to providing suffrage or other codified rights to either Muslims or Jews who also inhabited the city.⁴⁶

In August, the Earl of Sandwich arrived in Tangier to formally deliver the charter and oversee its enactment. But the earl's visit was also intended to investigate wider concerns held by the Tangier Committee about the state of the colony and tensions which existed between the garrison and the civilian community, as well as assuage the concerns of the military which were anticipated as a result of the change in governance and the associated loss of long-standing perquisites.⁴⁷ The earl's work in Tangier was also preparing the way for another important change to the governance of Tangier. In May, John, Earl of Middleton had been commissioned to replace Belaysse as governor,⁴⁸ but was not immediately dispatched to assume his new role. In light of concerns about the way in which previous governors had acquitted themselves, it had been resolved that a replacement would not be installed until someone had been 'sent to put the garrison in order, so as that he that goes may go with limitations and rules to follow'.⁴⁹ The Committee clearly intended to limit the discretionary authority of future governors, and exercise more control over the affairs of Tangier. Pepys had dismissed the plan of sending a commissioner in advance

⁴⁵ 'A Copy of the Charter Granted by His Ma[jes]ty to the city of Tanger', 4 June 1668, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.341, f. 194r. On the changes to governance arising from the charter and their significance, see Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 117–120; Tristan Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), pp. 999–1000. Cholmley provides an interesting discussion on considerations given to the system of law which should apply to Tangier given its unique position as a personal possession of the king in the Mediterranean in *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 73–76.

⁴⁶ On religious toleration in Tangier, see William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 210–219.

⁴⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 120–121; Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 27–28.

⁴⁸ 'Charles II: May 1668', in *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, BHO ed. (London, 1939), accessed 6 October 2017, entry for 15 May 1668.

⁴⁹ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 8, p. 160, entry for 10 April 1667.

as a waste of time, and to the extent that Sandwich resolved the hostilities between the garrison and civilian authorities, he was vindicated.⁵⁰ While a brief peace was achieved, the new arrangements created new points of tension which festered over the following year until a partial reconciliation between the parties was achieved by Middleton. But Tangier remained a deeply divided community.⁵¹

While his subjects squabbled amongst themselves in Tangier, the king was seeking to establish peaceful relations with Salé. On 30 July 1668, Charles signed a letter addressed to 'the most illustrious lords, the governors and commanders in chief of the castle city and towne of Salley'. It is an intriguing document. In it, the king opens with the admission that 'there be frequent vexations and hostilities committed reciprocally' by the inhabitants of Salé and his own subjects, which has occurred 'for want of that good understanding and correspondence' that had formerly existed between their respective predecessors. Appealing to common interests, Charles proposed the negotiation of 'an alliance and friendship as may be for the security and advantage of both parts', delegating full authority for his envoy, Commander Richard Rooth, to conclude such an agreement.⁵² This initiative was a marked departure from past practice. While Charles I had implicitly acknowledged the culpability of his subjects in perpetuating a cycle of maritime hostility, he had refused to enter into a formal peace with the leaders of the town, due to advice that it was inappropriate to do so.⁵³ But his son went further, not only offering the prospect of a formal treaty but doing so in an overtly conciliatory and unusually intimate manner, concluding the letter with 'Your good friende'.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 207, entry for 9 May 1668.

⁵¹ See Major Palmes Fairborne to Williamson, Tangier, 22 September 1668, TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 112–113; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 121–127. Cf. Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 76, 78.

⁵² Charles II to the governors and commanders of Salé, Whitehall, 30 July 1668, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 158.

⁵³ See chap. 3 of this thesis.

⁵⁴ TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 158. The mission may have been initiated in response to a proposal sent to the king five months earlier from a merchant by the name of Thomas Warren. See 'A remonstrance to the king by his late agent for South Barbary, Thomas Warren', 25 February 1667/68, *ibid.*, f. 157. On Warren and his interests, see below.

The royal charter for Tangier and the king's letter to the governors of Salé reveal an ambivalence about Moroccans within the English government. On one hand there existed prejudicial attitudes, but on the other an overriding desire for peaceful relations, and recognition that this outcome could not necessarily be achieved through intimidation, but preferably through understanding and accommodation. In this respect, England's general diplomatic position concerning Morocco appears to differ little from that which prevailed under Charles I, except to the extent that his son, quite possibly with an eye to his own interests in the country, demonstrated a greater desire to resolve hurdles to peaceful coexistence and trade in the region. Supporting this view is a draft of what appears to be a letter of introduction for Rooth from the king, dated the day before, which states:

Whereas we have resolved and determined nothing more constantly, than that for the renowne of our kingdom, and the good of our subjects, we may every where not onely timmely keep the peace already established with our friends that are our neer neighbours as well as those that are farther off but allso, by what humble meanes we can, binde and renew again the peace which hath been interrupted and is ready to decay.⁵⁵

It reflects a sentiment which, once again, stands in marked contrast to the views of scholars who have argued that the second-half of the seventeenth century witnessed an increasingly aggressive diplomatic posturing by the English in Morocco and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. However, previous diplomatic initiatives with the Salétins had achieved mixed results, and the king's efforts to establish a new peace with the corsair enclave were perhaps further complicated by the fact it was now under the control of the 'Alawīs. Rooth's mission was obviously unsuccessful because he was subsequently given the responsibility by Admiral Thomas Allin of mounting a blockade of the port, which also achieved no tangible results in preventing further attacks on English vessels.⁵⁶ It would be another eight years before the English were finally successful in negotiating a maritime treaty with Salé.

⁵⁵ Letter of introduction from Charles II, 29 July 1668, Westminster, BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 255.

⁵⁶ John Charnock, *Biographica Navalis; Or, Impartial Memoirs of the Lives and Characters of the Officers of the Navy of Great Britain*, 4 vols., vol. I (London, 1794), pp. 28–29; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, 2, p. 358.

In October 1669 the Earl of Middleton finally arrived to take up his new post. He was a controversial figure as a result of his actions during the Civil War and in the aftermath of the Restoration, but he continued to enjoy the support of the Duke of York. Middleton was born into the Scottish gentry and had begun his career as a soldier of fortune in France. In 1639, he returned to Scotland to fight for the Covenanter cause. He subsequently joined the parliamentary army in which he distinguished himself. Perhaps disillusioned by a more radical political direction being adopted by his fellow officers, Middleton defected to the Royalists in 1649. For his services to the cause, Charles II made him an earl, and following the king's restoration he was appointed to several important posts, including lord high commissioner to the Scottish parliament. However, his strong advocacy of pro-episcopalian and absolutist reforms led to discord with members of the court, and in 1663, the loss of his offices.⁵⁷

Views about Middleton among his contemporaries were mixed. His supporters spoke of a man who was courageous, modest, prudent, trustworthy, and noted for his sobriety and moderation.⁵⁸ Unaware he 'was the Great Major-Generall Middleton', after meeting him for the first time, Pepys found the earl 'a shrowd [shrewd] man, but a drinking man I think'. He thought him worldly, and well informed, yet diminished by partaking of excessive 'drinking and other pleasures'.⁵⁹ Similarly, Gilbert Burnet voices claims that Middleton's time as lord high commissioner was characterised by 'much excess', and 'madness of frolic and intemperance'. But his antagonism toward Presbyterians also attracted charges of imperiousness, and overseeing 'a reign of much violence and injustice'.⁶⁰ However, despite his propensity for intemperance, he proved to be a reasonably competent governor and commander, albeit during a period of relative peace for the colony.

⁵⁷ Edward M. Furgol, 'Middleton, John, first earl of Middleton (c.1608–1674)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 10 October 2017.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Pepys, *Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 9, pp. 325–326, 328, entries for 12 October and 13 October 1668.

⁶⁰ Gilbert Burnet, *Burnet's History of My Own Time*, new ed., ed. Osmund Airy, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford, 1897), p. 363.

Tangier's new charter had reaffirmed that the clear intention of the king was to develop Tangier both as a free port, and an open city, and this position is reiterated and elaborated upon in instructions which had been issued to Middleton prior to his departure. The instructions emphasized that the king had incorporated the city 'as the most likely meanes to advance our free-port, diminishe our charge, and invite inhabitants and comerce thither: Which were the only ends aimed at by us in possessing that place, and making a mould there'. Furthermore, determined to reverse the flagging fortunes of his possession, the king expected the governor to 'discountenance all persons, or interests' that seek to frustrate the achievement of these objectives.⁶¹

5.3. A Reluctant Envoy: Extremes of Acculturation

While references to relations with their Moroccan neighbours are notably absent in Middleton's instructions, the issue had not been overlooked. Lord Henry Howard had preceded the governor to Tangier to undertake a special embassy to Mawlay al-Rashīd. His arrival in August followed a series of skirmishes with the sultan's forces within the defensive perimeter of the city in the preceding months, after a long hiatus in hostilities. The attacks had caused concern that a more concerted assault may follow.⁶² But Howard's mission was not a direct result of this development. Planning for a mission to settle a peace with the Alawids had followed shortly after the proclamation, and was clearly part of a carefully considered and orchestrated strategy to deal decisively with the various problems which had plagued the colony.⁶³ The importance accorded the mission is evidenced by the status of the person chosen to lead it — Howard being the most high-ranking envoy that had been sent to Morocco by an English monarch — as well as the attention given to preparations: with Norwood liaising with the 'Alawīs from as early as February concerning the

⁶¹ 'Additional Instructions which may bee given to the Earle of Middleton', [August? 1669], TNA, CO 279/12, f. 93r–v.

⁶² Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 98–99; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 28. Signs of possible preparations for an attack by the 'Alawīs appear to have first been discerned by the garrison early in the new year. See Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 12 February 1668/69, TNA, CO 279/12, f. 250.

⁶³ Rumours about Howard's forthcoming mission were evidently circulating from at least the end of 1668. See 'Dr Browne to his son Edward', 21 December 1668 in Simon Wilkin, ed., *Sir Thomas Browne's Works*, 4 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1835–36), p. 166.

impending embassy,⁶⁴ and Howard taking personal charge of the acquisition of gifts worth four thousand pounds.⁶⁵ This episode in Anglo-Moroccan relations highlights not only how Britons could be seriously challenged by inter-cultural encounters, but also points to systemic problems in later-Stuart diplomatic practice which militated against effective outcomes.

One of the original objectives of the English was for the colony to act as a focal point for their trade with Morocco, an outcome which had been frustrated by both the political dislocation within the country, and Moroccan hostility towards the English occupation. Given the need to invigorate Tangier's economy, and with al-Rashīd's regime in the ascendancy, the embassy was a critical initiative to secure the future of English Tangier. In a letter to the sultan to be delivered by the ambassador, Charles clearly outlines what he was seeking:

Wee pray you to admitt and heare him [Howard] favourably in all things, and particularly in what he shall on our part propose to you for the settleing a firme and lasting peace and amity between our persons and subjects, in such a true trade and commerce with the Coast of Barbary...as hath been practised in times past ... As also, if it shall be found fit, with our City of Tangier, which ... we desire may entertaine a free entercourse and correspondence with the neighbouring parts of your dominions.⁶⁶

In addition, he sought the release of any of his subjects held in Morocco, in exchange for any Moroccans held in his own dominions.

Howard was a surprising choice for such an important mission, given that he possessed no diplomatic experience. His only qualification appears to have been his family connections, and the status which they conferred on him for the purposes of representing the king. Shortly prior to his departure he was created Baron Howard,

⁶⁴ Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 10 March 1668/69, TNA, CO 279/12, f. 241; *ibid.*, f. 250r.

⁶⁵ *CSPD: Charles II, October 1668–December 1669*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 9 (London, 1894), pp. 270, 273, 441, entries for 8 April, 9 April, and 6 August 1669.

⁶⁶ Charles II to the emperor of Morocco, 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, ff. 294v–295r. SP 71/13 is an important archival source relating to Howard's embassy but the ink of many of the folios is very faded, making some, or parts of them, illegible. Extended extracts from a number of these letters are provided in Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*. Copies of correspondence from Howard to al-Rashīd in Spanish can be found in BL, Sloane MS 3513, ff. 34, 38, 46, 55.

but more importantly he was next in line to succeed to the dukedom of Norfolk,⁶⁷ an association highlighted in the king's earlier letter of introduction, and by Howard himself in his initial correspondence with al-Rashīd.⁶⁸ The mission turned out to be an abject failure, at least partly due to Howard's unsuitability for the role. While professing impatience 'for the spedier progress of his majesyes commands' before his departure,⁶⁹ he made no concerted personal effort to do so once he was safely ensconced in Tangier. It soon became apparent that Howard's desire to quickly complete his mission was more to do with his discomfort with being in Morocco, and he began to sow the seeds to explain his hesitancy in leaving Tangier.⁷⁰ In early September he again wrote to Arlington to apprise him of reports of instability in the country, and his fear that al-Rashīd's hold on power was tenuous, the people despising him because of 'his extraordinary bloody severity and sudden crueltys'.⁷¹

The ambassador would not leave until his safety was assured. In the meantime, he sent two members of his party, his secretary, Thomas Warren, and a Mr Burghill, to make arrangements 'for my reception' at the sultan's court 'in such style of honour to both crownes', and to ensure his personal security 'whether by hostage or otherwise'.⁷² However, despite receiving assurances in September and November that al-Rashīd had given permission for him to proceed, and being provided with documents for safe passage, Howard continued to stall, citing a variety of problems.⁷³ Among the reports he provided to London during this time, in which, among other things, he attempted to explain the factors which had delayed him, was an account

⁶⁷ John Miller, 'Howard, Henry, sixth duke of Norfolk (1628–1684)', in David Cannadine, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 October 2017. Miller notes that as Howard was a Catholic, there would have been few opportunities for him to have been appointed to positions appropriate to his rank.

⁶⁸ Lord Henry Howard to emperor of Morocco, Tangier, 15 Aug 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 178.

⁶⁹ Howard to [Arlington?], onboard the Mary Rose, 13 July 1669, *ibid.*, f. 168.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Howard to [Arlington?], 13/23 August 1669, Tangier, *ibid.*, f. 177.

⁷¹ Howard to Arlington, Tangier, 9 September 1669, *ibid.*, f. 206v.

⁷² *Ibid.*, f. 178. Howard sometime rendered 'Burghill' as 'Burchell' or 'Burell'.

⁷³ See, in particular, Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 30 September 1669, *ibid.*, ff. 233–237, esp. f. 235; Translation of first serugo in English, *ibid.*, f. 226; Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 10 October 1669, *ibid.*, f. 242r; Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 13 November 1669, *ibid.*, ff. 259–262; 'Translation of second serugo', TNA, SP 71/14/Pt. 1, f. 49; Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 28 November 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, ff. 274–275; Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 4 December 1669, *ibid.*, ff. 279–288. See also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 104–108.

in which he described at length the perilous conditions which prevailed in the country, and emphasised the danger to which he would be exposed in 'venturing in amongst these barbarians'.⁷⁴ Contrary to his continued reassurances of imminent success and feigned bravado, his increasingly voluminous reports to London reveal both a growing paranoia and an awareness of the likely (self-fulfilling) failure of his mission.

Howard expressed strongly prejudicial views about Moroccans even though he appears to have had little direct contact with them. His one recorded encounter in Tangier was quite positive and should have given him cause to reassess his jaundiced attitudes.⁷⁵ However, the experience ultimately appears to have little effect on his views. Not only were they barbarians, according to Howard, but he frequently represents them as deceitful, duplicitous and mercurial. He justified his caution by asserting that it was commonly accepted that 'all these Moores are ... a subtle kynde of faithlesse rogues',⁷⁶ that they were a 'capritious people',⁷⁷ 'veary fikle',⁷⁸ and 'of a jelous and changeable disposition'.⁷⁹ Accordingly, he condescendingly concludes that they were a people 'that must be veary carefully and tenderly handled', and who lacked 'our old inglish innate honesty'.⁸⁰ But he also makes a frank admission that reveals his state of mind, an acknowledgement that he was experiencing difficulty in adjusting to being in an unfamiliar environment. Less than two months after his arrival he admits he is 'beginning to be a little weary of my long stay here in this excessive changeable place'.⁸¹ It was more than a delay in settling in though. Throughout his stay in Morocco, Howard demonstrates an incapacity to positively embrace the experience and view what he found there other than through the delimiting filter of his own preconceptions and fears.

⁷⁴ Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 21 Oct. 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, pp. 247–253. Quotation is from f. 251.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 280, 282–285.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 235.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 260.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 247.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 284.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 287.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, f. 236.

He reasonably suggested that the sultan's invitation to treat was nothing but a 'wheedle', but also continued to insinuate that it may be a more serious conspiracy, 'a darke designe to entrap me'.⁸² While his pronounced fears and negative representations of Moroccans were undoubtedly grounded in pre-existing prejudices, which were reinforced by his growing anxiety about residing in an alien land beset by real and imagined dangers, their inclusion in his reports must also be recognised as part of a shrewdly deliberate act, to emphasise the imminent danger he faced of being held hostage or meeting with other misfortune should he proceed to Fez, and providing him with further plausible excuses for delay and possible failure. Yet despite the general paranoia and xenophobia manifested by their leader, there were at least some men in Howard's entourage (which numbered around seventy) who reveal no such extreme disposition and demonstrated a marked capacity for positive acculturation. Among the delegation were Howard's two principal men, Burghill and Warren, who appear to have acquitted themselves well in their work on his behalf despite having had to defend the embassy in the face of Moroccan suspicion and frustration arising from Howard's demands and prevarication.

Warren was no stranger to Morocco. He had extensive trading interests in Santa Cruz and Salé, and, as discussed in the preceding chapter, he had led a mission in 1665–66 to negotiate several treaties. It was undoubtedly for these reasons that he had been asked to join the embassy, but he had his own motivation for wanting to participate. His deal with Abdul-Karin al-Shabbani in Marrakesh for the supply of gunpowder had not been fulfilled due to a delay in the delivery and the death of al-Shabbani, and the merchant was now seeking to negotiate a sale with al-Rashīd. The problem, Warren alleged, was that he was unsure of the fate of the original consignment. Cleverly, he used the situation to his advantage by arguing that if the government advanced to him twenty-five tons of gunpowder he would carry it to Morocco to prevent the issue of the missing gunpowder compromising the embassy, as well as holding out the prospect of effecting the release of captured Britons.⁸³

⁸² *Ibid.*, f. 286.

⁸³ 'Charles II: March 1669', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1668–9*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1894), entries for 18 March. See pp. 238–239 in printed edition.

It was an attractive opportunity for Warren; by tying his business transaction into the treaty negotiations he could overcome any misgivings the government may have had about the supply of gunpowder to a party that was already a recognised threat to Tangier. The government's acquiescence in Warren's suggestion, and the questionable value to England of his earlier mission, testify to the way in which commercial self-interest and corruption could compromise broader national interests during the later Stuart period. Howard, though, complicated the situation further by preventing Warren from negotiating separately with the sultan, insisting that the matter be incorporated into the business of the embassy and seeking to use it as leverage until he was more certain of al-Rashīd's disposition.⁸⁴ The problem was that the gunpowder had already been offered to the sultan, with just the terms of the sale to be finalised.

Little is known about Burghill other than that Howard had long been acquainted with him, and admired his 'discretion and ingenuity'.⁸⁵ It was Burghill who was given the lead role of liaising with the sultan's court, requiring him to traverse what he described as 'a damned contrey to travayle in'.⁸⁶ While he found his first journey challenging, he was obviously satisfied with the hospitality accorded his party upon their arrival, and the reception given to him by the sultan, although he reveals little of his thoughts about the experience. He does reflect on how reliant al-Rashīd and his counsellors were on the advice of the governors of Salé concerning diplomatic protocol, but passes no judgement on their evident awkwardness, although he did note with a hint of amusement the sultan's pleasure at being 'treated as the Grand Signior'.⁸⁷ Burghill was left to placate the sultan over the delay in the embassy, while Howard continued to prevaricate and his paranoia grew.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Howard to [Arlington?], 24 August 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 182r.

⁸⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 100–101. The source she quotes from is not identified.

⁸⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 101. Original source not identified.

⁸⁷ Burghill to Howard, Salé, 14 September 1669, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, ff. 219r–v. The index for the volume identifies the letter commencing at f. 257, but the index entry is misnumbered. The letter starts at f. 219 but the verso side is numbered 232, the recto side of the second sheet is numbered 222, with the verso side numbered 235. Folios 220 and 221 appear to be two postscripts to the letter. On this episode, see also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 102–103.

⁸⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 104–108.

Routh is scathing of Howard's conduct, but her assessment is perhaps overly critical, overlooking or underestimating some of the difficulties he faced. Burghill reveals the challenges of travel in the country, and of the logistical problems in transporting the ambassador in comfort and style.⁸⁹ Major Palmes Fairborne of the Tangier garrison also presents a very different perspective, both of Howard personally and as an ambassador. Writing to Joseph Williamson in January 1670, Fairborne notes that Howard is well liked by both the military and civilian communities of Tangier, and 'his behaviour all along in this embassy hath been very prudent and cautious'. He goes on to explain that Howard's mission had 'mett with severall delays and difficulties', but he did not doubt that it would be successful.⁹⁰ He also reported that it had been al-Rashīd himself who had not allowed the embassy to proceed during a recent uprising, as he could not guarantee the ambassador's safety. Fairborne also expresses support for Howard's decision to send Warren to seek the sultan's agreement to proceed, by the appointment of commissioners or for the sultan himself to come to Tangier.⁹¹ Furthermore, Howard was not alone in harbouring concerns about leaving Tangier; even John Luke who had been in the colony for seven years later reflected on his good luck at having avoided the need to accompany Howard to Fez.⁹²

Despite Fairborne's positive assessment, Howard had clearly made up his mind; he wished to return home and had no intention of travelling to Fez under any circumstance. In April he dismissed a report from Burghill that conditions were favourable to conclude the negotiations. In response, in a report to Arlington, he claimed that the Moroccans had from the start no other agenda than to take him captive, and launched into a tirade against the sultan and his courtiers. His desperation was such that he even undermined Burghill, to support his case for the

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

⁹⁰ Fairborne to Joseph Williamson, Tangier, 25 January 1669/70, TNA, CO 279/13, f. 18. Fairborne is rendered as 'Fareburne' in some accounts in which he is mentioned.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, f. 19. Cf. Routh, who dates Howard's dispatch of Warren to Fes to pursue this proposal to February, 1670. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 107.

⁹² John Luke, *Tangier at High Tide: The Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673*, ed. Helen Andrews Kaufman (Geneva, 1958), p. 21, entry for 9 December 1670. On p. 23, Luke also states that 'Tafiletta' had 'forbid our going into the country'.

cessation of the embassy. According to Howard, the Moroccans were irrational ‘brutes’, there was no certainty that al-Rashīd would prevail, and the sultan was a crazed, drunken tyrant. He argued that Burghill was motivated by self-interest, was misinformed, and had been corrupted from his time at the court. Howard alleged that Burghill slept little, drank and smoked excessively, and talked incessantly — ‘feares and disorders had partly crackt his braynes’.⁹³ Howard had given up all pretence of stoicism by this time, he simply wanted to convince the king in no uncertain terms that it was futile to seek a peace with the Moroccans. In doing so, Howard went further than questioning their moral integrity, he also highlighted their ethnic and religious differences; they were not simply rogues and barbarians, but ‘tawny rogues’, and al-Rashīd was a ‘mighty Mohemetan foe’.⁹⁴

Finally, in May 1670, after having been forced to agree to supply the gunpowder to secure the release of his men who were being held hostage, and still waiting for a response from the sultan concerning his proposal to appoint commissioners, Howard received, with palpable relief, permission to return home.⁹⁵ In July, eleven months after arriving, he left Morocco,⁹⁶ having achieved nothing more than providing al-Rashīd with a large supply of gunpowder, and, undoubtedly, tarnishing the sultan’s perceptions of the English. However, blame for the failure of the embassy should not be accorded to Howard’s conduct. Howard did not live up to Routh’s standards for Englishmen, but ultimately, as observed by Routh herself, the sultan does not appear to have been genuinely disposed to treat with the English; at the very least he was indifferent, more concerned with acquiring Warren’s gunpowder and suppressing revolt, than settling a peace.⁹⁷ More critically though, as discussed in the following chapter, the antipathy of the ‘Alawīs to European colonisation made any peace with the English, on terms that would have been acceptable to them, impossible.

⁹³ See the extract from Howard’s letter in Routh, *England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 108–109. Source details not provided.

⁹⁴ Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 14 May 1670, TNA, SP 71/14/Pt. 1, f. 115.

⁹⁵ Howard to [Arlington?], Tangier, 28 May 1670, *ibid.*, f. 117.

⁹⁶ Routh, *England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 110–111.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

What makes Howard an interesting character for this study is not that he succeeded or failed, but, rather, the impact that his experiences in Morocco had on him. His quick transition from reluctant, but confident, diplomatic envoy to a seemingly delusional xenophobe testifies to the way in which people, other than captives, could become disoriented and negatively affected through immersion in an unfamiliar location and culture. Howard had enjoyed a privileged upbringing and a sheltered life. He commenced his embassy with the expectation that his rank and role would accord him respect and influence, and that he would be able to quickly conclude negotiations and return home.⁹⁸ But he found the realities of Morocco a shock. Not only was travel in the country difficult, but his status as an English noble and royal representative did not guarantee deference. With this realisation came anxiety. Rather than seeking to understand the people he was charged to negotiate with, and allowing his preconceptions to be challenged, he instead turned to them to help rationalise to himself, and others, why he should not travel, and could not succeed. Over time, general anxiety and deliberate obfuscation developed into paranoia and delusion, and rejection of any information or experience which conflicted with his self-confirmed beliefs.

And Howard was not the only high-born English envoy around this time to have failed to acquit his duties in North Africa due to fear, ignorance, and arrogance. In 1660, Lord Winchelsea, the recently appointed ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had been charged with negotiating a treaty with Algiers. Like Howard he lacked knowledge of the place, was culturally intolerant, refused to leave his ship, resented having to remain there, and finally departed without having concluded his work, leaving the task to a subordinate.⁹⁹ The significance of the problems which could arise from the use of aristocrats such as Howard and Winchelsea to conduct culturally-sensitive

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁹⁹ Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 229–230. Cf. Alison Game's observation concerning the care which had been given to the selection of ambassadors, consuls and governors from the Elizabethan period to the end of the Commonwealth to ensure they possessed the skills, experience, and personal attributes commensurate with the requirements of their intended posts. Contrast this to the appointments of, for example, Belasyse and Howard, following the Restoration, during which time patronage appears to have become a more significant factor in selection. See Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 148–149.

missions was not lost on one contemporary. Musing on the need for greater understanding of Morocco and its people, and the possibility of obtaining a treaty, the author of *The Present Interest of Tangier* insisted that anyone sent on such a mission 'must not be a noble-man; for they care not to see any greater state amongst them than they observe'. Rather, they should be 'ingenious' and familiar with the local language, but also a clergyman, for the princes of Morocco 'have a great respect' for them.¹⁰⁰

Aside from Warren and Burghill, there were other gentlemen in Howard's party who also demonstrated more courage and commitment. Among them was a man known only by the initials 'S.L.', who in November 1669, while residing in Fez, wrote a letter to a friend about his experiences; the letter was published the following year. In it, S.L. notes that he is writing in response to the addressee's 'earnest request' for information and assures him that he has provided 'a full account of the estate of this country, as much as I have received from very good hands'. He also highlights that much of the information currently available about the country is 'mixed with fables and tales', or else no longer current.¹⁰¹ Despite his professions, S.L. reveals that when he departed for Tangier he possessed certain preconceptions, and he was not immune to the influence of hearsay, but he does demonstrate objectivity in many of his own observations.

He begins by recounting tales of Muslim Moroccan cruelty, perfidy, and persecution of both Christians and Jews, to stress the dangers of travelling in the country, yet admits, 'I have seen some French merchants riding abroad without fear, and return safely', adding that the people recognise the value of relations with other nations, understanding them to be 'very necessary for their more convenient subsistence'.¹⁰² His ability to reflect upon his experiences in a way that did not reinforce his prejudice is also evident when he recalls his alarm when first entering the camp of their Moroccan escort to observe aggressive posturing among the troops. At first thinking

¹⁰⁰ *The Present Interest of Tangier* (London, 1679), p. 4.

¹⁰¹ S.L., *A Letter from a Gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue to His Friend in London* (London, 1670), p. 1.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 1–3.

that they intended to attack the party, he learned that it was due to a disagreement between the men about a tenet of Islam. In response to this episode he wrote:

So general is that madness amongst men, not to allow what nature cannot refuse a freedom of judgement...I'll warrant you if those two nasty Moors had but had a little more breeding, and a little more authority, they would have been content to have made a schism about trifles and endangered mens lives in the maintainance of their mistakes.¹⁰³

The incident obviously had a powerful effect on S.L., but not as evidence of Moroccan bellicosity. His observation was, in fact, a pointed critique of his own society, of the corrupting influence of power and hubris: 'This particular I could not forget, because it relates to our own condition at home'.¹⁰⁴

Within the comfort and familiarity afforded by Tangier, S.L.'s first impressions of the country were highly favourable, as was generally the case with newly arrived Britons. He judged it to be 'a most pleasant seat as in the world', the air was 'pure and refined', the land was 'good and fruitful', and 'the climate very moderate'.¹⁰⁵ However, while treated with civility by his Moroccan hosts, S.L. clearly found his first day and night outside the city unsettling. He considered the food to be unpalatable, and the 'pitiful tent' shared with the 'stinking Moors' no less objectionable. It rained that night, he was beset by mosquitoes, and wished he was with his friend back in the 'Kings-Head' in London. He was also perturbed that the Moroccans conducted themselves with the same arrogance as the Spanish.¹⁰⁶ Either conditions or S.L.'s disposition improved for the remainder of the journey, for he makes no further complaints. His only reproach was due to the party having been accorded less 'pomp' on their arrival at Asilah than he obviously expected.¹⁰⁷ The lack of recognition and deference shown to the English clearly troubled him. Much more to his liking was the greeting they received in 'Alcazar' (Ksar el-Kebir) where 'many persons of quality flock'd together to bid us welcome', affirming his belief that not only did the

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Moroccans wish to establish good relations, but also that the English were favoured above all other nations for their behaviour and Protestant faith.¹⁰⁸ It was a conviction that had also been strongly held by John Harrison some four decades earlier. Cholmley too liked to think that the Moroccans were more favourably disposed to the English, but rather than religious affinity, he believed it was because of recognition of the long history of diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries.¹⁰⁹

Also, like Harrison, S.L. reserved his harshest criticisms not for the Moroccan people in general, but rather their leaders, whom he thought mistreated them, and none more so than Mawlay al-Rashīd. Based on stories he had been told, S.L. painted an image of al-Rashīd as being duplicitous, avaricious, and merciless. But unlike some other commentators, who characterised the people as disloyal and rebellious by nature, S.L. stresses their 'great respect and submission to their princes [al-Rashīd's] judgement and actions'.¹¹⁰ Not only could they give unquestioning commitment to their leaders, but they were also uncritical of their religion. Without recognising the culpability of his own society, and inspired by Christian self-righteousness, S.L. explained that their prejudice against Christians was nurtured in them from birth, giving them 'an inveterate hatred of the truth, and its professours, unto which their reason might otherwise incline them'.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, he began to admire their religious devotion and praised the system he blamed for perpetuating 'the Divels policy' of keeping the people in ignorance. He observed with approval that they 'have that good instinct to set apart a place for the worship of God'.¹¹² Furthermore, their system of education and religious instruction:

is the cause that every one is so devout, and that prophaness finds such little entertainment amongst them. It were to be wisht that our English clergy would practice the same custom ... We might then hope that the next generation of men would be ... more devoted to the service of God, and their Prince.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁹ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 38, 88.

¹¹⁰ S.L., *Letter from a Gentleman*, pp. 2–3, 16–18. Quotation is from p. 18 (my interpolation).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Like many of his compatriots, S.L. considered Moroccan Arabs and Berbers to be a 'lazy' people,¹¹⁴ but genuinely committed to their religion. The example the people and their religious leaders set in this regard caused him to reflect once again on his own society. Through his own observations, S.L. came to believe that Muslims provided a benchmark for education and religious devotion to which the English clergy should aspire, as a means to both dispel widespread ignorance and raise the standing of the Church.

But conversely, S.L.'s account also reveals the critical importance of the means by which cultural encounter and understanding is mediated. In Ksar el-Kebir the Britons were visited by a 'famous negromancer [necromancer]', who wished to show his respect by entertaining them with 'dance and music'. However, according to S.L., shortly after the man began he was joined by an 'ill shap'd rogue as black as the Devil, followed by a furious goat and dog', who all began to dance. He had enjoyed the performance until informed that the three 'shapes were not real, but that they were devils or evil spirits'. S.L. goes on to explain that the revelation disturbed him and his colleagues, and once their discomfort became evident 'these appearances vanish'd', leaving behind them a 'horrible stench' to 'punish our contempt'.¹¹⁵ The incident unsettled them and made them 'fall to our prayers' and strengthened their Christian devotion.¹¹⁶ Given the occultist overtones of the performance and contemporary concerns about witchcraft, their apprehension is understandable, but what S.L. observed was a performance by a Sufi mystic demonstrating his power to pacify and exorcise spirits (*jinn*). However, the religious nuances of the ritual were lost on the Britons because of the lack of anyone who could properly explain its meaning to them.

It has been claimed that S.L.'s aim in preparing the account was to 'redirect the imperial gaze to the wealth of the region' and provide Britons with assurance that

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

the land could be conquered and exploited.¹¹⁷ However, such an interpretation reflects a misreading of the content of the letter.¹¹⁸ The author makes it clear that he simply wrote to satisfy his friend's previously expressed curiosity about Morocco, and, accordingly, as was becoming increasingly commonplace, sought to provide him with more than just an account of the places he visited and his experiences; he also wished to provide him with ethnographic insight. He understandably devotes much attention to the political instability which had plagued Morocco, and the detrimental impact that this has had on the people and the land, but incorporates this into an extended discussion of the ethnic divisions in the country between Arabs and Berbers, and Moroccan customs and beliefs.¹¹⁹ While in places he wrote disparagingly of the people, and lamented their inability to exploit the resources available to them, it is evident that he was also trying to understand them, and was able on occasions to see beyond the bias of his preconceptions. S.L. finished his journey obviously more comfortable and enlightened than when he began. He was able to appreciate the hospitality of itinerant Arabs, with carpets for seats and the ground as a table, before arriving at Fez where he marvelled at the 'abundance of rare things' he discovered there.¹²⁰ The account is interesting, and rare, because in its detail and strict chronological sequence, and through its ambivalence, it provides insight into the ways in which an Englishman began to experience the effects of positive acculturation, reinforcing the influence that intercultural engagement could have on reframing preconceptions.

¹¹⁷ Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 141.

¹¹⁸ Matar bases his assertion, at least partly, on the content of a document *A Brief Account of the Native Commodities of Africa* which was appended to the published letter. However, there is nothing to indicate that this document, with its references to 'Basilisks' and other oddities, was written by S.L. It is more likely that it was prepared at the initiative of the publisher to provide further detail about Morocco to pique the interest of prospective readers. Furthermore, it also does not appear intended to encourage conquest and exploitation of Morocco, but rather, the author, like S.L., thought that development in the country had been hindered by its Arab rulers.

¹¹⁹ See esp., S.L., *Letter from a Gentleman*, pp. 23–30. S.L. refers to the Berbers by the toponymic appellation of 'Barbarians', but only to acknowledge them as the original people of the region, or 'Brabbers'.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

5.4. Profound Learnings: Morocco as a Conceptual Model

The author of *The Present Interest of Tangier* could very well have been thinking of Lancelot Addison when he described the type of person who should be sent among the Moroccans to negotiate a peace. As well as being a clergyman, he was intelligent, relatively knowledgeable about their religion and culture, and had some familiarity with their language. Given these attributes, it is, therefore, perhaps surprising that Addison appears to have played no role in Howard's embassy. In any event, his potential diplomatic utility was lost to the colony when he returned to England early in 1670, after seven years in Morocco. A rectorship in Wiltshire provided him with the means to pursue his scholarly interests, including a number of projects that would draw on his experiences in Morocco and the information he had collected there.¹²¹ The first of these was *West Barbary*, published the year after his return, in which he examined the political history and natural resources of Morocco, and discussed the country's people, and their customs and beliefs. In writing the text he combined what he found of relevance in existing sources, including Leo Africanus' *A Description of Africa*, with his own observations and interpretations, and information he had gleaned from Moroccans themselves.¹²² Addison's aim in writing *West Barbary* was not only to entertain his readers, but also to edify them; he sought to demonstrate that even a people judged to be 'barbarous, rude, and savage' recognised that attention to religious devotion and the principles of justice were necessary 'to suppress vice and encourage virtue', so as to ensure social harmony.¹²³ It is notable within the corpus of early modern English writing about North Africa both for the original detail it provides and its relative cultural sensitivity. While the work served an evidently ideological purpose, it also reveals a man who sought to gain an understanding of another people, and in the process developed a genuine affinity for them. The text provides one of the most vivid demonstrations of the possible effects

¹²¹ Alistair Hamilton, 'Addison, Lancelot (1632–1703)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017.

¹²² Addison, *West Barbary*, 'Preface', sig. a3r–[a4]v; Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 79–80, 82. On Addison's use of Africanus' work, see Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 92.

¹²³ Addison, *West Barbary*, 'Preface', sig. [a2]r–v.

of intensive and prolonged cultural immersion on Britons residing in the region during this period.

In keeping with his didactic purpose, Addison's exposition of the political and social upheaval in the country since the early sixteenth century is more than a simple history. In a not entirely inaccurate account, he attributes Morocco's problems to the founder of the Sa'dian dynasty, a man possessing 'high pretensions to piety and fervent zeal for their law', which he manifested in his rigidity of opinion and sanctimonious behaviour.¹²⁴ By claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet, he increased his popularity and the approbation of the people fostered in him the ambition to be ruler of Morocco. The people were receptive because they were tired of being oppressed by their rulers and foreign powers. Taking advantage of the prevailing civil discontent, the Sa'dis began to insinuate themselves into positions of influence until they were able to overthrow the Wattasids.¹²⁵ It was then that they revealed themselves to be hypocrites, who 'took up armes, not out of love to their country and zeale for their religion, but out of a desire to rule'.¹²⁶ According to Addison, the way in which the Sa'dis first usurped power set an example for their descendants which led to the subsequent prolonged period of internecine conflict.¹²⁷ Notably, Addison also did not attribute the political instability to a general belligerence or rebelliousness possessed by the people. Rather, like Harrison and S.L., he saw them as victims of self-serving men who used religion as a means to realise their personal ambitions.¹²⁸ What they were guilty of though, claimed Addison, was a lack of moral fortitude, given that they possessed a 'genius' for assessing the fairness of an act in accordance with its personal value, and using religious precepts to validate the decision.¹²⁹ But it is an assessment which is discordant with evidence he presents elsewhere of their piety and adherence to principles of justice.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2. On the writing of this part of the text, see Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 89–93.

¹²⁵ Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 2–6.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

¹²⁸ Cf. Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm>.

¹²⁹ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 43.

Addison begins the second part of the text with a relatively concise description of the geography, natural resources, farming practices, and economy of Morocco. The inclusion of this information was not incidental, but rather consistent with his belief that a proper understanding of the political history of the country could only be achieved by synthesising information derived from a variety of fields. The information was not particularly significant in itself, but he used it to support his arguments regarding more important issues.¹³⁰ He agreed with Africanus that much of the land was unattractive, but that this was 'recompensed in the fertility'.¹³¹ However, he refuted reports concerning the abundance of gold and livestock in the country, and in doing so highlighted the value of his own empirical approach.¹³² Another issue which these two chapters appear to have been intended to illuminate was the people's poor husbandry of the land, and the reasons for this; according to Addison, they did not exploit the riches available to them because they suffered from 'ignorance, idleness, or fear'.¹³³

It is in the remaining chapters of the book, concerning the Muslim peoples of Morocco and their culture, where Addison clearly struggles most with aligning his observations and other learnings with his ideological intent, and where his ambivalence is most marked. He recognised the ethnological differences between Berbers and Arabs, and possessed a more favourable opinion of the Berbers than the itinerant, and not 'so civilised' Arabs,¹³⁴ but judged, perhaps to simplify his task, that they possessed the same 'general character of body and humour'.¹³⁵ He could not fault the physical character of the men, and admired their martial skills, but noted their propensity for extremes of activity. He also found the women generally handsome, yet also modest and proper.¹³⁶ Like S.L., he thought Moroccans possessed

¹³⁰ Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 94.

¹³¹ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 76.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 96; Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 94.

¹³³ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 95.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 114, 218.

a serious demeanour. He accused them of being overly suspicious of strangers, but found they were not lacking in civility.¹³⁷

But what particularly struck Addison, as it had S.L. and countless other Christians who had observed it across Islamdom since the Middle Ages, was their commitment to their religion. He was clearly impressed by their piety, could not fault their religious practices, and commented favourably on their benevolence to their places of worship, and the respect they accorded their religious leaders, although he was suspicious of their maraboutic traditions.¹³⁸ He also evidently approved of their system of justice, and was aware that Moroccan civil law was inextricably linked to the tenets of Islam.¹³⁹ Addison admired much about Islam and the social benefits he believed derived from it, but he was not seeking to legitimise the religion. Not surprisingly, he maintained that Muhammed was an imposter,¹⁴⁰ although he could find little from the Prophet's teachings which he could criticise. He clearly disapproved of polygamy and concubinage, and essentially attributed what he believed was the Moroccans' disposition toward jealousy and vengefulness to their religious beliefs.¹⁴¹

In remarking upon the general ignorance of Moroccans, Addison was not implying that it was due to some innate failure in their character. He acknowledges their former renown as a 'race of literati',¹⁴² and observes that there are numerous schools throughout the country which provided a rudimentary education.¹⁴³ He notes, though, that they no longer have centres of higher learning, and suggests this 'may be a main reason of their growing stupidity and barbarism'.¹⁴⁴ However, his view on the cause and desirability of this situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, he argues that the people are too busy eking out a living to study the arts and sciences, and that

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 112.

¹³⁸ See, esp. *ibid.*, pp. 115, 129–131, 133–135, 141–144, 147–154, 162–163.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 165–179. See esp. p. 167.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 143–144, 163–164, 166.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 29, 56–57, 98, 104–105, 140. See also Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 110.

¹⁴² Addison, 'Preface' in *West Barbary*, sig. [a5]r.

¹⁴³ Addison, *West Barbary*, pp. 139–140, 225–226.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

without such learning any civilised people 'will soon degenerate into ignorance and rusticity'.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, he provides a seemingly alternative explanation that he alleges was proffered by his Moroccan interlocutors: since the beginning of the revolutions the people had rejected 'bookish inclinations' for more practical pursuits in the interests of avoiding the nurturing of sedition, and promoting civil peace.¹⁴⁶ However, to resolve this and other apparent contradictions in *West Barbary*, and better appreciate his attitude towards Moroccans, it is necessary to consider what Addison was attempting to achieve through the text.

It has been claimed that *West Barbary* provides further evidence of English imperial ambition concerning North Africa,¹⁴⁷ but, once again, this appears to be a misreading of the document: aside from being contrary to Addison's stated purpose, nowhere does he encourage the conquest of the country and subjugation of its people. Admittedly though, *West Barbary* and Addison's other published works are nuanced, and, as William J. Bulman states, it is necessary to read them in different registers to reveal his 'scholarly practices, foundational ideas, pastoral and political agendas, and public interventions'.¹⁴⁸ While I do not fully subscribe to all of Bulman's conclusions, he does provide many useful insights concerning Addison's works. He confirms that while Addison sought to provide a more up to date cosmographical and historical account of Morocco, he also imposed ideological slants in his portrayal of people and events aligned to his own political and religious agenda.¹⁴⁹ His writing was informed by belief not simply in the value of studying the past, but the history of all peoples, to elucidate historical truth, and he did so to help address the anxieties arising from the religious and political tensions of the period.¹⁵⁰ In this respect, his account of the civil discord in Morocco was intended to be read as an allegory for the English Civil Wars, warning of the dangers of puritanism,¹⁵¹ and his observations of Muslim and

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Addison, 'Preface' in *ibid.*, sig. [a5]r–[a6]v; Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 107–109.

¹⁴⁷ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 146.

¹⁴⁸ Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90–94.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 9, 89, 128–132.

¹⁵¹ Addison, *West Barbary*, p. 73. See also Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 89–90. Cf. Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', p. 8 of 12.

Jewish piety were intended to promote reflection on the standard of contemporary Protestant religious commitment.¹⁵² What he observed and learned about the recent history of political turmoil and conflict in Morocco seemingly also reinforced in him concerns which he had developed during the course of the English Civil Wars, about the potentially dangerous relationship between literature and social disorder.¹⁵³ But Addison was not necessarily endorsing Saavedra Fajardo's paraphrased assertion that 'all knowledge was superfluous' beyond that required to meet the needs of the state.¹⁵⁴ He clearly believed in the value of higher learning, attributing many of the problems in Morocco to its absence. Rather, what he appears to be offering is a warning about the risks of scholarly excess.¹⁵⁵

Whereas earlier commentators, such as John Harrison, had viewed the civil wars in Morocco in providential terms, Addison applied his learnings in Morocco to consider the general preconditions for social civility, those universal factors that would promote peace and order in any society. In Addison's political schema, social harmony was the product of 'the interplay of prudence and education'. Asserting that the disposition of a nation could be influenced by what the people were taught allowed him to marginalise the importance of unique cultural traits and universalise the applicability of reasonable and useful customs he identified in Morocco.¹⁵⁶ But critically, his case for universal learning from Morocco was premised on acceptance of the essential equivalency of Moroccan and European societies. Addison dismissed the traditional prejudicial distinction made between barbarism and civilisation, stating that '[i]t was one of the pedantic vanities of the Grecians', and noting that some people continue to hold such an opinion about things that diverge 'from the manners and customs of their own country'. Instead, he appealed to the reader to keep an open mind: 'Yet those who acknowledge humanity in all its habits, may in perusing the remarks made upon these barbarians [within the book], meet with

¹⁵² Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 10.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.107.

¹⁵⁴ Addison, *West Barbary*, sig. [a6]v.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 109.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 109–110.

something that that may civilize the title, and induce them to think, that which is commonly call'd barbarous, is but a different mode of civility'.¹⁵⁷

While Bulman acknowledges Addison's works as exemplifying 'the relatively open-minded orientalism of his day',¹⁵⁸ he argues that the gathering of historical and ethnographic knowledge by him was driven not so much by a desire for empirical truth *per se*, but rather to affirm that the foundation of high church Anglicanism was based on universal principles of a natural religion, thereby providing proof of its superiority over other confessional options.¹⁵⁹ In effect, Bullman argues this ideological cause provided Addison with not only the motivation to enquire about other cultures, but also the epistemological framework with which he interpreted these encounters. This may well be the case. But the existence of a higher purpose in Addison's work does not diminish the obvious revelatory impact of his experiences; the genuine depth of the relationships he developed with Moroccan Muslims and Jews; the strength of his conviction that Moroccan society was not only civilised, but in many ways superior to his own; and the fact that he was able to acknowledge a common humanity despite his first-hand experience of the depredations wrought on Tangier by these very same people, including the loss of his beloved Lord Teviot.

5.5. Looking beyond the Walls

Despite the failure of Howard's embassy, the inhabitants of Tangier continued to enjoy a period of relative peace, which allowed them to turn their attention to things other than the threat of attack. The prevalence of mundane records of quotidian life in Tangier in the Colonial Office archives dating from the late 1660s, has led Nabil Matar to conclude that the inhabitants, safely ensconced within the walls of the colony, became totally indifferent to the 'North African world around it', ceased to acknowledge the existence of their Moroccan neighbours, and were oblivious to events in the region, except in times of conflict. This disengagement, and associated

¹⁵⁷ Addison, 'Preface' in *West Barbary*, sig. [a2]v–a3r. See also *ibid.*, 'Epistle Dedicatory', and Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, pp. 129–131.

¹⁵⁸ Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment*, p. 45.

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 10–12, 131–140.

'lack of geohistorical awareness', by the Tangerines, according to Matar, was a result of their disdain for Moroccans and their culture.¹⁶⁰ However, this assessment ignores numerous other manuscript and published sources which testify to the ongoing engagement of some of the inhabitants with Morocco and the wider region, as has been demonstrated in the sources cited in this chapter to this point. Far from cutting themselves off from the world, their circumstances dictated they could not do so; the success of Tangier, and indeed its very survival, were, in fact, dependent on the gathering of intelligence from throughout Morocco and the Mediterranean, using a network of merchants, consuls, seafarers, and other informants, including local Arabs, Berbers, and Jews. Indeed, before he departed England, Belasyse had been advised that Tangier was 'a place suited most advantageously for all the variety of intelligence imaginable'.¹⁶¹ A few months later, in an account of his achievements, the Tangier Committee was informed that the new governor had 'erected a post office with instructions for a correspondence and intelligence from all parts'.¹⁶² But Tangier was also a colony, home to some two thousand people,¹⁶³ so it is not surprising that the archives are heavily weighted in favour of mundane financial accounts, requests for supplies, legal proceedings, and other routine administrative matters, as well as various civil issues.

The majority of the inhabitants may have never had the opportunity to travel outside the lines, but that is not evidence that they had no interest in doing so; nor does it mean that they had no exposure to Moroccans. They were regular visitors to Tangier as messengers, envoys, and traders. Some were even long-term residents: aside from

¹⁶⁰ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 140–141, 147–148, 158. Quotations are from pp. 147 and 148. The indifference, or at least ignorance, of the inhabitants of Tangier to what lay outside the walls of city is also alluded to by others. See Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), pp. 28, 37; Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space.

¹⁶¹ 'Proposals delivered unto the Lord Belasyse', 5 January 1664/65, BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 84v, point 3.

¹⁶² 'A brief account of what thinges have beene don by his excellency the Lord Belasyse since his arrival April the eighth in order to a good settlement of his majesties garrison of Tanger, 16 July 1665, *ibid.*, f. 90r.

¹⁶³ Routh notes that the population of Tangier varied but was never very large. The garrison usually consisted of between 1,200 to 1,400 English, Irish and Scottish soldiers, but the contingent was occasionally increased to 2000. In addition, there were usually around 600 civilians, predominantly Britons, but with small numbers of Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dutch, Italians and Jews. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 272.

a community of Jews and a sizeable number of Moroccan slaves belonging to private individuals and, later, the king, for several years Tangier had also been home to a group of native guides who served the garrison.¹⁶⁴ Tangier also occasionally provided sanctuary to Moroccans seeking to avoid persecution or punishment.¹⁶⁵ Interest in, and contact with, Moroccans was obviously sufficient for some Britons in Tangier to become proficient in their language, with Burghill remarking that 'Capt Jones and yonge Mascall both speak the language very perfectly'.¹⁶⁶ Addison wrote about his experiences and learnings, and, keen to validate the authenticity of his sources, describes some of his meetings with Moroccans in Tangier.¹⁶⁷ Others, such as the author of *A Short and Strange Relation* (1669) concerning the rise of 'Tafiletta', also sought to inform their compatriots about the country in which they had lived.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, Britons continued to conduct business in Tétouan and Salé.¹⁶⁹ In fact, rather than turning their backs on their neighbours, the English were actively encouraging them to visit the city and trade.

Around the same time that Middleton proclaimed his intention to force the 'African Jewes' to leave Tangier¹⁷⁰ — because he was concerned some might be spying for the 'Alawīs — he proudly reported that Moroccans were entering the city 'with all the freedome imaginable', and stated that it was his desire to 'confirme them of my good intentions'.¹⁷¹ He hoped that 'from correspondency and trade ... they will every day grow more and more friendly', and assured them that his king 'hath noe designe on their land', his only interests being peaceful relations, commerce, and security for his

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273. The number of Moroccan and Turkish slaves held in the city increased significantly to around 100, or perhaps more, from late 1672 with the stationing of oared galleys at Tangier to provide support to regular naval vessels in engagements. See *ibid.*, pp. 22, 141, 273.

¹⁶⁵ On Moroccans seeking refuge in Tangier at this time, see also Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 162.

¹⁶⁶ Quoted in Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 101.

¹⁶⁷ Addison, 'Preface' in *West Barbary*, sig. [a5]r–[a7]v.

¹⁶⁸ The author described himself on the title page as 'one that hath lately been in His Majesties Service in that Country', but admits had not travelled beyond Tangier, and relied on information provided by a French merchant who had lived among the Moors. See *A Short and Strange Relation*, p. 26.

¹⁶⁹ Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 43, 156, entries for 8 January 1671 and 14 September 1672.

¹⁷⁰ Order from Middleton 'To the sergeant-major of the towne', Tangier, 19 October 1672, BL, Sloane MS 3511, f. 168. The Moroccan Jews were not expelled from the city until 1677, as a result of fear of treachery, but some were later readmitted. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 162, 276.

¹⁷¹ Middleton to Tangier Commissioners, Tangier, 9 October 1672, BL, Sloane MS 3511, f. 160r.

subjects.¹⁷² Middleton clearly was seeking to win the hearts and minds of the Moroccans. News of this new period of entente was well received in England, with the *London Gazette* in May 1673 enthusiastically reporting that the peace which prevailed had given rise 'to very good effects, by the friendly intercourse between the inhabitants of Tangier and the Moors, who converse together, as if they were of one nation'.¹⁷³

The journal of John Luke has been cited by some scholars as evidence of how insular the inhabitants had become, and their consequent preoccupation with the minutiae of their own lives.¹⁷⁴ Luke, the secretary to the governor, had first arrived in Tangier with Peterborough in 1662 and had served there continuously since.¹⁷⁵ His journal, which covers the period from December 1670 to February 1673, admittedly devotes much attention to everyday internal affairs — both administrative and social — of the city. But Morocco and its people were definitely not overlooked by him; the journal contains many references to developments in the country and the activities of Moroccans both within and outside the walls during this period. What he does not do, though, is reveal his thoughts and feelings about them; he simply states what he heard and observed, but the details he offers do help to supplement those available from other sources.¹⁷⁶ A preoccupation by Luke and other Britons with the social intrigues of their closely knit, and frequently isolated community, and a desire to replicate familiar social and cultural elements in their new home, should by no means be seen in itself as indifference to, or a rejection of, Morocco and its people.

Luke's entries reveal that Middleton's efforts to promote peaceful trade were not reciprocated by al-Rashīd. During December 1670 there had been signs that the 'Alawīs were preparing for an assault on Tangier. Large contingents of troops had

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 160v.

¹⁷³ Cited in Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier', p. 421.

¹⁷⁴ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 146–148; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 32.

¹⁷⁵ On Luke, see the introduction to the published version of his journal, *Tangier at High Tide*. The original manuscript can be found in BL, Add. MS 36528.

¹⁷⁶ The editor of his journal also comments on its contribution to understanding of Anglo-Moroccan relations, and the general tendency toward repression and detachment in Luke's entries. See Helen Andrews Kaufman, 'Introduction', in Helen Andrews Kaufman, ed., *Tangier at High Tide: The Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673* (Geneva, 1958), pp. 12, 18–19.

been observed in the vicinity of the colony, and there had been incursions within the defensive perimeter.¹⁷⁷ There had also been intensive efforts made by the Moroccans to plant crops in close proximity to the lines, with the English apparently so concerned that these areas could provide cover for an encroaching force that they considered burning them.¹⁷⁸ But only a month later, al-Rashīd was struggling to hold onto power in the face of an assault by forces from ‘Tremisan’ (Tlemcen) and Algiers. In his desperation he reached out to the English to provide cannons, powder, and arms as a prelude to progressing a peace. Middleton prevaricated on the request but issued an invitation for the sultan’s subjects to come to Tangier and trade. According to Luke, the governor was confident that the Moroccans would soon find it advantageous to settle a peace with the English.¹⁷⁹ But this conviction must have been tested when the ‘Alawīs quickly recommenced testing Tangier’s defences, with small skirmishes and incursions occurring over the following weeks, followed by reports that al-Rashīd was preparing to mount a concerted campaign against the Christian garrisons.¹⁸⁰ Middleton obviously held some reservations himself because he embarked on a project to further fortify the city, despite it not being sanctioned by the Tangier Committee.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, despite these contrary indicators, the English remained positive about the prospects of establishing a peace with the ‘Alawīs.¹⁸²

News of al-Rashīd’s death in early 1672 was welcomed by the English, who, believing that his successor, his brother Ismā’īl, had more respect for them and a greater

¹⁷⁷ Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, pp. 25, 30, entries for 13, 21, and 22 December 1670.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 32, entries for 9 and 23 December 1670. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 148.

¹⁷⁹ John Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 43, entry for 8 January 1671.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 61, 68, entries for 18 and 19 January, and 7, 22, and 23 February 1671.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 84–85, entry for 25 June 1671. On this issue, see also Luke to Middleton, London, 6/16 May 1671, BL, Sloane MS 3511, ff. 3r–4r. Interestingly, Luke’s letter reveals that Middleton also proposed taking more land into the English lines to provide a source of stone for the mole, and to enhance the general viability of the colony. While it was a practical suggestion, the proposal was considered unnecessary by members of the Tangier Committee, and the king considered it foolish to think of taking more ground without having the men to defend it. It was one of several occasions when the king and his counsellors adopted a more prudent position than a governor.

¹⁸² Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 99, entry for 10 February 1672.

interest in developing trade, started work on drafting articles of peace.¹⁸³ The Alawīs domestic enemies also saw al-Rashīd's passing as propitious for achieving their own aims. By the autumn of that year, there were reports of wide-spread revolt, as well as news of the imminent return of the indefatigable warrior al-Khadr Ghailan.¹⁸⁴ Ismā'īl's accession indeed proved to be a pivotal event which would have significant repercussions for both his enemies and his would-be English suitors, but not of the kind envisaged by either of them at the time.

These developments did mark the beginning of a period of more positive relations between Tangier and neighbouring Moroccan communities as their traditional leaders once again reasserted their authority. During this period, the Tangerines witnessed and welcomed a succession of visits from Moroccan traders, and messengers and emissaries from Ghailan and other local magnates.¹⁸⁵ But once again, the English were confronted with the dilemma of choosing sides. Middleton was aware that the situation in Morocco had been 'upon very ticklish termes' since Ismā'īl's ascension.¹⁸⁶ He was encouraged by the rebels' amicable disposition and willingness to provide the city with much needed fresh provisions, as well as their initial successes against the new sultan, and quickly made up his mind to support them. He provided them with 'powder and armes, with what else they want; and promising them all the countenance and protection this place is able to afford'. The governor also hoped that Ghailan would agree to resume their earlier treaty until one more advantageous to trade could be negotiated. But Middleton was also wary, assuring the commissioners that he intended to keep all the inhabitants within the lines 'as if we were engaged in a most active warre'.¹⁸⁷

At the end of November, Middleton sent a delegation to meet with Ghailan to discuss a treaty. One of the members, a clerk, quite possibly experiencing the Moroccan

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 120, entry for 23 April 1672. At least one of Luke's sources from Salé he refers to was evidently a Briton, further evidencing their continuing presence in other parts of the region at this time. See 'Extract of a letter from William Sedgwick in Salle', 16/26 April 1672, TNA, CO 279/15, f. 113.

¹⁸⁴ Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, pp. 158–159, entries for 29 and 30 September 1672.

¹⁸⁵ See various entries from 1 October 1672 in *ibid.*, pp. 159ff.

¹⁸⁶ Middleton to the Lords Commissioners, Tangier, 10/20 July 1672, TNA, CO 279/15, f. 205r.

¹⁸⁷ BL, Sloane MS 3511, f. 160r–v.

countryside for the first time, wrote to Luke the following day to advise of the party's progress. He noted, with a hint of relief, that they had been treated very civilly, and his only complaints were that they could not eat the meat because it 'stunck of garlick', and the Moroccans had eaten from the platter with 'their dusty hands'.¹⁸⁸ The negotiations progressed smoothly except for two sticking points: Ghailan was still alleging that Norwood had stolen some of his possessions which had been sent to Tangier when he fled Asilah, and demanded a resolution of the issue;¹⁸⁹ and he would not agree to a perpetual treaty.¹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, in a sign of their mutual desperation, in early January 1673 a new treaty was agreed with an initial term of only six months, but with the (potentially worthless) provision for it to be renewed every six months thereafter.¹⁹¹ It did, however, provide a means to address their respective immediate needs, with Middleton later admitting to Charles II that the outcome had been influenced by Tangier's need for access to fresh provisions, and Ghailan's need for material support to prosecute his war against the Alawīs.¹⁹² The English did their best to meet Ghailan's regular, and at times unreasonable, requests for assistance.¹⁹³ However, once again, the benefits they obtained from the treaty and considerable investment were short-lived; in September of that year Ghailan was killed in battle and his army defeated, and resistance to 'Alawī rule in north-western Morocco subsequently collapsed.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ John Wollaston to Luke from Asilah, 21 November 1672, *ibid.*, f.176.

¹⁸⁹ This issue was not only a point of contention with Ghailan, but, as Luke reveals in his journal, also between senior members of the garrison. In addition to the freeing of the Portuguese women, Ghailan also complained that Norwood had broken into his chests and stolen jewellery and gold. Norwood later claimed that he had confiscated some items only to cover costs incurred by Ghailan and his followers in Tangier which Ghailan had refused to pay. But Norwood's real motivation remains unclear. See Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, pp. 159, 178–179, 184, 190–191, entries for 30 September, 2, 4 and 27 December 1672, and 8 and 9 January 1673; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 96–97; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 73–74.

¹⁹⁰ Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, pp. 181–184, 189, entries for 21, 23, 25, 27, and 31 December 1672.

¹⁹¹ 'Article of Peace', 2 January 1672/73, TNA, CO 279/16, ff. 314–315.

¹⁹² Cited in Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 74. The situation in Tangier at the time was sufficiently parlous that Middleton even threatened to resign his commission if the city's supply needs were not adequately addressed. See Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 194, entry for 28 January 1673.

¹⁹³ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 97, n. 3; Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, pp. 194, 202, entries for 27 January and 10 February 1673; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 73.

¹⁹⁴ Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 231.

Mawlay Ismāʿīl (r. 1672–1727) built on his brother's legacy by continuing to consolidate 'Alawī authority across the country. In a departure from his predecessors, Ismāʿīl not only conceived of his political power as being based on his religious authority, but was also careful not to be seen to favour any one ethnic or cultural group. For this reason, he attempted to ensure that his soldiers owed loyalty only to him, rather than their tribal groups, and incorporated them into a formal military structure.¹⁹⁵ However, a major military and social innovation introduced by Ismāʿīl was the establishment of a large army of black Africans, the 'Abid al-Bukhari.¹⁹⁶ He was known for his harsh and cruel treatment of those who he considered guilty of some transgression,¹⁹⁷ and such claims were often cited, and undoubtedly embellished by European commentators.¹⁹⁸ With Ismāʿīl, the English faced an increasingly powerful foe who began to marshal the considerable resources of a large centralised state against them and the other Christian enclaves, continuing the movement which had begun some 150 years before.

Immediately following Ghailan's death, Middleton adopted a multifaceted and contradictory approach to relations with the Moroccans. He went to great efforts to impress a group of visiting merchants from Tétouan, seeking to convince them of the benefits of trading with Tangier, and that his king has no designs for their country beyond peaceful trade and what was necessary to maintain the city. Yet he held another group of Moroccans hostage, hoping to use them to force Ismāʿīl into agreeing to a treaty. He also proposed that some frigates be dispatched to curtail the activities of the corsairs of Salé, and believed that, somehow, it would also 'bring Ismāʿīl to some reasonable terms for Tanger'. With no clear path to follow, Middleton was determined to 'leave nothing untried which I can imagine will conduce to a

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 230, 232.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 231; Aomar Boum and Thomas K. Park, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 40.

¹⁹⁷ Boum and Park, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, pp. 40–41.

¹⁹⁸ See, for example, the discussion on the sultan in Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 202–204, 210, in which Routh draws on Budgett Meakin's *The Moorish Empire* and a number of contemporary sources to characterise Ismāʿīl as a cruel, unprincipled, tyrant. On the historiographical treatment of Ismāʿīl, see Bejjit, 'Introduction', pp. 46–47.

peace with our neighbours'.¹⁹⁹ Over the following months he dispatched envoys to attempt to negotiate a treaty with the sultan, but his efforts proved to be in vain.²⁰⁰

In July 1674, Middleton passed away and was replaced by Lord Inchiquin in March 1675.²⁰¹ Inchiquin had been born into the Irish nobility but raised in London. As a young man he had served in the French military, seeing active service in Spain and Portugal. In 1660, he was captured by an Algerine corsair from a vessel off Lisbon, losing an eye in the preceding skirmish. He was taken to Algiers, where he remained until being ransomed the following year. He became a member of the Irish privy council in 1671, and succeeded to the earldom of Inchiquin following the death of his father in 1674.²⁰² Given his lack of experience, he was, arguably, the least qualified of all English Tangier's governors, and during his tenure continuing problems in the colony would contribute to increasing debate in England concerning its future.

Early in the new year, in order to promote the development of trade, the king had issued a proclamation which sought to assuage the concerns of foreign merchants in Tangier that their interests would be protected in the event of war with their home countries. Charles also declared that the city, 'through the blessing of God', was now 'in a flourishing condition'.²⁰³ However, the king's assurance belied the reality of life in Tangier for its inhabitants. Despite the efforts of the English authorities to reform the governance of the city, they had done little to improve the prosperity of the colony or the living conditions. The affairs of the colony continued to be plagued by division between the military and civil authorities, with vested self-interest at the root of many of Tangier's problems. While there was some improvement in trade following the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in early 1674, it was patchy, and

¹⁹⁹ Middleton to Arlington, Tangier, 12 October 1673, BL, Sloane MS 3511, ff. 218r–v.

²⁰⁰ Wollaston to Luke, 28 October 1673, *ibid.*, f. 233; Wollaston to Luke, Tetuan, 7 June 1674, BL, Sloane MS 3512, f. 58; Wollaston to Luke, Tetuan, 19 June 1674, *ibid.*, ff. 59–60; Wollaston to Luke, Tetuan, 2 July 1674, *ibid.*, ff. 75–76.

²⁰¹ On the dating of Middleton's death, see Maj. Palmes Fairbourne to (his uncle) Col. Roger Alsopp, Cadiz, 21/31 July 1674, BL, Sloane MS 3512, f. 23. Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 146, n. 1.

²⁰² W. W. Webb, 'O'Brien, William, second earl of Inchiquin (c.1640–1692)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 17 November 2017.

²⁰³ *By the King, a Proclamation [for the protection of the goods and estates of foreign merchants in Tangier]* (London, 1675).

revenues remained disappointing. Arrears in payments to the garrison were a continuing problem, which not only adversely affected the morale of the troops, but also the city's economy.²⁰⁴

Concerns about the value of Tangier that had earlier only been prudently voiced in private began to enter the public sphere from the early 1670s. But while Tangier had its detractors, it also continued to have its equally strident supporters, who presented the city and its prospects in sanguine terms, and whose writings often resurfaced and were published years after they were written, joining those of new apologists expressing support for Tangier as the city became the focus of increasing criticism.

In the account of his experiences in, and thoughts about, Tangier and Morocco, which he commenced shortly after his final departure from Tangier in 1672, Hugh Cholmley felt compelled to include a detailed defence of Tangier in response to 'objections ... from some men, who argue against the keeping of Tangier'.²⁰⁵ Cholmley acknowledged the problems which had plagued the colony, but provided some reasonably sensible proposals to help address them, and to enable Tangier to realise what he believed to be its considerable potential to contribute to England's developing maritime empire.²⁰⁶ Among the problems he identified was a lack of land, arguing that 'a little more elbow-room' was required if Tangier was to be more self-sufficient and less costly to maintain. More ambitiously, Cholmley suggested that an attempt be made to coerce the people of Salé to agree to terms of peace: such a 'war', he assured, was 'not likely to be of much expence or duration' and believed that the resultant maritime treaty could help open up trade into the country.²⁰⁷ Strangely, despite clearly being intended as an intervention in the emerging debate, the account was never published in Cholmley's lifetime. Having invested a decade of his life to the project, it is clear that his concern at the time was as much about the

²⁰⁴ See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 147–154, 160, 333–335; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, 2, pp. 367–368.

²⁰⁵ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, p. 82.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 82–102.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

future of his beloved mole, and protection of his legacy, as it was about Tangier *per se*, although for Cholmley all three were inextricably linked.²⁰⁸

However, Cholmley's work was possibly not wasted. Some four years later, his successor as surveyor-general of the mole, Henry Sheres, wrote a letter to a friend 'with an abstract of my judgements and observations' concerning Tangier.²⁰⁹ While Sheres appears to have simply been responding to a long-standing commitment to satisfy his correspondent's curiosity, the letter's preparation was quite possibly informed by renewed criticism of the colony, and certainly by a recent claim that the king had agreed to sell Tangier to the French.²¹⁰ In it, he provides a detailed and spirited explication of the benefits of retaining Tangier. For Sheres, Tangier was of inestimable value to England, and no cost was too high to protect it: 'Can anything then challenge a greater share in our esteem, than the means to insure this mighty benefit to us'.²¹¹ From the numerous similarities in the issues addressed and solutions presented in the letter, it is reasonably apparent that Sheres' defence was influenced to some degree by Cholmley's.²¹² One aspect in which they do differ is the greater clarity Sheres provides on his thinking about relations with Salé. While also advocating a 'war' — principally conducted through blockade of trade to and from the port — to awe and coerce the Salétins into accepting peace, for Sheres at least, the ultimate aim was to have them recognise the benefits which could be achieved through friendship with the English, and a peace based on 'equal terms'.²¹³ Sheres' assertive approach was informed by his belief that the policy of buying peace had

²⁰⁸ Around 1680 Cholmley anonymously published *A Short Account of the Progress of the Mole at Tangier*, not to argue for its completion, which was uncertain at the time, but rather, as he states in the final paragraph, to defend his reputation against claims he had mismanaged the project.

²⁰⁹ Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, p. 3.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33. The source of the claim cited by Sheres was possibly accusations made by a Mr Stysted/Stisted in London who was charged with 'spreading false and seditious news' in December 1675. See 'Charles II: December 1675', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 1907), accessed 21 November 2017, entries for 6–8, 10, and 15–16 December.

²¹¹ Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, p. 32. For other references to Sheres' views on Tangier, see the beginning of this chapter.

²¹² See, for example, Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 83–83, 93–94, 97–98, cf. Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, pp. 28, 32, 33–34, 48–49.

²¹³ Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, pp. 29–30. See also *ibid.*, pp. 44–47, and Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p.130.

made the English look weak and the Moroccans contemptuous of them for this reason.²¹⁴

As had been amply demonstrated in the past, without a treaty, or at least a *serugo*, Britons were at considerable risk if they went beyond Tangier's lines, even in force, and both residents and visitors were well aware not to stray too far from the security of the walls.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, unable to purchase fresh provisions from Portugal or Spain, by the early autumn of 1675 the situation had become so desperate that Inchiquin authorised a raid to obtain cattle. A party of over five hundred under the command of Palmes Fairborne left Tangier on 19 September, and met the same fate as their plundering Portuguese counterparts fourteen years earlier. During the march, the advance guard was ambushed by a large contingent of Moroccan cavalry, and the English lost some two hundred men in that initial encounter and the subsequent retreat of the main body of troops.²¹⁶ The outcome was potentially disastrous not only for the governor, but also for Tangier.

In response, Inchiquin sent his secretary, George Philips, to London to placate the commissioners.²¹⁷ However, in the interim, in an obvious attempt to limit the damage, Philips quickly dispatched an extensive letter to Inchiquin's uncle-in-law, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, which was published early the following year. In it he extolls the virtues of Tangier and its governors, including Inchiquin, but overlooks

²¹⁴ Sheres, *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, pp. 30–31.

²¹⁵ See, for example, Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 207, entry for 17 February 1673; 'An Itinerary of Our Voyage ... In His Majesties Shipp Maryrose, Captain Thomas Hamilton', Bodl., Rawl. MS C.353, pp. 24–25, entry for 19 May 1674.

²¹⁶ G[eorge] P[hilips], *The Present State of Tangier: In a Letter to His Grace, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and One of the Lords Justices There. To which is Added the Present State of Algiers* (London, 1676), pp. 36–38. Philip's account put the number killed at 134, but this figure omitted those in the main body killed in the retreat or who died of their wounds. Other reports put the total number killed as high as 205. See 'Charles II: October 1675', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 1907), accessed 17 November 2017, entries for 31 October; 'Charles II: November 1675', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 1907), accessed 17 November 2017, entries for 9 November. Fairborne provided his own accounts of the incident which are broadly consistent to that prepared by Philips, but more detailed. See 'A True Relation of Sir Palmes Fairborne on a deportment against the Moores on the 19th September 1675', n.d., TNA, CO 279/17, f. 112; Fairborne to [Williamson?], 25 September 1675, Tangier, *ibid.*, n.f. In his deposition, Fairborne estimated the number of enemy at 1,500, rather than the 5,000 reported by others.

²¹⁷ 'CSPD: November 1675', entries for 8 November.

many of the colony's problems. Philips asserted that it was not the governors who were responsible for the losses suffered by the garrison, but rather the treachery of the Moroccans, and on this occasion they had been betrayed by a trusted Moroccan collaborator known as 'James Hamet'. Nevertheless, he insisted, something had been gained, for through the 'honourable' retreat mounted by Fairborne the Moroccans had learned even greater respect for the English.²¹⁸ However, the Moroccans had not, in fact, been deterred; only months later they launched an attack within the lines, and large contingents of troops were again scouting around the perimeter of the colony.²¹⁹

Although Sheres demonstrates that the English remained interested in finding a pragmatic solution to avoid continuing conflict based on meeting mutual needs, it is also evident that he and others underestimated both the capability and the conviction of the Moroccans to resist the presence of Europeans in their country, except on those occasions when the needs of the two sides aligned. One such commentator was the anonymous author of *The Present Interest of Tangier*.²²⁰ Writing about the same time that Philips was penning his letter, the author also emphasises Tangier's potential, describing in florid terms the advantages it possesses in terms of climate, fecundity, trade and strategic position. But his purpose is not to eulogise the city, rather to explicate why it had not achieved its latent promise. The reasons, he argues, include impiety, avarice, corrupt leadership, ill-treatment of the soldiers and citizens, and the toleration of Catholicism; poor management and moral

²¹⁸ P[hilips], *The Present State of Tangier*, pp. 37, 39–40. The letter is dated 29 September, only ten days after the raid. On the letter, see also Beijit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 111–112. Beijit provides a transcript of the text on pp. 112–127. Fairborne also accused Hamet of betraying the English. Hamet appears to have been acquired as a slave by Belasyse and later given to the Duke of York, who arranged for his education in London and baptism. He was returned to Tangier to assist with relations with the Moroccans, and subsequently sent on a tour of Europe. He did not return to Tangier following the ambush, and it is claimed that he later used the skills and knowledge he had acquired during his time with the English in the service of the 'Alawis. On Hamet, see John Ross, *Tangers Rescue; or A Relation of the Late Memorable Passages at Tanger* (London, 1681), pp. 20–21; Luke, *Tangier at High Tide*, p. 53, entry for 25 January 1671; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 168–169.

²¹⁹ Wollaston to Luke, Tangier, 17/27 January 1676, BL, Sloane MS 3512, f. 233v.

²²⁰ While published in 1679, internal dating evidence suggests that the original text was probably written between late 1675 and early 1676. See Beijit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 147.

corruption discouraged good people from settling there.²²¹ But the author also attributes Tangier's plight to what he claims to be a legacy of unwarranted fear of the Moroccans. They have been successful, he opines, not because of their valour and martial skills, but rather because of the garrison's own 'weakness and unpreparedness'; after all, he explains, the Moroccans lacked organisation, discipline, and proficiency in modern weapons and tactics. For this reason, he assured his readers that the 'interest of Tangier' could readily be achieved 'either by peace or war' but believed that to do so, it was necessary to learn more about the Moroccans and their interests.²²²

The author of *The Present Interest of Tangier* appears to have given no thought to the possibility that the military balance may change in time. Cholmley, on the other hand, openly addressed the issue, stating his belief that it was unlikely that the Moroccans would be able to acquire the discipline and methods of European armies because they were too uncivilised, poor, and preoccupied with their own internal conflicts, although he did not rule out the possibility of the Moroccans doing so.²²³

Peace, however, remained the preferred course, and a peace with Salé had long been seen as critical to the success of Tangier, as well as to the safety of English navigation. On 28 August 1676 a two-year maritime truce was finally agreed. Exactly what brought about the change in Ismā'īl's disposition is unclear, the sultan having previously demonstrated little interest in formalising a peace. Both Julian Corbett and Routh credit coercion applied by John Narborough's fleet on its return from finalising an enforced peace with Tripoli.²²⁴ However, differences between a draft treaty prepared for Narborough's initial, unsuccessful, negotiations and the final form of the truce indicate otherwise.

²²¹ *Present Interest of Tangier*, pp. 2–3. See also Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 147–148. Similar concerns were expressed at the time by the mayor of Tangier, John Bland, who believed that '[n]o place was ever possessed by any prince more useful then this [Tangier], or more comodious for greatness toe a nation', but that the city's prospects were diminished by the prevalence of greed and corruption. See Bland to Williamson, Tangier, 29 November 1675, TNA, CO 279/17, f. 123. Given the similarities in expression between Bland's letter and the pamphlet, it is quite plausible that Bland was also the author of the latter.

²²² *Present Interest of Tangier*, pp. 3–4. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 153–154.

²²³ Cholmley, *An Account of Tangier*, pp. 82, 86.

²²⁴ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 382; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 143–144.

The draft treaty provided for a general peace for one year, which included Tangier, modelled on the articles recently agreed with Tripoli. The document was heavily weighted in England's favour, with thirteen of the twenty-one articles concerned with the rights of the English.²²⁵ However, the final truce, negotiated by envoys from Tangier appointed by the newly commissioned lieutenant-governor, Palmes Fairborne, is quite different. It excluded any specific protections for Tangier, but provided for a two-year peace at sea between the parties. As had been the case with earlier English treaties in Morocco, the final document provides reciprocal rights to the sultan's subjects for trade and provisioning of vessels, and was otherwise generally more favourable to Moroccan interests.²²⁶ But the article which perhaps explains the sultan's change of heart, and, conversely, demonstrates how desirous the English were of finalising an agreement, is one which generously permitted the 'Alawīs to purchase up to one hundred barrels of gunpowder, and 'also firelocks and other utensills of warre' whenever one of their vessels called at Tangier.²²⁷ While Routh argues against the significance of the concession, the fact is that it was seen as significant by the Moroccans, as Routh herself observes, because, in effect, it did not impose any absolute limit on munitions or weapons that could be purchased.²²⁸ Nevertheless, the truce was a promising development for Tangier, and a significant achievement for Fairborne.

Fairborne had assumed command of the garrison from Inchiquin in May 1676, after the governor departed for England the previous month. Inchiquin did not return for two years, and it was Fairborne who had responsibility for managing the affairs of Tangier during his absence. Like Inchiquin, Fairborne had served as a mercenary in

²²⁵ 'Articles of peace and commerce', 6 August 1676, BL, Add. MS 17021, ff. 6–8. See articles 2, 5, 8–19. On the 1676 treaty with Tripoli, see *Articles of Peace & Commerce between ... Charles II ... and the ... Lords the Bashaw, Dey, Aga, Divan, and Governours of the ... Kingdom of Tripoli Concluded by Sir John Narbrough ... the First Day of May, 1676* (London, 1677). A treaty had been agreed on 5 March 1676, and was published that year, but needed to be ratified due to a change in government in Tripoli precipitated by Narborough's actions against the regency. The English took the opportunity to add an addendum to the treaty.

²²⁶ Copies of the articles can be found in TNA, SP 71/14/Pt. 1, ff. 149–152; TNA, CO 279/19, ff. 82–84; BL, Sloane MS 3512, ff. 259–263; Bodl., Rawl. MS A.185, f. 267.

²²⁷ See *ibid.* article 14.

²²⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 161.

his youth, fighting for the Venetians during the siege of Candia. In 1661 he obtained a commission as a captain in the Tangier regiment, and embarked with Peterborough for Morocco in 1662. Although he acquitted himself sufficiently well in the garrison to be promoted to major in 1664, and was knighted in 1675, he was prone to impetuosity and belligerence which often affected his relationships with superiors, peers, and those under his command. His failure to win preferment was a continuing source of frustration for him. But despite his flaws, he proved to be a conscientious administrator and capable commander, doing much to improve the defences of the colony, and lobbying London persistently in the interests of his men and the city.²²⁹

In response to the increasing activity of 'Alawī troops in the area, Fairborne set about preparing for a possible assault: drilling the garrison and city militia, implementing measures to prevent ambushes, repairing and improving the fortifications. Early in 1677, he also sequestered and fortified a large portion of land beyond the existing lines to better integrate the city's defences. Fairborne did what he could to prepare Tangier but received little material support from London; although his efforts were rewarded with promotion to lieutenant-colonel.²³⁰ Morale among the soldiers and other residents declined, with Sheres despondently observing: 'The towne is very poore, and the people very mutinous for want of pay and provisions. God grant some vice may not ensue from our want of the latter, for that people may live without money, but not without bread'. He also acknowledged the wavering interest in Tangier in England, expressing his appreciation to 'the few that lay our conditions to heart'.²³¹ The colony's situation was further compromised by illness among the soldiers and inadequate recruitment, leaving Fairborne with insufficient men to properly defend the expanded lines.²³²

²²⁹ J. D. Davies, 'Fairborne, Sir Palmes (1644–1680)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 27 November 2017. See also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 155–160.

²³⁰ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 159–160.

²³¹ Sheres to earl of Anglesey, Tangier, 16 July 1676, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 24.

²³² Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 160.

However, the inhabitants still held out hope of achieving an accommodation with Ismā'īl, and even the usually pragmatic Sheres was eager to find something that affirmed the possibility. In a surprising admission, he welcomed news of the sultan's recent victory over Ghailan's former ally, and one of the last major sources of resistance to his reign, 'his nephew, Muli Hamet, that mutinous young man, in a great bataille', a development which he believed 'may possibly begett a peace with these people'.²³³ Once again, Sheres' declaration demonstrates that Britons were not disengaged from local developments, they maintained interest in, and possessed knowledge of, what was occurring outside the city, and had many reasons for doing so.

Fairborne pursued negotiations for a peace through the commander of the sultan's forces in the region, Qā'id Omar ben Haddū Hamami,²³⁴ sending envoys to Ksar el-Kebir with instructions to draw up a treaty. But the 'Alawīs, as their predecessors had done, were exploiting the rivalries between the Europeans, playing the English off against the French, who were also courting Ismā'īl, to obtain what they could from both.²³⁵ In response to Fairborne's concerns about the activities of the French, Omar assured him that in the event that any other Christian nation attacked Tangier, he would be ready to assist the English, and that he would seek to dissuade the sultan from an alliance with France. There were two reasons, he explained: the first was that the English were not 'Roman Catholics', and the second was that they 'were people of commerce' from who the Moroccans could 'buy what they had occasion for'.²³⁶ But despite Omar's professions about England's favoured status, a peace was not concluded, and by late 1677 the 'happy meeting' which Sheres had prayed for only a year earlier, appeared an unlikely possibility. Conflict now appeared inevitable, and

²³³ Sheres to Lord Coventry, Tangier, 16 July 1676, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 26.

²³⁴ Commonly referred to by the English as the Alcaide or governor of Alcazar

²³⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 160–161.

²³⁶ 'Extract from the Governor of Alcasars letter to Sir P Fairborne with his reasons for preventing a league between the French and his imperial majesty', 19 June 1677, TNA, CO 279/20, f. 419. As Routh notes in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 161., the last remark was probably a reference to the fourteenth article of the recent maritime truce.

in December of that year Fairborne finally expelled the Jews from Tangier in preparation for war.²³⁷

Conclusion

The inhabitants of Tangier greeted the 1670s with cautious optimism. After the initial excitement which accompanied the acquisition of Tangier had abated in the face of the realities of maintaining a colonial presence in North Africa, the English authorities and the inhabitants began to turn their attention to practical means of managing and improving the outpost, and make what they could of the opportunities which it might provide. Relatively peaceful relations with their Moroccan neighbours, combined with improving living conditions and trade were cause for hope that the fortunes of the colony were entering a new, positive phase.

Nevertheless, a long-term peace with the Moroccans — the key to securing the future of Tangier — remained elusive. The English employed a variety of approaches to achieve one, but their core diplomatic strategy to engage them remained generally consistent with the one established at the beginning of the occupation: demonstration of their good character, good intentions, and the mutual benefits which could be obtained through trade. Admittedly, their approach to relations with Salé could be seen as being inimical to these ends. The situation with Salé was complicated, because the English were seeking to address two different, but related, issues: one was the threat that its corsair fleet posed to English navigation, while the second was that the town was a competitor for trade. It was also viewed at times as a lever to exert pressure upon whatever faction controlled the town, to encourage them to a general peace. Aside from being a means to manage the corsairs, the logic underpinning the use of coercion against Salé to achieve other objectives was always ill-defined, and hopeful. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the treaty of 1676, the English came to realise, once again, that diplomacy rather than coercion was the only solution, and that the benefits of peace had to be shared with the Salétins and their overlords.²³⁸

²³⁷ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 162.

²³⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–46.

Efforts by the English to achieve a lasting peace were frustrated by a dynamic political environment, making it impossible for them to determine with whom they should be dealing. The uncertainty led to ambivalent responses, particularly concerning the 'Alawīs, who promised political stability, but also presented a military risk. But their failure to seal a peace was due to a more fundamental problem, the significance of which the English failed to fully grasp. They continued to emphasise the benefits of trade in framing their diplomatic strategies, in the belief that it held as much significance for Moroccans as it did for them. However, trade was not a sufficient incentive for their warring leaders to compromise their authority and legitimacy to settle a long-term peace with the English, or any other European nation. Any peace concerning the Christian enclaves in Morocco could only ever be temporary, and on terms that were both advantageous to their cause and acceptable to their supporters.

Pragmatic considerations and even feelings of amity influenced the behaviour of the English in their relations with Moroccans. But, what is surprising is the importance that they also accorded to honourable conduct, even when it was ostensibly to their disadvantage, as was well demonstrated by Norwood's dealings with Ghailan; and concern with honourable conduct also underpinned the actions of Teviot before him. The behaviour of these men does not appear to have been simply platitudinous, or affected in a cynical attempt to influence Moroccan sentiment, but rather the product of a deeply held sense of national and personal honour. With its origins in the chivalric social codes of the Middle Ages, the concept of honour had become firmly internalised as a 'sense of honor' in England by the middle of the seventeenth century.²³⁹ While the practice of honour was not uniquely English, it had played an important role in governing relations between the warring parties during the English

²³⁹ Frank Henderson Stewart, *Honour* (Chicago, 1994), chaps. 2–5. The term 'honour' defies simple definition, but in early modern England there was a level of general consensus about what constituted military honour. On the definition of honour and contemporary understanding of the concept, see *ibid.*, pp. 30–33; Barbara Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', *The Historical Journal*, 44 (2001), pp. 365, 367; Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford, 2008), p. 227.

Civil Wars, and in subsequent social recovery and reconciliation. Its prevalence in English society was not delimited by background or status, but military honour differed from civilian honour in so far as the former was concerned with circumstances and rules which applied specifically to soldiers. Furthermore, honour did not supplant, but could coexist with, other personal beliefs, and was grounded in both idealistic notions of morality as well as pragmatism.²⁴⁰ Despite its importance in early modern English society, remarkably, the role of honour has not previously been identified as an important factor governing relations between the English and North Africans during the early modern period, but it is certainly one that warrants more attention.

The appropriate exercise of honourable practice contributed to feelings of self-worth and personal reputation,²⁴¹ and for these reasons among others, Britons continued to place great store on how they were perceived by Moroccans. Their moral character, Protestant faith, and the long history of amicable relations between the two countries, were all factors that they believed separated them from their European rivals, and the reasons that Moroccans held them in special regard. This belief, perhaps grounded in truth, or cultural and religious chauvinism, informed their expectations of favourable treatment in Morocco. But, conversely, the attention they gave to drawing this distinction, and the sensitivity they exhibited when their expectations were not realised, perhaps underscores the existence of deep-seated anxiety, or at least self-consciousness, among Britons, about their place in the world.

While the often poor leadership provided by governors, infighting between the civilian and military communities, and inadequate support from London did not compromise diplomatic efforts, they certainly affected Tangier's development as a place of settlement and commerce, and contributed to growing criticism of the colony from the late 1660s. However, it was also during this time that trade and diplomacy exposed many inhabitants and visitors to Tangier to direct contact with Moroccans and the country outside the walls. The accounts of their experiences

²⁴⁰ Donagan, 'The Web of Honour', pp. 365, 367, 388–389.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 388; Donagan, *War in England*, p. 227.

vividly demonstrate the diverse ways in which Britons responded to contact with Morocco: from Howard's growing suspicion, anxiety and desire to return home; to S.L.'s initial bewilderment, disorientation, and nostalgia, and eventual adjustment; to Addison's fascination and enthusiasm.

Britons did not necessarily maintain their prejudices in the face of evidence to the contrary; some were capable of reassessing and changing their preconceptions about Maghribis. Personality, background, what they observed or experienced, and the context of encounter all influenced their responses. Howard evidently possessed a nervous disposition and strong prejudices, was pompous, and lacked worldly experience, all of which made him averse to even casual engagement with the people. S.L. was more receptive, but his experience demonstrates the importance of cultural mediators who could assist Britons to understand aspects of belief, custom and practice that would otherwise be inexplicable or subject to misinterpretation. In this way, Addison's positive acculturation was facilitated not only by his inquisitiveness and education, but also by the relationships he developed with Moroccan Muslims and Jews; which aided his cultural learning and acquisition of necessary social skills. While his very presence in Morocco only reinforced Howard's ethnocentric attitudes, the experiences of S.L. and Addison not only allowed them to acquire a more informed understanding of Moroccans and their customs, beliefs, and religion, it destabilised their preconceptions, leading them to make comparisons between what they discovered with things they were more familiar with, which in turn forced them to confront questions about the fundamental nature of their hosts and the superiority of aspects of their own nation's society and culture.

Tangier enjoyed a measure of peace and prosperity between 1667–1677. This development enabled Britons to acquire a greater knowledge and understanding of Islam and North Africa that further challenged traditional perspectives grounded in ignorance and bigotry. With its inhabitants equipped with these learnings, and with the mole nearing completion, Tangier was now better placed than ever to achieve its much vaunted potential. However, there were other forces at play that had also been slowly evolving during this time, in both Morocco and England, which eventually

would coalesce around the colony and determine its fate over the coming years, and the course of Anglo-Moroccan relations.

6. Despair, Crises, and Resignation (1678–1684)

‘For my owne part I know not wheather it has beene the intereste or error, or both, in my predecessours, who have charm’d the ministers at home into soe lowe an opinion of these people that we make noe account of them. But my lords I think I may modestly say I [have had more experience of them in both war and peace] — and I must ingeniously aver, that I thinke this beliefe hath beene of great prejudice to his majesty’s service’ (Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sackville, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1)¹

Mawlay Ismā’īl’s success against his nephew in the summer of 1676 had marked the beginning of a new phase of Anglo-Moroccan relations, but not of the kind which had been hoped for by Henry Sheres. It did, indeed, represent another significant step in the consolidation of ‘Alawī hegemony in Morocco, which was further advanced in 1678 when the sultan overcame the last major source of resistance to his rule. However, the increasing political stability which the ‘Alawī successes provided did not promise greater security for English Tangier. On the contrary, having finally put a stop to Turkish-sponsored resistance, Ismā’īl could now focus on removing the Europeans from their coastal enclaves.² Accommodations with the Christians were no longer as critical to his mission, nor tenable, if he was to successfully establish the legitimacy of his reign.

It was during the period between 1679 and 1680, while Tangier was effectively under permanent siege, that Britons experienced or heard about some of the most desperate and bloodiest encounters with Moroccans that had occurred up to that point. Prolonged sieges can provide insights that battles often cannot: they can reveal how cultural norms are affected by changes in prevailing conditions, and differences which exist between the military and civilian communities.³ Therefore, considerable attention is given in this chapter to the details of these engagements in order to

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sackville to Tangier Commissioners, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1, TNA, CO 279/27, f. 2r.

² Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 232.

³ Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford, 2008), p. 293.

better appreciate the impact which they had, particularly on both personal sentiment and decision making by the English.

The conflict elicited jingoism and belligerent rhetoric from some commentators in response to the loss of both British lives and national pride. But conversely, both the conflict and diplomatic initiatives which followed occasioned some of the most unexpectedly frank, insightful, and positive reflections by Britons resident in Morocco about the people and their culture and society; a vivid testament to the influence that experiential engagement can have on attitudinal development. Furthermore, Tangier's governors and the English government continued to exercise a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with the 'Alawīs, despite the existential threat they posed to the colony. Their endeavours in this respect brought some reprieve for the beleaguered city, aided by the continuing ability of Britons to overcome ethnological and religious prejudice and establish close personal relationships with some of the key Moroccan protagonists. This chapter reinforces findings identified elsewhere in this thesis: there was no common perception about Moroccans held by Britons, attitudes toward them varied considerably and could be enhanced as much as diminished by conflict; Britons possessed a capacity to reappraise and modify their preconceptions as a result of what they learnt about them; and their general conduct towards Moroccans on the battlefield was modelled on the same practices and principles which they would apply to any Christian European adversary, which was testimony to both their recognition of a shared humanity with Moroccans and respect for their martial skills.

But just as perceptions of Moroccans varied among Britons, from the very beginning English Tangier had had its supporters and detractors: the former emphasising its commercial, logistical, and geopolitical potential, while the latter questioned the colony's value against the significant subsidies required to maintain it. However, Tangier's status as a crown possession, and dependence on public funds made it vulnerable to public sentiment and domestic political developments. For this reason, the Popish Plot of 1678 and the subsequent Exclusion Crisis between 1679 and 1681 further complicated efforts to secure the colony's future. Ultimately though, Tangier

was a place of contestation of claims of sovereignty by two monarchs for whom it held more than material value; it was also a symbol of personal and national aspiration. The fate of Tangier would be determined by just how important a symbol it was to the two rulers and their subjects.

6.1. Tangier under Siege

A long period of relative peace came to an abrupt end in January 1678 when Ismā'īl's forces attacked several of the city's forts. The ground was regained and the forts rebuilt, but the attack was a serious concern for the garrison, not least because of the sophisticated tactics and equipment which had been employed. Furthermore, even though an attack had been anticipated, men and stores remained inadequate.⁴ As a measure of the anxiety felt by the English, even before news of the incident had reached London, instructions had been dispatched to the lieutenant-governor, Palmes Fairborne, to conclude a treaty with the 'Alawīs on terms they had earlier offered. However, Fairborne was loath to do so until he could rebuild and repossess the forts which had been destroyed.⁵ Despite the city's dire situation, Fairborne wished to avoid negotiating from a position of apparent weakness.

The governor, Lord Inchiquin, finally returned to Tangier in April, and in turn Fairborne departed for leave in England. In a report Inchiquin later prepared for the Tangier Committee, he provided an account of the events of the previous two years and the challenges he faced during this time. Despite its retrospective and self-justificatory nature, the report provides useful insights into the governor's concerns and hopes, and the circumstances faced by the English in Morocco at this time, particularly given the paucity of relevant archival sources for much of this period.⁶ Inchiquin found that there had been little improvement in the city's preparedness,

⁴ E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912), pp. 162–164.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁶ Lord Inchiquin to Tangier Committee, 'narrative of the affaires of Tanger' from April 1678 to April 1680, Tangier, BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 19–33. Notations and corrections within the document reveal that it is a draft of the final report. Routh in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 164–165, also notes the paucity of relevant correspondence in the State Papers for 1678–1679, and suggests that Inchiquin perhaps had not prepared detailed reports during this time. However, there are several references in his later report to letters he prepared for the Tangier Committee which may not have been preserved.

afflicted as it was with 'greate wants in many respect'. Reinforcements were desperately required, facilities for the garrison were poor, the fortifications required repair, and stocks of equipment and munitions were deficient.⁷ Fairborne had succeeded in concluding a treaty for six months with Omar ben Haddū Hanani, Qā'id of Alcazar and commander of 'Alawī forces in the region, but real or feigned differences in the interpretation of some of its clauses necessitated its renegotiation.⁸

While men were sent to strengthen the garrison, it remained vastly outnumbered, and illness further depleted the ranks.⁹ Under these circumstances renegotiation of a peace was highly desirable, and it is advice on relations with the Moroccans that the commissioners appear to have been principally interested in when they requested the report.¹⁰ The key Moroccan intermediary for the English was Qā'id Omar, and Inchiquin prefaces his account of his efforts to achieve a peace with an assessment of the character of the qā'id. In the governor's estimation, Omar was 'very subtle', a disposition not only in keeping with what he believed was Moroccan custom, but also affected in the pursuit of his own 'ambitions', which were 'not without a great tincture of avarice'.¹¹ Furthermore, through his artfulness and diligence he had won the respect and admiration of the sultan, but in doing so had also made powerful enemies. Inchiquin believed the qā'id to be the main instigator of hostility and stumbling block to peace, alleging he used the conflict as a means of maintaining Ismā'il's favour and a pretence for retaining a sizeable force under his command.¹²

Based on 'the best intelligence', Inchiquin reported in May 1678 that he expected that a large-scale assault was imminent. Despite believing that there was little likelihood of Fairborne's treaty continuing to be honoured, Inchiquin claims he maintained the pretence that Omar would do so.¹³ His reasoning for doing this

⁷ BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 19–21. Quotation is from f. 19r.

⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 21v–22r.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 19r–v.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 21v.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, f. 22r.

¹² *Ibid.*, ff. 22r–v.

¹³ *Ibid.*, ff. 22v–23v.

reveals that English strategy concerning relations with Moroccans had changed little since the beginning of Tangier's occupation. The principal reason he provides is that he saw 'it was a meanes of some trade betweene the merchants of this place' and their Moroccan counterparts, 'which I think might bee as advantageous to us as to them'. This was important because he was:

not altogether without hope that the profitts arising to both sides, might by degrees begett inclinations to a more continued good understanding betwixt us, which I always looke on as his majestyes greatest designe and interest at Tangier.¹⁴

Despite past experience, and growing fear and distrust, the English continued to believe that if they could just convince Moroccans of their good intentions and the value of amicable relations they could still secure Tangier's future.

At the beginning of June, Moroccan troops commenced exploring the city's defences, and in early July they laid several ambushes.¹⁵ However, there were no further significant developments until October when Omar unexpectedly encouraged Inchiquin to renew negotiation of a treaty. The governor was not confident of success but managed to effect the release of a group of merchants and some sailors, and conclude what he believed to be a new treaty.¹⁶ Sheres thought that the treaty was 'likely to come to little'. Observing that a recent outbreak of plague in Salé had resulted in a significant increase in trade through Tangier, he advocated an option which had previously been suggested by others, that a 'warr well managed' with the town could have the same effect.¹⁷ In resurrecting the idea, Sheres not only overlooked the political situation in Morocco, but also Tangier's own vulnerability. In any event the respite and trading opportunities that the treaty promised were short lived. Early in the new year, sporadic attacks recommenced, and in March 1679 the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 23v.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 24r. Routh in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 165, refers to this episode commencing in June 1680, which is clearly an error.

¹⁶ BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 24v.

¹⁷ Sir Henry Sheres to Colonel Palmes Fairborne, Tangier, 5 December 1678, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 379.

Moroccan army 'came again into the field with a very considerable force', against which Inchiquin could only muster '800 serviceable' men.¹⁸

Estimates provided in contemporary reports of the size of the Moroccan army vary widely, but it is likely to have numbered at most around six thousand, including a considerable contingent of mounted troops.¹⁹ Whatever the precise number, the army clearly outnumbered the English garrison. With his forces assembled, Qā'id Omar launched a general assault in the evening of 3 April. After hours of heavy fighting, the Moroccans withdrew, leaving two redoubts destroyed. During the encounter the Moroccans lost at least 150 men, while at least thirty-five Britons were either killed or taken captive, and many were wounded.²⁰ With insufficient troops to man Tangier's system of fortifications, and new tactics being employed by the enemy, the governor realised he had to revise the city's defensive strategy and abandon a number of the forts.²¹

Surprisingly, no further attacks were forthcoming over the following few months, but Tangier was by now effectively under permanent siege and its inhabitants began to be gripped by fear and despair. Inchiquin used the lull to incessantly lobby London for help, reminding them of the disparity in the respective forces and the garrison's want for all manner of things.²² Rumours that the French were also making preparations to take Tangier provided further incentive for people to leave the city

¹⁸ BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 24v–25r. Inchiquin does not elaborate on the details of the earlier attacks.

¹⁹ Compare the estimates provided in 'Madrid, April 20', *The London Gazette*, 24–28 April 1679 (London), p. 1; *An Exact Journal of the Siege of Tangier from the First Sitting Down of the Moors before it on March 25, 1680 to the Late Truce, May 19, following. In Three Letters Written by Three Eye-Witnesses of the Whole Transaction* (London, 1680), p. 10; and, E. M., *The Present Danger of Tangier: or, An Account of its being Attempted by a Great Army of the Moors by Land, and Under Some Apprehensions of the French at Sea ... To a Friend in England* ([London], 1679), p. 2. *The Present Danger* is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(2). Transcriptions of *The Present Danger* and *An Exact Journal* are also provided in Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance*, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 161–163, 167–182. The author of *The Present Danger* was not present in Tangier at the time, and was merely relaying information from reports circulating in Cadiz.

²⁰ 'Madrid, April 20', p. 1.

²¹ BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 25r.

²² *Ibid.*, ff. 25r–v.

and take their assets with them, contributing to the city's decline.²³ In June, Qā'id Omar — for reasons which are unclear — agreed to a two-month truce,²⁴ by which time the inhabitants were 'in some distress ... for they complain lamentably they are very ill furnisht in case of a siege'.²⁵ Sheres also highlights the feeling of foreboding felt within the city. While Tangier was no stranger to hostility, he reflected on the unusual nature of the current situation: 'We never had such an enemy before now, moreover in a war so constant to make our defense'. At this point he was no longer pondering the destruction of Salé but the colony's own demise and hoping that 'some speedy resolution will be taken for our relieve'.²⁶ Sheres' plea was answered in September when the long-awaited reinforcements finally began to arrive.²⁷

It was not until 25 March 1680 that Qā'id Omar's forces renewed their assault by beginning to methodically reduce Tangier's defences. The qā'id's plan was not unexpected, but what surprised the garrison was the speed and proficiency with which it was executed. The Moroccans dug a complex of entrenchments to isolate forts from both the city and from each other, thereby cutting lines of resupply, communication, and retreat. They also began to construct tunnels to mine Charles and Henrietta Forts, and despite sustained fire and heavy casualties, they continued their work throughout April with tenacity and discipline.²⁸

Fairborne returned in early April, around the same time that four companies of Scottish troops arrived from Ireland. In a report written shortly after, he offered a frank assessment of the situation clearly intended to shock the government into action:

²³ *Ibid.*, f. 25v; John Ross, *Tangers Rescue; or A Relation of the Late Memorable Passages at Tanger* (London, 1681), p. 1.

²⁴ BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 26r.

²⁵ E. M., *The Present Danger*, p. 2.

²⁶ Sheres to Secretary Coventry, Tangier, 6 July 1679, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 457.

²⁷ BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 26r–v; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 166.

²⁸ See *An Exact Journal*, pp. 1–4, 10, and Palmes Fairborne's reports from Tangier of 13–17 and 24 April in TNA, CO 279/25, ff. 183–184, 191–192. On the background to the resumption of hostilities and preparations, see also BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 26v–28v, and 'Tangier, January 18', *The London Gazette*, 19–23 February 1679[/80] (London). Routh provides a reasonable account of key developments during the siege in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, Chap. X.

I must needs confess I never have saw a place more ruinous than this, not one thing being in a condition fit for defence and what is worse, not one spare arme in the store excepting a few blunderbusses that is come at this time with me. I beseech you to dispatch with all speed at least 1200, the Scotch companys being very ill armed, and if we come to a brisk [action] we shall be in great distress.²⁹

Furthermore, he warned that without two thousand more foot-soldiers and three hundred cavalry, they were at risk of losing both Charles and Henrietta Forts.³⁰ By the end of April he remained hopeful that the forts could hold on until reinforcements and supplies arrived, but also recognised that the conflict had reached a critical point.³¹ His concerns would have been reinforced the following day, when he received a letter from Omar in which the qā'id advised that despite the failure of his army to take the forts and the losses it had incurred, he was committed to continue the siege until his 'intention is fulfilled'.³²

The crisis deepened when on 9 May the commander of Henrietta Fort advised that the fort had been undermined, the walls had been breached, and that he could not hold his position for much longer. It was determined that the men could not be recovered 'without palpable hazard of looseing the whole party'.³³ Instead, the governor sought to negotiate an honourable surrender of the fort, but Omar 'refused all proposalls, but their surrendering att his mercy'³⁴ — for a European commander under siege in the second-half of the seventeenth century, a negotiated surrender with 'honours of war' was perfectly acceptable, but as well as providing no surety of safety, surrender 'at discretion' was an affront to his personal honour, and that of his garrison, and the worst possible outcome.³⁵ The qā'id also clarified his orders: he

²⁹ TNA, CO 279/25, f. 183v (my interpolation). On the embarkation of the reinforcements, see 'Limerick, March 1', *The London Gazette*, 1–4 March 1679[/80] (London), p. 2.

³⁰ TNA, CO 279/25, f. 183r.

³¹ See *ibid.*, f. 191; Fairborne to Sir Leonell Jenkins, Tangier, 29 April 1680, *ibid.*, ff. 202–203.

³² Qā'id Omar to Fairborne, 30 April 1680, *ibid.*, f. 205.

³³ Fairborne to Jenkins, Tangier, 11 May 1680, *ibid.*, f. 209r.

³⁴ *Ibid.* See also *An Exact Journal*, p. 11.

³⁵ John A. Lynn, 'Introduction: Honourable Surrender in Early Modern European History', in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender* (Oxford, 2012), p. 107. On the subject of sieges and honourable surrender, in addition to the overview provided by Lynn at pp. 99–110, see also John Childs' chapter in the same book, 'Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1660–1783', pp. 153–168.

was not to leave until all the fortifications had been destroyed. It was at this time that a drastic option to resolve the impasse appears to have first been openly proposed: Fairborne bluntly advised the Secretary of State, Leonell Jenkins, that unless the garrison's needs were met soon, 'his majesty had better entertaine the thought of blowing it [Tangier] up, so that it may neither be fit for Christian nor Moore' to use it to trouble England.³⁶

Close to mutiny, the men in Charles Fort were given the choice of continuing to defend their position or attempting to retreat to the city. They agreed on the latter, and Inchiquin resolved that a contingent of almost five hundred men would advance to cover them. On the morning of 14 May all was ready, but Omar appears to have learned of the plan following the surrender of Henrietta Fort the night before, so when the men of Charles Fort commenced their flight, the Moroccans were prepared. Hindered by a series of deep, muddy trenches and enemy fire, fewer than fifty soldiers reached the city; some 120 were killed, and fourteen were captured. A further twelve were taken captive following the surrender of Giles Fort the same day. The garrison lost another fifteen or so men covering the retreat.³⁷

Later in the day, Omar sent Inchiquin a message in which he reiterated his terms: if the English wished to end the war, they would have to abandon all the remaining forts, and 'keepe the place as the Portugalls had it'. Fairborne was inclined to advise the governor to agree to this if an 'honourable peace' could be concluded. He was well aware of the consequences, for 'the next business will be the towne, for since the enemye are both skillfull in mineing and great guns we cannot hold out for long

³⁶ TNA, CO 279/25, f. 209v (my interpolation). Julian Corbett insists that the option was being discussed as early as the year before, but does not identify a source. See Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), p. 389, n. 2.

³⁷ See the various accounts provided in Fairborne to Jenkins, 14 and 15 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/25, ff. 211–212r; *An Exact Journal*, pp. 5–8, 11–12; *A True Relation of a Great and Bloody Fight between the English and the Moors before Tangiere* ([London], 1680); Francis Povey to Colonel George Legge, Tangier, 18 May 1680, *Dartmouth MSS*, 3 vols., vol. I (London, 1887), pp. 50–51. Routh considered Povey's account to be 'less reliable' due to some inaccuracies and exaggeration. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 176. Povey was highly critical of the way the retreat had been conducted.

if they proceed after the rate they have done'.³⁸ The qā'id also gave leave for the bodies which remained on the field to be collected. It is perhaps a measure of the hostility felt towards the English by some Moroccans, that when a party was sent out to collect the dead, they purportedly found not only had the corpses been decapitated, but they had also been mutilated in other ways.³⁹

Inchiquin thanked the qā'id for 'his civility' in permitting the recovery of the bodies, but refused his terms, explaining that 'it did not consist with honor of his majesty, nor his owne'. He acknowledged the remaining forts were vulnerable, but intended to 'sell them as deare as he could'.⁴⁰ The assault resumed the next day, and although the garrison continued to inflict heavy casualties, the strategic and tactical advantages enjoyed by the Moroccans had improved considerably with the fall of the forts and capture of their ordnance. They proceeded in their work against the town's defences in such a manner, observed Fairborne, 'so they leave nothing undon that may gain advantage upon us'.⁴¹ 'All the advantages are on the enemy's side', another officer later opined.⁴²

On 19 May, Qā'id Omar sent a messenger to again reiterate his terms for a peace. The offer was considered by a council of war in which it was agreed that the remaining outer forts were unlikely to hold for much longer. It was decided that the only realistic option was to negotiate the 'best articles they could'. A four-month truce was subsequently concluded. It required the English to abandon Pole and Norwood Forts; the Moroccans were to remove their guns and destroy their battery positions; and no new works were to be undertaken by either side.⁴³ While the truce did provide the English with grazing rights, it left the colony less self-sufficient, and

³⁸ TNA, CO 279/25, f. 211v.

³⁹ *An Exact Journal*, p. 12; *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 50. While there are both Qur'anic and historical precedents for the beheading by Muslims of unbelievers in warfare, that does not explain the other reported damage done to the bodies. It is, of course, possible that the wounds in question were incurred in battle and exaggerated.

⁴⁰ TNA, CO 279/25, f. 212r.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, f. 212. On the Moroccan position at this time, see also *An Exact Journal*, pp. 8–9, 12–13.

⁴² Major John White to Colonel Legge, Tangier, 25 June 1680, *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 51.

⁴³ Fairborne's report, 21 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/25, f. 217r.

more exposed to attack that it had been at any time since the first days of the occupation.

The stated intent of the truce was to allow time for 'the better adjusting of such a peace which may be to satisfaction of both parties'.⁴⁴ But Fairborne was by no means hopeful of such an outcome and was concerned about the long-term security of Tangier. Without adequate fortifications he believed the colony would remain at risk.⁴⁵ He was suspicious of Omar's motives: 'the enemy have not granted this concession out of affection but designe', he surmised.⁴⁶ The qā'id's refusal to allow the English to repair the city's defences, while at the same time permitting them, 'upon a small consideration [of gunpowder]' to obtain stone to progress the mole, was evidence, according to the lieutenant-governor, of the Moroccan commander's intent to renew the assault once the mole was 'good enough for them'.⁴⁷ The principal purpose of the truce from Fairborne's perspective was to give the Tangier commissioners sufficient time to convince the king to send reinforcements to undertake a counter-offensive. But if this force was not provided he once again warned, the king 'had better be resolved to quit and leave both the towne and mole in a ruin'.⁴⁸ He also shared his concerns with his friends, including Samuel Pepys, impressing upon them 'what I forsee must be the end' if no action is taken.⁴⁹ He later advised another correspondent, 'the enemy we have to deal withall are no more the silly Moors we had to do with fifteen years ago, but expert diligent enemy that will require provisioning accordingly'.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ On English thinking on fortification of overseas settlements between 1608 and 1759, see I. Bruce Watson, 'Fortifications and the "Idea" of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India', *Past & Present*, 88 (1980), pp. 70–87. Although concerned with developments in India, there are some parallels with the situation the English found in Morocco.

⁴⁶ Fairborne's report, 24 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/25, f. 218.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* (my interpolation).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 217r.

⁴⁹ Fairborne to Samuel Pepys, 24 May 1680, Tangier, *The Manuscripts of J. Eliot Hodgkin* (London, 1897), pp. 176–177.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Sari R. Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot, UK, 1991), p. 157, n. 2. Source is Huntington Library, EL 8483, Fairborne to Bridgewater, 3 July 1680, Tangier.

Fairborne and other observers came to realise what Colonel Norwood had understood eleven years earlier: that they not only faced a determined adversary, but one capable of becoming far more militarily sophisticated. While it may have been politically convenient — or a salve to assuage wounded racial, cultural or religious pride — for some Britons to attribute this development to the treachery of Christian European renegades,⁵¹ others were prepared to acknowledge the capacity of Moroccans and other Muslims to acquire the knowledge, skills, and discipline to meet Europeans on the battlefield on equal terms. The 'Alawīs undoubtedly benefited from the experience of European renegades and captives, but their capabilities were supplemented by the contribution of Turkish gunners and engineers who had participated in the successful siege of Candia,⁵² as well as by their own learnings from years of civil war and conflict with Europeans.⁵³ Moroccans were beginning to be recognised, not only for their bravery and basic martial skills, but as formidable a foe as any Christian army.⁵⁴ As discussed later in this chapter, while the events of this period meant that the perceptions held by Britons of Moroccans continued to be heavily influenced from a perspective of conflict, they also did much to raise the general esteem in which they were held. Moreover, acceptance of their enhanced military capability would become a decisive factor in deciding the fate of English Tangier.

⁵¹ See discussion on the sources of such claims later in the chapter.

⁵² *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 51. Another correspondent refers to the presence of 'dextrous miners from Algier and the Levant (as is said)'. See *An Exact Journal*, p. 9. See also Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 395–396. Cf. The assessment of the author of *The Last Account from Fez, in a Letter from One of the Embassy to a Person of Honour in London Containing a Relation of Colonel Kirk's Reception at Mequinez, by the Emperour, with Several Passages in Relation to the Affairs of Tangier* (London, 1682), pp. 1, 2. Based on the details of the activities on which he bases his assessment, and his possible identity, as discussed in n. 157 below, it is questionable whether the author was present during the siege, and therefore capable of fully assessing Moroccan military capability.

⁵³ In a rather interesting case of cultural exchange, the former Moroccan collaborator, James Hamet, introduced in chap. 5 of this thesis, appears to have participated in the siege, and may have contributed knowledge of European siege techniques he had acquired during a tour of Europe which had been sponsored by his patron, the Duke of York. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 168. Routh does not cite a source, but Hamet's presence at the time is attested to by the author of *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 21–22. On development of Moroccan military capability, see also Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 163–164.

⁵⁴ Fairborne first makes this direct comparison in TNA, CO 279/25, f. 209v. See also *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 51; *An Exact Journal*, p. 13.

Inchiquin was recalled to London in June 1680, leaving the defence of Tangier in the hands of Fairborne. In late August the lieutenant-governor finally received word that a relief force was being prepared. By this time, one of the king's principal advisors, the Secretary of State, Lord Sunderland, appears to have concluded that Tangier 'would certainly be lost', but advised the king that it was still necessary to demonstrate that they had done what they could to preserve it so Charles could defend himself from criticism.⁵⁵ However, the conclusion of a treaty remained a possibility: Qā'id Omar had sent a proposal to the king, but a response had not yet been provided. Despite his earlier scepticism, Fairborne was clearly eager to expedite the matter.⁵⁶ After all, as one of his own officers, a Major White, pointed out, and as the English were similarly finding in their dealings with the North African regencies, concluding a peace was a cheaper option than the use of military force.⁵⁷ According to at least one source, the cost of reinforcing and fortifying Tangier, together with the death of the Earl of Ossory at the end of July, who was to replace Inchiquin and lead the relief expedition, had finally made Charles amenable to a treaty which was not conditional on the re-fortification of the city.⁵⁸

As the crisis in Morocco was unfolding during 1679 and 1680, Charles II had also been dealing with a series of political crises at home which had not only distracted him, but prevented him from responding in a meaningful way to the desperate requests from Tangier. In June 1679, he had been forced to send an army to Scotland to quell another rebellion of the Covenanters. At the same time a more serious problem was developing as a consequence of the emergence of the Popish Plot the year before.

⁵⁵ John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, 2 vols., ed. William Bray, vol. II ([London], 1901), pp. 145–146, entry for 26 July 1680.

⁵⁶ Fairborne to Jenkins, 26 August 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, f. 43r.

⁵⁷ *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 51.

⁵⁸ James Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680: The Diary of Sir James Halkett', *The Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, 1 (1922), pp. 5–6. Halkett was a major in Dumbarton's Regiment which had been dispatched as part of the relief force, and had served earlier in Tangier under Teviot. He and the regiment remained in Tangier until the garrison left in 1684. Despite being an important contemporary source concerning events relating to Tangier from around the middle of 1680 to the end of 1682, as also noted by Captain McCance who prepared the article in which Halkett's account is reproduced, the diary does not appear to have been known to Routh when she wrote her seminal book on the colony. The major was also the author of another account, concerning events which took place on 27 October 1680, and published under the name 'Major J. A. Hackett', which is cited below.

This concocted conspiracy to assassinate the king and replace him with his Catholic brother, the Duke of York, together with the revelation of secret negotiations between the English government and France, further fuelled anti-Catholic sentiment, and hardened Parliament's resolve to exclude the duke from the succession in what became known as the Exclusion Crisis.⁵⁹ The colony's association with the king, and the dominance of Catholics within its garrison and civil administration, and among its foreign residents, meant that Tangier was inevitably drawn into the political concerns and intrigues which ensued.⁶⁰

Unable to rely on Parliament to authorise necessary funds, the king found himself torn between saving his colony and his own self-preservation. In response to the suggestion of drawing troops from the army for service in Morocco around the middle of 1679, Charles was forced to declare that 'tho' he loved Tangier well he loved himself better', and refused the proposal.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the latest news out of Tangier, reinforced by public sentiment, finally convinced him to act. The relief force that was finally dispatched was smaller than Fairborne had requested, but by late August 1680, just over one thousand reinforcements had either arrived or were on their way to Tangier, including mounted troops, bringing the establishment to more than three thousand officers and men.⁶² In addition, the garrison was supported by Admiral Herbert's fleet, and some five hundred seamen.⁶³ Ironically, after having repudiated the English occupation and actively scheming against it, but

⁵⁹ On the general impact of these events to October 1680, see, for example, John Miller, *Charles II* (London, 1991), pp. 288–333; Ronald Hutton, *Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 360–395.

⁶⁰ On the impact of these events on Tangier see Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 388–395; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 238–239; Tristan Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), pp. 1006–1007.

⁶¹ Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 24 June 1679, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde*, 8 vols., vol. IV (London, 1906), p. 527.

⁶² 'Charles II: August 1680', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1679–80*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 1915), accessed 19 January 2018, entries for 13 August. On the background to the establishment of the relief force, see Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 398–399; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 181–184, 317–319.

⁶³ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 7, cf. Ross, *Tangiers Rescue*, p. 5.

with a shared interest in the outcome, the Spanish also contributed a much needed cavalry unit.⁶⁴

Hostilities immediately resumed following the expiry of the truce on 15 September.⁶⁵ Five days later, the English marched out of Tangier and, catching the Moroccans unprepared, quickly took the site where Pole Fort had stood and commenced building a palisade. Over the following days the two sides skirmished while the English rebuilt the fort, and the Moroccans responded by digging new trenches.⁶⁶ However, on 7 October a messenger arrived from Omar with an offer to renew negotiation of a treaty. In a council of war, it was agreed that Fairborne should accept the offer. The stumbling block as always was the issue of the fortifications. The English requested use of the ground in which Charles Fort had been situated,⁶⁷ the return of all their redoubts, and agreement to the rebuilding of Pole Fort. The English representative, Lieutenant-Colonel Tollemache, was optimistic that the Moroccans would accept their conditions, except the one relating to Pole Fort. Indeed, Tollemache's Moroccan counterpart fervently declared that under no circumstances would the rebuilding of the fort be tolerated, and refused to negotiate further.⁶⁸ If there had remained any doubt, the position of the Moroccans on the issue of fortifications had now been made abundantly clear.

⁶⁴ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 13; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 185. With both their interests in Morocco under threat, in June the Spanish and English kings had put aside their long-standing differences and entered into a 'defensive alliance'. See Jenkins to Ormonde, 12 June 1680, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde*, 8 vols., vol. V (London, 1908), p. 334.

⁶⁵ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 187.

⁶⁶ Sheres' report, 29 October 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, 93r–96r; Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 8–11. A more sensationalised, but more detailed, account of these proceedings is provided by Ross in *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 9–19. An account of the events of 20–22 September is provided in *A Particular Relation of the Late Success of His Majesties Forces at Tangier against the Moors. Published by Authority* ([London], 1680). A transcription of the latter pamphlet is also provided in Bejitt, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 183–186. Sheres wrote his report at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Sackville. See Sackville to [Sunderland], 30 October 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, f. 188.

⁶⁷ The requirement for this land may be related to directions sent to the governor by the Privy Council in August 'to prolong the peace with the Moors and to agree with them for a certain parcel of ground, which they may encompass by cutting a passage into the Jures river'. This may have been seen as a means to secure the coastal area between the 'Jews River' and the city using the natural topography of the area, without the need to build fortifications, and thereby overcoming the objections of the Moroccans on this issue. See 'Charles II: August 1680', entries for 7 August.

⁶⁸ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 11–12; TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 96r–v. Cf. Routh's interpretation of the negotiations in *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 192.

Contrary to the impression of common purpose and enthusiasm among Tangier's defenders at this time (as conveyed in a contemporary pamphlet, *Tangers Rescue*), and the emphasis given to this interpretation by Routh,⁶⁹ the senior officers of the garrison were, in fact, deeply divided as to how best to deal with the situation. A group under the newly arrived Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sackville were critical of the way the war had been conducted and concerned at the possible outcome under Fairborne's leadership. Sackville had been disappointed with the failure of the recent treaty negotiations. He believed that Tangier 'could never be made steadable to the king in no fashion', and concurred with those 'judicious men, that understand Tangier well' and 'thinks that the charge and expence the king is at there might be better employed in England'.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, with the Moroccan entrenchments moving closer to Pole Fort, and the risk of it being undermined or cut off, a decision had to be made. Fairborne proposed a counter-offensive to drive the Moroccans from the fields. Sackville and his supporters argued against the plan, but it was carried by vote. However, the following day, 24 October, Fairborne was mortally wounded while overseeing work outside the town, and Sackville himself was required to take charge of the garrison.⁷¹

Despite his misgivings about the counter-offensive, Sackville found that he was outvoted once again by his fellow officers. So, on the morning of 27 October he gathered a force totalling fifteen hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, and sallied out to confront the Moroccans,⁷² who numbered between two and three thousand.⁷³

⁶⁹ See Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, esp. pp. 2–9; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 187–188.

⁷⁰ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 12.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14. On the general position of the English, and Fairborne's wounding, see also TNA, CO 279/26, 96v–97r; Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 19–20; [Henry Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement Between the Garison of Tangier, and the Moors, and of the Signal Victory which His Majesties Forces Obtained Against Them on the 27th of October Last. Published by Authority.* ([London], 1680). The latter pamphlet is a published version of Sheres' account of 29 October. A second edition was published the same year. The text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(5), and a transcript is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 187–193.

⁷² TNA, CO 279/26, f. 97r; [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*, p. 4. Sheres notes that the garrison's establishment had once again been significantly depleted by illness.

⁷³ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 14. The figure of around three thousand was confirmed by Moroccan prisoners. See *ibid.*, p. 19; J. A. Hacket, *A Full and True Relation, of the Fortunate Victory Gained Over the Moors by the Garrison of Tangier, upon the 27 of October, 1680* (not stated, 1680), p. 4. Cf. the figures variously cited by Sheres and Halkett/Hacket for the size of the two forces with the clearly

Henry Sheres, who was present, later reflected in his official report that the 'attack proved a hot and very bloody piece of service' with 'the enemy disputing every line and trench', and the men 'coming to push of pike and handy-blows in several places'.⁷⁴ By late afternoon, the garrison had driven the Moroccans from their positions and destroyed their entrenchments and mines, but both sides suffered heavy losses.⁷⁵ Despite the success of the English in forcing the Moroccans to retreat, and the jingoistic rhetoric with which it was later hailed, it was a hollow victory.

But it had been a significant win for the English, and a cause for optimism for some that the outcome would make the Moroccans amenable to concluding a peace on more advantageous terms.⁷⁶ But the proceedings of the past eighteen months had also amply demonstrated to more hard-headed Britons the vulnerability of the colony. Tensions created by these two positions became apparent when soon after the routing of the Moroccans, Qā'id Omar offered to enter into a peace treaty, and Sackville eagerly accepted the opportunity. Under the circumstances this turn of events is surprising, and has not been adequately explained. Shortly before he made the offer, the qā'id was apparently incensed to learn how his men who had been taken prisoner had been mistreated, and had vowed not to deal further with the English.⁷⁷ Sackville, on the other hand, had been aware that an ambassador had been dispatched from England to negotiate a treaty and would be carrying instructions from the king to this end.⁷⁸

It has been asserted that the impact of Moroccan losses during the siege had been so great that they were forced to seek a truce.⁷⁹ However, this seems implausible as they were not facing any immediate threat from the English. Much more likely, Omar

exaggerated ones presented by Ross in *Tangers Rescue*, p. 27. On the disposition of the Moroccans around Tangier on the day, see fig. 7 in this thesis.

⁷⁴ TNA, CO 279/26, f. 98r; [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*, p. 5. Cf. the more partisan account of Ross in *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 24–28. Halkett provides detailed and reasonably balanced accounts in 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 15–19 and *A Full and True Relation*, pp. 1–4.

⁷⁵ TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98v, 100r; [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*, p. 8.

⁷⁶ See, for example, Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, p. 31; Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 20–21.

⁷⁷ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 19.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20; Sunderland to Fairborne, Whitehall, 1 November 1680, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 57.

⁷⁹ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 401; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 198; Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 157.

and the sultan saw an opportunity associated with the receipt of the long-awaited response to the proposal the qā'id had forwarded to Charles months earlier. In his reply to the king he states:

As soon as I received your majesty's letter, I went from the [sultan's] court to the camp of Tanger, and ... quitted the war between the Moors and your majesty's subjects ... in consideration of your majesty's letter and they of Tanger desiring me to give them peace for six months in consideration of the said letter, I complied with what they desired.⁸⁰

Whether the king offered concessions is unclear, as a copy of his letter does not appear to have survived, but it was obviously of sufficient interest to warrant further consideration. Omar also welcomed news that Charles was intending to send an ambassador. However, the celerity with which Sackville concluded the ceasefire on the terms he agreed to, in full knowledge of the impending arrival of an ambassador, is harder to explain. While he may have been concerned with the garrison's readiness to repel a further siege, as suggested by Routh,⁸¹ it appears more likely he was seeking to prefigure the terms of the final treaty. The openness with which he responded to the qā'id, his desire to conclude what is in effect an interim treaty before the arrival of the ambassador, and the concessions which he made, were of great concern to his fellow officers, yet he persisted despite their misgivings.⁸²

Apart from a short stint in the Parliament, Sackville had been a career army officer since 1667. In addition to having developed a reputation for severe discipline, one contemporary found him to be 'naturally most peevish and passionate' and 'proud',⁸³

⁸⁰ 'Letter I: Qā'id Omar ben Haddū to King Charles II, 29 November 1680', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p.221. The original manuscript can be found in TNA, CO 279/26, f. 238. The letter from Charles was dated 14 September 1680. It is not clear if there had been a delay in dispatching it from England, or the qā'id had delayed replying, or both.

⁸¹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 198.

⁸² Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 20–21. The terms were far from 'humiliating' from the perspective of the Moroccans, as claimed by Matar in *Britain and Barbary*, p. 157, and were clearly not seen that way by the officers of the garrison.

⁸³ B. M. Crook and John. P. Ferris, 'Sackville, Edward (c.1640–1714), of Bow Street, Covent Garden, Westminster', in B. D. Henning, ed., *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1660-1690* (London, 1983), at <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/sackville-edward-1640-1714>, accessed 29 January 2018. It during his time as an MP in 1679 that Sackville had been caught up in the Popish Plot by having been provoked by Titus Oates into denouncing the veracity of the conspiracy.

a disposition which goes some way to explain his frequently testy relationship with his fellow officers in Tangier. Nevertheless, while he had only recently arrived, Sackville clearly possessed a more realistic understanding of the colony's situation than some of his compatriots, and, like Fairborne had been, he was pessimistic about its future. He not only understood that the Moroccans were a formidable enemy, but that it was pointless to continue to stubbornly insist on the right to fortify the colony in defiance of their repeated objections, unless the king was prepared to make a substantial investment in its defence.⁸⁴ In the absence of such a commitment, all the English could do was either leave, or ensure that the terms of any treaty were sufficiently advantageous to the Moroccans and trust that they honoured it. It is evidently with these considerations in mind that Sackville concluded his agreement with Omar in late November. Among other things, it provided the inhabitants of Tangier with access to fresh provisions and forage, and allowed them to graze their livestock, cut wood, and quarry stone (articles 2–8, 10). While precluded from re-establishing fortifications, the English were permitted to undertake any works within the town walls (article 1). Of obvious appeal to the merchants on both sides, it also provided them with freedom to trade their merchandise (articles 12, 13). In return Omar was to be supplied with one hundred bolts of cloth, one hundred and twenty barrels of gunpowder, and parts for two hundred muskets. While the truce was ostensibly only intended to be a stop-gap measure, its scope, and the reference to annual limits (articles 6, 17), indicates that it was negotiated with an eye to the future.⁸⁵ The terms were far from 'humiliating' for the Moroccans, as claimed by one scholar,⁸⁶ and were clearly not seen that way by the English.

The ambassador, Major Sir James Leslie, while waiting in Cadiz to embark for Tangier, was surprised to learn of Sackville's presumptuousness and was highly critical of the

⁸⁴ Sackville to Tangier Committee, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1, TNA, CO 279/27, ff. 2r–v; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, pp. 401–402.

⁸⁵ 'Articles of Truce and Commerce', 25 November 1680, BL, Add. MS 17021, ff. 49–52. The document is broadly similar to, but expands on the provisions contained in, a version of the treaty dated 16/26 November 1680 which can be found in TNA, CO 279/26, f. 259. The latter may have been a summary prepared to inform the ambassador of the direction of negotiations, as it was contained in his subsequent report cited below, prepared while waiting to complete his journey to Tangier.

⁸⁶ See Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 157.

terms which had been agreed. Aside from being affronted, Leslie also believed, like Sackville's colleagues, that they were not sufficiently advantageous, but was not prepared to renounce them until he had received further instructions.⁸⁷ The evident resentment felt towards Sackville for what one officer described as 'condescending to such mean and disadvantageous things' following what was perceived as a great, and hard-won, victory,⁸⁸ and the associated difference in attitude toward relations with the Moroccans, beg the question as to what effect the tumultuous events in both Tangier and in Britain which had occurred since the beginning of the siege eighteen months earlier, had had on the attitudes of Britons towards Tangier, Morocco and Moroccans.

6.2. Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Local Responses

Nabil Matar has concluded that by 1680, as a result of England's military achievements in Morocco and across the Western Mediterranean, Britons possessed 'a national self-image bursting with assertiveness, assuredness and superiority'. Furthermore, he claims that '[m]ilitary pride was now dictating the ideology of the conflict with the Moors', and that the encounter 'with the Moors has become completely grounded in colonial desire and religious difference'.⁸⁹ Some of the evidence and arguments Matar has put forward to support these conclusions have been discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis. However, it is his analysis of public sentiment for the period 1679 to 1680 that is relevant at this point, and for this purpose he turns to a range of contemporary published reports and pamphlets. While he correctly identifies the influence that growing disaffection about Tangier played in the production of some of these texts, he fails to fully contextualise the sources, adequately distil the aims of the authors, and explain how they represent prevailing normative attitudes. Moreover, he also overlooks the personal perspectives afforded in letters and accounts left by other Britons who were present

⁸⁷ Sir James Leslie to Tangier Commissioners, Cadiz, 6/16 December 1680, TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 258–259. See also Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 36. Leslie is sometimes rendered as Lesley or Lashly in some sources.

⁸⁸ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 21. On Halkett's feelings toward Sackville, see also p. 22.

⁸⁹ Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 156, 158.

in Tangier, as well as insights which can be gleaned from the pronouncements and actions of the English government.⁹⁰ Only by considering the milieu in which these publications were written can their real meaning and significance be deduced; and only by considering the other available sources can some measure of the impact that developments at this time had on attitudes, behaviour, and British self-identity be properly ascertained.

The occupation of Tangier had never received unanimous support in England, and over the years dissenting voices had become more emboldened as the colony lurched from one crisis to another. By 1679, pessimism about the value of Tangier was supplemented by concerns following the Popish Plot and commencement of the Exclusion Crisis that the colony would provide the foundation for a Catholic uprising. It was around this time that the possibility of abandoning Tangier began to be actively canvassed both to avoid the cost of maintaining it, and to mitigate the perceived threat to Protestant England.⁹¹ In an increasingly polarised political environment, a series of pamphlets, sometimes based on earlier works, were initiated over the next few years both by private citizens and the government to respond to the growing debate about Tangier's future, and to counter perceptions of the deteriorating military situation.

Among the apologias to appear were three written several years earlier and discussed in chapter 5: the anonymous *The Present Interest of Tangier* in 1679; Henry Sheres' *A Discourse Touching Tanger*, which was published in at least three editions the

⁹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 153–158. Matar also argues that John Dryden's play *The Spanish Fryar* reflects the celebratory mood following the English victory on 27 October by evoking events from the siege. However, given that much of the play is thought to have been written during the summer of 1680, and was already being performed by the time reports of the counter-offensive were filtering into London, it appears implausible that these same reports could have inspired details of the play cited by Matar on p. 157. See the chronology for the play provided in David Womersley, 'Dryden's *The Spanish Fryar*: Modernity and Exclusion', in Claude Rawson and Aaron Santesso, eds., *John Dryden (1631–1700): His Politics, His Plays, and His Poets. A Tercentenary Celebration Held at Yale University, 6–7 October 2000* (Newark, NJ, 2004), p. 81, n. 2.

⁹¹ Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, p. 389; Margarette Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 77 (2014), pp. 422–424.

following year, with one of those being accompanied by *The Present Interest*;⁹² and George Phillip's letter to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland also appeared in the same year as *The Present State of Tangier*. Lancelot Addison even made a contribution in 1681 with the publication of *The Moors Baffled*, in which he provided his own formulation to foil the Moroccans and ensure the commercial success of Tangier: adopt the policies for peace and security which had been advocated by the Earl of Teviot.⁹³ Despite their dated assessments, these commentaries remained germane, providing attractive assessments of Tangier's potential, and assurances that a resolution to the problem of Moroccan hostility and intransigence could be found, either by mutual accommodation or by force, if necessary.⁹⁴ They were joined by a succession of accounts which provided commentary on the current events in Morocco, including a number published by royal authority.⁹⁵ Many of these, according to a member of the garrison, Major James Halkett, were so filled with 'lyes, partialities and mistakes that it is hard for the king to find out the truth'.⁹⁶

While not all of these tracts are patently propagandistic in nature, even the more factually-based, less sensationalised accounts were likely to have been published with the aim of influencing sentiment toward Tangier, and for this reason they are

⁹² Two of the editions of Sheres' *Discourse* carried the same title, and it is to one of these that *The Present Interest* was appended.

⁹³ Lancelot Addison, *The Moores Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger, Especially when it was Under the Earl of Teviot* (London, 1681), pp. 25–27. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 155; William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 52, n. 46, 236; Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 86. See also various references to the details of this publication in the footnotes in chap. 4 of this thesis.

⁹⁴ To remove any doubt about its relevance, someone even went to the trouble to revise the date of Sheres' letter in two of its editions.

⁹⁵ E. M., *The Present Danger; An Exact Journal; A Particular Relation; A Faithful Relation of the Most Remarkable Transactions which have Happened at Tangier; Since the Moors have Lately Made their Attacques upon the Forts and Fortifications of that Famous Garrison* ([London], 1680); [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement; Great and Bloody News from Tangier, or a Full and True Relation of a Great and Dreadful Fight Which Happened on the 3d of this Instant November Between the English and the Moors* (London, 1680); Hacket, *A Full and True Relation*; Ross, *Tangers Rescue. A Faithful Relation* was republished in 1681. As also noted by Bejjit, the dating of the events described in *Great and Bloody News* to 3 November, rather than 27 October, is clearly an error and, together with other inaccuracies, indicates that the account was prepared by someone who had not been present. See Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 195, and a transcription of the text on pp. 195–197. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 157.

⁹⁶ Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 3. While Halkett appears to have been a generally reliable reporter of events, he was not beyond interposing some of his own partiality in his assessments, particularly concerning Sackville.

more than simple reflections of prevailing attitudes. Nevertheless, they still provide valuable insights into the views of their authors and perhaps other protagonists to which they refer, as well as shedding light on details of contemporary events. Furthermore, the number of these works and the republication of several of them attests to the level of interest the public had in the subject, so undeniably they would have been influential to some degree in informing public opinion. In reporting the proceedings of the siege, these accounts highlight, among other things, the enthusiasm and bravery of the defenders, and the competence of their leaders. Through their publication, those who wrote or commissioned them sought to appeal to national pride to engender public support for Tangier, and variously reassure Britons that the government remained committed to the colony, that it could be secured, and far from being a threat to Protestant England, the garrison was loyal and an asset to the nation.⁹⁷ What is notably different between them though, apart from their varying level of detail and accuracy, is their treatment of Moroccans to achieve these ends.

In the more jingoistic, triumphalist accounts the authors malign the character of Moroccans and disparage their military success and capabilities. In one such report they are nothing but ‘barbarous infidels’ who have become ‘tearful Moors’ when exposed to ‘English valour’, having been ‘shamefully repulsed with great slaughter’ and ‘forced to retreat in confusion’.⁹⁸ ‘Barbarians’ was an appellation given to them by another author, who reported that it was thought they had acquired their ‘stratagem of war’ from ‘French and Spanish mercenaries’.⁹⁹ In another, they were described as cowardly, disordered, and, once again, dependent on European renegades.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, these reductive, negative allusions are sparse in the

⁹⁷ See also the assessments of Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 392–395; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 35–36. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 154.

⁹⁸ *A Faithful Relation*, pp. 1–2.

⁹⁹ *A True Relation of a Great and Bloody Fight*, pp. 1, 4. The sultan is also accused of using ‘fraud’ in his efforts to gain Tangier. This appears to be an allegation that he had been underhanded in his dealings with the English, not necessarily that he had conspired with the French and Spanish as maintained by Matar in *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 155–156.

¹⁰⁰ *Great and Bloody News*, pp. 1–3.

tracts in question, and, overall, they are not particularly bellicose or polemic in nature.

John Ross, the author of *Tangers Rescue*, the only report of this kind from the period which appears to have been actually written by an eye-witness, also attributes the success which the Moroccans enjoyed to the assistance provided to them by renegades.¹⁰¹ He charges the Moroccans with 'barbarous cruelty' and 'rude inhumanity against measure', claiming they were hypocrites, as their actions were contrary to their professed 'civil and moral duties', presumably a reference to their religious beliefs.¹⁰² In fact, Ross is the only contemporary commentator on the siege that draws attention in any significant way to religious difference: he configures the conflict as being one between 'the Mores' and 'the Christians', although he does not dwell on the issue beyond this.¹⁰³ He goes on to claim that the Moroccans were treacherous, and that they had been 'most shamefully beat', having retreated in fear from the Christian advance. He also suggests the possibility that they used enchantments so that some men died of otherwise minor wounds.¹⁰⁴ But beyond these few references in the body of the tract, Ross' treatment of the Moroccans is not overly hostile or disparaging.

Perhaps the most intriguing part of *Tangers Rescue* is the poem appended to the account, which is intended to provide the reader with a 'description of the Mores, their nature and the country'.¹⁰⁵ It is not clear whether it was written by Ross. What it relates is at times abstruse, but it clearly presents a much more nuanced perspective on Moroccans than the preceding text. The martial skills of the 'Morish horse' have been acclaimed since the time of Hannibal, declares the author, 'esteem'd to be gallant in a superlative degree', but they treat their foot soldiers

¹⁰¹ Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 2, 18–19. Whether Ross was a member of the garrison is not clear. He describes himself as a gentleman, but does not appear in the English army lists and commission registers for the period, although he may have been a volunteer. Further, his account does not give the impression he was an active participant in the fighting.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁰³ See *ibid.*, pp. 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 24, 28, 34.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 26–28.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, title page.

harshly, instilling such fear that they 'charge with fury, and in mad despair'.¹⁰⁶ The Arabic-speaking people of the mountains, like the Irish, are indolent, according to the author; yet there were also 'gentlemen and citizens' in the country who 'are more sublime, and higher civilized', and the writer notes that they have engaged in 'commerce and trade' with other nations over 'many years'.¹⁰⁷ In this respect Morocco had much to offer; it is described as being fertile and rich in natural produce and other resources, the proverbial land of 'milk and hony'.¹⁰⁸ Yet, the land was also dangerous, warns the writer, because it was infested with 'a curs'd, dismal crew of little nigroes',¹⁰⁹ evidently a reference to Mawlay Ismā'īl's army of black soldiers, the Bukhari, who were present during the siege, but drew little attention in reports at the time.¹¹⁰ The Bukhari formed the backbone of the Moroccan army and being intensely loyal to the sultan were used to suppress insurrection in the country.¹¹¹ The author demonstrates an intense loathing for these men, charging them with contemptable savagery, and presenting them as a common enemy. The author was perplexed as to why, in such an otherwise idyllic country, such 'venom breeds', as it also did in Ireland.¹¹² For the author of the poem the issue of concern was not religious difference, but rather racial difference.¹¹³

But such partisan assessments of Moroccans were certainly not the rule in public reporting of the siege. Articles in the official *London Gazette* celebrated the 'most signal victory', which had been achieved by the garrison by quoting exaggerated estimates of the size of the Moroccan army and its losses without seeking to disparage, or promote feelings of antipathy towards, them.¹¹⁴ The authors of other pamphlets which provided first-hand accounts allowed the actions of the two sides to essentially speak for themselves, providing relatively unvarnished descriptions of

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹¹⁰ More correctly they were known as 'Abid al-Bukhari. On the presence of the Bukhari, see Fairborne's report in TNA, CO 279/25, f. 202v.

¹¹¹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, pp. 230–231; Aomar Boum and Thomas K. Park, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 21; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 46.

¹¹² Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, p. 35.

¹¹³ Cf. Matar's interpretation of the poem in *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 156–157.

¹¹⁴ 'Malaga, Nov. 22', *The London Gazette*, 22–25 November 1680 (London), p. 2.

events which demonstrated little overt prejudice. In these cases, Moroccans were referred to as nothing more than 'the enemy', or 'the Moors'.¹¹⁵ However, two correspondents went further than simply not demonstrating animus toward them. One acknowledged that the Moroccans had over recent years been transformed 'from a cowardly and inconsiderable enemy' to 'a puissant and formidable foe', 'a formidable enemy, being improved in all the arts of war'.¹¹⁶ The other, Major Halkett, who had served under Lord Teviot, felt compelled to not only 'render justice' to the officers of the garrison for their 'conduct and courage', but also 'to the Moors', who had 'fought most bravely', and 'especially their horsemen' who had performed the 'hardest and boldest things that ever was seen done'.¹¹⁷ Even in preparing the official report on the events of 27 October, which was published shortly after, Henry Sheres saw fit to acknowledge the valour of the Moroccan cavalry, and adds, after noting that many of the Moroccan dead had been buried in their own trenches, that they had 'very bravely lost their lives in defence of them'.¹¹⁸ In concluding his report, Sheres does not attribute responsibility for the outcome against an opponent whom he describes as 'vigilant, industrious and dareing' to English military superiority, but rather solely to God's 'divine providence and protection'.¹¹⁹

However, not all Britons who participated in the conflict appear to have been as charitable towards the enemy. In its article on the action on 27 October, the *London Gazette* reported that every soldier 'that took a Moor prisoner had him for his encouragement, there was about 20 taken, and 300 hundred bodies of Moors were dragged together in one heap, and as many heads into another pile'.¹²⁰ The author of *Great and Bloody News* similarly notes that the soldiers 'had free leave to make the best of [the prisoners]', but it refers to the bodies being placed into several piles, and

¹¹⁵ *A Particular Relation; An Exact Journal; Hacket, A Full and True Relation; [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*

¹¹⁶ *An Exact Journal*, p. 13.

¹¹⁷ Hacket, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98r–v; [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*, p. 5.

¹¹⁹ TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98v–99r. The description of the Moroccans provided in the report is omitted in the published version. See [Sheres], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement*, p. 6.

¹²⁰ 'Malaga, Nov. 22'

makes no mention of their decapitation.¹²¹ Ross in *Tangers Rescue* provides the most graphic account report of mutilation of the Moroccan dead. He writes:

It was thought a great matter before, and an act of signal courage to bring off one of the Mores dead bodies ... But at this time about a hundred and fifty dead bodies were brought off and thrown in a heap: cutting off their privitees to make purses, which I have seen, and their ears hung up and dried to be monuments, as trophies of this famous victory.¹²²

They were not the first reports of such behaviour. A few years earlier a ship's captain on a visit to Tangier had been shown 'the skinne of a More, very well tanned, with his Mahomitans lock upon the crowne of his head', who had been found hiding within the lines and killed.¹²³ That prisoners were mistreated following the siege was confirmed by Omar, although only a handful may have been taken alive.¹²⁴ However, the extent of despoliation of bodies described in some accounts appears to have been exaggerated to emphasise the extent of the English victory and regain lost pride. According to Sheres' official report, the bodies of slain Moroccans which remained within the English lines were collected and placed in a stockade outside the town. Some had indeed been beheaded, but they numbered no more than around forty.¹²⁵

There appear to have been no specific sanctions against the mistreatment of captured enemy soldiers or corpses in the general orders for the garrison, although that does not mean it was acceptable, even against infidels.¹²⁶ Certainly bodily

¹²¹ *Great and Bloody News*, p. 3.

¹²² Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, p. 23.

¹²³ 'An Itinerary of Our Voyage...In His Majesties Shipp Maryrose, Captain Thomas Hamilton', Bodl., Rawl. MS C.353, p. 25, entry for 19 May 1674.

¹²⁴ TNA, CO 279/26, f. 98v; Hacket, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 4.

¹²⁵ TNA, CO 279/26, f. 99r; Hacket, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 4. Interestingly, the published account of Sheres' report makes no mention of the decapitations.

¹²⁶ See *Lawes and Ordinances of War Established for the Better Governing of His Majesties Forces in the Kingdoms of Sus, Fez, and Morocco* (London, 1661). A copy can be found in TNA, CO 279/1, ff. 99–110. Whether they remained in force or had been superseded is unclear. The orders do prohibit 'unnatural abuse' (p.5), but this appears to relate only to sexual assault, and also the killing of a man if he surrenders (p. 11). The penalty for both infractions was death. Donagan provides an interesting and relevant discussion on English rules for war and for the conduct of soldiers, and exceptions to them, in the seventeenth century in *War in England*, pp. 3–4, chaps. 8–10. On the subject, see also Geoffrey Parker, 'Early Modern Europe', in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Schulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, 1994), pp. 40–58. Both scholars highlight the important influence that that a desire for reciprocity could have

mutilation and trophy-taking during times of conflict were not uncommon in the early modern period, nor are they today, with perpetrators motivated by hatred, desire for revenge, and racial prejudice, inflicting various types of disfigurement and removing parts possessing different personal or cultural significance.¹²⁷ In the case of some Britons in Tangier, these acts were, at the very least, seen as just retribution for similar treatment accorded to their fallen comrades (*lex talionis*), and a means to procure a meaningful memento of a hard-fought battle.¹²⁸ However, while it is clear that this behaviour was not officially sanctioned, it had to be tolerated in this instance. Sackville wrote to the Moroccan commander following the final battle, giving him permission to retrieve his dead, and, according to Sheres, the lieutenant-colonel apologised 'for the ill usage of the bodies ... wherein noe order whatsoever could restrain [the men]' from their action. Reinforcing his personal view on the matter, he added that it was his hope that such 'barbarity' 'for the future might if possible be prevented'.¹²⁹

Such displays of extreme animosity against the Moroccans, however, appear to have been an exception, and in general the conduct demonstrated by Britons was in accordance with normal European conventions of war.¹³⁰ Furthermore, notwithstanding the brutality of the fighting which had occurred in May, in the days immediately after the agreement of the four-month truce there are no signs of recriminations, with one soldier reporting that 'we had free intercourse with the Moors, they coming freely into us, and we going securely among them'.¹³¹ Somewhat ironically, as was the case during periods of conflict in the past, it is the men who

in informing conduct to avoid reprisals in war in the early modern period. See pp. 128–132 and p. 55 in the respective texts.

¹²⁷ Brian Sandberg, *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World, 1500–1700* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 13–14; Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization* (New York, 1996), pp. 99–103.

¹²⁸ See TNA, CO 279/26, f. 99r; Ross, *Tangers Rescue*, pp. 23–24.

¹²⁹ TNA, CO 279/26, f. 99r.

¹³⁰ Donagan in *War in England*, p. 196, observes that while 'Turks' might have been regarded as being outside accepted 'international conventions of conduct', the English, nevertheless, established no alternative standards of behaviour for relations with them. Cf. Geoffrey Parker's claim that Europeans did not consider either Africans or Native Americans as peoples to whom the normal laws of war applied. See Parker, 'Early Modern Europe', pp. 55–57.

¹³¹ *An Exact Journal*, p. 12. He also notes that during this time two boys from the garrison, a seaman, and a soldier had all absconded and 'turn'd Moor'.

actually confronted the Moroccans on the battlefield who provide some of the most unbiased, and favourable assessments of them.

Despite his claim to the contrary which appears in the epigraph to this chapter, Sackville was not the first garrison commander or governor in Tangier to openly acknowledge the military abilities of the Moroccans — Fairborne, in particular, had been forthright on the issue — but he was perhaps the most emphatic in declaring his views, as well as expressing his admiration for them. In January the following year, Sackville wrote to the Tangier Committee to defend his actions, advising the commissioners that the Moroccans should not be underestimated, and impressing upon them the futility of seeking to negotiate access to more ground, and its fortification. Reflecting on his observations of Moroccans he advised the committee:

To speake of them as enimies, I never saw men bolder in the field when they finde it reasonable to fight, nor more prudent to avoid it, when it was wisdom to decline it; nor is there I believe in the whole race of mankind a more vigilint, hardy, patient and laborious people, all quallities necessary to a soldier — in soe much had they the discipline of Europe, there would not bee a more formidable enimy in the world. In their treaty's they discourse and debate matters calmly and judiciously, and therefore I see not where the reason of this contempt of them lyes'.¹³²

Sackville had an incentive to provide an inflated assessment, but his plea appears to be unfeigned. In his estimation Moroccans were not only worthy opponents, but civilised and rational people. His assessment demonstrates neither colonial covetousness toward Morocco, nor religious or ethnic prejudice toward its people; and neither are such sentiments generally evident in the views expressed by other Britons, which have been examined in this chapter. The concurrency of the siege of Tangier, the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis drew the colony into a highly-charged environment of domestic politics, and much of what was published about the colony and the conflict there at this time has to be considered in this context, together with the growing scepticism about the value of Tangier. Britons undoubtedly felt pride at the success of the garrison in their efforts in repelling the Moroccan forces, and the

¹³² TNA, CO 279/27, f. 2r.

events perhaps elicited various levels of hostility towards them and nationalist fervour among the general population, but for many of those actually present in Tangier at the time their encounter with the North Africans only heightened the esteem with which they were held as warriors.¹³³

6.3. Diplomacy, Personal Encounters, and Ambivalent Friendships

Perceptions of Moroccans remained heavily influenced by conflict, but the period of peace which followed the siege provided Britons with opportunities to develop other insights concerning them, and their society and culture.¹³⁴ Despite the elation, or at least relief, felt following the garrison's success, there was also recognition that the Moroccans had not been decisively beaten and would not give up in their endeavours to take Tangier, and that the king's decision to seek peace with them was prudent.¹³⁵ As a demonstration that friendly and productive relations were possible, Mawlay al-Asghar's reverent letter to Charles I from 1637, in which he proposed an alliance with the king against their common enemies, was published in 1680, and again in two editions in 1682.¹³⁶

The possibility of a long-term peace with Mawlay Ismā'īl, however, initially appeared unlikely as a result of the English ambassador's insistence on the rebuilding of fortifications. Qā'id Omar wrote to Sackville following his meeting with Leslie, advising the commander that what the ambassador had proposed 'cannot be

¹³³ On these points, see also Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier', 423–424. Cf. Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm>, under II–Colonialism and the Discourse of Resistance.

¹³⁴ The extended periods of hostility also at least partly explain why there are very few references to female Moroccans in contemporary accounts during the English occupation of Tangier. John Ross in *Tangers Rescue*, p. 27, draws attention to the issue when he reflects on the fact that he knows nothing of the 'natures and beauties of their women ... since I never saw one of that sex belonging to their nation all the time I was in Tanger'.

¹³⁵ See, for example, 'Sir Thomas Browne to his son Edward', 29 November 1680, in Simon Wilkin, ed., *Sir Thomas Browne's Works*, 4 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1835–36), p. 293.

¹³⁶ The letter is discussed in more detail in chap. 3. See also Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 158. The editions published in London and, possibly, Edinburgh in 1682 both bore the title *The King of Morocco's Letter by His Ambassador to the King of England*. The letter was falsely represented in these later editions as being one carried by Mawlay Ismā'īl's ambassador, who arrived in England that year, but the publishers overlooked the reference to 'James your father of glorious memory'. See *ibid.*, p. 159.

obtained upon no consideration in the world', and reminded Sackville that unless the ambassador ratified the truce, as required under its terms, it would lapse; each party would then be free to 'prosecute what shall seem to us most convenient.'¹³⁷ Sackville was convinced the qā'id was not bluffing, and set about to also persuade the king and his counsellors of this fact. In order to do so, he appears to have been intent on marginalising the ambassador. Leslie, who was, in fact, no stranger to Morocco, having served in the garrison previously and been employed as an envoy on a number of occasions,¹³⁸ either did not share Sackville's views about Tangier's situation, or was determined to follow his orders to the letter, or both.

It is evident that the meeting had not gone well. Possibly concerned about how Leslie would report on it, in his own report to the Tangier Committee, Sackville vouched for Omar's integrity: he had conducted himself in a manner which 'declares him to be a man furnished with qualities which the most civilised nations rank amongst their prime virtues', he assured the commissioners.¹³⁹ Sackville presents himself as the central figure in the process, smoothing over the fractious relationship between the two men, and noting that Leslie had finally endorsed the truce. He confided to them that he thought the sultan would eventually permit the refortification of Tangier, but, quoting a Moroccan proverb, in the meantime he counselled them to be patient.¹⁴⁰ Sackville understood that it was not just a matter of obtaining Ismā'il's approval; such concessions would be opposed by his people — 'religious men and others'. He explained that to win their support, it was necessary to establish trust through 'a good peace and mutuall offices of friendship', and cautioned against any pre-emptive work. Such action would 'begett a religious warr', he warned, which would not only be costly and have an uncertain outcome, but would confirm to the people that the English had no 'other desire but to conquer'.¹⁴¹ It was preferable for the king to revise the ambassador's orders to allow him to negotiate the best terms possible, and bide

¹³⁷ 'Letter II: Qā'id Omar ben Haddū to Colonel Sackville, 24 December 1680', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 223. The original manuscript can be found in TNA, CO 279/26, f. 288.

¹³⁸ On Leslie, see Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 199.

¹³⁹ TNA, CO 279/27, f. 1r.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 1r–2v. According to Sackville, the proverb states that one can never hope 'to gett in our body's where the hole is too little for our finger'. See f. 2v.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, f. 2v.

his time to 'compass all his desires'.¹⁴² In any event, Leslie had announced that he would not depart Tangier until the king's gifts for the sultan had arrived, deeming it inappropriate to present himself without them. In the interim, it had been agreed that a 'principal gentlemen' should be dispatched to the sultan's court to provide an apology for the delay, and Sackville selected Colonel Percy Kirke as his envoy for this purpose.¹⁴³

At face value, Sackville's decision to select Kirke seems a somewhat odd choice. While he was a senior officer with a distinguished military career, he had no experience in Morocco, having only arrived after the conclusion of the siege, and had not served outside Northwest Europe.¹⁴⁴ More significantly, he does not appear to have possessed the disposition of a promising diplomat, if Samuel Pepys' later observations of him are to be believed. Pepys describes a man with a quick and violent temper, vindictive, overbearing, ill-mannered, and corrupt; an assessment not inconsistent with his behaviour both before and after his time in Morocco.¹⁴⁵ Despite Kirke's seeming unsuitability, his mission and subsequent dealings with Omar and Ismā'īl provide some of the most intriguing insights into inter-cultural engagement and the effect of acculturation on a Briton in Morocco in the early modern period.

Shortly after departing Tangier on his journey to visit the sultan, Kirke wrote to Sackville from Omar's camp. In his report he provides the following fulsome assessment of his hosts:

I am among the most sevilisde pepell in the worlde and iff ever I
have a sone I will rather choose to send him hether for breadin then
to the corte of France. I am shuer he may learne more [?] for of all

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, ff. 2v–3r.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, ff. 1v–2r. Kirk's first name was sometimes rendered as 'Piercy'. He acquired the colonelcy of his regiment in November 1680 following the death of the Earl of Plymouth in Tangier. See Charles Dalton, ed., *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661–1714*, 5 vols., vol. I (London, 1892), p. 279.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Piers Wauchope, 'Kirke, Percy (d. 1691)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2011), accessed 22 February 2018. The Kirke referred to in *A Particular Relation* cited by Wauchope is a Captain Kirke. Whereas Ross in *Tangers Rescue*, p. 32, indicates that Colonel Kirke and his regiment did not arrive until shortly after the siege.

¹⁴⁵ See *ibid.*,

the nations I was ever in I never had that kindnes mixt with sevelety
and trewe friendship as I have received heare.¹⁴⁶

He goes on to comment that he found the people in the countryside were as equally civil to them.¹⁴⁷ Kirke appears to have held no general prejudice against Moroccans at this time, even describing one of their escorts as ‘the best man in the worlde’, remarking that he could not have expected the kindness the man has given them, even if they had been brothers.¹⁴⁸ He reassures Sackville that there is a good prospect that they will be granted everything they reasonably ask for, but only if Leslie ‘takes the right way to doe itt’; counselling that ‘kindness will doe more heare then anything else’.¹⁴⁹ Aside from the adulatory nature of his initial impressions, what is equally notable is that Kirke does not appear to have suffered the kind of cultural dislocation, or ‘culture shock’, experienced by some of his predecessors. He seems to have not just taken the whole experience in his stride, but to have enthusiastically embraced it: Kirke was not so much surprised that the people were not savages, as suggested by Routh, rather he was processing his experiences with a surprising degree of open-mindedness.¹⁵⁰

In mid-February Kirke arrived in Meknes, the sultan’s new capital, where he was greeted warmly by him.¹⁵¹ Shortly after, Sackville was undoubtedly pleased to be able to report to London that Kirke’s mission was proving to be more successful than expected. While Leslie had still not left Tangier, being delayed awaiting new instructions, not only had Kirke been very well received, he had been advised by the sultan ‘that for his sake (since he had pleased to come to waite on him) he would give him foure years peace for Tanger’ and was provided with many ‘expressions of friendship’. Sackville took the opportunity to point out that this outcome had justified

¹⁴⁶ Colonel Percy Kirke to Sackville, ‘from the allcades campe near Allcazer’, 10 January 1681, TNA, CO 279/27, f. 19r (my interpolation).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 19v.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 20r–v

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 20r.

¹⁵⁰ See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 201.

¹⁵¹ *The Last Account From Fez*, p. 1.

his decision concerning the truce, proving that his detractors had been wrong to criticise him.¹⁵²

In a subsequent report to Sackville, Kirke wrote effusively about the treatment accorded to him. He describes Ismā'īl in terms that stand in stark contrast to the sultan's reputation as a capricious and vicious tyrant. The colonel expresses his gratitude for the kindness and generosity shown to him by Qā'id Omar and the sultan, and proclaimed that he 'must doe them the justice to tell the holle worlde I have mett with a kinde prince and a just general in Barberey'.¹⁵³ He recounts that Ismā'īl encouraged him to convert to Islam, but took no obvious offence at the suggestion, unlike one of his companions.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps most significantly, he claims that the sultan professed his love and friendship for Kirke, crediting the colonel with having done something that no other Christian had done before, 'which was to trust him and com and see him upon noe secquerety [security] but his word', vowing never to attack Tangier while Kirke was present there.¹⁵⁵ But Ismā'īl appears to have had another motivation for befriending Kirke. In his report, he remarks that the sultan 'expected I should be a man of my worde and that I should help him with everything he lacked out of England', promising him anything he desired in return. Furthermore, to reinforce the possibilities of what could be achieved from a peace, like his predecessors had done, Ismā'īl evoked the memory of the relationship which had existed between the two countries during Queen Elizabeth's reign.¹⁵⁶

A member of Kirke's entourage provides a more detailed description of what the company found and experienced during the mission, but his account is marked by

¹⁵² Sackville to Sir H. Goodricke, Tangier, 26 February 1680/1, TNA, CO 279/27, f. 143v.

¹⁵³ Kirke to Sackville, Meknes, 10 March 1680/1, *ibid.*, ff. 172v–173r.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 174r. For the response of his companion, see *The Last Account From Fez*, p. 1. The entreaty was not forgotten by him. Bishop Burnet recounted that when he was asked to convert to Catholicism shortly after James II acceded to the throne, Kirke allegedly retorted that 'he was unhappily pre-engaged, for that if ever he changed he had promised the King of Morocco to turn Mahometan'. See Thomas Stackhouse, ed., *An Abridgement of Bishop Burnet's History of His own Times* (London, 1906), p. 249.

¹⁵⁵ TNA, CO 279/27, f. 174r (my interpolation). See also *The Last Account From Fez*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁵⁶ TNA, CO 279/27, f. 174v.

distinct ambivalence.¹⁵⁷ The author of *The Last Account from Fez*, noting the ‘extream care and kindness’ which was afforded to them by their guide, the Qā’id of Tétouan, reflects on the fact that despite having encountered many things on the party’s journey worthy of observation, nothing stands out more than ‘the civility and complement we found from the chief men’; yet he still found it necessary to add, ‘of this wild and crude race of people’. He refers to Meknes as ‘the Versailles of this kingdom’, and believed, in time, it would become ‘a most agreeable and magnificent palace’, but notes that it is being built ‘by the misery and slavery’ of Christians.¹⁵⁸ He comments very favourably on the party’s sojourn in Fez, where, after having been received with ‘very civil expressions’, they were invited to view ‘New-Fez’. He found this part of the city ‘extremely delightful’, and at times his tone is almost lyrical: ‘their walks being adorned with rows of orange-trees, that grew through a pleasant and glittering pavement of painted tyles; the aqueducts and canals of water springing in the middle, represent a most pleasant and beautiful scene, and charming prospect’.¹⁵⁹ He remarks that the royal stable was the ‘largest and most stately’ he had ever seen.¹⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the author’s observations of ‘Old-Fez’ appeared to confirm his general beliefs about the inhabitants of the country. He notes that in the past, the city had obviously been ‘extraordinarily large’, and of ‘great beauty and glory, but time hath laid a rough hand upon it’. While the structures which remained were ‘great monuments of the vertue and ingenuity of their ancestors’, the present condition of the city was not only testament to ‘the continual rapine these heathens practice out of ambition who shall command’, but also, without understanding the history of the city, he believed it to be a consequence of their having turned away from Christianity

¹⁵⁷ *The Last Account From Fez*. The text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(8), and a transcript is also provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 201–206. Routh suggests the text was written by a Captain Johnson, who is referred to by Kirke in his report of 10 March 1681. See Routh, *England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 206. The captain in question may be Charles Johnson, a member of Kirke’s own regiment, although officially he appears to have only been a lieutenant at the time. See Dalton, *English Army Lists*, p. 281. As noted above, the regiment does not appear to have arrived until the lifting of the siege.

¹⁵⁸ *The Last Account From Fez*, p. 1.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

and learning. However, the dissonance in the account again is highlighted when he then turns to describe having dinner with the governor of the city, referring to 'the honour' accorded to the party for having been invited, and the 'great respect and kindness' shown to them by their host. He found the governor's residence to be richly furnished, and declared that its courtyards with their water features and orange trees 'delighted us extremely', adding that 'our cheer was extraordinarily plentiful, and pleasant, after their manner'.¹⁶¹

Unlike Kirke, the author of *The Last Account* appears to have been genuinely surprised by what he discovered and had difficulty reconciling his observations and experiences with his preconceptions. In particular, his opinion of Ismā'īl was clearly heavily influenced by the black legend of the sultan being bruited among Europeans. Despite the hospitality and favour which the sultan had accorded the party, and in marked contrast to Kirke's opinion, the author delivers a scathing assessment of Ismā'īl. According to him, the sultan 'excells all mankind in barbarous and bloody actions; massacre and murder being his royal game and divertisement' and, so he does not become bored, 'he invents every day a new pastime of cruelty'; although it is not at all clear that the writer observed any of this behaviour. Nevertheless, he argued that 'though it would be great inhumanity any where else, yet it's in some degree necessary here', and rationalised Ismā'īl's despotism by drawing on the familiar stereotypes of the barbarous and rebellious Moor. 'This savage race of people is not to be deterred from insolencies and crimes but by hourly and horrid examples of punishment', he explained, adding that as 'force of arms is the only preservation of their state, so it is alone the means of attaining it'.¹⁶² In coming to this conclusion, he, like others, overlooked England's own recent experience with political upheaval and civil war.

Although the author had vilified Ismā'īl, he paradoxically lavished praise on Qā'id Omar, despite acknowledging Omar's senior position in what he had represented as a tyrannical regime. He claimed that words failed him in trying to describe someone

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

‘whose character is so extraordinary, as well as for goodness and greatness’, so as he could impress upon the king how his ‘affairs may be advantaged by the honesty and justice of so well principled a Moor’, a ‘discreet honest man’, who treated them as well as ‘any well bred man’.¹⁶³ Whereas Inchiquin had been suspicious of the qā’id — a view which appears to have been grounded in some level of pre-existing prejudice — Sackville, Kirke, and the author of *The Last Account* esteemed Omar highly, and saw little or no distinction between him and any other civilised (Christian European) man, notwithstanding his role as commander of the army which had besieged Tangier.

Kirke quickly developed what seems to be a deep rapport with both Ismā’īl and Omar, and even feelings of friendship. Sometime after he had returned to Tangier, he wrote to the sultan to thank him for his treatment. Obsequious to an extreme, Kirke wished to acknowledge ‘with my most submissive thanks’ the ‘great honours’ accorded to him by Ismā’īl, and goes on to assure him:

I shall ever boast of, and leave it as a glorious remembrance to my posterity, that I had once the happinesse of receiving greater marks of your majesties goodnesse in your royall court than had been shewn to any other, neither can I better expresse my gratitude for those high favours, than by devoting my self and all my actions to your royall service, in applying my greatest endeavours to the promotion and encrease of the good understanding between my master and your sacred majestie.¹⁶⁴

The letter goes beyond the dictates of diplomacy: the colonel had clearly been deeply affected by the experience and had become enamoured of the sultan. However, as also observed by Routh, Kirke’s attitude to Ismā’īl and his people would change over time.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2 (my underlining).

¹⁶⁴ Kirke to Ismā’īl, Tangier, n.d., TNA, CO 279/26, f. 298r. The letter has also been transcribed by Bejjit in *English Colonial Texts*, as ‘Letter III’ on p. 225. Bejjit dates the letter to December 1681, but the manuscript is undated and quite possibly may have been written earlier that year.

¹⁶⁵ See Routh, *England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 201.

Leslie finally arrived in Meknes on 20 March, having received his new instructions.¹⁶⁶ The directions were brief: while the treaty was to include a clear right for the English to fortify the city walls, and secure the ditch immediately outside the walls, he had liberty to not insist on the right to fortify ground beyond the ditch, although he was to use 'his best endeavours' to do so.¹⁶⁷ Qā'id Omar was given responsibility to negotiate with the ambassador, and given the acrimony that had accompanied their previous meeting, and the fact that he was again required to test the waters on the issue of fortification, Leslie found dealing with Omar challenging.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, a treaty was concluded nine days later.¹⁶⁹ The treaty was for the promised four years, and the core provisions were those contained in the truce negotiated by Sackville (article 2). While the English were not permitted to establish new defences, they could repair their existing fortifications (articles 3, 6). Opportunities for local trade were also expanded to include, among other things, powder, guns, and other previously contraband goods (articles 8, 11). Aside from the restrictions on fortification, the treaty provided the possibility for a peaceful and viable future for the colony, although it only applied to English activities in the 'neighbourhood of Tanger by land' (article 1); it did not include protection for their maritime interests. Given the relative weakness of their position, the English had achieved a reasonably good outcome.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, either during or shortly following the negotiations, it was agreed that the sultan would send an ambassador to London to attempt to resolve any remaining issues concerning the treaty.¹⁷¹

Despite the peace, the inhabitants of Tangier remained wary, particularly after the Moroccans forced the capitulation of the Spanish garrison at 'Mamora' (Mehdya) in May. That victory had emboldened Ismā'īl and unnerved the garrison, making the

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

¹⁶⁷ 'Minutes of the lords for the affaires of Tangier', 8 February 1680, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 103.

¹⁶⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 207.

¹⁶⁹ See 'Articles of Peace, Friendship and Commerce', 29 March 1681, TNA, CO 279/27, ff. 207–210. An abstract of the treaty follows at ff. 211–212. Routh also provides a summary of the articles on pp. 208–209.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 208–209.

¹⁷¹ Routh in *ibid.*, p. 220, states that the offer of the embassy was a concession granted during the negotiations, but does not cite a source. In any event, the offer had obviously been made and accepted by late June. See Leslie to Jenkins, Tangier, 25 August 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 180r.

Tangerines even more sensitive to perceived slights by the Moroccans.¹⁷² Omar in particular was the subject of suspicion. Lieutenant-Colonel Boynton admitted to suspecting that the qā'id 'hopes to lull us into such security that his majesty may ... withdraw, or lessen his troopes heare' and upon doing so 'hee will take any slight occasion of breaking with us, for their is noe credett or trust to bee given to his honour where there is the prospect of soe vast an advantage' to him by taking Tangier.¹⁷³ Leslie was similarly troubled by him, believing Omar to be 'the chiefe if not the only man that opposed the interest of this place',¹⁷⁴ a view shared by Sheres, for whom Omar was 'our great and implacable enemy'.¹⁷⁵ However, Kirke, who was now in command following Sackville's return to England, held more general concerns, and despite his earlier positive impressions, reveals that he was not free of prejudice. He appealed to London that Tangier's needs be met, 'for though the Moores have made a peace for four yeares, and may keepe there words, yet they are Moores and not to be trusted to farr, and the better condition our garrison is in the better their peace will be kept'.¹⁷⁶

Tensions were further heightened by a series of incidents over the following months. Gifts for the sultan were delayed or were received with disappointment.¹⁷⁷ There were disputes over the interpretation of the treaty concerning the provision of guns and the purchase of cattle.¹⁷⁸ More serious was a protracted and complex dispute involving the redemption of captives. Leslie had been instructed to negotiate the release of seventy soldiers from the garrison who had been taken prisoner, but Ismā'īl refused to agree to the request unless another sixty English slaves held by him were also redeemed.¹⁷⁹ When the required amount was made available — 200 pieces of eight per captive — Omar's brother, Ali, insisted that the amount agreed had been

¹⁷² See, for example, Povey to Legge, Tangier, 17 May 1681, *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 61; Lieut-Col. Boynton to [?], Tangier, 3 June 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 7; Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 4 June 1681, *ibid.*, ff. 8r–v.

¹⁷³ TNA, CO 279/28, f. 7.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 180r.

¹⁷⁵ Sheres to Jenkins, Tangier, 4 November 1681, *ibid.*, f. 300.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 8v.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 8r; Kirke's report, Tangier, 26 January 1681/2, TNA, CO 279/29, f. 47r; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 215.

¹⁷⁸ Kirke's report, Tangier, 12 January 1681/2, TNA, CO 279/29, ff. 18–19.

¹⁷⁹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 209–210.

200 ducats per person. Kirke speculated that Ali was either seeking to profit from the transaction, or force him to concede on the matter of the guns.¹⁸⁰ The situation was further complicated by the fact that Ismā'īl was also attempting to negotiate the release of some of his own subjects from the English. The sultan's offer was declined by the Tangier Committee due its 'utter dislike' of payment in cattle, as proposed, and it sanctioned Kirke for having already released six of the captives as a gesture of good faith.¹⁸¹ Kirke defended his decision by insisting that it had been necessary to placate 'a prince whom I know to be of a humour impatient of contradiction'.¹⁸² Furthermore, the Committee requested that Kirke attempt to delay the release of the Moroccans until the arrival of the sultan's ambassador in London; it seems they intended using them as leverage in the treaty negotiations.

By early the following year Kirke had finally persuaded the sultan to release the captive Britons at the formerly agreed price. However, the agreement was terminated shortly before the captives were to be handed over when it was reported that English traders were supplying Ismā'īl's enemies with contraband. The sultan was incensed by the news and refused to accept that the English government had not been complicit.¹⁸³ Kirke was clearly growing frustrated by what he perceived as the Moroccans' unreasonable behaviour, and his irritation, in turn, was influencing a reassessment of his previously favourable perceptions of them, even of Ismā'īl. In a report to London in February 1682, he declared that this latest incident was 'but an addition to those many instances you have already had of the caprice and humour of this prince and people' and, therefore, gave cause to question all their future undertakings, 'which will infallibly cease upon the slightest pretences, whenever our weakness shall afford them hope of successe'.¹⁸⁴ Feelings of amity towards

¹⁸⁰ TNA, CO 279/29, f. 19r.

¹⁸¹ 'At the Committee for Tangier', Whitehall, 5 September 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 188.

¹⁸² Quoted in P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, [197?]), p. 55. Original source cited, Kirke to Jenkins, 15 July 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 125.

¹⁸³ Kirke's report, Tangier, 23 February 1681/2, TNA, CO 279/29, ff. 88r–v. See also Sheres to Jenkins, Tangier, 25 February 1691/[2], *ibid.*, 92v–93r. A decision to provide the sultan with a written undertaking that it would not happen again, as he had requested, does not appear to have been made until almost 10 months later, as a result of a petition from some of the wives of the men being held captive. See *CSPD: Charles II, 1 January–31 December 1682*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, 28 vols., vol. 23 (London, 1932), p. 578, entry for [? December 1682].

¹⁸⁴ TNA, CO 279/29, f. 88v.

Moroccans were giving way to intolerance and an increasing sense of general mistrust of them.

Nevertheless, despite his growing apprehensions, Kirke remained committed to maintaining good relations. In early September 1681, a member of the Moroccan royal family, a sharif, arrived at Tangier seeking sanctuary. The colonel agreed to take him in, and set about ensuring his needs were met until he had resolved how best to deal with him. Attesting to Kirke's new-found cynicism about Ismā'īl, he states that he was convinced that the man was of 'the royal blood', pronouncing that in 'all his behaviour and discourse he appears extravagant even to a degree of madness; which is a true character of a prince of the Morocco family'.¹⁸⁵ Kirke appears to have sought a reward for handing over the sharif, however, Omar made it clear that not only would they not provide one, but warned Kirke that there would be dire consequences for the peace if he refused to release him.¹⁸⁶ The colonel acquiesced and released the man contrary to instructions from London, which Kirke claimed only arrived after he had done so.¹⁸⁷ His orders were that the sharif was not to be released until the sultan had delivered all deserters from the garrison.¹⁸⁸ In response, Kirke justified his actions as having been in the king's best interests, particularly given that the sharif had expressed his desire to leave.¹⁸⁹ The English Government's inclination to resort to such crude and provocative bargaining practices at this time attests to a signal failure by it to fully comprehend both the sultan's disposition and the tenuous situation it faced in Morocco.

The equivocal nature of Kirke's attitude toward Moroccans is again demonstrated following news of Qā'id Omar's death in late October 1681. While Sheres was

¹⁸⁵ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 8 September 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, ff. 191r–v. On the arrival of the sharif in Tangier, see also Povey to Legge, Tangier, 22 September 1681, *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 68.

¹⁸⁶ Omar to Kirke, Meknes, 22 Ramadan 1092 (5 October 1681), TNA, CO 279/28, f. 228r. On the response of the Moroccans, see also 'Charles II: November 1681', in *CSPD: Charles II, 1680–1*, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 1921), accessed 21 November 2017, entries for 8 November.

¹⁸⁷ Kirke's report, Tangier, 2 December 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, f. 339r. A duplicate of the report can be found at ff. 341–342.

¹⁸⁸ Privy Council to Governor of Tangier, Whitehall, 14 October, *ibid.*, f. 272.

¹⁸⁹ Only months earlier the colonel had been forced to petition the king to revoke an order to suspend a delivery of cloth which was prescribed under the terms of the treaty, presumably to encourage the sultan to release the soldiers he held captive. See *ibid.*, f. 191r.

overjoyed to hear the news,¹⁹⁰ the commander continued to regard him highly, referring to his successor, Ali ben Abdallah, as 'the great Omars brother'. Furthermore, he appears to have quickly developed a rapport with Qā'id Ali, noting that after a discussion concerning their 'good neighbourhood', they had 'parted with all the marks of mutual confidence and satisfaction'.¹⁹¹ Kirke's relationship with Ali would be tested on occasions but he continued to exercise a notable degree of open-mindedness in his dealings with him, as he did with other Moroccans. This was certainly the case with the sultan's ambassador, Muhammad ben Haddu.

After a lengthy delay, the ambassador finally arrived at Tangier on 28 November. He was greeted with due honour, and the pageantry of the event was reported in detail in the *London Gazette*.¹⁹² During the delegation's stay, Kirke and his colleagues had time to become acquainted with ben Haddu and his entourage. Some were well known to the garrison, such as 'Jonas, an English renegade, who had twice deserted this place', had been employed as the ambassador's interpreter, and was judged to be 'a subtil and impudent villain' by Kirke.¹⁹³ The ambassador's secretary, 'Sidi Hadge Lucas' had a long connection with Tangier, having served as secretary to both Ghailan and Omar. According to Sheres, he was 'a very cunning and able man'.¹⁹⁴ Kirke, evidently having acquired some knowledge of Islam, reported how Lucas had enhanced his standing, and redeemed himself following the fall of Ghailan, by participating in the Hajj.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, he possessed 'so flexible a conscience that it never stands in opposition to his interests'. The 'Almocaden Mahomet el Xatef', Kirke observed, was 'a man of active and haughty spirit'.¹⁹⁶ While not flattering assessments, neither were they bigoted. The ambassador, on the other hand, was relatively unknown to the Tangerines, and hence had an untarnished reputation. To Kirke, he appeared to be 'a person of good temper and understanding'.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 300.

¹⁹¹ Kirke's report, Tangier, 2 December 1681, *ibid.*, f. 340r.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, ff. 340r–v; 'Tangier, 2 December', *The London Gazette*, 5–9 January 1681[2] (London), p. 2.

¹⁹³ TNA, CO 279/28, f. 339v.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 300. He is also referred to as Hamet Lucas, or el Hash Mahamed Lucas in other sources. Routh conflates Lucas with Jonas. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 222.

¹⁹⁵ Kirke's report, Tangier, 8 December 1681, TNA, CO 279/28, ff. 360v–361r.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 360v.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 360v, 361r.

The ambassador, accompanied by Leslie, left Tangier on 9 December and arrived in England at the end of the month. Kirke's favourable opinion of ben Haddu was echoed, and, indeed, frequently exceeded, by those who encountered him during the almost seven months he spent in England, details of which are discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. The various accounts of the visit reveal much about the attitudes of the elite of English society towards Moroccans at this time, and the expectation the English government had of concluding a satisfactory long-term peace. However, as observed by Routh, the archives provide little detail about the business of the embassy.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, correspondence that passed between Tangier and London does provide insights into the negotiations, and the contributions made by those who had both a stake in the colony's success and firsthand experience of the country.

Sheres and Kirke were Whitehall's principal informants from Tangier, and recipients of news of the proceedings. Knowing little about the Moroccans, their compatriots at home welcomed anything they could provide to help them understand their character and aims.¹⁹⁹ Kirke, in particular, was extremely concerned to ensure that the commissioners appointed to deal with the embassy were not beguiled and outmanoeuvred by the Moroccans, and asked that nothing be agreed until he had been given the opportunity to comment on the propositions and provide a proposal. The English were particularly interested in concluding a maritime treaty; however, Kirke had no knowledge as to the sultan's position on the matter.²⁰⁰ A letter from the sultan to Charles, delivered by the ambassador, makes no mention of the issue. However, what Ismā'īl does make patently clear is that while he desired peaceful trade with the English, it could only be achieved by respecting the customs and religion of his country, and his authority over it, including Tangier, for which he

¹⁹⁸ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 223.

¹⁹⁹ See, for example, P. Wynne to Sheres, Whitehall, 30 January 1681/2, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 81r. Wynne refers to Sheres' advice from 4 November in TNA, CO 279/28, f. 300.

²⁰⁰ TNA, CO 279/29, f. 18v. See also TNA, CO 279/28, ff. 360r–v. According to Kirke, a maritime treaty was not part of the treaty discussions in Meknes, and the Moroccans appear to have been unprepared when the issue was raised in London. See 'Kirkes answer to the Alcaid Hamet', Tangier, n.d. [late 1682], TNA, CO 279/30, ff. 234–235. Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 220.

expected an annual payment of six thousand pieces of eight.²⁰¹ It took the English some time to understand the implications of what the sultan was expecting from them.

By the end of January, Kirke had finalised his proposal.²⁰² He opens by acknowledging that there was a deficiency of understanding of the 'methods, interests and humours of the Moors', which made it difficult to judge how best to progress the negotiations.²⁰³ Nevertheless, he claims to have consulted with people who possessed knowledge and experience of dealing with them. The key to any peace, Kirke argued, was providing them with ready access to contraband goods — guns and gunpowder — but he insisted that these transactions must remain under the king's control. He pointed out that while the fortification of Tangier was highly desirable, the sultan had no reason to make any concession on the issue. Once again, he advised it was best to bide their time; besides, he observed, 'the present posture of affairs in Barbary' was 'in great tranquillity'.²⁰⁴ He also suggested that the negotiations be conducted with an air of intrigue, claiming they tend to do so in their own affairs; that each member of the delegation be surreptitiously provided with a present; and that moderation and affability be maintained to overcome their 'natural impatience'.²⁰⁵ He assured Whitehall that 'there is no more successful means of treating with them then their own way'.²⁰⁶ What he was recommending was that the process be conducted with deference to their customs and practices, or at least what he understood them to be; a similar message to that conveyed by Ismā'īl.

Against the wishes of the ambassador, the king endorsed the colonel's proposed restrictions on the sale of contraband, but agreed to strict limits on the extent of land accessible by the English outside Tangier, so as to avoid ongoing 'quarrels and

²⁰¹ Mawlay Isma'īl, *A Letter Sent by the Emperor of Morocco and King of Fez to His Majesty of Great Britain, and Delivered by His Ambassador in January 1681* (London, 1682)

²⁰² Kirke's report, Tangier, 26 January 1681/2, TNA, CO 279/29, ff. 45–47.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, f. 45r.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 46r.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 46v.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 46r.

differences', and a draft land treaty was concluded on this basis on 23 March 1682.²⁰⁷ However, rather than having promoted understanding, the negotiations appear to have antagonised the English bureaucrats and reinforced their bias against the Moroccans. Writing to Sheres about the outcome, Leonell Jenkins noted that not only was there 'nothing in it of the sea', but also remarked that 'the more we have to do with these people, the more is your character of them visible'. 'However', he added 'a warr with them is not his majesties business'.²⁰⁸ The king, on the other hand, had formed a good opinion of the ambassador and his secretary, and was so pleased with the proceedings that he wished for the latter to return to obtain the sultan's confirmation of the treaty. He ordered that Lucas be given three hundred muskets, as already agreed, and three hundred more were to be provided as a present. As a further gesture of good faith, the king requested that all his slaves held in Tangier be delivered to Lucas upon his arrival, with the remainder to be released upon the signing of the articles.²⁰⁹ In addition, when the ambassador departed on 23 July, he took with him one thousand barrels of powder which he had purchased, and a further 240 quintals gifted by the king.²¹⁰ The success of the embassy was further evidenced by the conclusion of a maritime treaty on 16 June.²¹¹

While the embassy and resulting 'Whitehall treaties', may have been judged a success in England, it was not the case in Morocco, with concerns expressed by the protagonists on both sides. Kirke, newly confirmed as governor,²¹² was not impressed by the outcome. He found the land treaty differed little to the one concluded in Meknes, and a number of the articles to be ambiguous, which he expected would be exploited by 'a people cautious in the highest degree and that are extream dextrous in cavills [vexatious objections]'.²¹³ He was perplexed by a provision which appeared

²⁰⁷ *CSPD, 1682*, pp. 125, 220, entries for 15 March, Newmarket, and 29 May, Windsor.

²⁰⁸ Jenkins to Sheres, Whitehall, 27 March 1682, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 83.

²⁰⁹ *CSPD, 1682*, p. 119, entry for 13 March, Newmarket.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 247, entries for 13 June 1682, Whitehall.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 247, 277 entries for 13 June and 29 June 1682, Whitehall.

²¹² Kirke to Charles II, Tangier, 4 May 1682, TNA, CO 279/29, f. 201.

²¹³ Kirke's report, Tangier 24 August 1682, TNA, CO 279/30, f. 55r (my interpolation). The treaties have not been sighted by the present author. Copies are apparently among the manuscript collection of the Earl of Dartmouth, but not extant elsewhere. See *Dartmouth MSS*, 3 vols., vol. III (London, 1896), p. 51.

to permit Moroccans to reside in the town. In arguing against this arrangement, Kirke reveals an interesting cultural comparison which perhaps reflects an acquired antagonism towards Moroccans. He claims 'of all the people in the world', there are none that are more incompatible for 'intimacy and familiarity' than the Moors and the English, for the former are 'subtle, distrustfull, implacable and undermining', while the latter are 'generous, loving, credulous, and without reserve'; and for this reason they were susceptible to being deceived by them. Moreover, whereas Britons 'have minds naturally inclined to peace', Moroccans were 'restless', 'ever enterprising', and antithetical to Christians.²¹⁴ His recent experiences in Morocco had not led him to question his own society, as some of his compatriots had done, but rather to idealise it. In concluding that the two peoples were incompatible, he overlooked the irony of also complaining, in the same report, that his men continued to desert and 'turn Moor' because of the hardships of life in his garrison.

Nevertheless, Kirke believed that 'friendship' was possible, although, he asserted, it would be 'more durable' if it was maintained 'at a convenient distance'.²¹⁵ What most concerned the governor though, was the right conferred on the Moroccans to purchase contraband 'without limitation'.²¹⁶ He foresaw that not only did this present a risk to the security of Tangier, but it would also create problems for supply, and give the Moroccans cause to dishonour their obligations if their demands were not met, as he had found a few months earlier in a dispute with Qā'id Ali.²¹⁷ The only Moroccan that Kirke appears to have continued to respect and trust was ben Haddu, a person who he claimed possessed a 'soundness of heart' that he found 'extraordinary in a man of his education and this climate'.²¹⁸ The governor's assessment of ben Haddu indicates that while his experiences had made him cynical about Moroccans, he maintained a degree of elasticity in his judgements, continuing to assess them on their individual merits and in the context of prevailing circumstances.

²¹⁴ TNA, CO 279/30, ff. 55r–v.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 55v.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 55v–56r.

²¹⁷ 'The Protest of the Alcaide Ali of Benabdala to the Governour of Tanger', n.d., TNA, CO 279/29, pp. 94–95.

²¹⁸ TNA, CO 279/30, f. 56r.

The period following ben Haddu's return to Morocco at the end of August 1682 was marked by political intrigues in the sultan's court, disagreements between Kirke and Qā'id Ali, and acts of provocation by the Moroccans.²¹⁹ By early October it was still not known whether the sultan would ratify the new treaties, and Kirke suspected that Ali, Lucas, and local tribal chiefs were colluding against the ambassador to undermine the peace process.²²⁰ A month later the governor's concerns were realised when ben Haddu advised him that as a result of the disagreement between his officials, the sultan had resolved that he would defer a decision until he had conferred with an ambassador sent by the king, and had written to Charles to this effect.²²¹ This turn of events caught Kirke by surprise, and gave him cause to now suspect a wider conspiracy which also involved both ben Haddu and Ismā'īl, the purpose of which was either to procure further gifts from an embassy, or, by refusal of the request, to give the sultan cause to break the peace.²²²

The English were left with a dilemma as to how best to respond to the sultan's request. To refuse risked open war, but to accede opened the possibility of more favourable terms. The governor did not think it likely that Ismā'īl would break the peace for the sake of presents if Tangier was made sufficiently strong, which he claimed could be achieved at less cost than an embassy. Nevertheless, he warned that the parties were now effectively in a state of war, and Tangier must be reinforced and provisioned accordingly.²²³ His underlying rationale was a familiar one:

²¹⁹ *Ibid.* ; Kirke's report, Tangier, 20 September 1682, *ibid.*, ff. 107r–108r ; Complaints against Qā'id Ali provided to the Moroccan ambassador by Colonel Kirke, September 1682, *ibid.*, ff. 128–131; Kirke's report, Tangier, 4 November 1682, *ibid.*, ff. 194r–195r.

²²⁰ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 5 October, *ibid.*, ff. 134v–135r.

²²¹ Ben Haddu to Kirke, 3 November 1682, *ibid.*, f. 188. The ambassador had proposed the Duke of Ablemarle as being a person of sufficient 'merits and honour' for the role, a suggestion which was endorsed by the sultan. See Mawlay Ismā'īl to Charles II (translation), 26 Shawwal 1093 [28 October 1682], *ibid.*, ff. 239–241.

²²² Such was Kirke's disillusionment by now, that he took offence at the tone of a letter sent to him by the ambassador. Kirke felt he had been deceived by ben Haddu, and states that he was 'now convinced no benefits are powerfull enough to make an honest man of a Moor'. See Kirke's report, Tangier, 16 November 1682, *ibid.*, f. 221r.

²²³ *Ibid.*, ff. 195v–197v. On the preparation of Tangier for possible war, see also Kirke to Legge, Tangier, 4 November 1682 and Kirke to Lord Dartmouth (the recently elevated George Legge), Tangier, 25 January 1682/3, *Dartmouth MSS*, I, pp. 78, 79.

appeasement would mark the English as weak and fearful, and would encourage further demands; refusal would show them to be honourable, and a people not to be trifled with, and besides, 'they will never value us ... for what we give them, but for what we are able to refuse them'.²²⁴ While Kirke was not proposing outright war, neither was what he espoused necessarily a doctrine conducive to peaceful coexistence, and, as such, it was premised on the ability of the king to provide the necessary resources to secure and maintain Tangier. However, it was made clear to the governor by the Secretary of State that he could not expect the reinforcements and supplies he requested, as the cost of maintaining Tangier already exceeded that of all the home garrisons combined.²²⁵

Instead of preparing for war, the government committed itself to doing whatever was feasible to avoid compromising the present peace — including curtailing action against Moroccan corsairs — and finding a diplomatic solution to the impasse on the new treaties, and did so in the face of Moroccan provocation and opposition in England to their efforts.²²⁶ After deliberations in London on the matter in December, Lieutenant Nicholson was dispatched early in the New Year to Ismā'īl's camp bearing a response from Charles to the sultan's earlier letter and detailed instructions from the governor on how he was to conduct himself.²²⁷ Kirke affirmed to Secretary Jenkins his own commitment to achieving a peaceful accommodation with Ismā'īl and, more generally, his intention 'to infuse into these people the thoughts of peace and of living within the bounds of good neighbourhood'.²²⁸ He added that he had taken care in his dealings with the Moroccans to judge just how far to press them,²²⁹

²²⁴ Kirke's report, Tangier, 16 November 1682, TNA, CO 279/30, f. 220v. See also Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 25 January 1682, TNA, CO 279/31, f. 59r.

²²⁵ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 22 February 1682/3, TNA, CO 279/31, f. 115v.

²²⁶ Kirke's report, Tangier, 30 November 1682, TNA, CO 279/30, ff. 237r–v; 'Copy of Col. Kirk's letter to the Emperour', n.d. [August–December 1682], *ibid.*, ff. 380–381; 'Kirke's answer to the Alcald Hamet', Tangier, n.d. [late 1682], *ibid.*, ff. 324–325; Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 25 January 1682/3, TNA, CO 279/31, ff. 57r–v; Bruce T. McCully, 'From the North Riding to Morocco: The Early Years of Governor Francis Nicholson, 1655–1686', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 19 (1962), p. 546. The only references to domestic opposition in these sources appear in the first of them, and Kirke only refers obliquely to its nature, as too, evidently, did his correspondent (most likely Secretary Jenkins). It is possible that he is alluding to rumours of Tangier's impending sale to the French.

²²⁷ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 25 January 1682, TNA, CO 279/31, ff. 58v–59v.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 59v.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 60r.

and he had drafted his instructions to Nicholson accordingly: the lieutenant was to attempt to pursue all outstanding matters, including the sea treaty and the redemption of the captives, but without compromising the main objective, which was the ratification of the land treaty.²³⁰ The king's letter, however, demonstrated an indifference to the sultan's sensibilities. A copy of the final form of the letter, which was translated into Arabic, does not appear to have survived. However, it is evident that Ismā'īl found the letter discourteous, being affronted by its tone and personal accusations.²³¹ While the problem was attributed at the time to a poor translation,²³² an extant draft of the document indicates another possible factor. It shows an approach that was blunt and abrasive, with the king openly questioning the sultan's conduct and honour, and reminding him of England's sea-power.²³³ Whatever the precise reason, the sultan refused to ratify the treaties or release the captives, and the incident marked a pivotal turning point in Anglo-Moroccan relations.

Despite the setback, Kirke remained upbeat. He judged that there had been little to gain from the Whitehall land treaty over what was already provided in the Meknes treaty, and rather than breaking with the English over the dispute, the sultan had confirmed his continuing support for the latter.²³⁴ The governor was also positive about the future. In a surprising about-face, he saw the former ambassador, Muhammad ben Haddu, and Qā'id Ahmed ben Haddu as valuable allies protecting

²³⁰ 'Letter IV: Colonel Percy Kirke to Captain Nicholson, 23 January 1683', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 227–228. A copy of the original instructions can be found in TNA, CO 279/31, ff. 49–50.

²³¹ 'Letter VIII: Mawlay Ismā'īl to King Charles, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', *ibid.*, p. 237. A copy of the original letter translated from Arabic can be found in TNA, CO 279/33, f. 125. On the sultan's response, see also McCully, 'From the North Riding to Morocco', p. 548. As noted by Bejjit, the manuscript appears to have been misfiled. There are also a number of manuscripts in volumes CO 279/30–33 which either are out of chronological order, or appear to be from internal dating evidence. A very different perspective on events following ben Haddu's embassy can be obtained if care is not exercised in placing them in the correct order, e.g. see the reference to a letter written by ben Haddu cited by Matar in *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 161–162, which in fact was not written until a year later than the date given by Matar.

²³² 'Alcade Abdala' to Jenkins, 26 February 1682/3, TNA, CO 279/31, f. 123; 'Letter IX: Ali ben Abdallah Hamami to King Charles II, Alacazar, 28 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094' [28 March 1683], in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 243–244; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 231. According to Routh, Kirke attributed the sultan's anger to being able for the first time to read correspondence from the English himself, without servile interpretation by others. She does not provide a citation for the source of this reference. The original manuscript for 'Letter IX' can be found in TNA, CO 279/32, f. 180.

²³³ 'Draft answer to the Emperor of Morocco's letter to his majesty', [December?] 1682, TNA, CO 279/30, ff. 362–365.

²³⁴ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 19 March 1682/3, TNA, CO 279/31, f. 164v.

England's interests, at least partly due to their kinship with the late Qā'id Omar. Furthermore, he believed that the sultan was only seeking a further embassy to satisfy his vanity and avarice, and was confident that an extension to the current truce would be granted, and at a considerably lesser charge.²³⁵ Kirke was not the first governor to make such a superficial judgement about the motivations of a Moroccan leader, but he would soon become the first to gain a real understanding of English Tangier's place in their world-view, and what was required if they wished to retain it.

6.4. A Price too High: The Final Days of English Tangier

The governor had been given reason to feel positive. He had received letters from the sultan and Qā'id Ahmed which affirmed that he continued to be held in high regard, that the current treaty would be honoured, and an extension would be granted, but they also reminded him of his obligation to provide the sultan with guns and powder of whatever quantities he requested.²³⁶ Moreover, Ahmed's letter concluded with a warning: if the English 'observe the peace, that is well', if they did not, once the treaty expired, 'we shall be the first to confront you with the will and power of Allah with four thousand mounted soldiers'.²³⁷ However, the sultan's letter to Charles was far less amicable, and more revealing of his thinking concerning relations with the English. He admonished the king on the discourteous tone of his response, disputed his claims about being obligated to honour the Whitehall treaties, and threatened to take Tangier if the English broke the terms of the existing peace.²³⁸ More interestingly though, in amongst the bluster and spurious explanations of what had transpired, Ismā'īl sets out the situation from his own perspective. He understood that Charles valued Tangier, and believed that the king would offer anything for peaceful possession of the city. He explained that the English presence was a cause of dissension among his people, and for that reason they had been told

²³⁵ Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 19 March 1682/3, *ibid.*, f. 166v.

²³⁶ 'Letter VI: King Ismā'īl to Colonel Percy Kirke, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 231–232; 'Letter VII: Qā'id Ahmed ben Haddū Hamami to Percy Kirke, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', in *ibid.*, pp. 233–235. A copy of the former can be found in TNA, CO 279/31, ff. 169–170. A translated copy of the latter can be found in TNA, CO 279/33, f. 124.

²³⁷ 'Letter VII', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 235.

²³⁸ 'Letter VIII: Mawlay Ismā'īl to King Charles II, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', in *ibid.*, pp. 237–241. A translated copy of the letter can be found in TNA, CO 279/33, f. 125.

Tangier was a *mallah* (a specific area set aside for Jewish residence).²³⁹ But now that he had extended his rule across the country, it was no longer tenable to tolerate the independence of the Christian enclaves and simply extract tribute from them; if he did so, his status and authority would be diminished. Nevertheless, he was prepared to honour the current 'truce' and even extend it, but only if the English 'do what shall appease the anger of Muslims against you by keeping the same correspondence we expect from you'.²⁴⁰

Ismā'īl was, in effect, proclaiming his sovereignty over Tangier, and asserting that the English would only occupy the city at his pleasure, and on his terms. However, the precise meaning inherent in the sultan's declaration was, admittedly, vague, and Kirke was seemingly unperturbed by it. It is perhaps because of this lack of response that the former Moroccan ambassador wrote, in a conspiratorial tone, to King Charles in August 1683. He claimed that he did so on his own volition to warn of his master's plans to retake Tangier following the expiry of the treaty, after he had been pressured to do so by the Ottoman sultan.²⁴¹ Drawing attention to the relative strengths of the two sides, ben Haddu asked the king to think carefully about committing to war. If he did not believe that the English could triumph, he asked Charles to consider another option: allow Tangier to become a *mallah*, 'and accede to everything which he requests from you and give to him from it everything which he imposes in the way of gunpowder and armaments and everything which is found and needed by my lord in that land'.²⁴² To obtain peace, the sultan was not only demanding that Tangier be recognised as part of his dominions, but that its inhabitants become his subjects and the king of England become a tributary to him.²⁴³ In an admission which could help explain Ismā'īl's equivocal diplomacy, ben Haddu also revealed that the sultan had

²³⁹ Such communities lived under the protection of the sultan, paid him tribute, and obeyed his commands. On Moroccan *mallahs*, see Boum and Park, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, pp. 322–323; Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 48.

²⁴⁰ 'Letter VIII', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 241.

²⁴¹ 'Letter X: Muhammad b. Muhammad A'tār to Charles II [Meknès] 11 Sha'bān 1094/ 5 August 1683', *ibid.*, pp. 245–251; Bejjit, *ibid.*, pp. 47–48. The original manuscript in Arabic for 'Letter X' can be found in TNA, SP 102/4, f. 110. A contemporary translation can be found in TNA, CO 279/30, ff. 253–256.

²⁴² 'Letter X', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 249.

²⁴³ On ben Haddu's letter see also Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 1009–1010, and cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 161–162.

been considering an expedition against Tangier for some time.²⁴⁴ There is no evidence that Ismā'īl instigated the letter,²⁴⁵ but it clearly served his purpose of bringing the matter of Tangier's future to a head.

The alternative to war proposed by ben Haddu was clearly unacceptable, as Kirke made clear in his response to him, and he refused to forward it to the king. He concluded by stating that he hoped ben Haddu 'will live to see your error, and to thank me for having proceeded with so much moderation'.²⁴⁶ In his subsequent report to Jenkins, Kirke dismissed the letter as a fraud, and as one more example of the machinations of the sultan's courtiers.²⁴⁷ But in their dealings with the English, the Moroccans had made no error, and had achieved what they had long sought.²⁴⁸ By the time this exchange occurred, Charles had already resolved the fate of Tangier, and plans were well advanced to give effect to his decision.

With Parliament refusing funds for Tangier unless the king assented to the Exclusion Bill, uncertainty about the long-term security of the colony without the ratification of the Whitehall treaties, and, possibly, to appease Louis XIV — on whom Charles depended for financial assistance and who saw the English occupation of Tangier as

²⁴⁴ 'Letter X', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 247.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Bejjit in *ibid.*, p. 255. Contrary to Bejjit's conclusion, it is evident that Kirke wrote 'Letter XII' before 'Letter XI'. The former is an acknowledgement of receipt of ben Haddu's letter, the latter is his response following its translation. Given ben Haddu's pretence of writing secretly to the king, it is unclear why he would advise Kirke he had written it by order of the sultan. See 'Letter XII: Colonel Percy Kirke to Mohamed ben Haddū Tanger, 9 August 1683', *ibid.* The original manuscript can be found in TNA, CO 279/32, f. 78. It is also possible that the letter was not written by ben Haddu: Kirke suspected that it was a forgery, as he had an earlier letter purportedly written by the former ambassador. See Kirke's report, Tangier, 13 July 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, f. 18r.

²⁴⁶ 'Copie of Colonel Kirke's second letter to the Morocco ambassador', Tangier, 9 August 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, f. 72r. A transcription of the manuscript is provided in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, p. 253, as 'Letter XI', however, it omits the final sentence in which the quotation appears.

²⁴⁷ See Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 9 August 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, ff. 74r–75r and Kirke's report, Tangier, 13 July 1683, *ibid.*, f. 18r. Kirke's cynicism is probably not unfounded. On factionalism in the Moroccan court and its impact on foreign policy, see J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash, 1706–1708', *The Historical Journal*, 51 (2008), p. 607.

²⁴⁸ Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 163. Matar refers to a letter which Ismā'īl sent to the king on 5 July 1683 in which he issues an ultimatum to Charles to enter into another peace treaty. The present author has been unable to obtain a copy of the manuscript in question (TNA, SP 102/4, f. 108). However, it seems incongruous that the sultan would be insisting on a new treaty at the same time he had repudiated the Whitehall treaties, and had offered to continue to honour the Meknes treaty. See also Ismā'īl's statements in his final letter to the king in 'Letter XIII: Mawlay Ismā'īl to Charles II 6 Rabī'c the first 1095/ 26 February 1684', in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 257–258.

an impediment to his own plans in the Mediterranean — the king was left with little choice: it was either Tangier or the Stuart succession. Furthermore, as well as presenting strategic risks, English prestige would also have suffered if Tangier fell into the hands of the French or Moroccans. In the end, the only viable option was to evacuate the colony, and destroy its fortifications and mole.²⁴⁹

The task was given to Lord Dartmouth, a well-educated man who had enjoyed royal favour, but was prone to indecisiveness and extremes of self-judgement, and whose competence as a naval commander and leader were questionable.²⁵⁰ The expedition was prepared under strict secrecy and subterfuge to avoid public scrutiny and criticism of the decision. The fleet was assembled under the pretence of a supply mission to the colony, and Dartmouth's appointment as its admiral, in addition to his commission as the new governor and commander-in-chief of Tangier, was only revealed shortly before the fleet was ready to sail.²⁵¹

Dartmouth's entourage included Samuel Pepys, who had been requested to join the expedition but without having been informed of the reason.²⁵² It was only after the fleet had set sail on 10 August that Dartmouth confided to him the true purpose of the mission and his role; he was to assess the interests of the inhabitants for the purpose of determining compensation. The announcement caught him by surprise, but he does not indicate that he was perturbed by the decision. Reasons for the evacuation and demolition of Tangier had already been agreed upon by the Privy

²⁴⁹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 242–246; Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, II, pp. 404–408. It has also been argued by Peter Le Fevre that factionalism within the navy contributed to the decision, whereas Sari R. Hornstein believes that the failure of Tangier to meet the needs of the navy was a more salient consideration, making it easier for the king to dispense with it. See Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, pp. 158–159. Lord Dartmouth advised Samuel Pepys in October that the King had supported the idea when it was raised at the beginning of the year, although it had first been proposed by the earl of Sunderland about three years previously. See Samuel Pepys, *The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys*, ed. Edwin Chappel ([London], 1935), p. 34, entry for 2 October 1683. This would have been around the time that John Evelyn recorded Sunderland's pessimistic assessment of Tangier's prospects, discussed earlier in this chapter.

²⁵⁰ J. D. Davies, 'Legge, George, first Baron Dartmouth (c. 1647–1691), naval officer', in *ODNB*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2006), accessed 23 March 2018.

²⁵¹ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 247–248; Chappel, 'Introduction', *Tangier Papers*, pp. xxiv–xxv. Transcriptions of Dartmouth's commission and instructions are provided in *ibid.*, pp. 58–67. Details of the instructions are also provided in *Dartmouth MSS*, I, pp. 83–85, entry for 2 July 1683.

²⁵² *Dartmouth MSS*, III, pp. 39–40.

Council, and these were supplemented by others volunteered by Pepys.²⁵³ The final document argued that the benefits which had been expected to be derived from Tangier as a naval station and entrepôt had not been achieved. It explained that the fortifications were deficient, and it would take many years to rectify them and considerable cost to do so, and more to maintain them. In addition, 'the Moors are no more the ignorant and unskilful neighbours they were to the Portuguese, but had grown to a great degree of knowledge in the business of war', as they had recently demonstrated. Commerce had not flourished, nor had the port proved suitable for servicing naval vessels. It was seen as essential that Charles provided a convincing justification for the destruction of Tangier both to placate his subjects and to avoid humiliation, and the *post hoc* arguments which were developed presented a compelling, if somewhat partial, case for doing so.²⁵⁴

When Dartmouth arrived in Tangier Bay on 14 September, he found that Qā'id Ali was encamped with a 'considerable armye' nearby,²⁵⁵ which reinforced in the new governor's mind the concerns that the king's counsellors possessed that the Moroccans would attack the town or otherwise frustrate the evacuation, should they discover what the English were planning. For this reason, they had charged him with taking all possible precautions to conceal the plan from them for as long as possible,²⁵⁶ and concerns about spying had led to the expulsion from Tangier of Moors and Jews who, according to Kirke, 'were flocking among us'.²⁵⁷ However, despite these efforts, news of the fleet's imminent arrival and its purpose preceded it, although not only had the inhabitants been informed but also, apparently, the Moroccans. It was for these reasons that Dartmouth and Kirke, who was, along with several others in Dartmouth's company, also now enjoined in the enterprise, agreed on means by which they would seek to maintain the deception. Firstly, they intended to initiate an enquiry to provide the impression that Dartmouth had been sent to

²⁵³ Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, pp. 4, 11, 15–16, entries for 13, 14 August and 3, 13 September 1683.

²⁵⁴ Pepys, 'Arguments for Destroying Tangier', *ibid.*, pp. 75–83. For discussion on the arguments see Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 254–258; Chappel, 'Introduction', *Tangier Papers*, pp. xxviii–xxix; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, pp. 156–208, 261.

²⁵⁵ Dartmouth's report, Tangier Bay, 16 September, TNA, CO 279/32, f. 137.

²⁵⁶ See clause 14 of 'Dartmouth's Instructions', Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, p. 65; *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 83.

²⁵⁷ *Dartmouth MSS*, I, pp. 84, 91.

survey the condition of the colony. Secondly, referencing Kirke's recent, stalled negotiations for a new combined land and maritime treaty, they agreed to 'continue treating civilly with the alcade and to amuse him as much as possibly we can' to lead him to think otherwise; although even at this late stage Kirke appears to have remained surprisingly optimistic that Tangier's future could still be secured through an acceptable peace.²⁵⁸

Dartmouth also sought to dissuade the Moroccans against hostility by staging an elaborate military review on 28 September. To inflate the garrison's strength, he even enlisted a thousand seamen. In all, some four thousand men were presented on the fields outside Tangier. All the remaining seamen were turned out on their vessels, which were arranged to flank the city, and on a signal all the ships fired their guns simultaneously. In turn the Moroccans exercised their cavalry in front of the English. Pleasantries were exchanged, and it was agreed with the Qā'id that commissioners would be appointed to progress negotiations.²⁵⁹

Some of the most interesting insights to be gained from this period are not those relating to the abortive negotiations with the Moroccans, or the preparations for evacuating the town, but rather are provided by Samuel Pepys in the account he left of his experiences and reflections during this time, in what are referred to as his *Tangier Papers*.²⁶⁰ Pepys was an urbanite bureaucrat who had travelled little outside

²⁵⁸ TNA, CO 279/32, ff. 137r–v. Quotation is from f. 137v. On Kirke's recent negotiations with Ali for a new treaty, see Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 24 August 1683, *ibid.*, ff. 100–103. See also Kirke's report to Dartmouth on 'the state of matters' between himself and the qā'id, Tangier, 16 September 1683, *Dartmouth MSS*, I, pp. 90–92. On Kirke's optimism, see the final sentence.

²⁵⁹ *Dartmouth MSS*, I, p. 94, entry for 26 September 1683; *ibid.*, III, pp. 40, 51–52, entries for 26, 28 September 1683.

²⁶⁰ The original manuscripts are preserved in the Bodleian Library in Rawlinson MS. C. 859. The current definitive transcription of these papers was undertaken by Edwin Chappel and published as *The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys* by the Navy Records Society in 1935. Chappel is highly critical of a transcription by John Smith first published in 1841, and reprinted in 1932, and which is used by Routh. See p. XV of his introduction. The other aspects of this period mentioned above are not dealt with in detail in this chapter. They are relatively well covered by Routh, with allowance made for the occasional dated and biased interpretation. See esp. chap. XIV of *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*. On differences between Pepys' diary and Tangier journal, and his treatment of England's colonial activities, and particularly Tangier, in the two sources, see Karim Bejjit, 'Tangier that Was: The Confessions of Samuel Pepys', in Ralph M. Coury and R. Kevin Lacey, eds., *Writing Tangier*, Currents in Comparative Romance Languages and Literatures (New York, 2009), pp. 152–155.

of England. While he was well informed about developments in Tangier and Morocco as a result of his work in the Admiralty and on the Tangier Committee, through his discussions with others, and perhaps from his general reading, he had never travelled to Morocco or the Mediterranean. All of which makes the generally positive portrayal of his sojourn, and his favourable perceptions of the country and its people all the more surprising.

The jaded perception that Pepys had developed of Tangier over the preceding six years was confirmed at his first sight of the city on his arrival in the bay. Observing that it was nestled amongst hills that overlooked it, he wondered how it could ever be secured, and marvelled at why the king had expended so much on such a place. Invited by Kirke for a ride outside the walls on his second day in Tangier, Pepys was filled with foreboding knowing that Moroccan soldiers were in close proximity.²⁶¹ Perhaps a source of greater concern to him, and certainly of indignation, was the immorality and depravity that he believed pervaded the town. 'Nothing but vice in the whole place of all sorts', he exclaimed in his notes.²⁶² According to Pepys, it was not just moral decay that Tangier suffered from, but an all-consuming corruption that ate away at the very fabric of the colony: 'Everything runs so to corruption here'. However, it was not the land that he blamed for this corrupting miasma, but rather its governors, with the sole exception of the revered Lord Teviot.²⁶³ He concurred with the chaplain, Dr Thomas Ken, that Tangier was a vicious place, and that it was 'time for God Almighty to destroy it'.²⁶⁴

Plagued by 'chinchies' (bedbugs) and mosquitoes, Pepys suffered much discomfort and restless sleep during his first few weeks in Tangier.²⁶⁵ Nonetheless, this inconvenience, and his concerns about Tangier society, did not diminish his ability to enjoy what else Morocco had to offer, and he demonstrated a marked degree of resilience to the change in his environment. He found many things there worthy of

²⁶¹ Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, pp. 14, 17–18, entries for 14, 17, 18 September 1683.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49, entry for 25 October 1683.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 41, entries for 17, 18 September and 12 October 1683.

comment and approbation.²⁶⁶ One of the fascinating aspects of Pepys' account is his observation of the minutiae, in particular his almost child-like sense of fascination with the novelties of nature he finds.²⁶⁷ He also took pleasure in the local produce and foods, and pondered its provenance.²⁶⁸ As observed by Karim Bejjit, Pepys' journal demonstrates a general vivacity inspired by the new 'geographical and cultural space' he encounters, providing perspectives which differ to those found in other accounts.²⁶⁹ In his curiosity and attention to detail, he is similar to Lancelot Addison, but lacking the latter's ideological motivations.

On his first excursion outside the walls he records that he 'did it with no pleasure, but great danger'.²⁷⁰ He also balked at Dartmouth's suggestion that he and his colleague, Dr Trumbull, be dispatched to negotiate the new treaty with the sultan and, like John Luke, was much relieved when he was later informed that he was no longer required to do so.²⁷¹ However, while Pepys was acutely aware of the risk of attack or abduction faced by any Briton who wandered too far from the town, and in his own estimation considered himself to be a 'good prize',²⁷² he adjusted and was soon regularly leaving the town to relax and to explore the local area. One evening, he accompanied Dartmouth for a ride to the very end of the lines, and several times beyond them, with the group even engaging in discussion with Moroccan sentries. Later that night, he reflected that despite the risk, he was pleased at having done so at least once so as 'to know the most of the place, some of the history of it against the Moors'.²⁷³ On another occasion he rowed alone around the bay, seeing the site of old Tangier and observing the Moroccans on the shore and 'the manner of their huts', and as the sun was setting, he marvelled at how blue the hills in the distance were, 'as I have sometimes seen them painted but never believed it natural painted',

²⁶⁶ Cf. Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, p. 294.

²⁶⁷ Like lizards 'sticking in the windows' of the church basking in the sun, a 'great locust' leaping onto the table, a 'most extraordinary spider ... at least ten times as big as an ordinary spider', and 'a glow-worm shining', but far smaller than those in England. See Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, pp. 22, 42, entries for 23 September and 15 October 1683.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19, entry for 20 September 1683; 'Notes on Tangier', *ibid.*, p. 92.

²⁶⁹ Bejjit, 'Tangier that Was', p. 157.

²⁷⁰ Samuel Pepys, *Tangier Papers*, p. 18, entry for 18 September 1683.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 28–30, entries for 28, 29 September 1683.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 40, entry for 11 October 1683.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 46, entry, 21 October 1683.

the scene evidently evoking feelings of familiarity, rather than distance.²⁷⁴ These excursions provided him the opportunity to observe and interact with Moroccans going about their daily lives, such as performing *salah*, and working with English carpenters to repair a boat.²⁷⁵ Pepys' response to his presence in Morocco stands in stark contrast to that of Dr Trumbull, who quickly sank into a state of depression; Trumbull was fearful and homesick, and Dartmouth agreed to release him early to return home.²⁷⁶

Despite the uneasy peace which prevailed, and Pepys' complicity in a report which partly justified Tangier's evacuation on the basis of the 'cruelty' and 'natural and known perfidiousness of that people',²⁷⁷ his judgements about the indigenes are notably free of preconceived or acquired prejudice. Pepys recounts an episode concerning a young Moroccan who sought refuge. He describes him as a 'very sober, good, well-looking youth'. Pepys was intrigued with how Muslims said their 'prayers' and asked him to demonstrate, remarking that he did so 'with so much reverence in his manner, speech, the motion of his hands and eyes and [s ?] of his voice and most of all of his prostrations, that I was never more taken with any appearance of devotion in my life'.²⁷⁸ Pepys' admiration for the people was also evident at the military review a few days later. He describes Qā'id Ali and his entourage not only as 'as grave and sober men', but he also thought the qā'id's 'discourse and manner of speech very good and with more presence of mind than I thought our master [Dartmouth] did'. He concluded with an emphatic endorsement: 'Their appearance and habits I liked very well'.²⁷⁹

Pepys' favourable assessments of Moroccans contrast with sentiments expressed in some other contemporaneous sources which emphasised suspicion and fear of them,

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47, entry for 22 October 1683.

²⁷⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 18, 40, entries for 18 September and 11 October 1683. On Pepys' peregrinations around Tangier, see also pp. 40, 42, 50, entries for 12, 15, 28 October 1683.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 39, 40, 42, entries for 27 September and 10, 14, 15 October 1683. See also Chappel, 'Introduction', *ibid.*, p. xvii.

²⁷⁷ 'Arguments for Destroying Tangier', *ibid.*, pp. 80, 83.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21, entry for 22 September 1683.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27, entry for 28 September 1683. (my interpolation).

and, to a lesser extent, religious difference.²⁸⁰ In a letter to a friend in London written in early November, one resident expressed his dislike of the 'treacherous Moors' and their use of ambushes, and for rhetorical effect described them as 'these devils like so many rabbits cover'd in the sands, or so many snakes and poison'd adders, underneath the long grass, with their venomous darts, spitting fire at their mouths, lay in ambuscade ready to devour us'.²⁸¹ While Pepys was not ignorant of the dangers the Moroccans posed, his observations lack any hint of general disdain, or ethnological or religious antipathy.²⁸² His account reinforces, once again, the fact that the attitudes of Britons concerning Morocco and Moroccans were not always defined by prejudice, that they had an individual capacity to appreciate them on their own terms, and that even at this time of national shame all Britons did not necessarily harbour resentment towards a people whose dogged assertion of national interest and territorial sovereignty had supplanted their own.

But the role played by the indigenes was certainly not downplayed. In a speech to the inhabitants on 4 October 1683, Dartmouth finally publicly revealed the king's intentions. In explaining the reasons for abandoning Tangier the continuing threat posed by Ismā'īl's army features prominently.²⁸³ Whether out of simple obedience or genuine relief, or a mix of both, the proclamation appears to have been well received, with addresses affirming support for the decision provided soon after by both the citizens and the officers and soldiers of the garrison, with both groups agreeing it was better to abandon the settlement than wait until the sultan took it by force.²⁸⁴ Both

²⁸⁰ On Pepys' portrayal of Moroccans, see also Bejjit, 'Tangier that Was', pp. 157–158.

²⁸¹ M. Poseley, *A Letter from Tangier, to a Friend in London. Describing the Causes, Manner and Time of the Demolishing of Tangier* (London, 1683), p. 1. Cf. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 164. Other, less colourful, examples are provided in Dartmouth's speech and the address of the citizens of Tangier discussed below.

²⁸² Margarette Lincoln in 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier', p. 433, suggests that Pepys evokes religious rhetoric against Moroccans in a reference in a personal letter to the impending destruction of Tangier. But what he is clearly describing is his feelings toward Tangier, not Moroccans. Bejjit in 'Tangier that Was', p. 158, similarly argues that Pepys considered the destruction of Tangier as 'divine punishment' for the immorality which prevailed in the city.

²⁸³ 'Lord Dartmouth's speech to the inhabitants of Tanger at the Town House', 4 October 1673, TNA, CO 279/32, ff. 184–189.

²⁸⁴ 'The most humble addresse of the citty of Tanger', Tangier, 8 October 1683, *ibid.*, f. 208; 'The most humble address of the late governour, ... , and the rest of the officers and souldiers of your majestie's royal garrison of Tanger, Tangier, 14 October 1683, *ibid.*, ff. 245–246. Transcriptions of the two manuscripts can be found in *Dartmouth MSS*, I, pp. 96–97, 97–98. The transcription of the first is not

responses were seen by Dartmouth as important to mitigate potential criticism of the decision, and of the king's stewardship of the colony.²⁸⁵ However, as it turned out, the outcome appears to have been far less controversial than anticipated, with the decision largely greeted in England by general indifference, or perhaps regret at the waste of lives and money.²⁸⁶

The evacuation of the civilian inhabitants was completed a month later, which allowed work on demolition of the fortifications and the mole to proceed unabated. Contrary to the initial concerns, no attempt was made by the Moroccans to take advantage of, or impede, the withdrawal or destruction of Tangier. Nevertheless, the task proved more challenging than expected, and it was not until around midnight on 5 February that the final mine was fired and, cloaked in darkness, Dartmouth and the rear-guard finally departed.²⁸⁷ Dartmouth wished to believe it was an end of their own choosing, a disciplined and honourable evacuation, and that the Moroccans would see it as such.²⁸⁸ He was wrong on both accounts. It was, in fact, an ignominious end to the king's project, and was seen as such by Moroccans, who believed the English left simply out of fear,²⁸⁹ with one near contemporary Moroccan historian writing that 'Tangier was besieged so closely that the Christians had to flee to their vessels and escape by sea'.²⁹⁰

It was a signal moment for both Mawlay Ismā'īl and King Charles; for the former it was a symbolic victory that would further strengthen his grip on power and ensure

complete. Dartmouth himself reported that the proclamation had been received 'very joyfully'. See Dartmouth's report, Tangier, 5 October 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, f. 191r. Dartmouth may not have been embellishing: a resident similarly reported the general feeling of relief and jubilation which followed. See Poseley, *A Letter from Tangier, to a Friend*, pp. 1–2. However, the consensus was threatened by the initial unwillingness of naval officers to endorse findings concerning the unsuitability of the harbour and the mole, but they were eventually persuaded to do so. See Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 258–360.

²⁸⁵ Dartmouth's report, Tangier, 19 October 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, ff. 274r–v.

²⁸⁶ Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 269–270.

²⁸⁷ Dartmouth's Tangier journal, *Dartmouth MSS*, pp. 53–54, entry for 4–5 February 1684; Routh, *England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, pp. 261–265.

²⁸⁸ Dartmouth to Jenkins, Tangier, 5 February 1684, TNA, CO 279/33, f. 55r.

²⁸⁹ Budgett Meakin, *The Moorish Empire: A Historical Epitome* (London, 1899), p. 154; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 164.

²⁹⁰ Muhammad Asaghir Al-Oufrani (1669/70–c.1743), cited in Budgett Meakin, *The Land of the Moors: A Comprehensive Description* (London, 1901), p. 131.

his legacy, and for the latter it was a necessary concession to maintain his own dynastic ambitions. Soon after the evacuation, Ismā'īl wrote to Charles to explain the situation in an effort to normalise relations. He expressed his appreciation for the treatment of his embassy, noting that it had been welcomed in a manner that other Christians would not have provided. But, he declared, the occupation of Tangier had been a source of great shame for him. While he had honoured the four-year truce, he could not have countenanced a treaty while the English maintained their fortifications and cannons; a 'treaty of *dhimma*', like that applied by the Turks to Christians living in their lands, had been the only option. However, the sultan assured the king that the return of Tangier was 'the perfection of good relations' and that he harboured no ill-feeling, promising that they would be provided with everything they desired in Moroccan ports.²⁹¹ Yet more than fifteen years would elapse before the two sides took the first substantive steps to renew diplomatic relations; nevertheless, that rapprochement was assisted by positive memories among Moroccans of their dealings with the English in Tangier.²⁹²

Conclusion

Hopes of peace and a prosperous future for Tangier quickly turned to despair from the beginning of 1678 as the 'Alawīs commenced a sporadic, but protracted military campaign against the colony. It was a despair borne out of both fear of the Moroccans and frustration with the failure of the English government to adequately reinforce and supply the city. Yet Tangier's leaders continued to cling to the long-held hope that, in time, a better understanding with the Moroccans was achievable, once they recognised the mutual benefits which could be derived through a peaceful settlement.

²⁹¹ 'Letter XIII: Mawlay Ismā'īl to Charles II 6 Rabī^c the first 1095/ 26 February 1684' [translation], in Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts*, pp. 257–258. The original manuscript can be found in TNA, SP 102/2, f. 128.

²⁹² Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, pp. 65–71; Brown, 'Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash', pp. 607–609.

Tangier was no stranger to hostilities from the local people but what contributed to the sense of foreboding which pervaded the city was the fact that it was now being subjected to sustained assaults by a determined and militarily sophisticated opponent. No longer could the inhabitants take comfort from the safety afforded by their fortifications, which were being reduced before their eyes. Moreover, the fighting was intense and brutal, leading to heavy casualties on both sides. The conflict elicited a range of anti-Moroccan and patriotic sentiment, but this appears to have been largely fuelled by growing scepticism in England about Tangier and the political fallout from domestic political developments, rather than indicative of base hatred and innate prejudice toward Moroccans; and, in particular, there was little attention given to religious difference. On the contrary, the prevailing attitudes towards Moroccans which were informed by the conflict, were, if not ambivalent, remarkably positive, and, if anything, it enhanced the esteem with which they were already held as warriors. Moreover, it is evident that the conduct of Tangier's commanders towards their adversaries was heavily prescribed by normative European rules and practices of war, and associated principles of honour and belief in the utility of reciprocity, and the transposition of this framework to North Africa was undoubtedly assisted by recognition of a shared *metier* of soldiering.

The lack of a common perception among Britons about Moroccans is mirrored in the lack of consensus which existed among the garrison on how to deal with them. Both of these facts highlight an important point: that the inhabitants of Tangier did not represent a homogenous, like-minded community any more than their compatriots at home did, and consequently it is difficult to draw simple conclusions about the general impact that the events in Tangier had on shaping prevailing attitudes towards Moroccans, or North Africans or Muslims more generally, let alone on the development of British national identity.²⁹³ Moreover, the period was marked not just by conflict, but there were also extended periods of peace and consequent opportunities for civil engagement, which provide other insights into the attitudes of Britons and the factors which influenced them. Opinions about individual Moroccans

²⁹³ Bejjit advances a similar argument based on his reading of Pepys' Tangier journal in 'Tangier that Was', p. 159.

varied considerably between commentators, ranging from the stereotypical negative assessment of Mawlay Ismā'īl provided by the author of *The Last Account*, to the overtly enthusiastic praise initially accorded the sultan and Qā'id Omar by Kirke. Once again, as a result of differences in personal background, disposition, preconception and experience, they saw the cultural, religious and geographic character of Morocco in various, and frequently, conflicting ways. But neither were these views necessarily fixed, as amply demonstrated by Kirke, whose attitudes towards Moroccans varied over time depending on his feelings, particularly about the reciprocity of trust and goodwill.

As has been observed elsewhere in this study, some Britons demonstrated an ability to positively acculturate in Morocco: to overcome 'cultural shock', to see beyond bigoted stereotypes and acquire some level of genuine knowledge, understanding and acceptance of the people as individuals, and as members of a distinct culture and society. The person who stands out in this respect in this chapter is, once again, Kirke. While aware of the limitations of his own insights, and challenged by ambivalent Moroccan policy, he became a critical mediator between the two sides, seeking to find an acceptable middle-ground between excessive Moroccan demands and culturally insensitive or otherwise unhelpful English responses.

A range of issues frustrated resolution of a long-term peace: from the fixation of the English with fortification, disputes between the parties, instability in the Moroccan hierarchy, and lack of trust, to general cultural misunderstanding; and other factors contributed to the decision to abandon it. But, as Tristan Stein has argued, the key impediment to the continuation of English occupation of Tangier was its status as a crown colony: not only did this complicate the situation with respect to domestic opposition, but it also resulted in competing claims of sovereignty. Lacking both the military power to impose a solution — and, perhaps, even the inclination to do so — and the political flexibility possessed by a corporate entity such as the East India

Company, in the face of demands to surrender sovereignty over Tangier, Charles II was left no choice but to abandon the city.²⁹⁴

The story of English Tangier is not simply one of trade and inter-cultural relations between two peoples, but also of the contestation of power and authority both within and between their respective polities. The acquisition and subsequent abandonment of Tangier highlight the gulf between imperial ambition and the ability of the English state to project its military power overseas in the seventeenth century.²⁹⁵ In this respect, sources from both sides of the encounter conspire to write back against a long-standing and influential imperial narrative concerning Tangier, which has marginalised Moroccan agency, as well as obscured the diverse and complex relationships which were established between Britons and Moroccans during this period.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ See Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 987–988, 1006, 1008–1011.

²⁹⁵ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), pp. 38, 40; Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 1007.

²⁹⁶ On the omission of Moroccan agency in the historiography of English Tangier, see also Bejjit, 'Introduction', p. 48.

Conclusion

‘Travel, you will see the meanings [of things].’

‘He who does not travel will not know the value of men.’

‘When you travel with him you will get to know him.’

(Moroccan proverbs)¹

This study is fundamentally about the responses of individual people and how these responses, shaped as they were by their encounter with a new reality, in turn influenced subsequent events in Anglo-Moroccan relations in the seventeenth century. In pursuing this aim the thesis seeks to reappraise the claims of other scholars concerning these very same people and events. But its scope is different to that of the few related studies which have been undertaken. It is not principally concerned about the history of English Tangier or the attitudes of Britons toward the colony. Nor does it seek to situate the attitudes of the subjects towards Morocco solely within a framework of contemporary perspectives concerning Islamdom, although such comparisons are provided. Rather, my intention has been to untangle their individual responses from the far more general and teleological assertions of others concerning the contemporary views of Britons about the people of North Africa, and more specifically about the people of Morocco, and the impact that their interactions with them had on their own sense of individual and collective identity. Following this path reveals a very different picture of Anglo-Moroccan relations at the time, and of the disposition of Britons to relations with non-European peoples in the early modern period. However, I have argued that in order to do so it is necessary to clearly understand how particular historiographical developments have led to significant misunderstanding about the nature of events and the consequences arising from engagement of early modern Britons with the Mediterranean generally, and Morocco in particular.

¹ Edward Westermarck, *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco: A Study of Native Proverbs* (London, 1930), pp. 135, 141.

It appears to be generally accepted among scholars that social, cultural and economic developments in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, accompanied by the nation's increasing naval power, contributed to the foundation of an imperial ideology that provided Britons with a sense of common purpose and identity, which in turn led them to asserting their cultural and religious superiority over other peoples, debasing them, and thereby justifying their right to invade, dominate, and exploit them. What remains the subject of debate is precisely when this world view began to perceptively and generally manifest itself in both their thoughts and actions.

Over the past two decades or so, there has been a tendency for commentators influenced by post-colonialism to posit that such beliefs began to become widely entrenched among Britons from around the late sixteenth century. However, there are others who argue that it was a much later development. As Daniel J. Vitkus has observed, prior to 'the latter half of the seventeenth century, England's "colonial" discourse was merely the premature articulation of a third-rank power'.² Like Linda Colley and Jonathan Burton, he believes that the assumptions of post-colonial theory and criticism in which representations of cultural antagonism and exclusion, and delusions of grandeur, were enablers for the colonisation of others, do not apply to the thinking of Britons and their relations with Islamicate societies in the Mediterranean zone in the early modern period. The Mediterranean was far too culturally complex, England's relations within it were too varied, and English military power too insufficient to sustain such a coherent and consistent discourse.³ The responses of the English state and individual Britons to their engagement with Morocco up until the abandonment of Tangier in 1684, which have been examined in this study, support this claim. Furthermore, it is useful to reflect on the fact that xenophobia and chauvinism were not restricted to Britons, nor only directed by them against non-Europeans, and such thinking was by no means necessarily associated

² Daniel J. Vitkus, *Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630* (New York, 2008), pp. 3–11. Quotation is from p. 3.

³ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004), pp. 102–103; Jonathan Burton, *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005), pp. 11–12; Vitkus, *Turning Turk*, pp. 7–8, 19–21.

with imperial aspiration.⁴ They can, in fact, be symptomatic of other social or individual pathologies, and it is also important not to confuse mentalities associated with early modern “Englishness”, or even what might more expansively be termed “Britonness”, with those of later “Britishness”.

Attempts by England to assert extra-territorial authority to further its commercial and geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not go unchallenged by other states and polities operating in the region, both Christian and Muslim alike. Moreover, the behaviour of Britons seeking to exploit opportunities overseas did not begin to be driven by clearly defined state-sponsored imperial or mercantilist policies until at least quite late in this period. To the extent there was a common purpose in the Mediterranean shared by the English state and private trading interests until then, it was simply to generate wealth — revenue for the former, and profit for the latter — in a region that was both geographically close and thought to possess considerable commercial potential. Despite occasional expressions of grand ambition, the experience of Britons in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century continued to be defined by uncertainty, caution, and vulnerability. Critically, it has been argued in this thesis that while they found the exercise of naval power could be useful, they discovered that it could also be counterproductive, as well as costly. For these reasons, they remained heavily reliant on pragmatic compromise to foster positive relations in the region. Furthermore, while Britons harboured anxieties about the Mediterranean as a site of potentially contaminating cultural exchange, they often found it necessary, or otherwise useful, to accommodate ethnological and religious differences. In turn, the playing down of such differences in the interests of trade and diplomacy helped overcome barriers to engagement and enabled deeper processes of acculturation to be experienced by them.

While there is much to be found in the general attitudes and behaviour of Britons in the wider Mediterranean in the seventeenth century which can be extended to their

⁴ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 104–105.

engagement with Morocco, there are also very important differences due to their unique history and dynamics of contact with that specific area of the Maghrib. England's interests in Morocco were always more complex, and its diplomatic responses more circumspect and nuanced than those relating to the other Barbary States. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli posed a threat to English navigation which needed to be mitigated. So did Salé, but it was at the same time, an important centre of Anglo-Moroccan trade. Furthermore, the port was often under the suzerainty of other parties with whom the English sought to cultivate relations and who they did not wish to offend in the pursuit of other objectives; in fact, while English diplomacy in the Mediterranean was invariably complicated by the need to negotiate the redemption of captured Britons alongside terms for trade and peace,⁵ nowhere did this prove to be more problematic than in Morocco. Furthermore, development of profitable trade with Morocco in the second half of the sixteenth century had been supplemented by diplomatic exchanges and a promising alliance against Spain later in the century under Mawlay Ahmad al-Mansūr and Elizabeth I. This period of Anglo-Moroccan relations would be evoked frequently by parties on both sides over the following decades, as an exemplar of what could be achieved by the two peoples. But by the beginning of the seventeenth century, not only had both sponsors of the accord passed away, but mutual interest in opposing Spain had waned, and with the subsequent collapse of state authority in Morocco, Britons had to navigate a far more complex political terrain of competing groups and diverse agendas in order to pursue their interests in the country.

It was war with Spain that once more encouraged the English to seek to establish diplomatic relations with a Moroccan leader in 1625. Morocco was again recognised as possessing both geo-political and commercial value, but the English government struggled to conceive of means by which it could best capitalise on these opportunities, as well as address the joint problems of Moroccan corsair activity and the redemption of the king's subjects held captive in the country. Not only were its efforts frustrated by the shifting mosaic of Moroccan politics, but also by competing

⁵ Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009), p. 69.

interests within its own seafaring and merchant communities; reinforcing not only the limitations of the English state at this time to impose its authority on the extra-territorial activities of its subjects, but also the absence of firm policies to guide its actions. It was, therefore, left to the initiative of individuals such as John Harrison, Stephen Scott, Giles Penn, and Robert Blake to find other ways by which England could productively engage with Morocco, though their efforts were to some extent driven as much by financial or ideological self-interest as a desire to serve the common good of the nation. Possessing knowledge and experience of the country, and unconstrained by concerns about political legitimacy, these men established relationships with Moroccan magnates and provided advice to the English authorities to inform their responses. They proposed a variety of schemes to advance English interests in the country between the late 1620s and the 1630s, some of which exhibited quasi-colonial elements or otherwise involved military intervention. But, by and large, what they advocated were essentially pragmatic solutions to intractable problems, informed by a belief that they would be found acceptable by the majority of Moroccans because they provided mutual benefits in terms of trade and security.

The promotion of mutual benefit and the exercise of *realpolitik* became the keystones of English diplomacy in Morocco from the late 1650s and continued to be so until Charles II finally decided to evacuate Tangier in 1683. Following the occupation of Tangier in 1662, the English had hoped that by demonstrating their good character, good intentions, and the benefits that could accrue through trade they could achieve a long-term accommodation with the Moroccans. They persevered with this policy in the face of Moroccan hostility and ambivalence, failing to accept that their occupation of Tangier had fundamentally changed how they were perceived by Moroccans, to whom they were no longer peaceable traders and potential allies, but hostile occupiers of their land, which was part of *dar al-Islam*. It was a change with both religious and political significance that put English Tangier at the heart of the internecine struggle in Morocco as the warring parties strove to win the support of the people to advance their respective claims.

The folly of English thinking about Tangier was not necessarily due to colonial covetousness or imperial ambition as asserted by other scholars, but, rather, appears to have principally been the result of a myopia induced by a strongly held belief that relations with Moroccans could essentially be monetised, that peace and cooperation could be bought at the right price. It was not an attitude just restricted to Morocco: one scholar has observed that Britons in India around this time also operated in the belief ‘that everything and everyone had a “price”’.⁶ It is, therefore, not surprising that Moroccan equivocation was often mistakenly interpreted as arising from avarice instead of genuine indecision. The Moroccans certainly found what they considered to be tribute paid by the English, particularly weapons and gunpowder, of tangible value, but it had to be weighed against the costs to religious legitimacy and political authority of being seen to sanction the continuing presence of the Christian enclaves. Following the occupation of Tangier by the English, the interests and objectives of the two sides become essentially diametrically opposed. The assumption of sovereignty over the town by the English compromised a long history of profitable commerce and generally constructive diplomacy, pitting one ruler against the other as both sought at the same time to deal with their own related domestic issues, and ultimately leaving no room for compromise.

The conflict over possession of Tangier has hitherto been used to support a historiographical narrative which has emphasised that early modern Britons held strongly prejudicial attitudes about Muslim North Africans, defined by perceptions of racial, cultural, and religious difference, which were reinforced by their association with piracy, slavery, antipathy towards Christianity, and general barbarity. But this distinctly reductive perspective misrepresents what contemporary sources reveal

⁶ Bernard Cohn, cited in Ania Loomba, ‘Of Gifts, Ambassadors, and Copy-cats: Diplomacy, Exchange, and Difference in Early Modern India’, in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2009), p. 49. Quotation is from Bernard Cohn, ‘Clothes, Clothes and Colonialism’, in *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton, 1996), p. 118. However, Loomba, in ‘Of Gifts, Ambassadors, and Copy-cats’, pp. 49–52, does argue that Cohen’s position is an oversimplification, and that process of gift giving did retain symbolic value for the English. She goes on to explain that cultural differences concerning the symbolic value of particular gifts could result in tensions between the parties, as could situations where the English did not receive returns which exceeded the value of the gifts they themselves provided, resulting on accusations of greed. There are clear parallels between Loomba’s findings concerning gift exchange involving the English in the Mughal court and the situation in Morocco.

about the diverse forms of contact which occurred, relationships which developed, and the heterogeneity of the responses of Britons to their encounter with North Africa generally, and Morocco particularly, at this time. Contrary to the claim of the author of the *The Present Interest of Tangier* with which this thesis began, Britons were neither disinterested in, nor wholly ignorant of, what existed beyond the walls of Tangier. Some even acquired respectable levels of knowledge and understanding of Moroccan society, culture, language, history, and religion. Therefore, the author's plea should not be seen as evidence of a general lack of engagement with, and learning about, Morocco, but rather how little the man in question himself knew about these subjects, and, perhaps, the limited public transmission of such information at the time.⁷

Between 1625 and 1684, large numbers of Britons travelled to Morocco for a variety of reasons and engaged with its people in different ways, under different circumstances. They came from diverse backgrounds, and possessed their own particular dispositions, system of beliefs and values, and preconceptions. All of these factors made their encounters with Morocco to a lesser or greater extent individually unique from those of their compatriots. For this reason the plurality of their experiences, and their responses to them, defy simple generalisation or incorporation into a teleological narrative. It has been shown that Britons negotiated with Moroccans, traded with them, fought them, and sometimes developed close personal relationships — even friendships — with them. Hostility elicited fear of, and prejudice against, Moroccans, but conversely it also fostered admiration and respect for their bravery, determination, martial skills, and military capabilities. But during the course of the six decades over which this study has ranged, Britons enjoyed even longer periods of, admittedly sometimes tense, but relatively peaceful engagement, and these interactions enabled them to garner new and valuable knowledge and understanding of the country and its people.

⁷ Cf. Colley, *Captives*, p. 37; Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljitt/Beljitt.htm>, under I—From Dramatic to Colonial Space.

A holistic and close examination of the interaction between Britons and Moroccans during this period provides important new insights into factors which more generally influenced their subsequent attitudes and behaviour. While they were prepared to resort to coercion on occasions, Britons also demonstrated adaptability in the pursuit of their interests in Morocco, as they did in the wider Mediterranean zone, and this can, at least partly, be attributed to a general aptitude for pragmatic dealing: through cultural and religious accommodation, and cooperation and collusion with Moroccan leaders, they sought to mitigate impediments to navigation and profitable trade. But in their dealings in Morocco, Britons were not necessarily acting insincerely or otherwise amorally.

While it has not previously been identified, it is clearly evident, particularly from the beginning of the Tangier period, that their actions were often guided by a strong sense of what constituted honourable conduct, not just in conflict, but also in their interpersonal relations. The concept of personal honour was indisputably an important factor in influencing the behaviour of the English, and Britons more generally, in the early modern period. But this was not just the case in their dealings with each other and other Europeans. In the transposition of rules of war, expectations of reciprocity, and application of other normative principles of honourable conduct and practice in both conflictual and pacific contexts, Britons clearly demonstrated their belief not only in a shared humanity with Moroccans, but also, frequently, some measure of equality with them. While the importance that Britons attributed to honour goes some way to explaining their sensitivity to the way they were perceived by Moroccans, their self-consciousness about personal and national perception also points to how fragile any notion of English exceptionalism they possessed really was at this time.

However, this deliberate, conscious behaviour does not fully account for the range of responses exhibited by Britons in their dealings and thinking about Morocco. Some Britons, like Lord Howard and Dr Trumbull, were so full of apprehension and fear following their arrival that they failed to positively engage with the place altogether. Others experienced the disorientating effects, the cognitive dissonance, of cultural

immersion, with their attempts to reconcile what they found with their pre-existing perceptions and beliefs, and understanding of normative cultural values and identity, clearly apparent in the ambivalence of their responses. Yet others, such as John Harrison, Lancelot Addison and Colonel Kirke, demonstrate remarkable open-mindedness and early signs of positive acculturation. They were able to develop close relationships with Moroccans who acted as cultural mediators, and these relationships, in turn, facilitated deeper engagement and assisted these men to achieve relatively high levels of cultural proficiency.

In contrast to the common image of Englishmen sticking resolutely to their own customs and preferring the company of their compatriots, it is clear that early modern Britons were, in fact, notably adaptable to other cultures, even as captives.⁸ Nevertheless, while the establishment of relationships with indigenes as interpreters, cultural informants, and even friends, was a critical factor influencing the acculturation of Britons,⁹ they did not guarantee the maintenance of an *entente cordiale* between the individuals in question or their nations. As seen especially with Kirke's Moroccan relationships, cultural differences could remain problematic as a source of uncertainty and tension. But, emotional investment in personal relationships could also make the parties vulnerable to heightened feelings of disappointment, frustration, and betrayal when their expectations were not met, leading not only to recriminations but also to attitudinal change.

Confusion and conflict are not unique to relationships between people of different cultural traditions, they also occur between people who share the same culture and language, and the social significance of, and effects arising from, any given encounter can only be determined within its own unique parameters.¹⁰ Furthermore, the effects of cultural interaction are not necessarily best understood by focussing on the level

⁸ Colley, *Captives*, pp. 356–361.

⁹ On the importance of such relationships for the development of English overseas interests, see Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 108–110.

¹⁰ Fredrik Fahlander, 'Third Space Encounters: Hybridity, Mimicry and Interstitial Practice', in Per Cornell and Fredrik Fahlander, eds., *Encounters-Materialities-Confrontations. Archaeologies of Social Space and Interaction* (Edinburgh, 2007), p. 15.

of the social or cultural system, or the responses of kings and other social elites, but rather by examining the consequences of encounter for the individuals, subcultures, or segments of societies which were actually involved.¹¹ In this way, Anglo-Moroccan relations in the early modern period should not be viewed as a single story of encounter, but, rather, multiple stories of individual and, to various degrees, collective encounters, both physical and imaginative, whose impact on the thought and behaviour of Britons was diverse and complex.

The influence of factors which fettered the colonial and broader imperial aspirations of Britons would gradually diminish, and the world views held by them would change and coalesce as a consequence. But until their unified country's fully-fledged imperial self-actualisation toward the end of the eighteenth century, the attitudes of Britons to Islam and Islamicate societies remained neither homogenous nor fixed; they were diverse and plastic, changing in accordance with developments in intellectual and religious thought, and estimations made by Britons of their position *vis-à-vis* their European competitors and the Muslim powers.¹² There are no signs of a clear and sustained general 'paradigm shift' between the late sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries in the thinking of Britons about the people of North Africa, grounded in a belief in their relative superiority, as claimed by Nabil Matar.¹³ On the contrary, their experience in Tangier was a lesson in humility, not a reason for hubris for the English,¹⁴ and as Alison Games observes, afterwards they simply returned to their 'old accommodating style of travel and trade in the Mediterranean'.¹⁵

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), p. xiv.

¹² Colley, *Captives*, pp. 112–113, 366; Burton, *Traffic and Turning*, p. 12. Cf. Nabil Matar, 'Britons and Muslims in the Early Modern Period: From Prejudice to (a Theory of) Toleration', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43 (2009),

¹³ Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 11. See the introduction to this thesis for details of Matar's argument.

¹⁴ In a review of Matar's book, *Britain and Barbary*, Robert C. Davis concludes: 'Far from representing the "imperial" call for conquering Barbary" (p. 40), invoked in Matar's first chapters, their experience in Tangier seems to have taught the British to stay away from such heedless adventures, especially in Islamic lands'. Matar, in fact, later in the book, offers a contradictory assessment to this effect. See Robert C. Davis, 'Nabil Matar. Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689', *The American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), p. 815; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 164–165.

¹⁵ Games, *The Web of Empire*, pp. 297–298.

Despite their increasing naval power during the course of the seventeenth century, the construction of Islamic alterity by Britons continued to be dependant on alternating feelings of fear and respect, similarity and difference, inferiority and superiority. In particular, sentiment amongst Britons at home concerning Morocco and Moroccans was influenced by immediate events, such as corsair raids, enslavement of their kin and compatriots, trade and diplomatic initiatives, developments at Tangier, as well as general domestic concerns, which could either reinforce old stereotypes or provide Britons with new ways in which to perceive Moroccans, and relations between the two countries. As one scholar has stressed, it was never simply a unilateral undertaking, it involved a reciprocal discourse between Moroccans and Britons, one that varied over time, and both shaped the course of events and was affected by them.¹⁶ In this way, it was possible for feelings of suspicion, fear, hostility, and alienation held by them to be replaced by trust, respect, amity, and cooperation, or, indeed, the converse.

Renewed interest in the Mediterranean and the activity of Britons in the region in the early modern period is providing new insights into inter-cultural encounters during this period and the impact that this engagement had on development of the British empire and British self-identity. Having suffered from neglect in scholarship until recent times, as well as from the legacy of a particularly partisan historiography, the relationship between Britons and the Barbary States provides a promising area for future research. However, in undertaking such work it is necessary to be mindful of the unique historical, political, and economic character of Morocco *vis-à-vis* the other Barbary States. Furthermore, as demonstrated in this study, close, contextualised, critical (re-)reading of the archival sources is pivotal to revealing the diverse ways in which the English state and individual Britons engaged with Morocco during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the complex ways they responded to it. A diachronic approach helps identify points of change over time and their contingent factors, ranging from the personal to the generational, both of which are well

¹⁶ J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Orientalism', 'Occidentalism' and Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries: A Case Study in Historicising Concepts of Discourse', *SOAS Journal of Graduate Research*, 1 (2005), pp. 10–12.

exemplified in the case of John Harrison.¹⁷ Finally, recognition of Moroccan agency and the recovery of the voices of the indigenous people are also critical to proper understanding of the dynamics of encounter and response between the two sides.¹⁸ But, conversely, care does need to be exercised to not overemphasise the 'politics of resistance' at the expense of an appreciation of the intertwined, and at times interdependent, nature of Anglo-Moroccan relations during the early modern period. To do so simply risks producing another set of simplistic, anachronistic readings of what was, in reality, a rich and in many ways productive period of cultural interaction between Britons and Moroccans.

¹⁷ John Reeve remarks that 'History is insufficiently written as a story of generations', and highlights the importance of studying generational differences to understand changes in attitudes and responses. See John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War', *Parergon*, 32 (2015), p. 177.

¹⁸ On these issues, see also Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety and the Muslim Power of Conversion: Five Perspectives on 'Turning Turk' in Early Modern Texts', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 2 (2002), pp. 62–63; Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance*, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 44–47.

Bibliography

Primary Sources: Manuscripts

Bodleian Library, Oxford

Carte MS 75	Correspondence, papers, of Edward Montagu 1st Earl of Sandwich. Chiefly on naval affairs, 1662–71
Carte MS 222	News-letters addressed to the Duke of Ormonde on public affairs in England and Europe, 1662–84.
Rawl. MS A.185	Folios from 'Pepys' Papers, Vol. xvi' involving naval matters.
Rawl. MS A.341	[no description provided]
Rawl. MS A.342	Copy book of letters written by Sir Henry Sheere to the ministry about Tangier, 26 May 1676–6 July 1679.
Rawl. MS C.353	An Account of a Voyage to the Straits in the Maryrose, 1673/4.
Rawl. MS D.916	Miscellaneous papers relating to Tangier, the American colonies, the company of Mining Adventurers, &c.

British Library, London

Add. MS 17021	Papers relating to Tangier, 1669–1680.
Add. MS 19872	Original letters to Henry Sheers, 1669–1700.
Add. MS 36528	Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673.
Harl. MS 1595	[no description provided]
Harl. MS 6844	Papers relating to military matters.
Lans. MS 192	A discourse concerning Tangier by Sir Hugh Cholmeley, 1672.
Sloane MS 505	Accounts of voyages and travels by T. Fisher, 1661–63.
Sloane MS 1831A/8	Journal of a voyage in the Mediterranean, 1665–66.
Sloane MS 1952	Various papers concerning the affairs of Tangier, including an account by Lord Inchiquin for April 1678 to 1680.
Sloane MS 1956	Nathaniel Luke's copy book. 'A wastbooke of all Tanger affaires 1661'.
Sloane MS 3495	Barbary: Treatise of the revolutions from 1508–1666
Sloane MS 3509	Misc. papers relating to the affairs of Tanger from 1660–1668
Sloane MS 3511	Misc. papers relating to the affairs of Tanger from May 1671 to May 1674.
Sloane MS 3512	Misc. papers relating to the affairs of Tanger from May 1674 to 1680.
Sloane MS 3513	Misc. Spanish papers relating to the affairs of Tanger from 1661 to 1676.

The National Archives, Kew, Richmond

CO 279/1	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1661–1662.
CO 279/2	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1663.
CO 279/3	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1664.
CO 279/4	Tangier, Despatches and Miscellaneous, 1665.
CO 279/6	Tangier, Despatches and Miscellaneous, 1666–1667.
CO 279/8	Tangier, Despatches and Miscellaneous, 1667.
CO 279/10	Tangier, Despatches and Miscellaneous, 1668.
CO 279/12	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1669.
CO 279/13	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1670.
CO 279/15	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1672.
CO 279/16	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1673–1674.
CO 279/17	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1675.
CO 279/19	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jul.–Dec. 1676.
CO 279/20	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jan.–Jun. 1677.
CO 279/25	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jan.–Jul. 1680.
CO 279/26	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Aug.–Dec. 1680.
CO 279/27	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jan.–May 1681.
CO 279/28	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jun.–Dec 1681.
CO 279/29	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jan.–Jul 1682.
CO 279/30	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Aug.–Dec 1682.
CO 279/31	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jan.–Jun 1683.
CO 279/32	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, Jul.–Dec 1683.
CO 279/33	Tangier, Correspondence – Sec. of State, 1684–1735
SP 71/1/Pts. 1 and 2	State Papers Foreign, Barbary States/Algiers, 1595–1685.
SP 71/13/Pts. 1 and 2	State Papers Foreign, Barbary States/Morocco, 1637–c. 1680.
SP 71/14/Pt. 1	State Papers Foreign, Barbary States/Morocco, 1670–1700.
SP 89/5	State Papers Foreign, Portugal, 1661–1662.
SP 89/9	State Papers Foreign, Portugal, 1668.
SP 102/2/Pt. 2	State Papers Foreign, Royal Letters/Barbary States/Morocco, 1564–1766.
SP 103/1	State Papers Foreign, Treaty Papers, Misc./Barbary States: ...; Morocco 1626–1700; ...
SP 108/5	State Papers Foreign, Treaties/Barbary States.
SP 113/2	State Papers: Gazettes and Pamphlets: Treaties

Primary Sources: Published

The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Embassador, Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdella, With His Associate, Mr. Robert Blake From the High and Mighty Prince, Mulley Mahamed Sheque, Emperor of Morocco, King of Fesse, and Suss (London, 1637).

- Articles of Peace & Commerce between ... Charles II ... and the ... Lords the Bashaw, Dey, Aga, Divan, and Governours of the ... Kingdom of Tripoli Concluded by Sir John Narbrough ... the First Day of May, 1676* (London, 1677).
- Articles of Peace Concluded and Agreed Between His Excellency the Lord Bellasyse His Majesties Governor of His City and Garison of Tangier in Affrica, &c. and Cidi Hamet Hader Ben Ali Gayland, Prince of West-Barbary, &c. The Second of April, 1666* (London, 1666).
- By the King. A Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Pleasure to Settle and Establish a Free Port at His City of Tanger in Africa* (London, 1662).
- By the King. A Proclamation [for the protection of the goods and estates of foreign merchants in Tangier]* (London, 1675).
- Calendar of Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1907).
- Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde*, 8 vols., vol. IV (London, 1906).
- Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde*, 8 vols., vol. V (London, 1908).
- A Congratulatory Poem Dedicated to His Excellency, the Ambassador, from the Emperor of Fez and Morocco* ([London], 1682).
- Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: Charles I, 1635*, ed. John Bruce, 23 vols., vols. 8–10 (London, 1865–1867).
- Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: Charles II, 1 January–31 December 1682*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, 28 vols., vol. 23 (London, 1932).
- Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: Charles II, 1661–1662*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1861).
- Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: Charles II, October 1668–December 1669*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 9 (London, 1894).
- Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: Interregnum, 1657–1658*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Greene, 13 vols., vol. 11 (London, 1858).
- A Description of Tangier, the Country and People Adjoyning. With an Account of the Person and Government of Gayland, the Present Usurper of the Kingdome of Fez, and a Short Narrative of the Proceedings of the English in those Parts* (London, 1664).
- A Dolorous Discourse, of a Most Terrible and Bloudy Battel, Fought in Barbarie, the Fowrth Day of August, Last Past, 1578 ...* (London, 1579).
- English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700*, ed. Karim Bejjit (Farnham, UK, 2015).
- An Exact Journal of the Siege of Tangier from the First Sitting Down of the Moors before it on March 25, 1680 to the Late Truce, May 19, following. In Three Letters Written by Three Eye-Witnesses of the Whole Transaction* (London, 1680).
- A Faithful Relation of the Most Remarkable Transactions which have Happened at Tangier; Since the Moors have Lately Made their Attacques upon the Forts and Fortifications of that Famous Garrison* ([London], 1680).
- The Fierce and Cruel Battaile Fought by the Three Kings in Barbarie, Nere to the Cittie of Maroques, the 25. of Aprill last. 1607* (London, 1607).
- The Glorious Qur'ân*, trans. Marmaduke Pickthall, bilingual ed. (Istanbul, 2014).

- Great and Bloody News from Tangier, or a Full and True Relation of a Great and Dreadful Fight Which Happened on the 3d of this Instant November Between the English and the Moors* (London, 1680).
- The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq., Conington Castle* (London, 1899).
- Intelligencer Published for the Satisfaction and Information of the People* (London).
- The Last Account from Fez, in a Letter from One of the Embassy to a Person of Honour in London Containing a Relation of Colonel Kirk's Reception at Mequinez, by the Emperour, with Several Passages in Relation to the Affairs of Tangier* (London, 1682).
- Lawes and Ordinances of War Established for the Better Governing of His Majesties Forces in the Kingdoms of Sus, Fez, and Morocco* (London, 1661).
- A Letter from the King of Morocco, to His Majesty the King of England Charles I* (London, 1680).
- The London Gazette* (London).
- The Manuscripts of J. Eliot Hodgkin* (London, 1897).
- The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth*, 3 vols., vol. I (London, 1887).
- The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth*, 3 vols., vol. III (London, 1896).
- A Particular Relation of the Late Success of His Majesties Forces at Tangier against the Moors. Published by Authority* ([London], 1680).
- The Present Interest of Tangier* (London, 1679).
- A proper new ballad, entitled, The Granadeers Rant. To its own proper new tune, H[e]y the Brave Granadeers, Ho* (London, 1681?).
- A Short and Strange Relation of some part of the Life of Tafielta the Great Conqueror and Emperor of Barbary by One that hath lately been in His Majesties Service in that Country* (London, 1669).
- A True Relation of a Great and Bloody Fight between the English and the Moors before Tangiere* ([London], 1680).
- Addison, L., *The Moores Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger, Especially when it was Under the Earl of Teviot* (London, 1681).
- Addison, L., *West Barbary, or, A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, Sacred, Civil, and Domestick* (Oxford, 1671).
- Africanus, J. L., *A Geographical Historie of Africa*, trans. John Pory (London, 1600).
- Barlow, E., *Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen and other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703*, ed. Basil Lubbock, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1934).
- Biddulph, W., *The Travels of Certaine Englishmen into Africa, Asia, Troy, Bythinia, Thracia, and to the Blacke Sea ... Begunne in the Yeere of Jubile 1600, and by some of them Finished in this Yeere 1608 ...*, ed. Theophilus Lavender (London, 1609).
- Blount, H., *A Voyage into the Levant: A Breife Relation of a Journey, Lately Performed by Master H. B. Gentleman, From England*, 2nd ed. (London, 1636).
- Braithwaite, J., *The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco, Upon the Death of the Late Emperor Muley Ishmael* (London, 1729).
- Browne, T., *Sir Thomas Browne's Works*, ed. Simon Wilkin, 4 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1835–36).

- Burnet, G., *Burnet's History of My Own Time*, new ed., ed. Osmund Airy, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford, 1897).
- Burnet, G., *A Supplement to Burnet's History of My Own Time*, ed. H. C. Foxcroft (Oxford, 1902).
- Carteret, G., *The Barbary Voyage of 1638*, ed. Boies Penrose (Philadelphia, 1929).
- Castries, Henry de, ed., *Les Sources Inédites de L'Histoire du Maroc. Première Série — Dynastie Sa'dienne: Archives et Bibliothèques D'Angleterre*, 3 vols., vols. 1–2 (Paris, 1918–25).
- Cenival, Pierre de, and Philippe de Cossé Brissac, eds., *Les Sources Inédites de L'Histoire du Maroc. Première Série — Dynastie Sa'dienne: Archives et Bibliothèques D'Angleterre*, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Paris, 1935).
- Cholmley, H., *An Account of Tangier* (unpublished, 1787).
- Cholmley, H., *The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, Knt. and Bart. Addressed to His Two Sons* (Unpublished, 1787).
- Cholmley, H., *A Short Account of the Progress of the Mole at Tangier, From the First Beginning of that Work* ([London], [1680]).
- Cottington, R., *A True Historicall Discourse of Muley Hamets Rising to the Three Kingdomes of Moruecos, Fes, and Sus ...* (London, 1609).
- Crouch, J., *An Elegie Upon the Much Lamented Death of that Noble and Valiant Commander the Right Honourable the Earl of Tiveot, Governour of Tangiers, Slain by the Moors* (London, 1664).
- Dunton, J., *A True Journall of the Sally Fleet with the Proceedings of the Voyage*, ed. Ralph Hall (London, 1637).
- Evelyn, J., *The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed. William Bray, 2 vols., vol. II ([London], 1901).
- Fitzgeffry, C., *Compassion Towards Captives Chiefly Towards our Brethren and Country-Men Who are in Miserable Bondage in Barbarie* (Oxford, 1637).
- Hacket, J. A., *A Full and True Relation, of the Fortunate Victory Gained Over the Moors by the Garrison of Tangier, upon the 27 of October, 1680* (not stated, 1680).
- Hakluyt, R., *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 3 vols. (London, 1599–1600).
- Halkett, J., 'Tangier – 1680: The Diary of Sir James Halkett', *The Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, 1 (1922), pp. 1–24.
- Harrison, J., *The Messiah Alreadie Come. Or Proofs of Christianitie, Both Out of the Scriptures, and Auncient Rabbins, to Convince the Jewes, of their Palpable, and More then Miserable Blindnes (if More May Be) for their Long, Vayne, and Endles Expectation of their Messiah (as They Dreame) Yet For to Come* (Amsterdam, 1613).
- Harrison, J., *The Tragickall Life and Death of Muley Abdala Melek the Late King of Barbarie. With a Proposition, or Petition to all Christian Princes, Annexed Thereunto: Written By a Gentleman Employed Into Those Parts* (Delph, 1633).
- Heywood, T., *The Fair Maid of the West. Or, A Girle Worth Gold* (London, 1631).
- Hyde, E., earl of Clarendon, *The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, in which is Included a Continuation of His History of the Grand Rebellion*, 3 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1827).
- Isma'il, M., *A Letter Sent by the Emperor of Morocco and King of Fez to His Majesty of Great Britain, and Delivered by His Ambassador in January 1681* (London, 1682).

- Knight, F., *A Relation of Seaven Yeares Slaverie Under the Turkes of Argeire, Suffered by an English Captive Merchant...* 2nd ed. (London, 1640).
- L., S., *A Letter from a Gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue to His Friend in London* (London, 1670).
- Lithgow, W., *The Totall Discourse, of the Rare Adventures, and Painefull Peregrinations of Long Nineteene Yeares Travayles from Scotland, to the most Famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia, and Affrica...* (London, 1632).
- Luke, J., *Tangier at High Tide: The Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673*, ed. Helen Andrews Kaufman (Geneva, 1958).
- Luttrell, N., *A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714*, 6 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1857).
- M., E., *The Present Danger of Tangier: or, An Account of its being Attempted by a Great Army of the Moors by Land, and Under Some Apprehensions of the French at Sea...To a Friend in England* ([London], 1679).
- Montagu, E., *The Journal of Edward Montagu: First Earl of Sandwich, Admiral and General at Sea, 1659–1665*, ed. R. C. Anderson ([London], 1929).
- [Muddiman, H.], *A Brief Relation of the Present State of Tangier and of the Advantages which His Excellence the Earle of Tiveot has Obteyned against Gayland* (London, 1664).
- Newton, S., *The Diary of Samuel Newton, Alderman of Cambridge (1662–1717)*, ed. J. E. Foster (Cambridge, 1890).
- Ogilby, J., *Africa: Being an Accurate Description of the Regions of Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia, and Billedulgerid ...* (London, 1670).
- P[hilips], G., *The Present State of Tangier: In a Letter to His Grace, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and One of the Lords Justices There. To which is Added the Present State of Algiers* (London, 1676).
- Paris, M., *Chronic Majora*, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., vol. II (London, 1874).
- Pepys, S., *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, 11 vols., eds. Robert Latham and William Matthews (London, 1970–1983).
- Pepys, S., *The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys*, ed. Edwin Chappel ([London], 1935).
- Pinkerton, J., ed. *A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in all Parts of the World*, 17 vols., vol. 15 (London, 1814).
- Poseley, M., *A Letter from Tangier, to a Friend in London. Describing the Causes, Manner and Time of the Demolishing of Tangier* (London, 1683).
- Purchas, S., *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Land Travells by Englishmen and Others*, 20 vols., vol. IX (Glasgow, 1905).
- Purchas, S., *Purchas His Pilgrimage. Or Relations of the World and the Religions Observed in all Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto this Present in Foure Parties ...* (London, 1613).
- Purchas, S., *Purchas His Pilgrimes in Five Bookes ...*, 4 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1625).
- Rich, J., *Brief Memorial of the Losse of the Late Incomparable and Excellent Andrew Lord Rutherford Earle of Teveot, &c. Killed by an Ambuscadoe of Moores* (London, 1664).
- Ross, J., *Tangers Rescue; or A Relation of the Late Memorable Passages at Tanger* (London, 1681).

- S., R., *The New Prophetical King of Barbary or the Last Newes from Thence in a Letter Written of Late from a Merchant There, to a Gentl. Not Long Since Employed into that Countrie from His Maiestie*, ed. John Harrison (London, 1613).
- Sheres, H., *A Discourse Concerning the Mediterranean Sea, and the Streights of Gibraltar* (London, 1705).
- Sheres, H., *A Discourse Touching Tanger on these Heads*, 1. *The Service Tanger has Already Rendred the Crown*. 2. *What Service it May Render it, if Improv'd*. 3. *The Mischief it May Do Us, if Possess'd by any Other Powerful Prince*. 4. *Some General Observations Touching Trade*. In *a Letter to a Person of Quality* (London, 1680).
- [Sheres, H.], *A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement Between the Garison of Tangier, and the Moors, and of the Signal Victory which His Majesties Forces Obtained Against Them on the 27th of October Last. Published by Authority*. ([London], 1680).
- Stackhouse, T., ed. *An Abridgement of Bishop Burnet's History of His own Times* (London, 1906).
- Stubbe, H., *Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism With the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies of Christians*, ed. Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani (London, 1911).
- Teonge, H., *The Diary of Henry Teonge: Chaplain on Board His Majesty's Ships Assistance, Bristol, and Royal Oak, anno 1675 to 1679* (London, 1825).
- Wilkins, G., *Three Miseries of Barbary: Plague. Famine. Civill Warre. With a Relation of the Death of Mahamet the Late Emperour: and a Briefe Report of the Now Present Wars Betweene the Three Brothers* (London, [1607]).

Primary Sources: Online

- 'Charles II – volume 99: June 1664', in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1663–4*, British History Online ed. (London, 1862), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1663-4/pp602-631>, accessed 2 August 2017.
- 'Charles II – volume 154: April 17–30, 1666', in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1663–4*, British History Online ed. (London, 1864), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1665-6/pp355-374>, accessed 26 September 2017.
- 'Charles II – volume 163: July 15–20, 1666', in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1665–6*, British History Online ed. (London, 1864), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1665-6/pp536-559>, accessed 4 August 2017.
- 'Charles II: March 1669', in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1668–9*, British History Online ed. (London, 1894), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1668-9/pp219-258>, accessed 17 October 2017.
- 'Charles II: October 1675', in F H Blackburne Daniell, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, British History Online ed. (London, 1907), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1675-6/pp328-377>, accessed 17 November 2017.

- 'Charles II: November 1675', in F H Blackburne Daniell, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, British History Online ed. (London, 1907), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1675-6/pp377-426>, accessed 17 November 2017.
- 'Charles II: December 1675', in F H Blackburne Daniell, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1675–6*, British History Online ed. (London, 1907), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1675-6/pp427-485>, accessed 21 November 2017.
- 'Charles II: August 1680', in F. H. Blackburne Daniell, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1679–80*, British History Online ed. (London, 1915), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/addenda/1660-85/pp103-107>, accessed 19 January 2018.
- 'Charles II: November 1681', in F H Blackburne Daniell, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, 1680–1*, British History Online ed. (London, 1921), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/1680-1/pp544-596>, accessed 21 November 2017.
- 'Charles II: June 1664', in F. H. Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, British History Online ed. (London, 1939), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/addenda/1660-85/pp103-107>, accessed 1 August 2017.
- 'Charles II: February 1665', in F. H. Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, ed., *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, British History Online ed. (London, 1939), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/addenda/1660-85/pp126-131>, accessed 1 August 2017.
- 'Charles II: May 1668', in F H Blackburne Daniell and Francis Bickley, eds., *CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685*, British History Online ed. (London, 1939), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/chas2/addenda/1660-85/pp267-269>, accessed 6 October 2017.
- 'Entry Book: July 1668', in William A Shaw, ed., *Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 2, 1667–1668*, British History Online ed. (London, 1905), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-books/vol2/pp587-603>, accessed 17 October 2017.
- 'House of Lords Journal Volume 3: 19 April 1626', in *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 3, 1620–1628*, British History Online ed. (London, 1767-1830), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol3/pp562-565>, accessed 15 July 2016.
- 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 8 May 1661', in *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 1660–1666*, British History Online ed. (London, 1767-1830), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol11/pp240-245>, accessed 15 July 2016.
- 'Venice: June 1655', in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 30, 1655–1656 (London, 1930), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol30/pp61-73#highlight-first>, accessed 13 April 2017.
- 'Volume 90: April 1–June 15, 1704', in Joseph Redington, ed., *Calendar of Treasury Papers*, vol. III, 1702–1707 (London, 1874), at <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol3/pp248-271>, accessed 2 June 2016.

Secondary Sources: Published

- Abbey, W. B. T., *Tangier Under British Rule, 1661–1684* (Channel Islands, 1940).
- Abulafia, D., *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (Oxford, 2011).
- Abun-Nasr, J. M., *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1971).
- Abun-Nasr, J. M., *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987).
- Adas, M., *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY, 1989).
- Albion, R. G., 'Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830. Godfrey Fisher', *The Journal of Modern History*, 31 (1959), pp. 131–132.
- Anderson, M. S., 'Great Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth Century', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 29 (1956), pp. 87–107.
- Anderson, M. S., 'Sir Godfrey Fisher's Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1411–1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957)' Review of Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830, Godfrey Fisher, *The English Historical Review*, 74 (1959), pp. 724–726.
- Andrews, K. R., *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991).
- Armitage, D., 'Literature and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 99–123.
- Aylmer, G. E., 'Navy, State, Trade, and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 467–480.
- Aylmer, G. E., 'Slavery Under Charles II: The Mediterranean and Tangier', *The English Historical Review*, 114 (1999), pp. 378–388.
- Baepler, P., ed. *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives* (Chicago, 1999).
- Bak, G., 'Different Differences: Locating Moorishness in Early Modern English Culture', *The Dalhousie Review*, (1996), pp. 197–216.
- Balleine, G. R., *All for the King: The Life Story of Sir George Cartaret* (St Helier, Jersey, 1976).
- Barthelemy, A. G., *Black Face Maligned Race: The Representation of Blackness in English Drama from Shakespeare to Southerne* (Baton Rouge, 1987).
- Bartlett, R., 'Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 31 (2001), pp. 39–56.
- Bate, J., 'Introduction', in Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, eds., *Othello* (New York, 2009), pp. vii–xxi.
- Beach, A. R., 'Satirizing English Tangier in Samuel Pepy's Diary and Tangier Papers', in Goran V. Stanivukovic, ed., *Remapping the Mediterranean World in Early Modern English Writings* (New York, 2007), pp. 227–244.
- Bejjit, K., 'Introduction' in Karim Bejjit, ed., *English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 1–54.

- Bejjit, K., 'Tangier that Was: The Confessions of Samuel Pepys', in Ralph M. Coury and R. Kevin Lacey, eds., *Writing Tangier*, Currents in Comparative Romance Languages and Literatures (New York, 2009), pp. 151–162.
- Belcher, G. L., 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661: A Reassessment of Charles II's Foreign Policy at the Restoration', *Journal of British Studies*, 15 (1975), pp. 67–88.
- Bell, D., 'An Accidental Australian Tourist: Or a Feminist Anthropologist at Sea and on Land', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 502–555.
- Ben Rejeb, L., 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514–1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization', *Dialectical Anthropology*, 6 (1982), pp. 345–355.
- Ben Rejeb, L., 'The General Belief of the World': Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean History', *European Review of History*, 19 (2012), pp. 15–31.
- Bennison, A. K., *Jihad and its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (London, 2002).
- Berger, S., 'The Return of National History', in Pedro Ramos Pinto and Bertrand Taithe, eds., *The Impact of History?: Histories at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Hoboken, NJ, 2015), pp. 82–94.
- Berry, J. W., Y. H. Poortinga, S. M. Breugelmans, et al., *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*, 3rd ed. (New York, 2012).
- Binns, J., 'The Memoirs: Introduction', *The Memoirs and Memorials of Sir Hugh Cholmley*, ed. Jack Binns (Woodbridge, UK, 2000).
- Bitterli, U., *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, trans. Richie Robertson (Oxford, 1989).
- Blanning, T., *The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648–1815* (London, 2008).
- Boum, A., and T. K. Park, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2016).
- Braddick, M. J., 'The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 286–308.
- Braudel, F., *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1972).
- Braudel, F., *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1973).
- Brotton, J., *This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic World* (London, 2017).
- Brown, J. A. O. C., 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash, 1706–1708', *The Historical Journal*, 51 (2008), pp. 599–620.
- Brown, J. A. O. C., '“Orientalism”, “Occidentalism” and Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries: A Case Study in Historicising Concepts of Discourse', *SOAS Journal of Graduate Research*, 1 (2005), pp. 1–19.
- Bulman, W. J., *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge, 2015).
- Burke, P., *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London, 2001).

- Burton, J., 'English Anxiety and the Muslim Power of Conversion: Five Perspectives on 'Turning Turk' in Early Modern Texts', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 2 (2002), pp. 35–67.
- Burton, J., *Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624* (Newark, NJ, 2005).
- Canny, N., 'England's New World and the Old', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 148–169.
- Canny, N., 'The Origins of Empire: An Introduction', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. I. *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 1–33.
- Carey, D., 'Questioning Incommensurability in Early Modern Cultural Exchange', *Common Knowledge*, 6 (1997), pp. 32–50.
- Charnock, J., *Biographica Navalis; Or, Impartial Memoirs of the Lives and Characters of the Officers of the Navy of Great Britain*, 4 vols., vol. I (London, 1794).
- Chaudhuri, K. N., 'From the Barbarian and the Civilized to the Dialectics of Colour: An Archaeology of Self-Identities', in Peter Robb, ed., *Society and Ideology: Essays in South Asian History Presented to Professor K. A. Ballhatchet* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 22–48.
- Childs, J., 'Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1660–1783', in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 153–168.
- Clifford, J., 'Introduction: Partial Truths', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Los Angeles, 1986), pp. 1–26.
- Colley, L., *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (New York, 2004).
- Constable, O. R., 'Muslims in Medieval Europe', in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds., *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Blackwell Companions to European History (Oxford, 2013), pp. 313–332.
- Corbett, J. S., *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1904).
- Corbett, J. S., *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917).
- Cory, S., *Reviving the Islamic Caliphate in Early Modern Morocco* (Abingdon, UK, 2016).
- Curtis, M., 'Introduction to the Transaction Edition', in *Public Opinion: With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998), pp. xi–xxxvi.
- D'Amico, J., *The Moor in English Renaissance Drama* (Tampa, FL, 1991).
- Dalton, C., ed. *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661–1714*. 5 vols., vol. I (London, 1892).
- Daniel, N., *Islam and The West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh, 1960).
- Davies, S., and N. L. Whitehead, 'From Maps to Mummy-Curses: Rethinking Encounters, Ethnography and Ethnology', *History & Anthropology*, 23 (2012), pp. 173–182.

- Davis, J., *History of the Second Queen's Royal Regiment Now the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment*, 7 vols., vol. 1 (London, 1887).
- Davis, L. J., *Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel* (Philadelphia, 1996).
- Davis, R., 'England in the Mediterranean, 1570–1670', in F. J. Fisher, ed., *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England* (London, 1974), pp. 117–137.
- Davis, R. C., *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800* (New York, 2003).
- Davis, R. C., 'Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast', *Past & Present*, (2001), pp. 87–124.
- Davis, R. C., 'Nabil Matar. Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689', *The American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), pp. 815.
- Dening, G., 'The Theatricality of Observing and Being Observed: Eighteenth-Century Europe "Discovers" the ? Century "Pacific"', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 451–483.
- Donagan, B., *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford, 2008).
- Donagan, B., 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', *The Historical Journal*, 44 (2001), pp. 365–389.
- Dowd, F. B., 'Barbary Legend. Sir Godfrey Fisher. Oxford University Press' Review of Barbary Legend, Godfrey Fisher, *African Affairs*, 57 (1958), pp. 79–80.
- Dursteler, E. R., *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, 2006).
- Eagleton, T., *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, 2 ed. (Minneapolis, MN, 1996).
- Earle, P., *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary* (London, 1970).
- Ebsworth, J. W., ed. *The Roxburghe Ballads*. 9 vols., vol. VII (Hertford, UK, 1893).
- Eickelman, D. F., *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin, 1976).
- Ekin, D., *The Stolen Village: Baltimore and the Barbary Pirates* (Dublin, 2008).
- Elbl, M. M., *Portuguese Tangier (1471–1662): Colonial Urban Fabric as Cross-Cultural Skeleton* (Peterborough, Canada, 2013).
- Euben, R. L., *Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge* (Princeton, 2006).
- Fahlander, F., 'Third Space Encounters: Hybridity, Mimicry and Interstitial Practice', in Per Cornell and Fredrik Fahlander, eds., *Encounters-Materialities-Confrontations. Archaeologies of Social Space and Interaction* (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 15–41.
- Feingold, M., '"The Turkish Alcoran": New Light on the 1649 English Translation of the Koran', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 75 (2013), pp. 475–501.
- Fisher, G., *Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830* (Oxford, 1957).
- Foley, S., 'Muslims and Social Change in the Atlantic Basin', *Journal of World History*, 20 (2009), pp. 377–398.
- Fremont-Barnes, G., *The Wars of the Barbary Pirates. To the Shores of Tripoli: The Rise of the US Navy and Marines* (Oxford, 2006).

- Fritze, R. H., 'Jews in England', in Ronald H. Fritze and William B. Robison, eds., *Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, 1603–1689* (Wesport, CT, 1996), pp. 269–271.
- Fuchs, B., 'Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and the English Nation', *ELH*, 67 (2000), pp. 45–69.
- Games, A., *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2009).
- García-Arenal, M., *Ahmad al-Mansur: The Beginnings of Modern Morocco* (London 2009)
- García-Arenal, M., 'The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros of Salé', in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain*, (Leiden, 2014), pp. 286–328.
- Gardiner, S. R., *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603–1642*, 10 vols., vol. VIII (London, 1884).
- Greenblatt, S., *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Oxford, 2003).
- Greene, M., 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', *Past and Present*, 174 (2002), pp. 42–71.
- Greene, M., 'The Early Modern Mediterranean', in Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014), pp. 91–106.
- Greene, M., *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2000).
- Griffiths, T., *The Art of Time Travel: Historians and their Craft* (Carlton, Vic., Aust., 2016).
- Hall, K. F., *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY, 1995).
- Harris, B., 'A Portrait of a Moor', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, eds., *Shakespeare and Race* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 23–36.
- Harris, W. V., ed. *Rethinking the Mediterranean* (Oxford, 2005).
- Hebb, D. D., *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642* (Aldershot, UK, 1994).
- Hendricks, M., 'Surveying 'Race' in Shakespeare', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, eds., *Shakespeare and Race* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 1–22.
- Hess, A. C., *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 2010).
- Hill, C., *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714*, 2nd ed. (Wokingham, UK, 1983).
- Hill, C., *God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (London, 1970).
- Hodgson, M. G. S., *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols., vol. 1. *The Classical Age of Islam* (Chicago, 1977).
- Holt, P. M., 'Background to Arabic Studies in Seventeenth-Century England', in G. A. Russell, ed., *The 'Arabick' Interest of the Natural Philosophers in Seventeenth-Century England* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 20–29.
- Holt, P. M., 'Introduction', in P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2. *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization* (London, 1970), pp. xix–xxvi.
- Holt, P. M., *A Seventeenth-Century Defender of Islam: Henry Stubbe (1632–76) and His Book* (London, 1972).

- Hopkins, A. G., 'Development of the Utopian Ideal, 1960–1999', in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 635–652.
- Horden, P., and Kinoshita, S., eds., *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014).
- Horden, P., and Purcell, N., *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2002).
- Hornstein, S. R., *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot, UK, 1991).
- Housley, N., 'The Crusades and Islam', *Medieval Encounters*, 13 (2007), pp. 189–208.
- Houston, R. A., *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education 1500–1800* (London, 1990).
- Howard, J. E., 'An English Lass Amid the Moors: Gender, Race, Sexuality and National Identity in Heywood's *The Fair Maid of the West*', in Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker, eds., *Women, "Race," and Writing in the Early Modern Period* (London, 1994), pp. 101–117.
- Hunt, L., 'Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Historical Thought', in Lloyd S. Kramer and Sarah C. Maza, eds., *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, Blackwell Companions to History (Malden, MA, 2006), pp. 337–356.
- Hutton, R., *Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989).
- Irwin, R., *For Lust of Knowing. The Orientalists and their Enemies* (London, 2006).
- Jamieson, A. G., *Lords of the Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs* (London, 2012).
- Johnston, A. F., 'Tudor Drama, Theatre and Society', in Robert Tittler and Norman Jones, eds., *A Companion to Tudor Britain* (Malden, MA, 2004), pp. 430–447.
- Jones, E., *Othello's Countrymen: The African in English Renaissance Drama* (London, 1965).
- Julien, C.-A., *The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. From the Arab Conquest to 1830*, trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart (London, 1970).
- Katz, D. S., *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655* (Oxford, 1982).
- Kaufman, H. A., 'Introduction', in Helen Andrews Kaufman, ed., *Tangier at High Tide: The Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673* (Geneva, 1958), pp. 11–20.
- Kaufmann, M., *Black Tudors: The Untold Story* (London, 2017).
- Keay, J., *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company* (London, 1993).
- Keeley, L. H., *War before Civilization* (New York, 1996).
- König, D. G., 'Muslim Perception(s) of "Latin Christianity": Methodological Reflections and a Reevaluation', *Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und Vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung*, 20 (2010), pp. 18–42.
- Lane-Poole, S., *The Barbary Corsairs*, 4 ed. (London, 1890).
- Lane, H. C., 'Intercultural Learning', in N. M. Seel, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning* (New York, 2012), pp. 1618–1620.
- Laroui, A., *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, 1977).
- Laroui, A., *L'histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse* (Paris, 1970).
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., 'A Sociologist Looks at Historians', in Melvin Small, ed., *Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Detroit, 1970), pp. 39–59.

- Lette, R., 'The Influence of Inter-Cultural Engagement on the Perceptions of Mendicant Friars in the Thirteenth Century Concerning Islam and Muslims', *Medieval Encounters*, 23 (2017), pp. 479–507.
- Lincoln, M., 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 77 (2014), pp. 417–434.
- Lippmann, W., *Public Opinion: With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998).
- Lloyd, C., *English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast* (London, 1981).
- Loades, D., *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690* (London, 2000).
- Loomba, A., 'Of Gifts, Ambassadors, and Copy-cats: Diplomacy, Exchange, and Difference in Early Modern India', in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2009), pp. 41–75.
- Lord, W. F., *England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830* (London, 1901).
- Lord, W. F., *The Lost Possessions of England: Essays in Imperial History* (London, 1896).
- Louis, W. R., ed. *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1998–9).
- Lubbock, B., 'Introduction', in Basil Lubbock, ed., *Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen and other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703*, vol. I (London, 1934), pp.
- Lynn, J. A., 'Introduction: Honourable Surrender in Early Modern European History', in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 99–110.
- MacLean, G., and Matar, N., *Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713* (Oxford, 2011).
- Mantran, R., 'North Africa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2. *The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 238–265.
- Marshall, P. J., 'The First British Empire', in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 43–53.
- Marshall, P. J., and Glyndwr, W., *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London, 1982).
- Matar, N., *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2006).
- Matar, N., *British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–1760* (Leiden, 2014).
- Matar, N., 'Britons and Muslims in the Early Modern Period: From Prejudice to (a Theory of) Toleration', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43 (2009), pp. 213–231.
- Matar, N., *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge, 1998).
- Matar, N., *Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999).
- McCully, B. T., 'From the North Riding to Morocco: The Early Years of Governor Francis Nicholson, 1655–1686', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 19 (1962), pp. 534–556.
- McJannet, L., *The Sultan Speaks: Dialogue in English Plays and Histories about the Ottoman Turks* (New York, 2006).
- Meakin, B., *The Land of the Moors: A Comprehensive Description* (London, 1901).

- Meakin, B., *The Moorish Empire: A Historical Epitome* (London, 1899).
- Meggitt, J. J., *Early Quakers and Islam: Slavery, Apocalyptic and Christian-Muslim Encounters in the Seventeenth Century* (Uppsala, 2013).
- Miller, J., *Charles II* (London, 1991).
- Mills, S., 'Learning Arabic in the Overseas Factories: The Case of the English', in Jan Loop, Alastair Hamilton and Charles Burnett, eds., *The Teaching and Learning of Arabic in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 272–293.
- Mojuetan, B. A., 'Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth Century During the Interregnum', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), pp. 347–360.
- Moran Cruz, J. A. H., 'Popular Attitudes Towards Islam in Medieval Europe', in David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto, eds., *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1999), pp. 55–81.
- Morgan, J., *A Compleat History of the Piractical States of Barbary...By a Gentleman Who Resided there Many Years in a Public Character* (London, 1750).
- Neisser, U., *Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology* (San Francisco, 1976).
- Pagden, A., *The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge, 1982).
- Panzac, D., *The Barbary Corsairs: The End of the Legend, 1800–1820*, trans. Victoria Hobson and John E. Hawkes, vol. 29 (Leiden, 2005).
- Parker, G., 'Early Modern Europe', in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Schulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, 1994), pp. 40–58.
- Parker, G., *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2001).
- Parker, G., *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, 2013).
- Parker, K., *Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology* (London, 1999).
- Parker, K., 'Reading 'Barbary' in Early Modern England, 1550–1685', *The Seventeenth Century*, 19 (2004), pp. 87–115.
- Parker, P., 'Preposterous Conversions: Turning Turk, and its "Pauline" Rerighting', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 2 (2002), pp. 1–34.
- Parry, V. J., 'Sir Godfrey Fisher: Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 22 (1959), pp. 404.
- Pennell, C. R., 'Treaty Law: The Extent of Consular Jurisdiction in North Africa from the Middle of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 14 (2009), pp. 235–256.
- Petkovic, J., 'A Critical Review of the Relevant Interpretations of the Process of Acculturation', *Facta Universitatis: Series Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History*, 11 (2012), pp. 89–102.
- Phillips, K. M., *Before Orientalism: Asian Peoples and Cultures in European Travel Writing, 1245–1510* (Philadelphia, 2014).
- Playfair, R. L., *The Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers Prior to the French Conquest* (London, 1884).
- Powell, T., ed. *Beyond the Binary: Reconstructing Cultural Identity in a Multicultural Context* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1999).

- Quinn, D. B., and Ryan, A. N., *England's Sea Empire, 1550–1642* (London, 1983).
- Rabb, T. K., *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1975).
- Redfield, R., R. Linton, and M. J. Herskovits, 'Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation', *American Anthropologist*, 38 (1936), pp. 149–152.
- Reeve, J., 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War', *Parergon*, 32 (2015), pp. 151–181.
- Rogers, P. G., *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, [197?]).
- Routh, E., 'The English Occupation of Tangier (1661–1683)', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 19 (1905), pp. 61–78.
- Routh, E. M. G., 'The English at Tangier', *The English Historical Review*, 26 (1911), pp. 469–481.
- Routh, E. M. G., *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912).
- Russell, G. A., 'Introduction: The Seventeenth Century: The Age of 'Arabick'', in G. A. Russell, ed., *The 'Arabick' Interest of the Natural Philosophers in Seventeenth-Century England* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 1–19.
- Said, E. W., *Orientalism* (London, 2003).
- Sandberg, B., *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World, 1500–1700* (Cambridge, 2016).
- Sayre, G. M., 'Renegades from Barbary: The Transnational Turn in Captivity Studies', *American Literary History*, 22 (2010), pp. 347–359.
- Schwartz, S. B., 'Introduction', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 1–19.
- Shairani, H. M. K., 'Introduction', in Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani, ed., *Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism With the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies of Christians* (London, 1911), pp.
- Sharpe, K., *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven, CT, 1992).
- Sherman, S., 'Dryden and the Theatrical Imagination', in Steven N. Zwicker, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to John Dryden* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 15–36.
- Shiraev, E. B., and D. A. Levy, *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Critical Thinking and Contemporary Applications*, 5th ed. (Boston, 2013).
- Shoval, I., *King John's Delegation to the Almohad Court (1212): Medieval Interreligious Interactions and Modern Historiography* (Turnhout, 2016).
- Smithers, A. J., *The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army* (Stroud, UK, 2003).
- Snader, J., *Caught Between Worlds: British Captivity Narratives in Fact and Fiction* (Lexington, KY, 2000).
- Steensgaard, N., 'Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 15 (1967), pp. 13–55.
- Stein, T., 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', *The Historical Journal*, 54 (2011), pp. 985–1011.
- Stewart, F. H., *Honour* (Chicago, 1994).
- Stoler, A. L., *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, 2009).

- Stradling, R. A., 'Spanish Conspiracy in England, 1661–1663', *The English Historical Review*, 87 (1972), pp. 269–286.
- Subrahmanyam, S., *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).
- Thrush, A., 'Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money', in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., *War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650* (Manchester, 1991), pp. 133–162.
- Tinniswood, A., *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean* (London, 2010).
- Tolan, J. V., *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York, 2002).
- Toomer, G. J., *Eastern Wisdom and Learning: The Study of Arabic Learning in Seventeenth Century England* (Oxford, 1996).
- Trevor-Roper, H. R., 'The General Crisis of the 17th Century', *Past & Present*, 16 (1959), pp. 31–64.
- Trye, J. H., 'Colonel Henry Norwood of Leckhampton, Co. Gloucester', *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society*, 47 (1925), pp. 113–121.
- Vaughan, V. M., 'Representing the King of Morocco', in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700* (Farnham, UK, 2009), pp. 77–92.
- Vitkus, D. J., *Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630* (New York, 2008).
- Vitkus, D. J., and Matar, N., eds., *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England* (New York, 2001).
- Waite, G. K., 'Reimagining Religious Identity: The Moor in Dutch and English Pamphlets, 1550–1620', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 66 (2013), pp. 1250–1295.
- Ward, C., S. Bochner, and A. Furnham, *The Psychology of Culture Shock*, 2nd ed. (Hove, UK, 2001).
- Waterhouse, E., *Painting in England 1530–1790* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1978).
- Waters, D. W., *The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times* (London, 1958).
- Watson, I. B., 'Fortifications and the "Idea" of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India', *Past & Present*, 88 (1980), pp. 70–87.
- Weiner, J. B., 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the First Decade of the Occupation of Tangier, 1662–1672', *Hespèris Tamuda*, 18 (1979), pp. 63–75.
- Westermarck, E., *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco: A Study of Native Proverbs* (London, 1930).
- Willan, T. S., *Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade* (Manchester, 1959).
- Williams, N. T. S. J., *Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth of the British Army (1660–1690)* (London, 1994).
- Winks, R. W., 'The Future of Imperial History', in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., vol. V. *Historiography* (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 653–668.
- Womersley, D., 'Dryden's *The Spanish Fryar*: Modernity and Exclusion', in Claude Rawson and Aaron Santesso, eds., *John Dryden (1631–1700): His Politics, His Plays, and His Poets. A Tercentenary Celebration Held at Yale University, 6–7 October 2000* (Newark, NJ, 2004), pp. 65–85.

Young, G., *A Picture of Whitby and Its Environs* (Whitby, UK, 1824).

Zaller, R., *The Discourse of Legitimacy in Early Modern England* (Stanford, CA, 2007).

Secondary Sources: Online

'Harrison, John (fl.1630)', in *Dictionary of National Biography*, 63 vols, vol. 25 (London, 1885–1900), p. 33.

Barrows, L., 'Review of Matar, Nabil, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery', in *H-W-Civ, H-Net Reviews* (2000), at <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4632>.

Barry, P., 'Tackling Textuality – with Theory', The English Association, <http://www2.le.ac.uk/offices/english-association/schools/teaching-poetry/tackling-textuality-with-theory>, accessed 7 April 2016.

Bejjit, K., 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm>.

Binns, J., 'Cholmley, Sir Hugh, first baronet (1600–1657)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5341>, accessed 17 July 2017.

Chaouch, K., 'British Travellers to Morocco and their Accounts, from mid-16th to mid-20th Centuries: A Bibliography', in *Working Papers on the Web*, vol. 7 (2004), at <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Chaouch/Chaouch.htm>, accessed 13 April 2016.

Crook, B. M., and Ferris, J. P., 'Sackville, Edward (c.1640–1714), of Bow Street, Covent Garden, Westminster', in B. D. Henning, ed., *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1660–1690* (London, 1983), at <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/sackville-edward-1640-1714>, accessed 29 January 2018.

Davies, J. D., 'Fairborne, Sir Palmes (1644–1680)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9068>, accessed 27 November 2017.

Davies, J. D., 'Legge, George, first Baron Dartmouth (c. 1647–1691), naval officer', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2006), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-16352>, accessed 23 March 2018.

Duffin, A., 'Fitzgeffry, Charles (c.1575–1638)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9544>, accessed 12 July 2017.

Finkelpearl, P. J., 'Chamberlain, John (1553–1628)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5046>, accessed 14 July 2016.

Furgol, E. M., 'Middleton, John, first earl of Middleton (c.1608–1674)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18674>, accessed 10 October 2017.

- Hamilton, A., 'Addison, Lancelot (1632–1703)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/157>, accessed 12 July 2017.
- Hopper, A. J., 'Belasyse, John, first Baron Belasyse of Worlaby (bap. 1615, d. 1689)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1977>, accessed 2 August 2017.
- Landon, M. d. L., 'Brydall, John (b. c.1635, d. in or after 1705?)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.utas.edu.au/view/article/3800>, accessed 15 June 2017.
- Marshall, A., 'Bennet, Henry, First Earl of Arlington (bap. 1618, d. 1685)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2104>, accessed 11 July 2017.
- Matar, N., 'Harrison, John (d. 1641x52)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12435>, accessed 12 July 2017.
- Miller, J., 'Howard, Henry, sixth duke of Norfolk (1628–1684)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13907>, accessed 12 October 2017.
- Mordechai, F., 'Stubbe, Henry (1632–1676)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26734>, accessed 12 July 2017.
- Murison, B. C., 'Povey, Thomas (b. 1613/14, d. in or before 1705)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22640>, accessed 6 July 2017.
- Parr, A., 'Wilkins, George (d. 1618)', in Lawrence Goldman, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29418>, accessed 16 February 2015.
- Parrott, D., 'Rutherford, Andrew, earl of Teviot (d. 1664)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/24360>, accessed 12 July 2017.
- Rudmin, F. W., 'Catalogue of Acculturation Constructs: Descriptions of 126 Taxonomies, 1918–2003', in *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 8(1) (2009), at <http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1074>.
- Stater, V., 'Mordaunt, Henry, Second Earl of Peterborough (bap. 1623, d. 1697)', in David Cannadine, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19163>, accessed 21 June 2017.
- Wauchope, P., 'Kirke, Percy (d. 1691)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2011), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-15664>, accessed 22 February 2018.

Webb, W. W., 'O'Brien, William, second earl of Inchiquin (c.1640–1692)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), at <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20469>, accessed 17 November 2017.

Secondary Sources: Theses

Almas, L. M., 'The Women of the Early Modern Turk and Moor Plays', PhD Thesis (University of Minnesota, 2009).

Jenkins, I., 'Writing Islam: Representations of Muhammad, the Qur'an and Islamic Belief and the Construction of Muslim Identity in Early Modern Britain', PhD Thesis (Cardiff University, 2007).

Stein, T. M., 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard University, 2012).